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  Abstract	  Two	  features	  of	  warfare	  are	  particularly	  ethically	  striking.	  Firstly,	  and	  most	  obviously,	  war	  involves	  killing	  and	  maiming	  on	  a	  grand	  scale.	  Secondly,	  war	  involves	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  obeying	  the	  commands	  of	  those	  who	  claim	   to	   possess	   authority	   over	   them,	   such	   as	   their	   superior	   officers	   and	  political	  leaders.	  	  Whereas	   leading	   contemporary	  work	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	  war	   focuses	   on	  the	   former	   aspect,	   this	   thesis	   investigates	   the	   relevance	  of	   the	   latter.	  The	  project	   is	   orientated	   around	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   traditional	   just	   war	  requirement	   that	   wars	   be	   waged	   by	   a	   ‘legitimate	   authority’,	   and	   makes	  three	  central	  contributions.	  Firstly,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	  a	  much	  more	  important	  role	  within	  just	  war	  theory	  than	  is	  commonly	  supposed.	  Rather	  than	  simply	  imposing	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   justifying	   the	   resort	   to	   war,	   the	  criterion	  also	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  judgements	  about	  the	  permissibility	  of	  individuals’	   conduct	   in	   war.	   More	   specifically,	   the	   criterion	   captures	   the	  idea	   that	   individuals	   who	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   entity	   are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	  of	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  than	  those	  that	  apply	  to	  private	  actors.	  Secondly,	  I	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  commands	  of	  authorities	  are	  capable	   of	   affecting	   the	   deontic	   status	   of	   acts	   of	   harming.	   Drawing	   on	   a	  ‘service-­‐based’	   account	   of	   the	   justification	   of	   authority,	   I	   argue	   for	   the	  controversial	   conclusion	   that	   individuals	   may	   be	   morally	   required,	   all-­‐things-­‐considered,	   to	   obey	   commands	   to	   cause	   serious	   harm	   to	   others,	  even	  in	  cases	  were	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  straightforwardly	  morally	  unjustified	  in	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  command.	  This	  argument	  has	   important	  revisionary	  implications	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   both	   the	   ethics	   of	   harm	   and	   the	  moral	  limits	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  obey.	  Thirdly,	   I	   employ	   this	   argument	   to	   provide	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion	   against	   powerful	   objections	   raised	   by	   an	   influential	  ‘reductivist’	  approach	  to	   just	  war	   theory.	  While	   they	  diverge	   in	   important	  respects,	  I	  argue	  that	  my	  defence	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  basic	  commitments	  that	  motivate	  a	  reductivist	  view.	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   1	  
Introduction	  	  The	  past	   decade	  has	  witnessed	   a	   remarkable	   resurgence	   in	   philosophical	  interest	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  warfare.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  drivers	  behind	  this	  trend	  is	  a	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  common	  assumption	  –	  either	  explicit	  or	  implicit	   –	   that	  warfare	   is	   in	   some	   sense	  morally	   special,	   governed	   by	   its	  own	   sui	  generis	  moral	   rules.	   Instead,	  many	   theorists	   now	   believe	   that	   an	  acceptable	  theory	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  moral	  principles	   that	   we	   accept	   in	   other	   domains	   of	   action.	   In	   particular,	   with	  those	   principles	   that	   govern	   the	   permissibility	   of	   causing	   serious	   non-­‐consensual	  physical	  harm	  to	  others.	  This	  approach	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  reassessment	  and	  rejection	  of	  many	  of	  the	  standard	   tenets	   of	   just	   war	   theory,	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   they	   are	  irreconcilable	  with	   our	  most	   stable	   views	   about	   the	  morality	   of	   harming	  more	   generally.	   This	   criticism	  has	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	   positive	   task	   of	  constructing	   a	   new	   theory	   of	   the	   ethics	   of	   war	   on	   more	   plausible	  foundations,	   drawing	   on	   the	   resources	   of	   practical	   philosophy	   more	  generally.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  project	  that	  my	  thesis	  aims	  to	  contribute.	  To	  date,	  the	  leading	  contributions	  to	  the	  field	  have	  primarily	  drawn	  on	  the	   resources	   supplied	   by	   work	   in	   normative	   and	   applied	   ethics.	   In	  particular,	   many	   contemporary	   just	   war	   theorists	   aim	   to	   elucidate	   the	  morality	  of	  war	  in	  terms	  of	  sophisticated	  accounts	  of	  the	  moral	  principles	  that	   govern	   the	   use	   of	   defensive	   force	   between	   private	   individuals.	   By	  contrast,	  my	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  contribution	  that	  other	  branches	  of	   practical	   philosophy	   may	   make	   to	   uncovering	   the	   morality	   of	   war.	   In	  particular,	  it	  investigates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  discussions	  that	  usually	  take	  place	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  philosophy	  can	  productively	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  debates	  within	  just	  war	  theory,	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  interpersonal	  harming	  more	  generally.	  	  My	  thesis	  aims	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  this	  question,	  by	  focussing	  on	  one	  specific	   component	   of	   just	  war	   theory	   –	   the	   traditional	   requirement	   that	  wars	  be	  waged	  by	  a	   ‘legitimate	  authority’.	   In	   the	  broadest	  possible	   terms,	  the	   inclusion	   of	   an	   authority	   criterion	  within	   the	   theory	   reflects	   the	   idea	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that	  moral	  judgements	  regarding	  armed	  conflict	  are	  sensitive	  to	  facts	  about	  the	  status	  or	  standing	  of	  the	  belligerent	  parties	  engaging	  in	  that	  conflict.	  	  I	   focus	  on	   the	  authority	   criterion	   for	   two	  main	   reasons.	  Firstly,	  unlike	  other	  standard	  components	  of	  the	  theory	  –	  such	  as	  those	  requiring	  wars	  to	  have	  a	   just	  cause,	  be	   the	  option	  of	   last	  resort,	  and	  prohibit	   targeting	  non-­‐combatants	   –	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   an	   overtly	   political	   requirement,	  having	   no	   straightforward	   analogue	   in	   ordinary	   interpersonal	   morality.	  Furthermore,	   the	   topics	   of	   authority	   and	   legitimacy	   are	   of	   absolute	  centrality	  within	  political	  and	   legal	  philosophy.	  So,	   if	  we	  are	   interested	   in	  what	  (if	  anything)	  these	  branches	  of	  practical	  philosophy	  have	  to	  say	  about	  the	  morality	   of	   war,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   provides	   an	   obvious	   starting	  point	  for	  our	  inquiry.	  Secondly,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   receives	   relatively	   little	   attention	   in	  contemporary	   discussions.	   For	   example,	   Michael	   Walzer’s	   hugely	  influential	   Just	   and	   Unjust	   Wars	   contains	   no	   explicit	   discussion	   of	   the	  criterion.1	  Furthermore,	  of	  the	  few	  theorists	  to	  offer	  sustained	  discussions	  of	   the	   criterion,	  many	   are	   sceptical	   that	   considerations	   of	   authority	   have	  any	  significant	  role	   to	  play	   in	   the	  best	   theory	  of	   the	  morality	  of	  war.	  This	  lack	  of	   interest	  should	  be	  surprising,	  given	  a	  historical	  perspective	  on	  the	  just	  war	   tradition.	  For	   the	   founding	   fathers	  of	   the	   tradition,	   the	  authority	  criterion	  was	  considered	  the	  first	  and	  most	  important	  condition	  of	  just	  war.	  Yet,	   within	   current	   debates	   it	   remains	   the	   most	   under-­‐theorised	  component.	  	  	  With	  some	  sympathy	  for	  this	  venerable	  position,	  the	  overarching	  aim	  of	  the	   thesis	   is	   to	   deploy	   the	   resources	   of	   contemporary	   political	   and	   legal	  philosophy	  to	  show	  that	  considerations	  of	  legitimate	  authority	  are	  far	  more	  central	   to	   the	  morality	  of	  war	   than	   is	   commonly	   supposed,	   and	   to	  offer	  a	  novel	   (though	   importantly	   qualified)	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	  against	  its	  critics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  omission	  is	  emphasised	  in	  Brian	  Orend,	  Michael	  Walzer	  on	  War	  and	  Justice	  (Cardiff:	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2000),	  Ch.4.	  2	  I	   leave	  aside	  here	   the	  more	  recently	  emphasised	   fields	  of	   justice	   in	  ending	  wars	   (jus	  ex	  
bello)	   and	   justice	   following	  war	   (jus	  post	  bellum).	   For	   the	   former,	   see	  Darell	  Mollendorf,	  ‘Jus	  ex	  Bello’,	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  16,	  No.	  2	  (2008),	  123-­‐136;	  Cecile	  Fabre,	   ‘War	  Exit’,	  Ethics	   (forthcoming).	  For	  the	   latter,	  see	  Gary	  Bass,	   ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  Philosophy	  and	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The	   thesis	   is	   divided	   into	   five	   chapters.	   The	   first	   chapter	   is	   largely	  conceptual	   in	   nature,	   providing	   a	   precise	   account	   of	   the	   role	   that	   the	  authority	   criterion	   plays	   within	   mainstream	   just	   war	   theory.	   I	   do	   so	   by	  distinguishing	   two	   questions	   we	   can	   ask	   about	   the	   authority	   criterion.	  Firstly,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  normative	  consequences	  are	  meant	  to	  follow	  from	  the	  possession	  or	  non-­‐possession	  of	  war-­‐waging	  authority.	   I	   term	  this	  the	  question	  of	  normative	  effect.	  Second,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  properties	  an	  entity	  must	  possess	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  this	  authority.	  I	  term	  this	  the	  question	  of	  
relevant	  properties.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   its	   normative	   effect,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   standardly	  interpreted	  as	  functioning	  solely	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  providing	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justifying	  the	  resort	  to	  war.	  On	  this	  view,	  in	  order	  for	  a	  war	   to	  be	   justified,	   it	  must	  be	   initiated	  and	  waged	  by	  an	  entity	   that	  possesses	   the	   relevant	   properties.	  Wars	   fought	   by	   groups	   that	   lack	   these	  properties	  are	  therefore	  unjust.	  The	  criterion	  thus	  performs	  an	  essentially	  
restrictive	   function.	   	   Its	   normative	   effect	   is	   to	   restrict	   the	   waging	   of	   just	  wars	   to	   a	   certain	   class	   of	   entities,	   standardly	   interpreted	   to	   mean	   those	  entities	  that	  possess	  the	  properties	  of	  statehood	  or,	  less	  restrictively,	  those	  that	  aspire	  to	  statehood.	  In	  opposition	  to	  this	  interpretation,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	  a	  much	  more	  expansive	  role	  within	   just	  war	  theory	  than	  standardly	  assumed.	   In	   addition	   to	   its	   restrictive	   function	   within	   jus	   ad	   bellum,	   the	  authority	   criterion	   also	   performs	   a	   crucial	   role	   within	   the	   jus	   in	   bello	  component	   of	   the	   theory,	  which	   is	   concerned	  with	   judgements	   about	   the	  permissibility	  of	  individuals’	  conduct	  in	  war,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  war	  itself.	  On	  the	  interpretation	  that	  I	  argue	  for,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  serves	   to	   capture	   the	   idea	   that	   individuals	  who	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	  kinds	  of	  entity	  enjoy	  additional	  moral	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  war.	  On	  this	  alternative	  interpretation,	  the	  normative	  effect	  that	  follows	  from	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  authority	  to	  wage	  war	  is	  essentially	  permissive.	  Acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  legitimate	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  serves	  to	  increase	  an	  agent’s	  moral	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  to	  others,	  beyond	  those	  that	  they	  would	  possess	  qua	  private	  actor.	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With	   this	   conceptual	  background	   in	  place,	   the	   following	   four	   chapters	  turn	  to	  the	  central	  normative	  question	  raised	  by	  the	  preceding	  discussion:	  Can	  the	  authority	  criterion,	   in	  either	   its	  restrictive	  or	  permissive	  roles,	  be	  given	  a	  principled	  moral	  defence?	  The	   second	   chapter	   begins	   this	   task	   by	   considering	   criticisms	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion,	   put	   forward	   by	   proponents	   of	   an	   increasingly	  influential	   ‘reductivist’	   approach	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   war.	   While	   reductivism	  encompasses	  a	  spectrum	  of	  possible	  view,	  it	  can	  be	  characterised	  in	  terms	  of	   a	   commitment	   to	   two	  basic	   theses.	   Firstly,	   it	   holds	   that	  war	   is	  morally	  continuous	  with	  all	  other	  activities	  and	  is	  governed	  by	  precisely	  the	  same	  moral	   principles	   that	   govern	   interpersonal	   harming	   in	   all	   other	  circumstances.	   Secondly,	   reductivism	   holds	   that	   the	   killing	   and	   injuring	  constitutive	   of	  warfare,	  when	  morally	   justified,	   is	   justified	   either	   because	  the	  individuals	  harmed	  have	  rendered	  themselves	  liable	  to	  that	  harm,	  and	  therefore	  suffer	  no	  violation	  of	  their	  rights,	  or	  because	  their	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  is	  overridden	  as	  the	  impartial	  lesser-­‐evil.	  	  A	   reductivist	   view	   has	   important	   revisionary	   implications,	   many	   of	  which	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  great	  detail.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  inquiry,	  I	  focus	  specifically	  on	  explaining	  how	  reductivism	  contains	  the	  resources	  for	  powerful	   objections	   to	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   in	   both	   its	   restrictive	   and	  permissive	   interpretation.	   In	   fact,	   as	   I	   explain,	   this	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	  revisionary	  aspect	  of	  reductivism.	  Reductivists	   reject	   the	   standard,	   restrictive	   interpretation	   of	   the	  authority	  criterion,	  because	  they	  hold	  that	   individuals’	  permissions	  to	  use	  force	  on	  grounds	  of	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  are	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  both	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  and	  its	  conduct.	  Given	  such	  a	  view,	   it	  cannot	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	   of	   permissible	  warfare	   that	   it	   be	  waged	   by	   a	   particular	   type	   of	  entity,	   since	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   justifications	   are	   available	   to	  individuals	   in	  their	  private	  capacity.	  No	  authorisation	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  permissibly	  act	  on	  such	  justifications.	  	  Reductivists	   also	   reject	   the	   permissive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion,	   because	   they	   hold	   that	   individuals’	   permissions	   to	   use	   force	   on	  grounds	  of	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil	  are	  necessary	  for	  justifying	  both	  the	  resort	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to	  war	  and	  its	  conduct.	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	  participates	  in	  war	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  cannot	  serve	  to	  extend	  their	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	   to	  others.	  This	   seems	  highly	  plausible.	   If	   an	   individual	   retains	   their	  right	   not	   to	   be	   killed,	   and	   this	   right	   is	   not	   overridden	   by	   weightier	  considerations,	   how	   can	   it	   somehow	   become	   morally	   permissible	   for	   an	  agent	   to	   kill	   or	   maim	   that	   individual	   simply	   in	   virtue	   of	   that	   agent’s	  membership	  or	  role	  in	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  organisation?	  	  For	  reductivists,	  then,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  is	  at	  best	  redundant	  or	  at	  worst	   deeply	   pernicious	   and	   ought	   to	   be	   jettisoned	   from	   just	   war	  theorising.	  With	   this	   critique	   in	  place,	   the	   following	   three	   chapters	  of	   the	  thesis	  investigate	  the	  prospects	  for	  rehabilitating	  the	  authority	  criterion.	  In	  particular,	   I	   argue	   for	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	   permissive,	   in	   bello	  interpretation	  of	  the	  criterion.	  This	   requires	   showing	   that	   one	   of	   the	   claims	   associated	   with	  reductivism	  is	  mistaken.	  To	  this	  end,	  in	  the	  third	  chapter	  I	  consider	  a	  rival	  ‘non-­‐reductivist’	   approach	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	  war.	  On	   this	   view,	   reductivists	  are	  mistaken	   in	   holding	   that	   the	  morality	   of	  war	   is	   determined	   solely	   by	  considerations	  of	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil,	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  warfare	  differs	  from	   ordinary	   forms	   of	   interpersonal	   violence	   in	   some	   morally	   relevant	  respect.	   Proponents	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   typically	   locate	   this	   difference	   in	  the	  fact	  that	  war	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  groups	  of	  individuals	  engaged	  in	   morally	   significant	   relationships	   with	   one	   another.	   A	   central	   claim	   of	  non-­‐reductivism	   is	   that	   these	   relationships	   are	   independently	   capable	   of	  generating	   permissions	   for	   killing	   and	   injuring	   in	   war,	   thus	   denying	  reductivism.	  An	  assessment	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	   is	   thus	  particularly	  relevant	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   evaluating	   the	   permissive	   authority	   criterion,	   since	   it	  potentially	   provides	   the	   resources	   for	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   idea	   that	  participants	  in	  war	  enjoy	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  virtue	  of	  fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  must	  be	  rejected.	  The	  argument	  works	  by	  pushing	  a	  dilemma	  onto	  non-­‐reductivists:	   If	  non-­‐reductivists	  are	  successful	  in	  showing	  that	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity	  gives	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rise	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war,	  they	  must	  also	  jettison	  the	   most	   intuitive	   restrictions	   on	   conduct	   in	   war	   –	   most	   saliently,	   the	  prohibition	  on	  intentionally	  killing	  morally	  innocent	  non-­‐combatants.	  Since	  this	   conclusion	   is	   unacceptable,	   we	   must	   conclude	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	  fails.	  In	   the	   fourth	   chapter	   I	   provide	   the	   groundwork	   for	   an	   alternative	  defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   I	   do	   so	   by	   exploring	   the	   connections	  between	  two	  central	  topics	   in	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy:	  the	  morality	  of	   interpersonal	   harming	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   moral	   legitimacy	   of	  authority	  on	  the	  other.	  	  These	  topics	  are	  routinely	  discussed	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another.	  This	  is	   understandable,	   but	   unfortunate.	   Ultimately,	   theorists	  working	   in	   both	  these	  areas	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  wider	  project	  of	  establishing	  what	  reasons	  moral	  agents	  have	  for	  action	  –	  with	  what	  individuals	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  ought	   and	   ought	   not	   to	   do.	   We	   may	   characterise	   those	   working	   on	   the	  morality	  of	  harming	  as	   concerned	  with	   the	  basic	  question,	   ‘When,	   if	   ever,	  do	   individuals	   have	   undefeated	   moral	   reason	   to	   cause	   harm	   to	   others?’.	  Theorists	  of	  authority,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  concerned	  with	  a	  different	  question,	  ‘When,	   if	   ever,	   do	   individuals	   have	   undefeated	  moral	   reason	   to	   obey	   the	  commands	  of	  another?’	  The	  former	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  justification	  of	  harm,	  the	  latter	  with	  the	  justification	  of	  obedience.	  Set	  up	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  see	  that	   there	  are	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  cases	   in	  which	   determining	   whether	   an	   agent	   is	   justified	   in	   causing	   a	   particular	  harm	   –	   with	   whether	   she	   has	   undefeated	   reason	   to	   do	   so	   –	   requires	   an	  answer	   to	   an	   important	   third	   question,	   which	   combines	   our	   response	   to	  each	  of	   the	  above,	  namely,	   ‘When,	   if	   ever,	  do	   individuals	  have	  undefeated	  moral	   reason	   to	   obey	   commands	  which	   require	   them	   to	   cause,	   or	   refrain	  from	  causing,	  harm	  to	  others?’	  	  In	  response	  to	  this	  question,	   I	  defend	  two	  main	  claims.	  Firstly,	   I	  argue	  that,	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   the	   command	   of	   an	   authority	   can	   provide	  agents	  with	  an	  independent	  moral	  justification	  for	  causing	  serious	  physical	  harm	  to	  others.	  Controversially,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  may	  be	  true	  even	  in	  cases	  where	   the	  harm	  would	  be	   straightforwardly	  unjustified	   in	   the	   absence	  of	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the	   command.	   I	   imagine	   that	  many	  will	   find	   this	   claim	  highly	  unintuitive,	  even	   repugnant.	   Given	   that	   any	   plausible	   account	   authority	   must	   place	  limits	  on	  the	  obligation	  to	  obey,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  conclude	  that	  wherever	  the	  precise	  limits	  lie,	  commands	  that	  require	  imposing	  serious	  unjust	  harm	  on	  others	  must	  surely	  exceed	  them,	  given	  the	  moral	  gravity	  of	  the	  wrongdoing	  involved.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  view,	  while	  intuitive,	  is	  mistaken.	  My	  argument	  draws	  on	   a	   service-­‐based	   account	   of	   authority,	   defended	   most	   influentially	   by	  Joseph	  Raz.	  On	  this	  view,	  authorities	  possess	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  place	  their	  subjects	   under	   obligations	   to	   obey	   when,	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that,	   their	  subjects	   better	   comply	   with	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   them	   by	   obeying	   the	  authority,	   compared	   to	   not	   obeying.	   This	   view	   thus	   offers	   a	   broadly	  instrumental	   justification	   of	   the	   duty	   to	   obey.	   Authorities	   are	   justified	  because	  they	  enable	   individuals	   to	  better	  do	  what	   they	  have	  reason	  to	  do	  independently	  of	  the	  authority.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  same	  reasoning	  can	  be	  applied,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	   the	   reasons	   that	   govern	   the	   distribution	   of	   harm.	   Put	   briefly,	   on	   the	  service-­‐based	   view	   that	   I	   advance,	   if	   individuals	   will	   overall	   better	  distribute	  harms	  in	  accordance	  with	  right	  reason	  by	  obeying	  an	  authority,	  compared	   to	   not	   obeying,	   then	   obedience	   is	   morally	   required	   (and	  therefore	  justified).	  Importantly,	  this	  includes	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  authority	  issues	  commands	  that	  are	  mistaken	  and	  require	  distributing	  harm	  in	  ways	  not	   supported	   by	   the	   balance	   of	   authority-­‐independent	   reasons.	   In	   such	  cases,	   I	   argue,	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   command	  may	   still	   have	   an	   undefeated	  reason	   –	   an	   instrumental	   reason	   –	   to	   obey	   the	   command.	   I	   term	   this	  argument	   the	   ‘Authority	   View	   of	   Harm.’	   If	   successful,	   it	   reveals	   that	   the	  range	   of	   potential	   justifications	   for	   harming	   is	   broader	   than	   standardly	  assumed.	  In	  addition	  to	  standard	  justifications,	  such	  as	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil,	  the	  Authority	  View	  posits	  the	  existence	  of	  what	  I	  term	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  harm.	  	  With	  this	  argument	  in	  place	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  defence	  of	  a	  second	  claim,	  which	  concerns	  the	  permissibility	  of	  imposing	  defensive	  harm	  on	  individuals	  who	  threaten	   to	   impose	  unjust	  harm	  on	  others,	  but	  who	  possess	  an	  authority-­‐
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based	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  I	  argue	  that,	  in	  such	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	   is	   justified	   in	   threatening	   harm	   does	   not	   increase	   the	   justificatory	  burden	  for	  inflicting	  defensive	  harm	  on	  that	  agent.	  This	  argument	  provides	  a	   novel	   counter-­‐example	   to	   a	   common	   view	  within	   the	   literature	   on	   the	  ethics	   of	   self-­‐defence,	   which	   holds	   that	   there	   can	   be	   no	   justified	   defence	  against	  a	  justified	  threat.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  this	  may	  be	  true	  of	  other	  forms	  of	   justification,	   it	   is	   not	   true	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications.	   The	   reason	  for	   this,	   I	   contend,	   is	   that	  a	   subject’s	   reasons	   to	  obey	  authorities	  are	   fully	  agent-­‐relative,	  applying	  only	   to	   the	  subject	  of	   the	  command	  while	   leaving	  the	  normative	  situation	  of	  others	  untouched.	  However,	  while	  I	  deny	  that	  an	  agent’s	  possession	  of	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	   itself	   counts	   against	   imposing	   defensive	   harm	   on	   them,	   this	  does	   not	   entail	   that	   the	   commands	   of	   authorities	   cannot	   raise	   the	  justificatory	   burden	   for	   acts	   of	   defensive	   harm.	   As	   I	   explain	   in	   the	   final	  section	   of	   the	   chapter,	   the	   same	   argument	   that	   supports	   the	   idea	   of	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   also	   supports	   the	   converse	   notion	   of	   an	  
authority-­‐based	  constraint.	  	  The	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm	   provides	   a	   fairly	   general	   and	   abstract	  account	   of	   how	   judgements	   about	   the	   morality	   of	   causing	   harm	   are	  sensitive	  to	  considerations	  of	  authority.	  In	  the	  fifth	  and	  final	  chapter	  I	  apply	  the	   Authority	   View	   to	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   warfare	   and	   draw	   out	   its	  implications	  for	  just	  war	  theorising.	  	  	  According	   to	   the	   resulting	   ‘Authority	   View	   of	   War’,	   individuals	   are	  morally	   justified	   in	   obeying	   the	   commands	   of	   an	   authority	   on	  matters	   of	  warfare	   when,	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that,	   by	   doing	   so	   the	   individual	   better	  conforms	  to	   the	  reasons	   that	  govern	   the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  
war,	   compared	   to	   not	   obeying	   that	   authority.	  When	   these	   conditions	   are	  met,	   authorities	   acquire	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   give	   their	   subjects	   decisive	  reasons	  for	  action	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare.	  Importantly,	  this	  includes	  actions	  that	  involve	  causing	  serious	  harm	  to	  others.	  	  As	  I	  will	  explain,	  this	  model	  of	  legitimate	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  enables	  a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   Firstly,	   the	   concept	   of	   an	  authority-­‐based	   justification	   provides	   the	   resources	   for	   rehabilitating	   the	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permissive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   On	   my	   view,	  individuals	   who	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   legitimate	   authorities	   may	   be	  morally	  justified	   in	  obeying	  commands	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war,	  even	  when	  doing	  so	  would	  not	  be	   justified	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	   authority-­‐independent	   reasons,	  such	  as	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil.	  The	  most	  salient	  implication	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  individuals	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  participating	  in	  unjust	  wars	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  commanded	  to	  do	  so	  by	  an	  authority.	  	  Secondly,	   the	  notion	  of	  an	  authority-­‐based	  constraint	  enables	  a	  partial	  defence	   of	   the	   restrictive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	  On	  my	  view,	  legitimate	  authorities	  possess	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  give	  their	  subjects	  undefeated	  reasons	  to	  refrain	  from	  participating	  in	  wars,	  including	  in	  wars	  where	   participation	   would	   be	   morally	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  authority-­‐independent	  considerations.	  	  With	  this	  defence	  in	  place	  I	  go	  on	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  Authority	  View	  with	  a	  reductivist	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  the	  two	  positions	  come	  apart	  in	  important	  respects	  –	  over	  the	  permissibility	  of	  participation	  in	  unjust	  wars	  most	  obviously	  –	  the	  Authority	  View	  is	  broadly	  compatible	  with	  the	  basic	  commitments	  underlying	  reductivism,	  such	  as	  its	  commitment	   to	   the	  moral	   primacy	   of	   individuals	   and	   its	   rejection	   of	   the	  idea	  that	  war	  (or	  political	  action	  more	  generally)	  is	  morally	  sui	  generis.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  clarify	  and	  refine	  the	  Authority	  View	  in	  light	  of	  two	  objections	  that	  may	  be	  pressed	  against	  it.	  The	  first	  objection	  holds	   that	   the	   Authority	   View,	   even	   if	   correct,	   has	   very	   little	   practical	  relevance,	  since	  no	  real-­‐world	  authorities	  will	  in	  fact	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  it	   requires	   for	   legitimacy	   regarding	   warfare.	   In	   response,	   I	   argue	   that	  authority	   over	   warfare	   can	   be	   justified	   from	   much	   more	   modest	  assumptions	   about	   the	   character	   and	   competence	   of	   existing	   political	  authorities	   than	   one	  might	   think.	   This	   is	   because	   authority	   over	  warfare	  need	   not	   be	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing.	   Rather,	   an	   authority	   may	   be	   legitimate	  regarding	  certain	  aspects	  of	  warfare	  and	  not	  others,	  depending	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  	  A	   second	   objection	   argues	   that	   the	   Authority	   View,	   when	   applied	   to	  war,	   falls	   foul	   of	   the	   very	   same	   objection	   that	   I	   pressed	   against	   non-­‐
	  	   10	  





















	  	   11	  
Chapter	  1	  –	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  
1.1 Introduction	  	  The	  dominant	  intellectual	  framework	  for	  morally	  evaluating	  warfare	  –	  the	  just	   war	   tradition	   –	   has,	   since	   its	   earliest	   incarnations,	   included	   a	  requirement	   that	   war	   be	   initiated	   and	   waged	   by	   an	   entity	   with	   the	  authority	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  while	  recent	  years	  have	  witnessed	  a	  huge	  rise	  in	   philosophical	   interest	   in	   the	   ethics	   of	   war,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	  largely	   absent	   from	   contemporary	   discussions.	   In	   this	   opening	   chapter	   I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  this	   is	  an	  oversight	  worth	  rectifying,	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  authority	   criterion	   plays	   a	   much	   more	   significant	   role	   within	   just	   war	  theorising	  than	  is	  commonly	  supposed.	  	  	  	   	  As	  standardly	  understood,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  provides	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	   the	   justification	  of	   the	   resort	   to	  war,	   but	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  questions	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war.	   By	   contrast,	   I	   argue	   for	   an	  alternative	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion,	   which	   attributes	   to	   it	   a	  fundamental	   role	   in	   assessing	   this	   latter	  question	   (Sections	  1.2–1.6).	  This	  more	  expansive	   role	   is	  necessitated	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  orthodox	  accounts	  of	  permissible	  conduct	  in	  war	  are	  committed	  –	  either	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  –	  to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   norms	   of	   action	   in	  war	   are	   distinct	   from,	   and	  more	  permissive	   than,	   those	   that	   govern	   interpersonal	   harming	   in	   non-­‐war	  contexts.	  I	  argue	  that,	  given	  this	  commitment,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	  a	  crucial	  jurisdictional	  role	  within	  just	  war	  theory:	  it	  distinguishes	  the	  class	  of	  activities	  to	  which	  its	  war-­‐specific	  norms	  apply	  from	  those	  to	  which	  they	  do	  not.	  	  With	   this	   revised	   interpretation	   in	   place,	   I	   then	   demonstrate	   its	  advantages	  by	  applying	  it	  to	  the	  practical	  issue	  of	  armed	  conflicts	  that	  are	  initiated	   and	   fought	   by	   non-­‐traditional	   belligerents	   (Section	   1.7).	   While	  several	   theorists	   have	   recognised	   that	   this	   common	   feature	   of	   modern	  armed	  conflict	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory	  in	  general	  –	  and	   to	   the	   authority	   criterion	   in	   particular	   –	   I	   argue	   that	   existing	  discussions	  frequently	  misconstrue	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  challenge,	  since	  they	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assume	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   requirement	   and	   its	  role	  within	  the	  theory.	  I	  then	  show	  that	  the	  revised	  interpretation	  provides	  a	   clearer	   account	   of	   both	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   non-­‐traditional	  belligerency	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  response	  that	  it	  requires.	  In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  (Section	  1.8)	  I	  show	  that	  my	  arguments	  for	   the	  revised	   interpretation	  of	   the	  authority	  criterion	  generalise	  beyond	  contemporary	   orthodox	   accounts	   of	   just	   war	   theory.	   As	   I	   argue,	   the	  authority	   criterion	   plays	   a	   structurally	   similar	   role	   in	   classical	   just	   war	  theory	  –	  as	  espoused	  by	  Augustine	  and	  Aquinas	  –	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  classical	   view	   endorses	   a	   radically	   different	   conception	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	  compared	  to	  contemporary	  mainstream	  views.	   In	  doing	  so,	   I	  demonstrate	  an	   important	   continuity	   within	   the	   just	   war	   tradition	   that	   often	   goes	  unnoticed.	  	  	  The	   arguments	   of	   this	   chapter	   are	   largely	   formal,	   in	   that	   they	   aim	   to	  show	   that	   given	   certain	   common	   views	   regarding	   permissible	   conduct	   in	  war,	  a	  more	  expansive	  account	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  and	  its	  role	  within	  just	   war	   theorising	   follows.	   I	   conclude	   (Section	   1.9)	   by	   identifying	   the	  central	   normative	   question	   raised	   by	   my	   discussion	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion:	   Can	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   in	   either	   its	   standard	   or	   revised	  interpretations,	  be	  given	  a	  principled	  moral	  defence.	  This	  question	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  four	  chapters	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
1.2 The	  Structure	  of	  Orthodox	  Just	  War	  Theory	  	  Just	  war	  theory	  ranges	  over	  two	  main	  fields	  of	  inquiry.2	  The	  first,	  known	  as	  
jus	  ad	  bellum,	  specifies	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  satisfied	  for	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  to	  be	  morally	  justified.	  The	  second,	  known	  as	  jus	  in	  bello,	  addresses	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  by	  individual	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	   leave	  aside	  here	   the	  more	  recently	  emphasised	   fields	  of	   justice	   in	  ending	  wars	   (jus	  ex	  
bello)	   and	   justice	   following	  war	   (jus	  post	  bellum).	   For	   the	   former,	   see	  Darell	  Mollendorf,	  ‘Jus	  ex	  Bello’,	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  16,	  No.	  2	  (2008),	  123-­‐136;	  Cecile	  Fabre,	   ‘War	  Exit’,	  Ethics	   (forthcoming).	  For	  the	   latter,	  see	  Gary	  Bass,	   ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Public	   Affairs	   32,	   No.	   4	   (2004),	   384-­‐412;	   Larry	   May,	   After	   War	   Ends:	   A	   Philosophical	  
Perspective,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012);	  Jeff	  McMahan,	   ‘The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation’,	  Loyola	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Review	  31	  (2009),	  7-­‐31;	  Brian	  Orend,	  ‘Jus	  Post	  Bellum’,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Philosophy	  31,	  No.1	  (2000),	  117-­‐137.	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Particular	   accounts	   of	   the	   content	   of	   jus	   ad	   bellum	   vary,	   but	   the	  following	   six	   criteria	   represent	   a	   reasonable	   consensus.3	  In	   order	   for	   the	  resort	  to	  war	  to	  be	  justified	  the	  following	  individually	  necessary	  and	  jointly	  sufficient	   conditions	  must	  be	   satisfied:	   the	  war	  must	  have	  a	   just	   cause;	   it	  must	  be	  fought	  with	  the	  right	  intentions;	  the	  harm	  caused	  by	  the	  war	  must	  be	  proportionate	   to	   the	  good	  achieved;	   it	  must	  be	   the	   last	   resort;	   it	  must	  have	  a	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  success;	  lastly,	  it	  must	  be	  initiated	  and	  waged	  by	  a	  legitimate	  authority.	  Discussion	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	   focuses	   on	   two	   main	   requirements	   that	  individual	   participants	   in	   war	   must	   satisfy	   in	   order	   to	   act	   permissibly.	  Firstly,	  they	  must	  discriminate	  between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  targets	  and	  attack	  only	  the	  former.	  The	  legitimate/illegitimate	  target	  distinction	  is	  typically	   held	   to	   track	   the	   distinction	   between	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   discrimination	   requirement	  prohibits	  causing	  harm	  to	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war,	  merely	  that	  deliberately	  targeting	   non-­‐combatants	   is	   prohibited.	   Harming	   non-­‐combatants	  collaterally,	   as	   a	   side-­‐effect	   of	   attacking	  military	   targets,	   does	   not	   violate	  the	   discrimination	   requirement.	   Such	   harms	   are	   constrained	   by	   a	   second	  main	   requirement	   of	   jus	   in	   bello,	   which	   holds	   that	   harms	   caused	   in	   war	  must	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  military	  advantage	  gained	  by	  doing	  so.	  	  The	  nature	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  domains	  of	   just	  war	  theory	   is	   highly	   important.	   According	   to	   what	   has	   been	   termed	   the	  
orthodox	  account	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  –	  as	  influentially	  defended	  by	  Michael	  Walzer	  and	  finding	  resonance	  in	  both	  the	  law	  of	  armed	  conflict	  and	  in	  folk	  judgements	   about	   war	   –	   jus	   ad	   bellum	   and	   jus	   in	   bello	   are	   “logically	  independent”	  of	  one	  another.4	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  war	  satisfies	  the	  criteria	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  whether	  individual	  participants	   in	   that	  war	  act	  permissibly	  or	   impermissibly	  when	  they	   fight	  in	   it.5	  This	   independence	  underpins	  a	  central	  aspect	  of	  orthodox	  accounts,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  useful	  survey	  and	  comparison	  of	  a	  range	  of	  different	  accounts	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  see	  Christopher	   Toner,	   ‘The	   Logical	   Structure	   of	   Just	  War	   Theory’,	  The	   Journal	   of	   Ethics	   14,	  No.2	  (2010),	  81-­‐102.	  4	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars:	  A	  Moral	  Argument	  With	  Historical	  Illustrations’,	  4th	  Edition	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2006),	  p.21	  5	  Ibid.	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concerning	   how	   in	   bello	   permissions	   and	   prohibitions	   are	   distributed	  between	  opposing	  combatants	   in	  war.	  According	   to	   the	  orthodox	  view,	   in	  
bello	   norms	   apply	   neutrally	   to	   all	   parties	   to	   a	   war	   and	   are	   equally	  satisfiable	   by	   all	   combatants,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   ad	   bellum	   status	   of	   the	  wars	   in	  which	   they	   fight.	   Term	   this	   the	  Equality	  Thesis.6	  According	   to	   the	  Equality	   Thesis,	   provided	   that	   combatants	   in	   war	   target	   only	   opposing	  combatants	  and	  proportion	  the	  harm	  they	  cause	  to	  military	  advantage,	  they	  do	  not	  act	  wrongly.	  	  	  
1.3 The	  Standard	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  This	  chapter,	  and	  thesis	  more	  generally,	  will	  centre	  on	  one	  of	  the	  above	  just	  war	   criteria	   –	   the	   requirement	   that	   a	   war	   be	   initiated	   and	   waged	   by	   a	  legitimate	  authority.7	  To	  begin,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  distinguish	  two	  questions	  we	  can	  ask	  about	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   Firstly,	  we	   can	  ask	  what	  normative	  consequences	  are	  meant	   to	   follow	   from	  the	  possession	  or	  non-­‐possession	  of	   war-­‐making	   authority.	   Term	   this	   the	   question	   of	   normative	   effect.	  Second,	   we	   can	   ask	  which	   properties	   an	   entity	  must	   possess	   in	   order	   to	  have	  war-­‐making	  authority.	  Term	  this	  the	  question	  of	  relevant	  properties.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   its	   normative	   effect,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   standardly	  understood	   to	   function	   solely	   as	   an	   ad	   bellum	   requirement,	   providing	   a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  to	  be	  morally	  justified,	  but	  having	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  permissibility	  of	  conduct	  in	  war.8	  On	  this	  view,	  if	  a	  war	  is	  to	  be	  justified	  it	  must	  be	  initiated	  and	  waged	  by	  an	  entity	  that	  possesses	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  properties.	  If	  such	  properties	  are	  lacking,	  then	  wars	  fought	  by	  that	  entity	  are	  unjustified	  (though	  this	  ad	  bellum	  deficiency	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  permissibility	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  fighting	  for	  that	  entity,	  given	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  Equality	  Thesis).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  Equality	  Thesis	  and	   the	  debate	  surrounding	   it,	   see	  David	  Rodin	  and	   Henry	   Shue,	   ‘Introduction’	   in	   David	   Rodin	   and	   Henry	   Shue	   (eds),	   Just	   and	   Unjust	  
Warriors:	  The	  Moral	  and	  Legal	  Status	  of	  Soldiers,	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  1-­‐18.	  7	  The	  criterion	  is	  also	  variously	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘right’,	   ‘proper’,	   ‘competent’,	   ‘sovereign’	  or	  ‘public’	  authority	  criterion	  in	  the	  literature.	  8	  This	  interpretation	  is	  particularly	  reinforced	  on	  an	  orthodox	  approach	  to	  just	  war	  theory,	  on	  which	  these	  two	  components	  of	  the	  theory	  are	  independent	  of	  one	  another.	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Christopher	   Toner	   usefully	   suggests	   that	   each	   component	   of	   jus	   ad	  
bellum	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   tracking	   one	   of	   several	   distinct	   variables	  relevant	   to	  determining	   the	  permissibility	  of	   action.	  He	  points	  out	   that	   in	  order	  to	  morally	  evaluate	  any	  action,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  several	  things:	  what	  action	  has	  been	  done;	  why	   it	  was	  done;	  how	   it	  was	  done;	  and	  who	  did	   it.	  Applied	  to	  the	  particular	  act	  of	  resorting	  to	  war,	  Toner	  suggests	  that	  the	  ad	  
bellum	   criteria	   of	   just	   cause,	   right	   intention,	   proportionality,	   success	   and	  last	   resort	   can	  be	  understood	  as	  pertaining	   to	   the	   ‘what’,	   ‘why’	  and	   ‘how’	  questions.	   The	   authority	   criterion,	   by	   contrast,	   addresses	   the	   distinct	  question	   of	   ‘who’	   is	   initiating	   the	   war	   and	   directing	   its	   prosecution.	   The	  authority	  criterion	  thus	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  other	  ad	  bellum	  criteria	  in	  an	  important	   respect.	   Whereas	   the	   others	   may	   be	   characterised	   as	   external	  conditions,	   pertaining	   to	   various	   morally	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   the	  interactions	   between	   belligerent	   parties,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   provides	  an	   internal	   constraint	   on	   the	   resort	   to	   war,	   focusing	   on	   the	   identity	   and	  character	  of	  a	  potential	  belligerent.9	  	  The	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion	   holds	   that	   justified	   war-­‐waging	   is	   an	   activity	   restricted	   to	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   entity.	   But	   this	   still	  leaves	   open	   the	   question	   of	   what	   properties	   an	   entity	   must	   possess	   in	  order	   to	   produce	   this	   normative	   effect.	   Precise	   accounts	   of	   what	   war-­‐waging	   authority	   consists	   in	   vary,	   but	   on	   a	   fairly	   standard	   view,	   a	  belligerent	  party	  must,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify,	  constitute	  a	  recognised	  state,	  or,	  less	   stringently,	   a	   non-­‐state	   entity	   that	   shares	   the	   central	   features	   of	  statehood,	   such	   as	   being	   an	   organised	   political	   community	   with	   de	   facto	  control	  over	  territory	  and	  a	  population.	  A	  more	  precise	  view	  requires	  not	  only	  that	  a	  belligerent	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  state-­‐like	  type,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  resort	  to	   war	   must	   be	   deliberated	   upon	   and	   declared	   through	   the	   official	  procedures	  of	  the	  state	  (or	  quasi-­‐state	  entity)	  that	  are	  entrusted	  with	  this	  important	  task	  and	  which	  possess	  the	   legal	  authority	  to	  enact	   the	  various	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	   discussion	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   ‘external’	   and	   ‘internal’	   constraints	   on	   the	  resort	  to	  war,	  see	  Allen	  Buchanan,	  ‘The	  Internal	  Legitimacy	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention’,	  
Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  7,	  No.1	  (1999),	  71-­‐87.	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apparatus	  of	  war,	  such	  as	  raising	  the	  armed	  forces,	  instituting	  conscription,	  nationalising	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  etc.10	  	  Restricting	  justified	  war-­‐making	  to	  entities	  that	  possess	  the	  properties	  of	   statehood	   (or	  quasi-­‐statehood)	   seems	   intuitively	   sensible	   and	   ethically	  advantageous	   in	   several	   respects.	   Most	   obviously,	   given	   that	   war	   is	   a	  terrible	   thing	  we	  have	   strong	  moral	   strong	   reasons	   to	   try	   to	  minimise	   its	  incidence.	  Limiting	  the	  class	  of	  entities	  that	  may	  permissibly	  engage	  in	  war	  seems	   an	   obvious	   way	   of	   contributing	   to	   this	   humanitarian	   goal	   by	  discouraging	   the	   initiation	   of	   war.11	  In	   addition,	   limiting	   justified	   war	   to	  entities	  with	   certain	   institutional	  procedures	  may	  have	   the	  advantages	  of	  making	   the	   resort	   to	   war	   less	   rash,	   providing	   a	   bulwark	   against	   private	  interests	  within	  a	  community	  gaining	  disproportionate	  influence,	  and	  may	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  better	  accords	  with	  the	  will	  of	  the	  citizenry.12	  	  However,	   perhaps	   as	   a	   result	   of	   its	   pragmatic	   appeal	   and	   legalistic	  flavour,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   receives	   much	   less	   attention	   in	   the	  contemporary	   just	   war	   literature	   compared	   to	   other	   elements	   of	   the	  theory.13	  It	   is	   far	  overshadowed	  by	  discussion	  of	   the	  ad	  bellum	   conditions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See,	   for	   example,	   Nicholas	   Fotion,	  War	   and	   Ethics:	   A	   New	   Just	  War	   Theory,	   (London:	  Continuum,	  2007),	  pp.18-­‐20;	  Michael	  Quinlan	  and	  Charles	  Guthrie,	   Just	  War,	   (New	  York:	  Bloomsbury,	  2007),	  p.13;	  Brian	  Orend,	  Michael	  Walzer	  on	  War	  and	  Justice,	  p.87;	  Richard	  J.	  Regan,	   Just	   War:	   Principles	   and	   Cases,	   (Washington	   DC:	   Catholic	   University	   of	   America	  Press,	   1996),	   Ch.2;	   Henrik	   Syse	   and	   Helene	   Ingierd,	   ‘What	   Constitutes	   a	   Legitimate	  Authority?’,	  Social	  Alternatives	  24,	  No.3	  (2005),	  11-­‐16.	  11 	  Several	   theorists	   claim	   that	   this	   pragmatic	   humanitarian	   concern	   to	   reduce	   the	  incidence	   of	   war	   explains	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   within	   the	   just	   war	  tradition.	   See,	   for	   example,	  Anthony	  Coates,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War,	   (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  p.125.	  12	  See	  Syse	  and	  Helene,	  ‘What	  Constitutes	  a	  Legitimate	  Authority?’	  13	  This	  lacuna	  is	  emphasised	  most	  forcefully	  by	  Anthony	  Coates.	  Coates,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War’,	  p.123.	  It	  is	  also	  noted	  in:	  Cecile	  Fabre,	  ‘Cosmopolitanism,	  Just	  War	  Theory	  and	  Legitimate	  Authority’,	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  84,	  No.	  5	  (2008),	  963-­‐976;	  Anthony	  F.	  Lang	  Jr,	  Cian	   O’Driscoll	   and	   John	   Williams,	   ‘Introduction’	   in	   Just	   War:	   Authority,	   Tradition	   and	  
Practice,	   Anthony	   F.	   Lang	   Jr,	   Cian	   O’Driscoll	   and	   John	  Williams	   (eds),	   (Washington	   DC:	  Georgetown	   University	   Press,	   2013),	   1-­‐19;	   Syse	   and	   Ingierd,	   ‘What	   Constitutes	   a	  Legitimate	  Authority?’,	  p.11;	  Anne	  Schwenkenbecher,	  ‘Rethinking	  Legitimate	  Authority’	  in	  Fritz	  Alhoff,	  Nicholas	  G.	   Evans,	   and	  Adam	  Henschke	   (eds),	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  Ethics	  
and	  War	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge),	  161-­‐170.	  	  Heather	  Wilson	  suggests	  the	  lack	  of	  discussion	  arises	  because	  contemporary	  just	  war	  theorists	  and	  international	  lawyers	  simply	  assume	  that	  only	  states	  may	  permissibly	  resort	  to	  war.	  “The	  idea	  that	  only	  a	  sovereign	  State	  may	  legitimately	   wage	   war	   seems	   a	   foregone	   conclusion	   in	   the	   twentieth	   century.”	   Heather	  Wilson,	   The	   Use	   of	   Force	   by	   National	   Liberation	   Movements,	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	  1988),	  p.15.	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of	   just	   cause	   and	   proportionality,	   and	   the	   voluminous	   literature	   on	  practical	  questions	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  When	  the	  authority	  criterion	  is	  discussed,	  it	   is	  often	   treated	  as	  a	  rather	  bureaucratic	  addendum	  to	   the	   jus	  ad	  bellum	  ‘checklist’.14	  This	   contemporary	   neglect	   for	   the	   authority	   criterion	   should	   be	  surprising,	   given	   a	   historical	   perspective.	   For	   the	   founding	   fathers	   of	   the	  just	   war	   tradition,	   most	   notably	   Augustine	   and	   Aquinas,	   the	   authority	  criterion	  was	  of	  absolute	  central	  importance.15	  With	  some	  affinity	  with	  the	  classical	   view,	   it	   will	   be	   a	   central	   contention	   of	   this	   chapter	   that	   the	  authority	   criterion	  plays	   a	  much	  more	   important	   role	  within	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory	  than	  is	  commonly	  assumed.	  More	  specifically,	   I	  will	  argue	  for	   a	   different	   account	   of	   the	   normative	   effects	   that	   follow	   from	   the	  possession	   and	   non-­‐possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority.	   Against	   the	  standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   –	   which	   holds	   that	   the	  authority	  criterion	  functions	  restrictively	  within	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  –	  I	  will	  show	  that	   the	   authority	   criterion	   also	  plays	   a	   crucial	  permissive	  role	  within	   the	  
jus	   in	   bello	   component	   of	   the	   theory.	   An	   interesting	   implication	   of	   this	  interpretation	   is	   that	   it	  denies	   the	  strict	   independence	  of	   jus	  in	  bello	   from	  
jus	  ad	  bellum.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For	   example,	   several	  discussions	   the	  authority	   criterion	   focus	  on	   the	   legal	  question	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  has	  the	  power	  to	  take	  the	  nation	  to	  war	   without	   congressional	   approval.	   Paul	   Christopher	   ‘The	  Ethics	   of	  War	   and	  Peace:	   An	  
Introduction	  to	  Legal	  and	  Moral	  Issues,	  3rd	  Edition	  (New	  Jersey:	  Prentice	  Hall,	  2004),	  pp.87-­‐88;	  Orend,	  Michael	  Walzer	  on	  War	  and	  Justice,	  p.	  97;	  Regan,	  Just	  War,	  Ch.2.	  15	  This	  point	  is	  stressed	  in,	  among	  others,	   John	  Langan,	   ‘The	  Elements	  of	  Augustine’s	  Just	  War	  Theory’,	  Journal	  of	  Religious	  Ethics	  12,	  No.	  1	  (1984),	  19-­‐38;	  Stephen	  C.	  Neff,	  War	  and	  
the	   Law	   of	   Nations:	   A	   General	   History,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2005),	  p.50:	  Frederick	  Russell,	  The	  Just	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	   1975),	   pp.	   68-­‐71;	   James	   Turner	   Johnson,	   ‘Aquinas	   and	   Luther	   on	   Sovereign	  Authority’,	   Journal	  of	  Religious	  Ethics,	   31,	  No,	   1	   (2003),	   3-­‐20;	   The	   authority	   criterion,	   or	  something	   closely	   analogous	   to	   it,	   was	   also	   a	   preeminent	   component	   of	   Confucian	  approaches	  to	  the	  morality	  of	  warfare.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Sumner	  B.	  Twiss	  and	  Jonathan	  Chan,	  ‘The	  Classical	  Confucian	  Position	  on	  the	  Legitimate	  Use	  of	  Military	  Force’,	  Journal	  of	  
Religious	  Ethics	  40,	  No.	  3	  (2007),	  447-­‐472.	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1.4 The	  Discontinuity	  Thesis	  	  The	   first	   step	   in	   this	   argument	   is	   generated	   by	   comparing	   an	   orthodox	  conception	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	   with	   our	   settled	   views	   regarding	   the	  permissibility	  of	  harming	  and	  killing	  in	  ordinary,	  non-­‐war	  contexts.	  	  Despite	   the	   pervasiveness	   of	   an	   orthodox	   conception	   of	   jus	   in	  bello	   in	  common-­‐sense	  thought	  about	  war	  and	  in	  the	  law	  of	  armed	  conflict,	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  and	  important	  question	  here	  concerning	  whether	  these	  norms	  can	   be	   given	   a	   principled	  moral	   grounding.	   After	   all,	  morality	   contains	   a	  strong	  presumption	  against	  the	  kind	  of	  actions	  typical	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  –	  namely,	   intentional	   killing	   and	   maiming.	   The	   normal	   explanation	   of	   this	  presumption	   is	   that	   individuals	   possess	   basic	   rights	   against	   such	   harm,	  which	   impose	  stringent	  correlative	  duties	  on	  others	  to	  refrain	   from	  doing	  so.	  Yet	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory	  permits	  homicide	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  	  An	   attractive	   strategy	   for	   grounding	   an	   orthodox	   conception	   of	   jus	   in	  
bello	   norms	   would	   be	   to	   show	   that	   it	   can	   be	   derived	   from	   the	   same	  justifications	  for	  harming	  that	  we	  accept	  in	  cases	  of	  interpersonal	  harming	  outside	  of	  warfare.	  	  However,	   as	   several	   theorists	   have	   recently	   pointed	   out,	   despite	   an	  orthodox	  view	  representing	  the	  default	  position	  on	  the	  morality	  of	  conduct	  in	  war,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  ground	  these	  norms	  in	  our	  more	  general	  views	  about	  harming	  and	  killing	  in	  non-­‐war	  contexts.	  In	  particular,	  the	  orthodox	  view’s	   neutral	   distribution	   of	   the	   permission	   it	   grants	   to	   combatants	   to	  intentionally	  kill	  their	  opponents,	  independently	  of	  considerations	  of	  jus	  ad	  
bellum,	  has	  proven	  stubbornly	  immune	  to	  such	  an	  explanation.16	  I	  lack	  the	  space	  here	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  overview	  of	  this	  important	  debate.	  Instead,	  by	  way	  of	   illustration,	   I	  will	   show	  how	   two	  popular	   attempts	   to	   support	   the	  orthodox	  conception	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  in	  this	  way	  are	  unsuccessful.	  A	   standard	  way	  of	   justifying	   intentional	   killing	   is	   by	   showing	   that	   the	  subject	  of	  harm	  lacks	  their	  normal	  right	  against	  being	  killed,	  thus	  removing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Jeff	   McMahan	   has	   done	   most	   to	   argue	   for	   this	   view.	   Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘Innocence,	   Self-­‐Defense	   and	  Killing	   in	  War’,	   Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  2,	  No.	   3	   (1994),	   193-­‐221;	   Jeff	  McMahan,	   ‘The	   Ethics	   of	   Killing	  War’,	   Ethics	  114,	   No.4	   (2004),	   693-­‐733;	   Jeff	   McMahan,	  
Killing	  in	  War,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  Chs.	  1-­‐2.	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the	  constraint	  against	  doing	  so.	  The	  notion	  of	  rights	  loss	  forms	  the	  standard	  justification	  for	  killing	  in	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defence.	  The	  basic	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  an	   individual	   can	   lose	   her	   right	   against	   being	   harmed	   if	   harming	   her	   is	  instrumental	  to	  averting	  a	  threat	  for	  which	  that	  individual	  is	  appropriately	  responsible.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   that	   individual	   is	   liable	   to	   defensive	  harm.	  Michael	  Walzer	   influentially	  appeals	  to	  a	   liability-­‐based	   justification	  to	  ground	  a	  neutrally	  distributed	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war.17	  On	  this	  view,	  by	  threatening	  their	  opponents	  with	   lethal	  harm,	  combatants	   thereby	  render	  themselves	  liable	  to	  their	  enemy’s	  lethal	  defensive	  force.	  In	  virtue	  of	  their	  liability,	  combatants	  may	  be	  killed	  without	  their	  rights	  being	  violated	  or	  a	  corresponding	  duty	  breached.	  As	  Walzer	  puts	  it,	  combatants	  in	  war	  are	  all	  “dangerous	  men”.18	  Since	   all	   combatants	   pose	   this	   danger	   irrespective	   of	  whether	  their	  wars	  are	  just	  or	  unjust,	  all	  forfeit	  their	  right	  not	  to	  be	  killed	  by	   their	  opponents.	  Hence,	   all	   combatants	  possess	  an	   “equal	   right	   to	  kill”	  their	  opponents	  in	  self-­‐defence.19	  	  However,	   the	   key	   problem	   with	   this	   neat	   defence	   of	   an	   orthodox	  permission	   to	   kill	   in	   war	   is	   that	   it	   relies	   on	   a	   conception	   of	   liability	   to	  defensive	   force	   that	  we	  would	  not	   accept	   in	   any	   circumstance	  other	   than	  war.	   Theories	   of	   self-­‐defence	   typically	   treat	   mere	   threat-­‐posing	   as	  insufficient	   for	   liability.	  This	   is	   for	  good	  reason.	  Potential	  murder	  victims,	  for	   example,	   do	   not	   render	   themselves	   liable	   to	   defensive	   force	   if	   they	  defend	  themselves	  against	  their	  attacker	  with	  proportionate	  and	  necessary	  harm.	   Yet	   a	   threat-­‐based	   account	   of	   liability,	   which	   supports	   a	   neutral	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war,	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  precisely	  this	  implication.	  A	  plausible	  account	  of	  liability	  requires,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  threat	   of	   unjustified	   harm.	   This	   revised	   criterion	   of	   liability	   yields	   the	  correct	   result	   in	   the	   murderer/victim	   case,	   since	   only	   the	   attempted	  murderer	  poses	  an	  unjustified	  threat.	  However,	   this	  more	  plausible	   account	  of	   liability,	  when	  applied	   to	   the	  case	   of	   war,	   cannot	   yield	   the	   view	   that	   the	   permission	   to	   kill	   applies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  pp.144-­‐145.	  18	  Ibid.	  p.145.	  19	  Ibid.	  p.41.	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neutrally	  to	  all	  combatants.	  The	  reasoning	  here	  parallels	  that	  in	  the	  simple	  murderer/victim	   case,	   the	   thought	   being	   that	   any	   plausible	   account	   of	  liability,	  when	  applied	  to	  combatants	  in	  war,	  must	  be	  sensitive	  to	  whether	  the	  overall	  aims	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  which	  they	  fight	  are	  justified	  or	  unjustified.	  So,	  while	   combatants	  who	   fight	   in	  wars	   that	   lack	  a	   just	   cause	  may	  satisfy	  the	   revised	   criterion	   of	   liability	   to	   attack	   and	   therefore	   be	   killed	  without	  being	  wronged,	   those	  who	   fight	   in	   justified	  wars	   do	   not	   thereby	   become	  liable.	  	  A	   different	   attempt	   to	   show	   that	   a	   neutral	   conception	   of	   permissible	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  rights-­‐consistent	  appeals	  to	  consent-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  harming.	  On	  this	  view,	  by	  voluntarily	  joining	  the	  military	  and	  participating	  in	   wars	   combatants	   thereby	   consent	   to	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   killed	   by	   their	  opponents	   and	   waive	   their	   right	   against	   such	   treatment,	   regardless	   of	  whether	   they	   fight	   in	   just	   or	   unjust	   wars.	   Given	   this	   mutual	   consent,	  combatants	   may	   kill	   their	   opponents	   without	   violating	   their	   rights,	  independently	  of	  the	  justice	  of	  their	  wars.20	  	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  several	  problems	  with	  this	  argument.	  Firstly,	  it	  has	  limited	  scope,	  since	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  all,	  or	  even	  many,	  combatants	  join	  the	  military	   under	   the	   stringent	   conditions	   of	   voluntariness	   that	   are	  presumably	  required	  in	  order	  for	  one’s	  act	  of	  waiving	  of	  one’s	  right	  not	  to	  be	  killed	  to	  be	  morally	  efficacious.	  The	  most	  obvious	  cases	  are	  combatants	  who	   are	   conscripted	   or	   otherwise	   coerced	   into	   joining	   the	   military,	   but	  cases	   in	  which	   combatants	   enlist	   through	   a	   lack	   of	   better	   alternatives	   or	  through	  ignorance	  are	  also	  problematic.	  	  Secondly,	   and	   more	   seriously,	   it	   is	   doubtful	   that	   the	   act	   of	   freely	  entering	   the	   military	   and	   accepting	   the	   associated	   risks	   entails	   waiving	  one’s	   right	   not	   to	   be	   killed	   by	   one’s	   opponents	   in	   war.21	  For	   example,	  imagine	  that	  Benny	  is	  due	  to	  testify	   in	  court	  against	  the	  Mafia	   in	  a	  week’s	  time	   and,	   understandably,	   fears	   for	   his	   life.	   He	   explains	   his	   situation	   to	  Julie,	  who	  then	  consents	  to	  be	  Benny’s	  bodyguard	  in	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Versions	  of	  this	  argument	  have	  been	  put	  forward,	  independently,	  by	  Michael	  Walzer	  and	  Thomas	   Hurka.	   Walzer,	   Just	   and	   Unjust	   Wars,	   p.37;	   Thomas	   Hurka,	   ‘Liability	   and	   Just	  Cause’,	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  20	  (2007),	  199-­‐218.	  21	  This	  problem	  is	  raised	  by	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  p.52.	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risks.	  If	  Benny	  is	  then	  attacked	  by	  a	  Mafia	  assassin	  and	  Julie	  bravely	  takes	  a	  bullet	   for	   him,	   it	   seems	   wrong	   to	   say	   that	   Julie	   is	   not	   wronged	   by	   the	  
assassin	  when	  he	  shoots	  her,	  even	  though	  she	  consented	  to	  the	  risk.	  While	  Julie’s	   act	  of	   consent	  may	  successfully	  alter	  her	   rights	  and	  duties	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Benny,	   it	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   normative	   situation	   between	   her	   and	   the	  assassin.	  	  Thirdly,	   even	   if	  we	   grant	   that	   a	   combatant’s	   consenting	   to	   joining	   the	  military	  does	  successfully	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  right	  not	  to	  be	  killed,	  this	  still	  seems	  insufficient	  to	  render	  it	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permissible	  for	  his	  opponent	   to	   kill	   him.	   For	   if	   his	   opponent	   is	   fighting	   in	   a	   war	   which	   has	  unjust	   aims,	   she	   will	   still	   be	   promoting	   those	   aims	   by	   killing	   her	   just	  opponent,	   even	   if	   she	   does	   not	   violate	   his	   rights	   by	   doing	   so.22	  For	   these	  reasons,	   the	   appeal	   to	   consent	   also	   seems	   unable	   to	   ground	   a	   neutral	  distribution	  of	  in	  bello	  permissions.	  This	  brief	  comparison	  between	  an	  orthodox	  account	  of	   jus	  in	  bello	  and	  our	   views	   about	   the	   justification	   of	   interpersonal	   harming	   in	   non-­‐war	  contexts	   reveals	   a	   serious	   tension.	   Ordinarily,	   we	   think	   that	   the	   moral	  assessment	   of	   an	   activity’s	   ultimate	   aims	   are	   directly	   relevant	   to	  determining	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  its	  component	  actions,	  particularly	  so	  when	  these	  acts	  involve	  inflicting	  serious	  harms.	  Yet	  the	  orthodox	  view	  holds	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  war.	  The	  norms	  governing	  causing	  harm	  in	  war	  are	  more	  permissive	  than	  those	  that	  apply	  in	  other	  circumstances.	  My	   aim	   here	   is	   not	   to	   take	   a	   stand	   on	   whether	   this	   result	   should	   be	  taken	  to	  count	  against	  an	  orthodox	  view.23	  Instead	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  what	  follows	   from	  a	   commitment	   to	   an	   orthodox	   view	  of	   jus	   in	  bello,	   once	   this	  tension	  is	  made	  overt,	   in	  terms	  of	  theorising	  about	  the	  authority	  criterion	  and	  its	  role	  within	  just	  war	  theory.	  Given	   this	   aim,	   the	   important	   point	   here	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   an	  obvious	   problem	   of	   inconsistency,	   orthodox	   just	   war	   theory	   requires	   a	  commitment	   to	   what	   I	   term	   the	   Discontinuity	   Thesis.	   According	   to	   the	  Discontinuity	   Thesis,	   the	  moral	   norms	   that	   govern	   killing	   in	  war	   are	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Ibid,	  pp.56-­‐57.	  23	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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grounded	   in	   the	   moral	   principles	   that	   determine	   the	   permissibility	   of	  causing	   harm	   in	   ordinary,	   non-­‐war	   contexts.24	  On	   this	   ethically	   dualist	  view,	  there	  need	  be	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  moral	  norms	  that	  govern	  each	  domain,	   since	   war	   and	   non-­‐war	   fundamentally	   differ	   in	   some	   morally	  relevant	  respect.	  War	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  morally	  sui	  generis,	   irreducible	  to	  the	   principles	   that	   govern	   interpersonal	   harming	   in	   other	   areas	   of	   life.25	  This	  view	  of	  war	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  activity	  thus	  enables	  one	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   norms	   of	   conduct	   in	   war	   are	   more	   permissive	   that	  those	  that	  govern	  other	  forms	  of	  violence.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  war	  is	  morally	  distinct	  from	  other	  walks	  of	  life	  is	  central	  to	   folk	   judgments	   regarding	  war	   and	   has	   a	   long	   historical	   pedigree.	   It	   is	  often	  claimed	  that	  war	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  ‘public’	  morality,	  separate	  from	  the	  ‘private’	   morality	   that	   governs	   interactions	   between	   individuals.26	  In	   his	  historical	  survey	  of	  the	  law	  of	  war,	  Stephen	  C.	  Neff	  points	  out	  that	  many	  of	  the	   ancient	   civilisations	   worshipped	   separate	   deities	   for	   war	   and	   mere	  violence,	  indicating	  the	  perceived	  distinctness	  of	  the	  two	  spheres.	  Neff	  also	  emphasises	   the	   pervasiveness	   of	   the	   distinction	   in	   language,	   noting	   the	  difference	  words	  used	  to	  describe	  interpersonal	  violent	  conflicts	  compared	  to	   the	   kind	   of	   enmity	   encountered	   in	   war,	   a	   trend	   which	   holds	   up	   well	  cross-­‐culturally.27	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	   Discontinuity	   Thesis	   is	   similar	   to	   a	   view	   Seth	   Lazar	   has	   labeled	   ‘exceptionalism’.	  	  Seth	   Lazar,	   ‘National	   Defence,	   Self-­‐Defence,	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Political	   Aggression’,	   in	  Seth	   Lazar	   and	   Cecile	   Fabre	   (eds),	   The	   Morality	   of	   Defensive	   War	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  11-­‐39.	  25	  Henry	   Shue	   and	   Michael	   Walzer	   each	   endorse	   a	   version	   of	   the	   discontinuity	   thesis.	  Henry	   Shue,	   ‘Do	  We	   Need	   a	   ‘Morality	   of	  War’	   in	   Rodin	   and	   Shue	   (eds),	   Just	   and	  Unjust	  
Warriors,	   87-­‐111;	  Michael	  Walzer,	   ‘Response	   to	  McMahan’s	   Paper’,	  Philosophia	  34,	   No.1	  (2006),	   43-­‐45.	   Both	   Judith	   Jarvis	   Thomson	   and	   Frances	   Kamm	   have	   also	   suggested	  versions	  of	   it,	   albeit	  without	  explicit	   endorsement.	   See	  Frances	  Kamm	  The	  Moral	  Target,	  (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2012),	   p.27;	   Judith	   Jarvis	   Thomson,	   ‘Self-­‐Defense’,	  
Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  20,	  No.4	  (1991),	  283-­‐310	  at	  p.297.	  26	  For	   a	   book	   length	   discussion	   of	   this	   contrast,	   see	   Andrew	   Fiala,	   Public	   War,	   Private	  
Conscience:	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Political	  Violence,	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2010).	  	  27	  Neff,	  War	   and	   the	   Law	   of	   Nations,	   pp.13-­‐20.	   Neff	   does	   note	   that	   a	   small	   minority	   of	  cultures,	   such	  as	   the	   Innuit,	  do	  seem	  to	   lack	  a	  strong	  distinction	  between	  war	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  violence.	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1.5 The	  Demarcation	  Requirement	  	  The	  next	  step	  the	  argument	  for	  a	  more	  expansive	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  proceeds	  by	  noting	  an	  important	  problem	  for	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory,	  entailed	  by	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  Discontinuity	  Thesis.	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  conduct	  in	  war	  and	  non-­‐war	  contexts	  are	  governed	  by	  different	  and	   incompatible	   sets	   of	   norms,	   then	   it	   is	   vitally	   important	   that	   just	  war	  theory	   is	   able	   to	   clearly	   distinguish	   between	   the	   activities	   to	   which	   its	  norms	  apply	  and	  those	  to	  which	  it	  doesn’t.28	  As	  George	  Fletcher	  puts	  it,	  “not	  every	  shootout	  at	   the	  OK	  Corral	  qualifies.”	  29	  For	  example,	   just	  war	  theory	  needs	   to	  be	  able	   to	  distinguish	  between	  genuine	  wars	  and	  so-­‐called	   ‘gang	  wars’.	  While	   these	   two	   phenomena	  may	   share	   some	   important	   empirical	  features	  –	  large-­‐scale,	  protracted	  and	  organised	  violence	  most	  obviously	  –	  orthodox	   just	   war	   theorists	   presumably	   do	   not	   want	   to	   conclude	   that	  participants	  in	  such	  conflicts	  possess	  the	  same	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  that	   are	   granted	   to	   regular	   combatants	   under	   jus	   in	   bello,	   which	   apply	  independently	  of	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  overall	  aims	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  which	  they	  participate.	  In	  cases	  of	  violence-­‐other-­‐than-­‐war,	  just	  war	  theorists	  need	  to	  be	   able	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   standard,	   peacetime	   norms	   of	   interpersonal	  harming	  apply.	  30	  To	  put	   the	  point	  another	  way	  –	   since	  orthodox	   just	  war	  theorists	   are	   committed	   to	   the	   view	   that	  war	   is	  morally	   distinct	   from	   all	  other	  violent	  activities,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  know	  a	  war	  when	  they	  see	  one.	  Term	  this	  the	  Demarcation	  Requirement.31	  	  Without	   a	   means	   of	   clearly	   resolving	   the	   Demarcation	   Requirement,	  acts	  of	  violence	  will	  have	  an	  indeterminate	  moral	  status	  under	  an	  orthodox	  approach	   to	   just	   war	   theory,	   since	   whether	   such	   acts	   are	   morally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Jeff	  McMahan	  also	  raises	  this	  requirement	  for	  orthodox	  conceptions	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  in	  
Killing	  in	  War,	  p.31.	  29	  George	  Fletcher,	  Romantics	  at	  War:	  Glory	  and	  Guilt	   in	  the	  Age	  of	  Terrorism,	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  p.3.	  	  30 	  This	   worry	   motivates	   Robert	   Goodin’s	   argument	   that	   just	   war	   principles	   are	  inapplicable	  to	  the	  action	  of	  terrorist	  organisations.	  	  Robert	  E.	  Goodin,	  What’s	  Wrong	  With	  
Terrorism?	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Polity	  Press,	  2006),	  Ch.1.	  31	  David	  Luban	  raises	  an	  analogous	  problem	  regarding	  demarcating	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	   application	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   the	   humanitarian	   law	   of	   armed	   conflict.	   David	  Luban	  ‘War	  Crimes:	  The	  Laws	  of	  Hell’	  in	  Larry	  May	  (ed),	  War:	  Essays	  in	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  266-­‐288	  at	  p.276-­‐280.	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permissible	   or	   impermissible	   will	   depend	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   are	  committed	  within	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  token	  act	  of	   intentional	   killing	   is	   morally	   justified	   or	   unjustified,	   the	   orthodox	   just	  war	   theorist	   cannot	   appeal	   to	   jus	   in	  bello	  criteria,	   since	   these	   criteria	   are	  specific	  to	  war.	  The	  most	  that	  could	  be	  said	  is	  that	  ‘this	  act	  of	  killing	  would	  be	  permissible	  under	   the	  norms	  of	   jus	  in	  bello,	   if	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   the	  case	   that	  these	   norms	   apply	   to	   it’.	   But	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   antecedent	   of	   this	  conditional	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  Demarcation	  Requirement.	  	  
	  
1.6 The	  Revised	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  I	   have	   argued	   that	   orthodox	   approaches	   to	   just	   war	   theory	   rest	   on	   a	  commitment	   to	   the	   Discontinuity	   Thesis	   and	   must	   therefore	   resolve	   the	  Demarcation	   Requirement.	   These	   two	   points	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   an	  alternative	   and	   more	   expansive	   account	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion	  in	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory.	  	  Returning	   to	   the	   six	   standard	   ad	   bellum	   requirements	   set	   out	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   this	   chapter	  we	   can	   see	   that	   only	   one	   of	   these	   is	   capable	   of	  providing	   orthodox	   just	   war	   theory	   with	   the	   resources	   to	   satisfy	   the	  Demarcation	  Requirement	  –	  the	  authority	  criterion.	  	  Consider,	   first,	   the	   ad	   bellum	   criteria	   of	   just	   cause,	   right	   intention,	  proportionality,	   last	   resort	   and	   prospect	   of	   success.	   Each	   of	   these	  requirements	   plays	   a	   necessary	   role	   in	   making	   the	   central	   distinction	  within	   just	  war	   theory	  between	  wars	   that	   are	  morally	   justified	  and	   those	  that	  are	  not.	  However,	  these	  criteria	  cannot	  be	  appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  help	  just	   war	   theory	   make	   the	   more	   fundamental	   distinction	   between	   those	  activities	   that	   constitute	   war,	   subject	   to	   jus	   in	   bello	   norms,	   and	   those	  activities	  which	   do	   not.	   Unjustified	  wars	   are	   importantly	   still	  wars	  on	   an	  orthodox	  view,	  subject	  to	  precisely	  the	  same	  war-­‐specific	  norms	  of	  conduct.	  Hence,	  to	  invoke	  one	  of	  these	  five	  criteria	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  wars	  and	  non-­‐wars	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  very	  odd	  definition	  of	  war,	  in	  which	  an	  unjust	  war	  would	  no	  longer	  counts	  as	  a	  war	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  
	  	   25	  
More	   importantly,	   doing	   so	   would	   dramatically	   undermine	   the	   orthodox	  commitment	   to	   the	   Equality	   Thesis,	   since	   it	   would	   make	   jus	   in	   bello	  permissions	  conditional	  on	  some	  degree	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  adherence.	  	  	  Having	  excluded	  these	  ad	  bellum	  criteria	  from	  being	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	   the	   Demarcation	   Requirement,	   only	   the	   authority	   requirement	  remains.	  Recall	  the	  earlier	  characterisation	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  as	  an	  ‘internal’	   constraint	   on	   the	   resort	   to	   war.	   Rather	   than	   focussing	   on	   the	  rights	   and	  wrongs	   of	   the	   interactions	   between	   belligerent	   parties,	   as	   the	  other	  ad	  bellum	  criteria	  do,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  inquires	  into	  whether	  a	  war	   is	   waged	   by	   the	   appropriate	   type	   of	   entity.	   It	   is	   this	   difference	   in	  evaluative	   focus	   that	   enables	   a	   more	   expansive	   interpretation	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion,	   which	   attributes	   to	   it	   the	   role	   of	   resolving	   the	  Demarcation	  Requirement.	  	  According	   to	   the	   standard	   interpretation,	   the	   authority	   criterion	  provides	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  determining	  whether	  a	  pre-­‐established	  war	   is	   justified	   or	   unjustified.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   possession	   or	   non-­‐possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   has	   precisely	   the	   same	   normative	  effect	   that	   the	   satisfaction	   or	   non-­‐satisfaction	   of	   any	   other	   ad	   bellum	  criterion	  does.	  By	  contrast,	  on	  the	  revised	  interpretation	  that	  I	  propose,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  also	  fulfils	  the	  more	  fundamental	  role	  of	  determining	  which	  class	  of	   activities	   counts	   as	  war	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   evaluation	   under	   the	  war–specific	   norms	   of	   just	   war	   theory.	   On	   this	   interpretation,	   the	   criterion	  serves	  not	  simply	  to	  identify	  the	  entities	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  waging	  justified	  wars,	   but	   to	   identify	   the	   entities	   which	   are	   capable	   of	   waging	   war	  
simpliciter.32	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  war	  –	  understood	  as	  the	  class	  of	  activities	  to	  which	  the	  norms	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  apply	  –	  is	  identified	  by	  “determining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Helen	  Frowe	  makes	  a	  similar,	  though	  brief,	  observation	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  role	  for	   the	   authority	   condition	   in	   defining	   war.	   Helen	   Frowe,	   The	   Ethics	   of	  War	   and	   Peace	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  p.59.	  However,	  Frowe	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  why	  it	  matters	   that	  war	   be	  defined	   in	   such	   terms.	   It	   is	   this	  missing	   element	   that	   I	   aim	   to	   have	  provided	  here.	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the	   entities	   that	   are	   allowed	   to	   begin	   and	   engage	   in	   war.”33	  In	   a	   recent	  work,	   Mark	   Evans	   has	   suggested	   that	   we	   may	   understand	   satisfying	   the	  authority	  criterion	  as	  requiring	  the	  possession	  of	  “the	  right	  to	  wage	  war.”34	  We	  may	  adopt	  Evans’	  terminology	  here	  and	  flesh	  out	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  right	  to	  wage	   war	   as	   consisting	   in	   an	   entity’s	   entitlement	   to	   have	   its	   organised	  violence,	   whether	   ad	   bellum	   justified	   or	   unjustified,	   evaluated	   under	   the	  norms	  of	   just	  war	   theory	   rather	   than	   the	  moral	   norms	   that	   govern	  other	  uses	  of	  force.35	  This	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   allows	   orthodox	  just	  war	  theory	  to	  resolve	  the	  Demarcation	  Requirement.	  By	  defining	  war	  as	  an	  activity	  of	  a	  limited	  class	  of	  entities,	  orthodox	  theorists	  are	  able	  draw	  the	  necessary	  normative	  boundary	  between	   the	  violent	  activities	   that	   are	  covered	  by	  its	  norms	  and	  those	  that	  are	  not.	  War	  and	  its	  attendant	  norms	  are	   distinguished	   from	   other	   activities	   by	   distinguishing	   between	   the	  entities	  which	  are	  able	  to	  create	  a	  state	  of	  war	  from	  those	  who	  are	  not.	  The	  authority	  criterion	  thus	  has	  a	  much	  more	  expansive	  and	  fundamental	  role	  within	   orthodox	   just	   war	   theory	   than	   is	   commonly	   assumed	   under	   the	  standard	   interpretation.	   Rather	   that	   simply	   contributing	   to	   determining	  whether	  a	  candidate	  war	  is	  ad	  bellum	  justified,	  the	  criterion	  determines	  the	  logically	   prior	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   activity	   in	   question	   constitutes	   a	  war	  in	  the	  first	  place.36	  	  On	   this	   revised	   reading,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   also	   importantly	  functions	  as	  an	  in	  bello	  criterion	  on	  an	  orthodox	  view.	  At	  first	  glance,	  it	  may	  be	  unclear	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  After	  all,	  one	  might	  think,	  jus	  in	  bello	  pertains	  to	  quite	  specific	  norms	  of	  conduct,	  such	  as	   the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants.	   It	   is	   not	   obvious	  what	   the	   authority	   criterion	  has	   to	   do	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33 	  Alexander	   Moseley,	   ‘The	   Philosophy	   of	   War’,	   Internet	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy,	  available	   at	   http://www.iep.utm.edu/war/.	  Moseley	   does	   not	   offer	   this	   statement	   as	   an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion.	  34	  Mark	   Evans,	   ‘Moral	   Theory	   and	   the	   Idea	   of	   a	   Just	  War’,	   in	  Mark	   Evans	   (ed),	   Just	  War	  
Theory:	  A	  Reappraisal,	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  p.13.	  35	  A	   similar	   point	   is	   also	   made,	   independently,	   by	   Cecile	   Fabre	   and	   Christopher	   Finlay.	  Cecile	   Fabre	   Cosmopolitan	   War	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2012),	   p.160.	  Christopher	   Finlay	   ‘Legitimacy	   and	   Non-­‐State	   Political	   Violence’,	   Journal	   of	   Political	  
Philosophy,	  18,	  No.3	  (2010),	  287-­‐312.	  36	  The	  logical	  priority	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  is	  also	  pointed	  out	  by	  Anthony	  Coates,	  who	  advances	   a	   structurally	   similar	   account	   of	   the	   criterion	   to	  my	  own.	  Coates,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  
War,	  p.124.	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these.	  We	  can	  appreciate	  the	  in	  bello	   function	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  by	  distinguishing	   between	   the	   content	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	   norms	   and	   their	  
jurisdiction.	   By	   the	   content	   of	   these	   norms,	   I	   mean	   the	   substantive,	   first-­‐order	   rules	   of	   conduct	   in	   war,	   such	   as	   the	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants.	  This	  is	  what	  most	  people	  are	  talking	  about	  when	  they	  refer	  to	  ‘the	  rules	  of	  war’.	  The	  jurisdiction	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  norms,	  by	  contrast,	  refers	  to	  the	  question	  of	   the	   range	  of	   activities	   and	  persons	   to	  whom	   these	  norms	  are	  applicable.	  Given	  this	  distinction,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	   the	   role	   of	   setting	   the	   jurisdictional	   scope	   of	   jus	   in	  bello	  norms.	   On	  this	  view,	  in	  order	  for	  acts	  of	  harming	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  jus	  in	  bello,	  they	  must	   be	   performed	   by	   an	   individual	   fighting	   on	   behalf	   of	   an	   entity	  which	   satisfies	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   The	   key	   normative	   effect	   of	   the	  possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   is	   that	   those	   individuals	   who	   act	   on	  behalf	  of	  such	  entities	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	  of	  permissions	  to	   cause	  harm	   than	   if	   they	   fought	   on	  behalf	   of	   an	   entity	  which	   lacks	   that	  authority.	  On	  the	  revised	  interpretation,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  thus	  plays	  an	  essentially	  permissive	  role.	  An	  interesting	  implication	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  independence	  of	  
jus	  in	  bello	  from	  just	  ad	  bellum	  cannot	  strictly	  be	  true,	  by	  the	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theorist’s	  own	  lights.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  precisely	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  orthodox	   view	   which	   necessitates	   an	   increased	   role	   for	   the	   authority	  criterion,	  to	  bridge	  the	  ad	  bellum/in	  bello	  divide	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.37	  With	   the	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   in	   place,	  we	  can	   appreciate	   the	  moral	   significance	   of	   philosophical	   definitions	   of	  war,	  such	  as	  Brian	  Orend’s,	  which	  make	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  character	  of	  the	  entities	  engaged	  in	  violence,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  definitions	  employed	  by	  empirical	  social-­‐scientists,	  which	  focus	  instead	  on	  the	  quantitative	  intensity	  of	   violence.38	  	   According	   to	   Orend,	   	   “War	   is	   a	   phenomenon	  which	   occurs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  As	  Christopher	  Finlay	  nicely	  puts	  it,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  “silently”	  links	  the	  two	  fields.	  Finlay,	  ‘Legitimacy	  and	  Non-­‐State	  Political	  Violence’,	  p.300.	  38	  For	  example,	   the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Project,	  which	  provides	  a	  major	  source	  of	  data	   for	  social	   scientific	   research	   on	   war	   and	   violence,	   classifies	   wars	   as	   sustained	   combat,	  involving	  organised	   forces,	   resulting	   in	  at	   least	  one	   thousand	  combat	  deaths	  per	   twelve-­‐month	   period.	   See,	   http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/	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only	   between	   political	   communities,	   defined	   as	   those	   which	   either	   are	  states	  or	  intend	  to	  become	  states.”39	  In	  light	  of	  the	  preceding	  argument,	  we	  can	   interpret	   such	  definitions	   as	   offering	   a	   fairly	   standard	   account	   of	   the	  relevant	  properties	  that	  an	  entity	  must	  posses	  in	  order	  to	  have	  war-­‐making	  authority,	   understanding	   the	   normative	   effects	   that	   follow	   from	   the	  possession	  of	  such	  authority	  in	  the	  way	  that	  I	  have	  claimed.	  The	  idea	  being	  that	  the	  more	  extensive	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  contained	  within	  jus	  in	  
bello	   apply	   only	   to	   individuals	   who	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   states	   or	   entities	  which	  aspire	  to	  statehood.	  	  
	  
1.7 The	  (Real)	  Challenge	  of	  Irregular	  Belligerency	  	  	  My	   arguments	   in	   support	   of	   the	   revised	   interpretation	   have	   so	   far	  proceeded	   at	   a	   fairly	   abstract	   level.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   demonstrate	   its	  strengths	   by	   considering	   a	   common	   feature	   of	   contemporary	   armed	  conflicts	  –	   that	   they	  are	  often	   fought	  by	   ‘irregular’	  belligerents.	  This	   term	  refers	  to	  groups	  engaging	  in	  armed	  conflict	  that	  are	  not	  recognised	  states.	  Examples	  include	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  groups,	  revolutionary	  and	  secessionist	  movements,	   factions	   within	   a	   civil	   war,	   ‘warlords’,	   terrorist	   groups,	   and	  armed	  criminal	  gangs.	  	  	  While	   several	   theorists	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   this	   empirical	  phenomenon	  poses	  an	  important	  challenge	  to	  just	  war	  theory40	  –	  and	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  COW%20Website%20-­‐%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf.	   For	   an	   accessible	   discussion	   of	  the	  different	  methods	  of	  quantitatively	  analysing	  armed	  conflict,	  see	  Stephen	  Pinker,	  The	  
Better	  Angels	  of	  Our	  Nature:	  A	  History	  of	  Violence	  and	  Humanity,	   (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2011),	  pp.241-­‐267	  and	  pp.358-­‐361.	  39	  Brian	   Orend,	   ‘War’	   in	   The	   Stanford	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy	   (Fall	   2008	   Edition),	  Edward	   N.	   Zalta	   (ed),	   available	   at:	  	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/	  40	  See,	  for	  example,	  Endre	  Begby,	  Gregory	  Reichberg	  and	  Henrik	  Syse,	   ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  War.	  Part	  II:	  Contemporary	  Authors	  and	  Issues’,	  Philosophy	  Compass	  7,	  No.5	  (2012),	  328-­‐347	  at	  p.331.	  More	  broadly,	  proponents	  of	  the	  ‘new	  wars’	  thesis,	  such	  as	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  argue	  that	  the	   diversity	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	  modern	   armed	   conflict	   also	   poses	   deep	   challenges	   to	  normative	   international	  political	   theory	  more	  generally.	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  New	  and	  Old	  Wars:	  
Organised	   Violence	   in	   a	   Global	   Era,	   2nd	   Edition,	   (Cambridge:	   	   Polity	   Press,	   2007).	   For	  arguments	   disputing	   the	   ‘newness’	   of	   the	   new	   wars	   thesis,	   see	   Mats	   Berdal,	   ‘The	   ‘New	  Wars’	   Thesis	   Revisited’	   in	   Huw	   Strachan	   and	   Sibylle	   Scheipers	   (eds),	   The	   Changing	  
Character	  of	  War	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  109-­‐133.	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authority	   criterion	   in	   particular 41 	  –	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   contemporary	  discussions	   frequently	   misconstrue	   the	   precise	   nature	   of	   this	   challenge,	  because	   they	   assume	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion.	   I	   then	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion	   provides	   a	  clearer	   account	   of	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   irregular	   belligerency	   and	   the	  kind	  of	  response	  that	  it	  requires.	  	  While	  my	  arguments	  are	   intended	   to	  apply	   to	  all	   accounts	  of	   just	  war	  theory	  that	  endorse	  both:	  (i)	  an	  orthodox	  conception	  of	   jus	  in	  bello	  norms	  and	   (ii)	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   my	  discussion	   here	   will	   focus	   on	   Nicholas	   Fotion’s	   recent	   work.42 	  This	   is	  worthy	   of	   particular	   attention,	   since	   Fotion	   endorses	   both	   these	   views,	  while	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  irregular	  belligerency	  head	  on.43	  	  Fotion	   rightly	  points	  out	   that	   irregular	  belligerency	  poses	  a	  particular	  problem	   for	   the	   requirement	   that	   a	   war	   be	   initiated	   and	   directed	   by	   an	  appropriate	  authority,	  which	  Fotion	  interprets	  to	  mean	  that	  a	  war	  must	  be	  initiated	   through	   the	   appropriate	   legal	   institutions	   of	   the	   state.	   The	  challenge,	  as	  Fotion	  sets	  it	  up,	  is	  that	  this	  requirement	  seems	  to	  heavily	  bias	  just	  war	  theory	  against	  irregular	  belligerents,	  since	  such	  groups	  will	  often	  lack	  the	  relevant	  properties.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  such	  groups	  “may	  have	  leaders,	  even	   charismatic	   ones,	   but	   these	   leaders	   do	   not	   have	   legitimate	  authority.”44	  Taking	   a	   standard	   view	   of	   the	   normative	   effect	   that	   follows	  from	  non-­‐possession	   of	  war-­‐making	   authority,	   Fotion’s	  worry	   is	   that	   just	  war	   theory	   will	   render	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   potential	   wars	   fought	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Eric	   A.	   Heinze	   and	   Brent	   J.	   Steele,	   ‘Introduction:	   Non-­‐State	   Actors	   and	   the	   Just	   War	  Tradition’,	   in	   Eric	   A.	   Heinze	   and	   Brent	   J.	   Steele	   (eds),	   Ethics,	   Authority	   and	   War	  (Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	   MacMillan,	   2009),	   1-­‐20;	   Coates,	   The	   Ethics	   of	  War,	   pp.125-­‐126;	  Frowe,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  p.191.	  42	  Nicholas	   Fotion,	  War	  and	  Ethics,	   Ch.9.	   See	   also,	  Nicholas	   Fotion,	   ‘Two	  Theories	   of	   Just	  War’,	  Philosophia	  34	  (2006),	  53-­‐64.	  43	  Fotion	   does	   not	   explicitly	   endorse	   the	   orthodox	   conception	   of	   jus	   in	  bello.	   However,	   a	  commitment	  to	  an	  orthodox	  view	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  what	  he	  does	  say	  on	  the	  topic.	  For	  example,	  he	  writes	   “it	   is	  easy	   to	  separate	   that	  part	  of	  a	   theory	  of	  exception	  having	   to	  do	  with	  starting	  a	  war	  (justice	  of	  the	  war)	  and	  the	  protracted	  period	  of	  time	  that	  follows	  once	  the	   war	   is	   started	   (justice	   in	   the	   war).”	   War	   and	   Ethics,	   p.21.	   Fotion	   also	   endorses	  conceptions	   of	   discrimination	   and	   proportionality	   in	  war	   that	   are	   equally	   satisfiable	   by	  combatants	   who	   participate	   in	   just	   and	   unjust	   wars.	   	   Fotion,	  War	   and	  Ethics,	   pp.21-­‐22.	  Thus,	   taken	   together,	   it	   seems	   fair	   to	   attribute	   to	   Fotion	   a	   commitment	   to	   an	   orthodox	  conception	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  44	  Fotion,	  War	  and	  Ethics,	  p.121.	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irregular	  belligerents	  as	  unjustified	  a	  priori.	  This	  statist	  bias	  is	  unattractive,	  since	   presumably	   some	   wars	   fought	   by	   irregular	   belligerents	   could	   in	  principle	   be	   justified. 45 	  We	   may	   term	   this	   the	   Standard	   Challenge	   of	  irregular	  belligerency	  –	  since	  it	  corresponds	  to	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion.	  In	   light	   of	   this	   challenge,	   Fotion	   offers	   a	   novel	   revision	   to	   just	   war	  theory,	  by	  dividing	   it	   into	   two	  parts	  –	   ‘Regular	   Just	  War	  Theory’	   (JWT-­‐R),	  which	   applies	   to	   traditional	   state	   belligerents,	   and	   ‘Irregular	   Just	   War	  Theory’	   (JWT-­‐I),	  which	   applies	   to	   non-­‐state	   actors	   engaging	   in	   organised	  violence.	   While	   JWT-­‐R	   retains	   all	   the	   standard	   criteria	   of	   jus	   ad	   bellum,	  Fotion	  boldly	  jettisons	  the	  authority	  criterion	  from	  JWT-­‐I.46	  On	  this	  revised	  theory	   of	   just	  war,	   the	   authority	   criterion	   functions	   only	   as	   a	   conditional	  requirement,	   in	  that	  the	  criterion	  need	  only	  be	  satisfied	   if	   it	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  satisfied.	  As	  Fotion	  puts	  it,	  “Since	  they	  [irregular	  belligerents]	  are	  unable	  to	  satisfy	   the	  principle,	   even	   in	   theory,	   JWT-­‐I	  does	  not	  ask	   them	  to	  do	  so.”47	  This	   ingenious	   twin	   version	   of	   just	   war	   theory	   is	   designed	   to	   bring	   the	  theory	  up-­‐to-­‐date,	  removing	  its	  unpalatable	  statist	  bias.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  deep	  problem	  with	  this	  response	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  irregular	   belligerency,	   arising	   from	   Fotion’s	   jettisoning	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion	  while	  maintaining	  a	  commitment	  to	  an	  orthodox	  conception	  of	  jus	  
in	  bello.	   As	   argued	   above,	   such	   a	   conception	   entails	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	  Discontinuity	   Thesis,	   which	   in	   turn	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   Demarcation	  Requirement.	  The	  problem,	   for	  Fotion,	   is	   that	  by	   jettisoning	   the	  authority	  criterion	   he	   denies	   himself	   the	   resources	   to	   satisfy	   the	   Demarcation	  Requirement,	  which	  generates	  some	  highly	  implausible	  results.	  The	  problem	  can	  be	  drawn	  out	  by	  considering	  the	  following	  example.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  For	  a	  classic	  critique	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  statism,	  see	  David	  Luban,	  ‘Just	  War	  and	  Human	  Rights’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  9,	  No.2	  (1980),	  160-­‐181.	  46	  Fotion	   also	   relaxes	   the	   criterion	   of	   reasonable	   prospect	   of	   success	   in	   JWT-­‐I.	  War	  and	  
Ethics,	  p.120	  47	  Fotion,	  War	  and	  Ethics,	  p.121.	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The	  Zepos:	  The	  Zepos	  are	  a	  large	  and	  well-­‐organised	  criminal	  organisation.	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  criminal	  empires,	  the	  Zepos	  declare	  themselves	  to	  be	   at	   war	   with	   the	   state	   in	   which	   they	   operate	   and	   which	   threatens	   to	  hamper	   their	   activities.	   The	   Zepos	   then	   conduct	   a	   campaign	   of	   lethal	  violence	   in	   pursuit	   of	   this	   aim.	   The	   Zepos	   armed	   fighters	   target	   only	  military	   personal	   and	   do	   not	   use	   any	   force	   beyond	   that	   required	   for	  achieving	  their	  goals.	  	  	  Imagine	   that	   when	   confronted	   with	   the	   accusation	   that	   they	   are	   acting	  seriously	  morally	  wrongly	  by	   fighting	   and	  killing	   in	  pursuit	   of	   such	   aims,	  individual	  Zepo	  fighters	  offer	  the	  following	  reply	  –	  “It	  may	  well	  be	  true	  that	  our	   aims	   are	   unjust.	   However,	   this	   injustice	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   jus	   ad	  bellum.	  Given	  that	  the	  norms	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  obtain	  independently	  of	  considerations	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  we	  cannot	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  acting	  wrongly	  by	  reference	  to	  such	  aims.	  Our	  action	  can	  only	  be	  evaluated	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  jus	  in	  bello,	  which	  we	  followed	  to	  the	  letter.”	  	  Clearly,	  something	  has	  gone	  amiss	  with	  this	  argument,	  since	  it	  is	  –	  I	  take	  it	   –	   uncontroversial	   that	   Zepo	   fighters	   are	   acting	   morally	   wrongly	   by	  targeting	  and	  killing	  their	  victims,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  members	  of	  the	  military.	  The	  obvious	  rejoinder	  to	  their	  claims	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  norms	  of	  jus	  in	  
bello	  are	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  violent	  activity	  which	  the	  Zepos	  are	  engaged	  in.	  The	  underlying	   thought	  here	   is	   that	  groups	  such	  as	   the	  Zepos	   lack	   the	  ability	   to	   create	   a	   genuine	   state	   of	   war,	   and	   hence	   their	   violence	   falls	  outside	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   orthodox	   just	   war	   theory	   and	   its	   war-­‐specific	  norms	   of	   conduct.	   Once	   this	   argument	   is	   made,	   the	   claims	   of	   individual	  Zepo	  members	  to	  moral	  and	  legal	  immunity	  for	  their	  acts	  of	  killing	  can	  be	  rejected.	  Their	  claims	  are	  not	  mistaken	  because	   they	  have	  misunderstood	  what	   the	   norms	   of	   jus	   in	  bello	   are,	   but	   because	   they	   have	  misunderstood	  what	  a	  state	  of	  war	  is	  and	  who	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  one	  into	  existence.	  	  As	   argued	   above,	   this	   crucial	   idea	   that	   war	   and	   non-­‐war	   are	   to	   be	  distinguished	  by	  reference	  to	  facts	  about	  the	  parties	  engaging	  in	  violence	  is	  captured	   by	   adopting	   a	   more	   expansive	   conception	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion.	   The	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion	   allows	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orthodox	   just	  war	   theory	   to	  make	   the	  argument	   that	  violence	  such	  as	   the	  Zepos’	   falls	   outside	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   just	  war	   theory,	   thus	   resolving	   the	  Demarcation	   Requirement.	   The	   thought	   is	   that	   Zepos	   fighters	   are	   not	  morally	  permitted	  to	  kill	  opposing	  military	  personnel	  because	  they	  do	  not	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  possesses	  war-­‐making	  authority.	  	  The	  problem	  for	  Fotion’s	  twin	  just	  war	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  unable	  to	  make	   this	   necessary	   argument,	   since	   it	   does	   not	   include	   an	   authority	  criterion	   within	   JWT-­‐I,	   the	   part	   of	   his	   theory	   which	   applies	   to	   armed	  conflicts	  waged	  by	  irregular	  belligerents,	  such	  as	  the	  Zepos.	  The	  troubling	  implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   JWT-­‐I	   lacks	   the	   resources	   to	   explain	  why	   Zepo	  fighters	  act	  morally	  wrongly.	  The	  most	  that	  can	  be	  said	  under	  JWT-­‐I	  is	  that	  the	  Zepos	  clearly	  lack	  a	  just	  cause,	  but	  all	  that	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  this	  is	  that	  the	  Zepos	  are	  fighting	  an	  unjust	  war,	  which	  is	  precisely	  the	  concession	  that	  the	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theorist	  needs	  to	  reject.	  	  Fotion	  does	   consider	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   demarcation	  problem	  arising	  for	   his	   twin	   theory.	   Fotion’s	   concern	   is	   that	   the	   theory	   may	   suffer	   from	  vagueness	  when	   applied	   to	   particular	   cases,	   so	   that	   it	  may	   be	   difficult	   to	  distinguish	   between	   groups	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   satisfying	   the	   authority	  criterion	   and	   those	   which	   are	   not.	   The	   result	   of	   this	   is	   that	   we	  may	   not	  know	   whether	   JWT-­‐R	   or	   JWT-­‐I	   applies	   to	   the	   particular	   case,	   the	   worry	  being	  that	  just	  wars	  may	  be	  wrongly	  classified	  as	  unjustified,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  After	  considering	  the	  problem,	  Fotion	  concludes	  that,	  “In	  the	  end	  the	  dual-­‐theory	   approach	   to	   Just	  War	   Theory	   seems	   viable.	   It	   helps	   keep	   us	   clear	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  war	  we	  are	  engaged	  in,	   it	  doesn’t	  suffer	  from	  so	  much	  vagueness	  as	  it	  seemed	  it	  did	  at	  the	  outset	  and	  although	  it	  perhaps	  triggers	  more	   wars	   than	   the	   classic	   theory,	   those	   additional	   wars	   are	   few	   in	  number.”48	  However,	   this	   misses	   the	   deeper	   problem	   of	   demarcation	   facing	  Fotion’s	   twin	   theory.	  What	   should	   be	   of	   concern	   here	   is	   not	   that	   it	   may	  struggle	  to	  tell	  us	  “what	  kind	  of	  war”	  we	  are	  dealing	  with,	  and	  hence	  which	  version	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  applies.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  that	  it	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  explain	  why,	   in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases	  of	  violent	  activity,	  no	  version	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Fotion,	  ‘Two	  Theories	  of	  Just	  War’,	  pp.60-­‐61.	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just	   war	   theory	   applies.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   mentioned,	   JWT-­‐I	   lacks	   the	  component	   of	   the	   theory	   capable	   of	   performing	   the	   vital	   role	   of	  distinguishing	   the	   class	   of	   activities	   that	   fall	   within	   its	   jurisdiction	   from	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  	  The	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  for	  Fotion’s	  twin	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  misconstrues	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   irregular	   belligerency,	   because	   it	  assumes	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   and	   the	  normative	  effects	  that	  follow	  from	  its	  possession	  and	  non-­‐possession.	  	  If	  my	  arguments	   motivating	   a	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	  are	   successful,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   real	   challenge	   posed	   by	   irregular	  belligerency	  is	  not	  –	  contra	  the	  standard	  challenge	  –	  that	  it	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	   to	   distinguish	   between	   ad	   bellum	   just	   and	   unjust	   wars.	   Rather,	  irregular	   belligerency	   makes	   it	   far	   more	   difficult	   for	   just	   war	   theory	   to	  cleanly	  distinguish	  those	  activities	  to	  which	  its	  norms	  apply	  from	  those	  to	  which	   they	   do	   not.49	  Term	   this	   the	   Revised	   Challenge.	   Importantly,	   the	  revised	  challenge	  is	  essentially	  a	  problem	  of	  jus	  in	  bello,	  not	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  It	  is	  a	  problem	  about	  how	  to	  establish	  the	  precise	  scope	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  norms,	  given	  that	  reflection	  on	  irregular	  belligerency	  suggests	  that	  legitimate	  war	  making	  is	  not	  solely	  the	  preserve	  of	  easily	  identifiable	  states.	  Fotion’s	  novel	  solution	   to	   the	   standard	   challenge,	   which	   jettisons	   the	   problematic	   ad	  
bellum	  authority	  criterion,	  thus	  undercuts	  the	  ability	  of	  his	  twin-­‐theory	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  deeper	  revised	  challenge.	  The	  revised	  challenge	  reveals	  that	  orthodox	   just	  war	  theory	  cannot	   jettison	  the	  authority	  criterion,	  since	  the	  theory	  relies	  on	  the	  authority	  criterion	  for	  its	  coherence.	  	  As	   mentioned	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   section,	   the	   problem	   that	   I	   have	  pressed	  against	  Fotion’s	  twin	  theory	  is	  intended	  to	  have	  wider	  significance.	  The	  very	  same	  demarcation	  problem	  arises	  on	  any	  orthodox	  account	   that	  assumes	   the	   standard	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   The	  problem	  is	  just	  more	  easily	  diagnosable	  in	  Fotion’s	  account.	  On	  any	  theory	  which	   includes	   an	   authority	   requirement,	   but	   treats	   it	   as	   solely	   an	   ad	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  For	   a	   discussion	   of	   this	   problem	   in	   terms	   of	   applying	   the	   law	   of	   war,	   see	   Rosa	  Ehrenreich	   Brooks,	   ‘War	   Everywhere:	   Rights,	   National	   Security	   Law,	   and	   the	   Law	   of	  Armed	   Conflict	   in	   an	   Age	   of	   Terror’,	   University	   of	   Pennsylvania	   Law	   Review	   153,	   No.2	  (2004),	  675-­‐761.	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bellum	   criterion,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   particular	   group	   initiating	   a	   campaign	   of	  large-­‐scale	  violence	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  it	  tells	  us	  nothing	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  group’s	  agents	  fall	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  norms	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  or	  not.	  	  To	  demonstrate,	   let	   us	   return,	   one	   last	   time,	   to	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Zepos.	  The	  example	  was	  designed	  to	  show	  that	  an	  account	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  such	  as	  Fotion’s	  JWT-­‐I,	  which	  endorses	  an	  orthodox	  conception	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  but	  does	   not	   contain	   an	   authority	   criterion,	   is	   incapable	   of	   explaining	   why	  individual	  Zepo	  fighters	  act	  morally	  wrongly.	  The	  very	  same	  problem	  arises	  for	  any	  orthodox	  account	   that	  assumes	   the	  standard	   interpretation	  of	   the	  authority	   criterion.	   When	   applied	   to	   cases	   such	   as	   the	   Zepos,	   these	  accounts	   are	   (unlike	   Fotion’s)	   able	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   Zepos	   fail	   to	  possess	   legitimate	   war-­‐making	   authority.	   However,	   given	   that	   such	  accounts	   treat	   the	  authority	   criterion	  as	   solely	  an	  ad	  bellum	   requirement,	  all	  that	  follows	  from	  this	  failure	  is	  that	  a	  belligerent’s	  armed	  conflict	   is	  ad	  
bellum	  unjustified.	  Making	  this	  point	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  theory	  with	  any	  resources	   for	   denying	   the	   Zepo’s	   claim	   to	   evaluation	   under	   the	   norms	   of	  just	  war	  theory.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory	  must	  endorse	  the	  revised	  interpretation.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  reveal	  the	  theoretical	  significance	  of	  the	  practical	   issue	   of	   irregular	   belligerency.	   Once	   the	   challenge	   of	   irregular	  belligerency	   is	   recognised	  a	   challenge	   regarding	   the	  precise	   jurisdictional	  scope	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	   norms,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   authority	   requirement	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  to	  the	  ad	  bellum	  domain,	  nor	  jettisoned	  in	  the	  difficult	  cases	  raised	  by	  irregular	  belligerents.	  To	  address	  the	  challenge	  of	  irregular	  belligerency,	  orthodox	  just	  theorists	  must	  fulfil	  two	  important	  tasks.	  	  Firstly,	  a	  much	  more	  precise	  account	  of	  the	  relevant	  properties	  that	  give	  rise	   to	   the	   possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   (in	   its	   revised	   role)	   is	  required,	  which	  tells	  us	  more	  than	  the	  vague	  intuition	  that	  agents	  who	  use	  force	  on	  behalf	  of	  established	  states	  fall	  within	  it,	  while	  agents	  who	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  criminal	  gangs	  such	  as	  the	  Zepos	  clearly	  do	  not.	  The	  challenge	  of	  irregular	  belligerency	  requires	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theorists	  to	  venture	  into	  the	  murky	  spectrum	  of	  cases	  between	  these	  two	  poles	  and	  provide	  criteria	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for	   clearly	  demarcating	  war	   from	  other	  violent	  activities,	   and	   to	  do	   so	  by	  reference	  to	  properties	  of	  the	  of	  entities	  involved.	  	  Secondly,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   a	   charge	   of	  arbitrariness,	   such	   an	   account	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   not	   only	   has	   to	  provide	   an	   intuitively	   acceptable	   account	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   just	  war	   theory	  and	  its	  war-­‐specific	  norms	  of	  conduct,	  it	  also	  has	  to	  explain	  why	  members	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  entity	  are	  entitled	  to	  evaluation	  under	  those	  distinct,	  and	  more	  permissive,	  moral	  norms.	  If	  the	  norms	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  apply	  only	  to	  those	  who	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  entities	  that	  possess	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  properties,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  explained	  what	  it	  is	  about	  those	  properties	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm.	  	  We	   can	   see	   then	   that	   the	   practical	   issue	   of	   irregular	   belligerency	   has	  great	  significance	  for	  theoretical	  debates	  within	  just	  war	  theory	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  war	  and	  other	  spheres	  of	  action.	  The	  plausibility	  of	   the	  view	   that	  war	   is	  morally	  discontinuous	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	   its	  proponents	   can	   provide	   a	   satisfactory	   response	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	  irregular	   belligerency.	   A	   failure	   to	   do	   so	   will	   provide	   strong	   support	   for	  critics	   of	   the	   orthodox	   view,	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   correct	   account	   of	   the	  morality	  of	  war	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  our	  settled	  moral	  views	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  killing	  and	  injuring	  in	  all	  other	  contexts.	  	  
1.8	  Classical	  Just	  War	  Theory	  and	  the	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  endorsing	  an	  orthodox	  conception	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  entails	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  more	  expansive	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	  authority	  within	  just	   war	   theorising	   and	   the	   normative	   effects	   that	   follow	   from	   its	  possession	  or	  non-­‐possession.	   In	   this	   final	  section,	   I	  demonstrate	   that	   the	  argument	  I	  have	  offered	  for	  this	  conclusion	  generalises	  to	  other	  approaches	  to	   just	  war	   theory	  which	  do	  not	  endorse	   this	   specific	   conception	  of	   jus	  in	  
bello.	  In	  particular,	   I	  show	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  also	  plays	  the	  same	  expansive	  role	  within	  classical	  just	  war	  theory,	  as	  influential	  formulated	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Catholic	  theologians	  such	  as	  Augustine	  and	  Aquinas,	  despite	  the	  important	  differences	  between	  the	  classical	  and	  orthodox	  views.	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As	  I	  have	  argued,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  arises	  from	  a	  commitment	   to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   norms	   governing	   conduct	   in	   war	   are	  distinct	  from	  and	  irreducible	  to	  the	  norms	  that	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  in	  other	  contexts.	  As	  explained	  above,	  within	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory,	  it	  is	  the	  commitment	  to	  the	  Equality	  Thesis	  that	  necessitates	  such	  a	  view,	  since	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  equality	  is	  generally	  absent	  in	  cases	  of	  justified	  harming	  outside	  the	  context	  of	  war.	  	  Given	   the	  ubiquity	  of	   the	  orthodox	  view,	   it	   is	   tempting	   to	  assume	  that	  this	   conception	   of	   just	   conduct	   in	   war	   has	   a	   long	   and	   distinguished	  pedigree.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   The	   Equality	   Thesis	   is	   in	   fact	   a	  relatively	  recent	  development,	  only	  becoming	  established	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	   centuries	  with	   the	   rise	  of	   international	   law.50	  By	   contrast,	  classical	   just	  war	   theorists	  did	  not	  endorse	   the	  Equality	  Thesis.	  For	   these	  thinkers,	   only	   combatants	   who	   fought	   in	   wars	   with	   a	   just	   cause	   were	  permitted	   to	   attack	   and	   kill	   their	   opponents.	   Those	  who	   fought	   in	   unjust	  wars	  committed	  a	  serious	  moral	  wrong	  by	  doing	  so.51	  	  Interestingly,	   despite	   rejecting	   the	   Equality	   Thesis,	   classical	   just	   war	  theorists	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  ground	  the	  permission	  to	  fight	  and	  kill	   in	  just	  wars	   in	   the	   ordinary	   moral	   permissions	   to	   use	   force	   available	   to	  individuals,	   such	   as	   self-­‐defence.	   	   As	   Gregory	   Reichberg	   explains,	   on	   a	  classical	  view,	  	  	   It	   was…understood	   that	   public	   war	   should	   be	   waged	   and	   its	  morality	   judged	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   set	   of	   norms	   that	   are	   not	  directly	   reducible	   to	   those	   governing	   private	   self	   (and	   other)-­‐defense.52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Gregory	  Reichberg,	  ‘The	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants	  –	  A	  Doctrine	  in	  Classical	  Just	  War	  Theory?	  A	  Response	   to	  Graham	  Parsons’,	   Journal	  of	  Military	  Ethics	  12,	  No.2	   (2013),	  181-­‐194.	  51Ibid,	  at	  181-­‐185.	  This	  point	  is	  also	  stressed	  in,	  among	  others,	  McMahan,	  ‘War’;	  Neff,	  ‘War	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Nations’,	  p.63;	  Gregory	  Reichberg,	   ‘Just	  War	  and	  Regular	  War:	  Competing	  Paradigms’	   in	   Rodin	   and	   Shue	   (eds),	   Just	   and	   Unjust	  Warriors,	  193-­‐214;	   Uwe	   Steinhoff,	  ‘Rights,	  Liability	  and	  the	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants’,	  Journal	  of	  Ethics	  16,	  No.4	  (2012),	  339-­‐366.	  52	  Reichberg,	  ‘The	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants	  –	  A	  Doctrine	  in	  Classical	  Just	  War	  Theory?	  A	  Response	  to	  Graham	  Parsons’,	  p.182.	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In	   the	   terminology	   introduced	   earlier,	  we	   can	   say	   that	   classical	   just	  war	  theory	  was	  also	  committed	  to	  the	  Discontinuity	  Thesis.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	   the	   classical	   theorists	   endorsed	   a	   much	   more	   restrictive	   account	   of	  permissible	   homicide	   than	   that	   generally	   accepted	   today.	   In	   particular,	  they	   took	   a	   much	   more	   restrictive	   view	   of	   permissible	   self-­‐defensive	  killing.53	  On	   the	   most	   extreme	   view,	   such	   killing	   was	   straightforwardly	  morally	   wrong.54	  On	   a	   more	   moderate	   view,	   defensive	   killing	   may	   have	  been	   permissible	   in	   a	   weak	   sense,	   but	   only	   under	   extreme	   and	   unusual	  circumstances,	  where	  the	  agent’s	  ‘back	  was	  against	  the	  wall’,	  so	  that	  the	  act	  of	  killing	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  unintended	  and	  instinctive	  lashing	  out.55	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘permissible	   in	  a	  weak	  sense’	  because,	  even	  in	  these	  cases,	  self-­‐defence	  was	  viewed	  more	  as	  an	  excuse	  than	  a	  justification,	  in	  contrast	  to	   contemporary	   practice. 56 	  Given	   such	   a	   conception	   of	   permissible	  homicide,	  it	  is	  clear	  why	  the	  classical	  just	  war	  theorists	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  ground	  the	  permission	  to	  participate	  in	  just	  wars	  in	  the	  ordinary	  norms	  of	  interpersonal	   morality.	   Such	   an	   attempt	   could	   only	   yield	   pacifism	   as	   a	  result,	   since	   these	   norms	  would	   not	   permit	   individuals	   to	   engage	   in	   the	  premeditated	  and	  organised	  acts	  of	  killing	  typical	  of	  war.	  	  	  So,	   despite	   their	   very	   different	   substantive	   accounts	   of	   permissible	  conduct	   in	   war,	   both	   classical	   and	   orthodox	   just	   war	   theory	   share	   a	  common	  commitment	  to	  the	  Discontinuity	  Thesis.	  Once	  this	  is	  made	  overt,	  we	   can	   see	   the	   central	   importance	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   for	   classical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  See	  Oliver	  O’Donovan,	  The	  Just	  War	  Revisited	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  p.22.	  54	  This	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  Augustine’s	  view,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  St.	  Ambrose.	  See	  Lackey,	  
The	   Ethics	   of	   War	   and	   Peace,	   p.17;	   Langan,	   ‘The	   Elements	   of	   St.	   Augustine’s	   Just	   War	  Theory’,	   p.27;	   Louis	   J.	   Swift,	   ‘St.	   Ambrose	   on	   Violence	   and	   War’,	   Transactions	   and	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  American	  Philological	  Society	  101	  (1970),	  533-­‐543	  at	  p.537.	  	  55	  See	   Neff,	   War	   and	   the	   Law	   of	   Nations,	   pp.59-­‐62;	   Reichberg,	   ‘The	   Moral	   Equality	   of	  Combatants	   –	   A	  Doctrine	   in	   Classical	   Just	  War	   Theory?	   A	   Response	   to	   Graham	  Parsons’	  p.189;	   Michael	   Thompson,	   ‘Aquinas	   and	   Locke	   on	   Self-­‐Defense’,	  University	   of	   Pittsburgh	  
Law	  Review	  57	  (1996),	  677-­‐684.	  	  56	  Thompson,	   ‘Aquinas	  and	  Locke	  on	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  at	  pp.677-­‐679.	  George	  Fletcher	  points	  out	   that	   a	   successful	   invocation	   of	   the	  medieval	   common	   law	  defence	   of	   se	  denfendendo	  resulted	  only	   in	   the	  defendant’s	   avoidance	  of	  punishment	  by	  execution,	  while	   conceding	  the	   wrongfulness	   of	   the	   act.	   The	   successful	   defendant	   was	   still	   required	   to	   give	   up	  property	  to	  the	  crown	  by	  way	  of	  recompense	  for	  the	  homicide.	  Fletcher	  notes	  that,	  “Until	  the	   Statute	   of	   Henry	   VIII,	   passed	   in	   1532…there	   was	   no	   theory	   of	   self-­‐defense	   that	  rendered	   a	   killing	   fully	   lawful,	   justifiable	   and	   therefore	   free	   of	   the	   taint	   that	   affected	  excusable	   homicide.”	   George	   Fletcher,	   ‘Defensive	   Force	   as	   an	   Act	   of	   Rescue’,	   Social	  
Philosophy	  and	  Policy	  7,	  No.	  2	  (1990),	  170-­‐179	  at	  p.171.	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just	   war	   theorists,	   for	   the	   same	   reasons	   that	   I	   have	   argued	   regarding	  orthodox	   just	   war	   theory.	   For	   both	   the	   classical	   and	   orthodox	   just	   war	  theorist,	   the	   domains	   of	   war	   and	   non-­‐war	   require	   demarcation,	   and	   this	  role	   is	  performed	  by	   the	  authority	  criterion.	  On	  each	  view,	   the	  normative	  effects	  that	  follow	  from	  the	  possession	  and	  non-­‐possession	  of	  war-­‐making	  authority	   are	   the	   same	   –	   those	   who	   use	   force	   on	   behalf	   of	   war-­‐making	  authorities	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   more	   extensive	   set	   of	   permissions	   to	   inflict	  lethal	  harm,	  whereas	  those	  who	  use	  force	  privately	  (or	  on	  behalf	  of	  entities	  which	   also	   lack	   the	   relevant	   authority)	   are	   covered	   only	   by	   the	   more	  minimal	   permission	   (or	   perhaps	   only	   excuse)	   of	   self-­‐defence. 57 	  As	  Reichberg	  notes,	  for	  the	  classical	  theorists,	  	  	   Chief	   among	   the	   factors	   separating	   the	   two	   sorts	   of	   conflict	  was	   the	  role	  assigned	  to	   legitimate	  authority	  –	  war	  requiring	  it,	  and	  self-­‐defense	  not…Those	  called	  to	  war	  (i.e.	  bellum	  in	  the	  proper,	   public	   denotation	   of	   the	   term)	   and	   serve	   in	   it,	   are	  bound	  by	  a	  norm	  that	  has	  little	  applicability	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  private	  self-­‐defense.58	  	  	  This	  coheres	  nicely	  with	  the	  arguments	  that	  I	  have	  offered	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  more	  expansive	  conception	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  within	  orthodox	  just	   war	   theory.	   For	   both	   orthodox	   and	   classical	   just	   war	   theory,	   the	  authority	   criterion	   plays	   an	   important	   in	   bello	   role,	   determining	   which	  individuals	   are	   covered	   by	   war	   specific	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Michael	  Thomson	  makes	  a	  similar	  point,	  arguing	   that	   “premodern	  practice,…restricted	  justified	  killing	  to	  that	  legitimately	  performed	  by	  agents	  of	  the	  state.”	  Thompson,	  ‘Aquinas	  and	  Locke	  on	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  p.678.	   	  This	   thought	   is	  endorsed	  by	  Elizabeth	  Anscombe,	   the	  most	  influential	  recent	  proponent	  of	  a	  classical	  conception	  of	  just	  war.	  “The	  right	  to	  attack	  with	  a	  view	  to	  killing	  is	  something	  that	  belongs	  only	  to	  rulers	  and	  those	  they	  command	  to	  
do	   it”.	   G.E.M.	   Anscombe,	   ‘War	   and	   Murder’,	   in	   The	   Collected	   Papers	   of	   G.E.M.	   Anscombe.	  
Volume	   Three:	   Ethics	   Religion	   and	   Politics	   (Oxford:	   Blackwell,	   1981),	   51-­‐61	   at	   p.53	  (emphasis	  added).	  58	  Reichberg,	  ‘The	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants	  –	  A	  Doctrine	  in	  Classical	  Just	  War	  Theory?	  A	   Response	   to	   Graham	   Parsons’,	   p.189.	   	   James	   Turner	   Johnson	   makes	   a	   similar	   point,	  noting	   that	   within	   classical	   just	   war	   theory,	   	   “There	   is	   a	   fundamental	   moral	   difference	  between	  the	  use	  of	  the	  sword	  by	  one	  in	  sovereign	  authority	  or	  on	  his	  behalf	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	   sword	  by	  a	  private	   individual.	  The	   former	  may	  wage	  bellum,	  which	   is	   the	  use	  of	   the	  sword	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  common	  good;	  the	  latter	  may	  not.	  ”	  James	  Turner	  Johnson,	  ‘Aquinas	  and	  Luther	  on	  Sovereign	  Authority’,	  pp.9-­‐10.	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which	   individuals	   are	   not,	   by	   identifying	   the	   entities	   which	   are	   morally	  entitled	   to	  bring	  a	  state	  of	  war	   into	  existence	   from	  those	  which	  are	  not.59	  Despite	  their	  many	  differences,	  viewing	  classical	  and	  orthodox	  approaches	  from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   reveals	   an	   important	  continuity	  in	  the	  just	  war	  tradition	  that	  often	  goes	  unnoticed.	  	  This	   brief	   discussion	   of	   classical	   just	   war	   theory	   is	   intended	   to	  demonstrate	  the	  wider	  point	  that	  the	  argument	  I	  have	  offered	  in	  favour	  of	  the	   revised	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   generalisable.	   The	  importance	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  arises	  from	  a	  general	  commitment	  to	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  war	  and	   its	   relationship	   to	  other	  activities,	  and	  not	  on	  a	  particular	  substantive	  account	  of	  just	  conduct	  in	  war.	  	  	  
1.9 Conclusion	  	  I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   traditional	   requirement	   that	   a	  war	   be	  waged	  by	   a	  legitimate	   authority	   has	   much	   greater	   significance	   within	   just	   war	  theorising	   than	   is	   usually	   recognised.	   The	   normative	   effects	   that	   follow	  from	   the	   possession	   or	   non-­‐possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   are	  broader	   than	   commonly	   supposed.	   Whereas	   standard	   views	   treat	   the	  criterion	   as	   functioning	   restrictively	   –	   imposing	   a	   constraint	   on	   the	  justification	  of	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  –	  I	  aim	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  criterion	  can	  also	   be	   understood	   as	   functioning	   permissively	   –	   expressing	   the	   core	  intuition	   that	   individuals	   who	   use	   force	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	  entities	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	  of	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  than	  if	  they	  acted	  privately.	  The	  arguments	  offered	  here	  have	  are	  largely	  formal	  and	  interpretive.	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  show	  that	  given	  certain	  common	  views	  about	  the	  morality	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  It	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  classical	  just	  war	  theory	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  particularly	  developed	  account	  of	  jus	  in	  bello,	  compared	  to	  modern	  practice.	  Most	  saliently,	  classical	  views	  did	  not	  contain	   a	   clear	   prohibition	   on	   attacking	   certain	   classes	   of	   person	   in	   war	   akin	   to	   the	  contemporary	  principle	  of	  discrimination.	  (See,	  for	  example,	  Langan,	   ‘The	  Elements	  of	  St.	  Augustine’s	   Just	   War	   Theory’,	   p.31).	   While	   this	   is	   true,	   the	   arguments	   presented	   here	  suggest	  that	  classical	  theories	  do	  have	  an	  account	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	   in	  an	  important	  sense,	  in	  that	  they	  view	  conduct	  in	  war	  as	  governed	  by	  different	  norms	  to	  those	  that	  govern	  private	  action,	  and	  ground	  this	  locate	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  who	  permissibly	  participate	  in	  wars	  do	  so	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  business	  of	  war-­‐making.	  	  	  
	  	   40	  





	  	   41	  
Chapter	  2	  –	  Scepticism	  Regarding	  the	  Authority	  Criterion	  
	  
2.1	  Introduction	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	  a	  much	  more	   expansive	   role	   within	   the	   just	   war	   tradition	   than	   is	   commonly	  supposed.	   According	   to	   the	   standard	   interpretation,	   the	   normative	   effect	  that	   follows	   from	  an	  entity’s	  possessing	   the	   relevant	   authority-­‐conferring	  properties	   is	   that	   it	   has	   the	   ability	   to	   fight	   justified	  wars.	   Entities	   lacking	  those	  properties	  may	  still	   fight	  wars,	  but	   those	  wars	  will	  be	  unjust	  by	  ad	  
bellum	  standards.	  By	  contrast,	  on	  the	  revised	  interpretation,	  the	  normative	  effect	  that	  follows	  from	  an	  entity’s	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  properties	  is	  that	  individuals	  who	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  that	  entity	  are	  subject	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm.	  The	  criterion	  thus	  performs	  both	  a	  restrictive	  and	  permissive	  function.	  With	  this	  conceptual	  groundwork	  in	  place,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  normative	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   morally	  defensible,	  in	  either	  its	  restrictive	  or	  permissive	  roles.	  I	  begin	  exploring	  this	  question	  by	  setting	  out	  a	  recent	  and	   increasingly	   influential	   ‘reductivist’60	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war,	  defended	  most	  prominently	  by	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  Cecile	   Fabre	   and	   Helen	   Frowe	   (Sections	   2.2).61	  	   Reductivism	   has	   been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	  view	   I	   term	   ‘reductivism’	   is	  also	  sometimes	  referred	   to	  as	   ‘individualism’.	   See,	   for	  example,	  Helen	  Frowe,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  Ch.2.	  As	   I	  use	   the	   term,	   reductivism	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   synonymous	  with	   individualism.	   To	  my	   knowledge,	   the	   term	  was	  first	  coined	  in	  David	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  Self-­‐Defense	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  Ch.6.	  61	  McMahan,	   ‘Innocence,	  Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Killing	  in	  War’;	  McMahan,	   ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	   War’;	   Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘War	   as	   Self-­‐Defense’,	   Ethics	   and	   International	   Affairs	   18,	   No.1	  (2004),	   13-­‐18;	   Jeff	   McMahan,	   Killing	   in	  War;	   Cecile	   Fabre,	   ‘Guns,	   Food	   and	   Liability	   to	  Attack	   in	  War’,	  Ethics	  120,	  No.1	   (2009),	   36-­‐63;	   Cecile	   Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	   2012);	   Cecile	   Fabre,	   ‘Internecine	  War	  Killings’,	  Utilitas	   24,	  No,2	  (2012),	  214-­‐236;	  Cecile	  Fabre,	  ‘Cosmopolitanism	  and	  Wars	  of	  Self	  Defence’	  in	  Cecile	  Fabre	  and	   Seth	   Lazar	   (eds),	   The	   Morality	   of	   Defensive	   War	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  2014),	  90-­‐114;	  Helen	  Frowe,	  ‘Self-­‐Defence	  and	  the	  Principle	  of	  Non-­‐Combatant	  Immunity’,	  
Journal	   of	  Moral	   Philosophy	   8,	   No.4	   (2011),	   530-­‐546;	   Helen	   Frowe,	  Defensive	  Killing:	   An	  
Essay	  on	  War	  and	  Self-­‐Defence	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	   forthcoming).	   For	   other	  statements	  of	   a	   reductivist	   view,	   see,	  Richard	   J.	  Arneson,	   ‘Just	  Warfare	  Theory	  and	  Non-­‐Combatant	  Immunity’,	  Cornell	  International	  Law	  Journal	  39	  (2006),	  663-­‐668;	  David	  Rodin,	  ‘The	  Moral	   Inequality	   of	   Combatants:	  Why	   jus	   in	  bello	  Asymmetry	   is	  Half-­‐Right’	   in	   Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  44-­‐68;	  C.A.J.	  Coady,	  ‘The	  Status	  of	  Combatants’	  in	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  153-­‐175;	  Andrew	  Altman	  and	  Christopher	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subject	  to	  much	  discussion,	  but	  here	  I	  aim	  to	  highlight	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  view,	  which	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  powerful	  objections	  to	   the	  moral	   significance	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   in	   both	   its	   permissive	  and	  restrictive	  roles	  (Sections	  2.3-­‐2.4).	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  reductivists	  argue	   that	   the	   criterion	   should	   be	   jettisoned	   from	   just	   war	   theorising	  altogether.	  Section	  2.5	  concludes.	  
	  
2.2	  Reductivism:	  An	  Overview	  
	  I	  begin	  by	  providing	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  reductivist	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war.	  While	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  reductivist	  thinkers	  and	  theories,	  the	  view	  can	  be	  characterised	  by	  a	  shared	  commitment	  to	  two	  theses.62	  
	  
2.2.1	  The	  Continuity	  Thesis	  
	  The	   fundamental	   commitment	   of	   reductivism	   is	   that	   war	   is	   morally	  continuous	  with	  all	  other	  domains	  of	  action.	  The	  moral	  reasons	  that	  govern	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  war	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  those	  that	  govern	  all	  other	  cases	   of	   interpersonal	   harming.	   According	   to	   reductivism,	   “there	   is	   no	  special	   morality	   of	   war.”63 	  There	   is	   one	   single	   moral	   domain	   and	   all	  activities	  fall	  within	  its	  jurisdiction.	  On	  this	  view,	  both	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  and	  conduct	  within	  war,	  when	   justified,	  are	   justified	  precisely	  because,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  they	  can	  be	  justified	  under	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Heath	   Wellman,	   ‘From	   Humanitarian	   Intervention	   to	   Assassination:	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Political	   Violence’,	   Ethics	  118,	   No.2	   (2008),	   228-­‐257;	   Lionel	   McPherson,	   ‘Innocence	   and	  Responsibility	  in	  War’,	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  34,	  No.4	  (2004),	  485-­‐506;	  Gerhard	  Overland,	   ‘Killing	   Soldiers’,	   Ethics	   and	   International	   Affairs	   20,	   No.4	   (2006),	   455-­‐475;	  James	   Pattison,	   ‘When	   Is	   it	   Right	   to	   Fight?	   Just	   War	   Theory	   and	   the	   Individual-­‐Centric	  Approach’,	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice	   16,	  No.1	   (2013),	  34-­‐54;	  Uwe	  Steinhoff,	  The	  
Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Terrorism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  Uwe	  Steinhoff,	   ‘Jeff	  McMahan	   on	   the	  Moral	   Equality	   of	   Combatants’,	   Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	   16,	  No.	   2	  (2008),	  220-­‐226.	  62	  In	   formulating	   the	   two	   theses	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   I	   have	   drawn	   on	   Seth	   Lazar’s	  helpful	   discussion.	   Lazar,	   ‘National	   Defence,	   Self-­‐Defence,	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Political	  Aggression’	  in	  Fabre	  and	  Lazar	  (eds),	  The	  Morality	  of	  Defensive	  War,	  11-­‐39.	  63	  Jeff	  McMahan,	   ‘War’	   in	  David	  Estlund	  (ed),	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  298-­‐318	  at	  p.309.	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justify	   interpersonal	   harming	   in	   all	   other	   circumstances.	   Term	   this	   the	  
Continuity	  Thesis.	  Jonathan	  Glover	  provides	  an	  early	  statement	  of	  this	  view:	  	   It	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  quite	  different.	  It	  is	  not,	  and	  we	   need	   to	   think	   about	   the	   implications	   of	   this…apart	  from	  important	  special	  side-­‐effects,	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  morally	  on	   a	   par	   with	   other	   killing.	   Declarations	   of	   war,	   military	  uniforms	   and	   solemn	   utterances	   by	   national	   leaders	   in	   no	  way	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  justification	  for	  an	  act	  of	  killing.64	  	  The	   Continuity	   Thesis	   is	   not	   only	   endorsed	   by	   reductivist	   just	   war	  theorists.	  It	  also	  finds	  support	  among	  theorists	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  ethics	  more	  generally.	  For	  example,	  discussing	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  public	  officials	  in	  general,	  John	  Gardner	  also	  endorses	  a	  view	  analogous	  to	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis	  (which	  he	  terms	  “the	  unity	  view’’65):	  	   the	  differences	  between	   the	  duties	  of	   police	  officers	   and	  of	  other	  people,	   in	  other	  roles,	  are	  ordinary	  moral	  differences.	  Although	  police	  officers	  as	  such	  are	  indeed	  in	  special	  moral	  positions,	   there	   is	   no	   distinct	   ‘political’	  morality	   applicable	  to	  them	  that	  displaces	  ordinary	  moral	  judgement.	  Morality	  is	  just	  morality,	  and	  it	  applies	  to	  all	  people.	  It	  applies	  to	  public	  officials	   (judges,	   soldiers,	   parliamentarians,	   police	   officers,	  local	  authority	  librarians,	  etc.)	  because	  they	  are	  people.	  They	  do	  not	  stop	  being	  people	  and	  hence	  do	  not	  stop	  being	  bound	  by	  morality	  when	   they	  put	  on	   their	  uniforms,	  or	  otherwise	  go	  on	  duty.66	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Jonathan	  Glover,	  Causing	  Death	  and	  Saving	  Lives	  (London:	  Penguin,	  1977),	  pp.251-­‐252	  65	  John	  Gardner,	  ‘Criminals	  in	  Uniform’,	  in	  Anthony	  Duff,	  Lindsey	  Farmer,	  Sandra	  Marshall,	  Massimo	  Renzo	  and	  Victor	  Tadros	  (eds),	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  97-­‐118	  at	  p.118	  66 	  Gardner,	   ‘Criminals	   in	   Uniform’,	   p.116.	   A	   similar	   view	   is	   endorsed	   by	   Kimberley	  Brownlee,	   ‘Responsibilities	  of	  Criminal	   Justice	  Officials’,	   Journal	  of	  Applied	  Philosophy	   27,	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  Two	   further	   features	   of	   reductivism	   are	   worth	   highlighting.	   Firstly,	   it	   is	  
individualist	  in	  that	  it	  takes	  individuals	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  unit	  of	  moral	  concern	  and	  evaluation.	  The	  morality	  of	  war	  should	  be	  wholly	  assessed	  in	  terms	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   interpersonal	   morality	   that	   govern	   the	   use	   of	  force	  between	  agents	  qua	  individuals.	  Secondly,	  and	  relatedly,	  reductivism	  is	  aggregative,	  in	  that	  the	  war	  is	  to	  be	  morally	  analysed	  as	  a	  composite	  of	  all	  the	   individual	   actions	   that	   make	   it	   up.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   only	   morally	  relevant	   difference	   between	   war	   and	   ordinary	   cases	   of	   interpersonal	  violence	  is	  that	  war	  takes	  place	  on	  a	  larger	  and	  more	  complex	  scale.	  
	  
2.2.2 The	  Content	  Thesis	  
	  While	   central,	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis	   is	   a	   purely	   formal	   component	   of	  reductivism,	  providing	  an	  adequacy	  condition	  that	  any	  acceptable	  account	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  must	  satisfy.	  It	  simply	  holds	  that	  whatever	  the	  moral	  reasons	   are	   that	   determine	   the	   permissibility	   of	   individuals	   killing	   and	  injuring	  others	  in	  war,	  they	  are	  precisely	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  determine	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	  and	  injuring	  in	  all	  other	  circumstances.	  But	  this	  leaves	   it	   entirely	   open	  what	   these	   justifications	   consist	   in.	   As	   Seth	   Lazar	  points	  out,	  one	  can	  perfectly	  coherently	  combine	  any	  substantive	  account	  of	   the	  morality	   of	   interpersonal	   harming,	   such	   as	   an	   act-­‐consequentialist	  account,	   with	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis.67	  Indeed,	   Glover	  frames	   his	   endorsement	   of	   the	   thesis	   from	   within	   a	   broader	  consequentialist	  outlook.68	  	  However,	   reductivism	   is	   not	   a	   consequentialist	   view.	   Instead,	  reductivists	  generally	  endorse	  a	  broadly	  ‘threshold	  deontological’	  position	  within	   normative	   ethics,	   and	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   interpersonal	   harming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No.2	   (2010),	   123-­‐139	   at	   p.136.	   Brownlee	   also	   notes	   the	   parallel	   between	   this	   view	   and	  reductivist	  approaches	  to	  just	  war	  theory.	  	  67	  Lazar,	  ‘National	  Defence,	  Self-­‐Defence,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Aggression’,	  p.14	  68 	  For	   other	   consequentialist	   perspectives	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   war,	   see	   R.B.	   Brandt,	  ‘Utilitarianism	   and	   the	   Rules	   of	  War’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	   1.	   No.2	   (1972),	   145-­‐165;	  R.M	  Hare,	   ‘Rules	  of	  War	  and	  Moral	  Reasoning’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  1.	  No.2	  (1972),	   166-­‐181;	  William	   Shaw,	   ‘Utilitarianism	   and	   Recourse	   to	  War’,	  Utilitas	  23,	   No.	   4	  (2011),	  380-­‐401.	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specifically.69	  This	   view	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   are	   weighty	  non-­‐consequentialist	   constraints	   on	   harming	   others,	   which	   is	   typically	  expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   individual’s	   possession	   of	   important	   rights	   against	  being	   killed	   and	  maimed.	   But	   it	   also	   holds	   that	   these	   constraints	   are	   not	  absolute	  and	  may	  be	  permissibly	  overridden	  when	  doing	  so	  brings	  about	  a	  considerably	  more	  valuable	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs	  compared	  to	  that	  which	  would	  result	   from	  refraining	   from	  transgressing	  the	  right.	  Despite	   their	   focus	  on	  individuals’	  rights,	  reductivists	  accept	  that	  numbers	  also	  matter	  morally.70	  Furthermore,	   reductivists	   typically	   assess	   the	   permissibility	   of	  interpersonal	  harming	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  respect	  for	  rights	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  value,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  agency	  by	   which	   harm	   is	   brought	   about.	   For	   example,	   reductivists	   generally	  endorse	   the	   standard	   deontological	   distinctions	   between	   doing	   and	  allowing,	   intending	   and	   foreseeing,	   and	   between	   manipulative	   and	  eliminative	  agency.71	  In	  each	  of	  these	  pairs,	  causing	  harm	  via	  the	  first	  mode	  of	   agency	   is	   considered	   subject	   to	   a	   higher	   justificatory	   burden	   than	   the	  second,	  other	  things	  being	  equal.	  According	   to	   reductivism,	   the	   morality	   of	   war	   is	   constituted	   by	   two	  basic	   forms	   of	   justification	   for	   causing	   harm	   drawn	   from	   ordinary	  interpersonal	   morality.	   Each	   form	   of	   justification	   provides	   a	   different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  For	  explicit	  endorsement,	  see	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  pp.13-­‐14.	  70	  As	   Helen	   Frowe	   puts	   it,	   “There’s	   nothing	   in	   reductivism	   that	   prohibits	   caring	   about	  numbers.	   	   The	   central	   claim	  of	   reductivism	   is	   that	   the	  moral	   rules	  of	  war	   are	   the	  moral	  rules	  of	  ordinary	   life,	   and	  aggregation	   is	   certainly	   a	   feature	  of	  morality	   in	  ordinary	   life.”	  
Defensive	  Killing,	  Ch.5.	  71	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  doing	  and	  allowing,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  ‘Killing,	  Letting	   Die,	   and	   Withdrawing	   Aid’,	   Ethics	   103,	   No.2	   (1993),	   250-­‐279;	   Warren	   Quinn,	  ‘Actions,	   Intentions	   and	   Consequences:	   The	   Doctrine	   of	   Doing	   and	   Allowing’,	   The	  
Philosophical	  Review	  98,	  No.3	  (1989),	  287-­‐312;	  Philippa	  Foot,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices	  and	  Other	  
Essays	  in	  Moral	  Philosophy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  Ch.2;	  Samuel	  Scheffler,	  ‘Doing	   and	   Allowing’,	   Ethics	   114,	   No.2	   (2004),	   215-­‐239.	   On	   the	   distinction	   between	  intending	  and	   foreseeing,	   see	  Warren	  Quinn,	   ‘Actions,	   Intentions	  and	  Consequences:	  The	  Doctrine	   of	   Double	   Effect’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	   18,	   No.4	   (1989),	   334-­‐251;	   Foot,	  
Virtues	   and	   Vices	   and	   Other	   Essays	   in	   Moral	   Philosophy,	   Ch.2;	   Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘Intention,	  Permissibility,	  Terrorism	  and	  War’,	  Philosophical	  Perspectives	  23	  (2009),	  345-­‐372;	  Victor	  Tadros.	   The	   Ends	   of	   Harm:	   The	   Moral	   Foundations	   of	   Criminal	   Law	   	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	   Press,	   2011),	   Ch.7.	   On	   the	   distinction	   between	   eliminative	   and	   manipulative	  harm,	   see	  Quinn,	   ‘Actions,	   Intentions	   and	  Consequences:	   The	  Doctrine	   of	  Double	   Effect’;	  Jonathan	   Quong,	   ‘Killing	   in	   Self-­‐Defense’,	   Ethics	   119,	   No.2	   (2009),	   334-­‐351;	   Tadros,	  The	  
Ends	  of	  Harm,	  Ch.6.	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account	  of	  how	  the	  usual	  constraint	  on	  killing	  and	  injuring	  can	  be	  defeated	  by	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  causing	  harm.	  	  Firstly,	   killing	   in	   war	   can	   be	   justified	   by	   appeal	   to	   principles	   of	  permissible	   killing	   in	   self-­‐	   and	   other-­‐defence.	   	   As	   standardly	   understood,	  causing	  defensive	  harm	  is	  permissible	  because	  the	  subject	  of	  harm	  has	  lost	  or	  forfeited	  their	  normal	  right	  against	  being	  harmed.	  This	  loss	  arises	  when	  harming	  that	  individual	  serves	  to	  avert	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  to	  which	  they	  are	  appropriately	  connected.	  In	  the	  relevant	  terminology,	  the	  subject	  of	  harm	  is	  
liable	  to	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  harm,	  and	  suffers	  no	  wrong	  by	  being	  subjected	  to	   it.	   The	   key	   debate	   within	   the	   literature	   on	   self-­‐defence	   concerns	   the	  correct	   rendering	   of	   the	   ‘appropriately	   connected’	   clause	   for	   grounding	  liability.72	  For	   reductivists,	   the	   intentional	   killing	   of	   combatants	   in	   war,	  when	  permissible,	  is	  primarily	  justified	  because	  the	  combatants	  have	  acted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  render	  themselves	  liable	  to	  defensive	  killing.	  They	  may	  thus	  be	  killed	  by	   their	  opponents	  without	  being	  wronged.73	  The	  appeal	   to	  individual	  defensive	  rights	  is	  a	  defining	  component	  of	  a	  reductivist	  view.	  As	  McMahan	  puts	  it:	  	   the	   morality	   of	   defense	   in	   war	   is	   continuous	   with	   the	  morality	  of	  individual	  self-­‐defense.	  Indeed,	  justified	  warfare	  just	  is	  the	  collective	  exercise	  of	  individual	  rights	  of	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense	   in	   a	   coordinated	   manner	   against	   a	   common	  threat.74	  	  Of	   course,	   liability	   justifications	   alone	   will	   not	   suffice	   to	   justify	   warfare,	  since	   wars	   typically	   involve	   causing	   serious	   harm	   to	   those	   who	   are	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  For	   a	   representative	   sample,	   see	   Thomson,	   ‘Self-­‐Defense’;	   Kimberly	   Ferzan,	   ‘Justifying	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	   24,	  No.6	   (2005),	  711-­‐749;	   Jeff	  McMahan,	   ‘The	  Basis	  of	  Moral	   Liability	   to	   Defensive	   Killing’,	   Philosophical	   Issues	   15	   (2005),	   386-­‐405;	   Jonathan	  Quong,	  ‘Liability	  to	  Defensive	  Harm’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  40,	  No.1	  (2012),	  45-­‐77;	  David	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  Self-­‐Defence,	  Chs.1-­‐4;	  Victor	  Tadros,	  ‘Duty	  and	  Liability’,	  Utilitas	  24,	  No.2	  (2012),	  259-­‐277.	  73	  Jeff	  McMahan	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  combatants	  may	  also	  be	  justified	   by	   appeal	   to	   a	   combination	   of	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   justifications.	   See	   Jeff	  McMahan	   ‘What	  Rights	  May	  We	  Defend	  By	  Means	  of	  War’	   in	  Fabre	  and	  Lazar	   (eds),	  The	  
Morality	  of	  Defensive	  War,	  115-­‐158	  at	  pp.138-­‐140.	  74	  McMahan,	   ‘The	   Ethics	   of	   Killing	   in	   War’,	   p.717.	   See	   also,	   McMahan,	   Killing	   in	   War,	  pp.155-­‐158	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liable.	  Most	  obviously,	  conducting	  a	  war	  will	  invariably	  involve	  collaterally	  killing	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants.	   For	   reductivists,	   such	   killing,	   when	  justified,	  is	  justified	  by	  appeal	  to	  considerations	  of	  lesser-­‐evil.	  According	  to	  this	   form	   of	   justification,	   an	   individual’s	   right	   not	   to	   be	   harmed	   or	   killed	  may,	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   be	   justifiably	   overridden	   by	  weightier	  moral	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  harming	  or	  killing	  them.	  Applied	  to	  the	  collateral	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  persons	  in	  war,	  reductivists	  hold	  that	  such	  acts	  can	  be	  justified	   by	   appeal	   to	   the	   impartial	   good	   brought	   about	   by	   doing	   so,	   in	  conjunction	   with	   discounting	   the	   moral	   gravity	   of	   the	   rights	   violation	   in	  virtue	  of	  it	  being	  an	  unintended	  side-­‐effect	  of	  producing	  the	  good	  effect.	  According	  to	  reductivists,	  the	  moral	  permissibility	  of	  both	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  and	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  is	  determined	  by	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  justification.	  As	  Seth	  Lazar	  summarises,	  on	  this	  view	  “Justified	  warfare…is	  no	  more	  than	  the	   coextension	   of	   multiple	   acts	   justified	   under	   these	   two	   principles.”75	  Term	  this	  the	  Content	  Thesis.76	  The	  thesis	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  essentially	  a	   claim	   about	   the	   range	   of	   reasons	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   justifying	   causing	  serious	  harm	  to	  others.	  According	  to	  this	  thesis,	  for	  any	  act	  of	  violence	  –	  in	  war	  and	  in	  any	  other	  context	  –	  if	  the	  recipient	  of	  harm	  retains	  their	  normal	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  and	  their	  right	  is	  not	  overridden	  by	  considerations	  of	  impartial	  good,	  then	  agents	  have	  insufficient	  moral	  reason	  to	  cause	  that	  harm	  and	  are	  unjustified	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  
	  
2.3	  Jettisoning	  the	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion	  
	  With	  this	  characterisation	  of	  reductivism	  in	  place,	  I	  now	  move	  on	  to	  explain	  why	   a	   commitment	   to	   reductivism	   generates	   considerable	   scepticism	  regarding	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   I	   begin	   with	   the	   standard,	   restrictive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  criterion	  and	  the	  normative	  effects	  that	  follow	  from	  its	  possession	  and	  non-­‐possession.	  This	   interpretation	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Lazar,	  ‘National	  Defence,	  Self-­‐Defence	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Aggression’,	  p.12	  76	  In	  addition	  to	  endorsing	  a	  version	  of	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis,	  John	  Gardner	  also	  endorses	  a	  view	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  Content	  Thesis.	  ‘Criminals	  in	  Uniform’,	  pp.112-­‐113.	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The	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion:	   In	   order	   for	   a	  war	   to	   be	   justified,	   it	  must	   be	   initiated	   and	   fought	   by	   an	   entity	   that	   possesses	   a	   certain	   set	   of	  properties.	  
	  As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   relevant	   properties	   for	  constituting	  a	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  are	  standardly	  specified	  in	  terms	  that	  restrict	  the	  authority	  to	  wage	  war	  to	  states.	  As	  we	  saw,	  one	  problem	  with	  this	   specification	   is	   that	   it	   implies	   that	   no	   rebellion	   or	   civil	  war	   could	   be	  justified	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   insurgents,	   since	   these	   belligerents	   lack	   the	  relevant	  statist	  properties.	  This	  seems	   implausible,	   since	  we	  can	  generate	  counter-­‐examples	  –	  either	  real	  or	  imagined	  –	  in	  which	  a	  belligerent	  entity	  lacks	   those	   properties,	   but	   the	   normative	   conclusion	   that	   its	   war	   is	  unjustified	   intuitively	   does	   not	   follow.	   The	   possibility	   of	   justified	   wars	  fought	   by	   non-­‐state	   actors	   cases	   is	   often	   taken	   to	   refute	   the	   idea	   that	  fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justifying	  the	  resort	  to	  war.	  	  However,	   such	   cases	   are	   not	   sufficient	   to	   warrant	   jettisoning	   the	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion	  from	  just	  war	  theorising.	  This	   is	  because	  an	  alternative	   conclusion	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   intuitive	   possibility	   of	  justified	  wars	   fought	  by	  non-­‐states.	   It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	   these	  cases	  only	  provide	   counter-­‐examples	   to	   the	   statist	   conception	   of	   the	   relevant	  properties	   that	   constitute	   being	   an	   authority,	   and	   not	   to	   the	   normative	  effect	   that	   follows	   from	   the	   possession	   or	   non-­‐possession	   of	   the	   relevant	  properties.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  only	  show	  that	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory	  is	   mistaken	   regarding	   who	   has	   war-­‐making	   authority,	   and	   that	   the	  hallmarks	   of	   statehood	   provide	   too	   narrow	   an	   account	   of	   what	   the	  authority	   to	   wage	   war	   consists	   in.77	  They	   do	   not	   licence	   the	   stronger	  conclusion	   that	   the	   possession	   of	   such	   authority	   is	   not	   necessary	   for	  justifying	  the	  resort	  to	  war.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77 	  This	   is	   the	   conclusion	   drawn,	   independently,	   by	   Ian	   Holliday	   and	   Anne	  Schwenkenbecher.	  Ian	  Holliday,	  ‘When	  is	  a	  Cause	  Just?’,	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  28,	  No.3	  (2002),	  557-­‐575	  at	  pp.567-­‐568;	  Schwenkenbecher,	  ‘Rethinking	  Legitimate	  Authority’,	  p.167.	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This	   response	   is	   supported	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   just	  war	   tradition	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  modern	  state	  by	  over	  a	  thousand	  years,	  yet	  has	  retained	  a	  central	  place	   for	   the	   authority	   criterion	   throughout	   its	   development.	   Within	  medieval	   just	   war	   theory,	   formulated	   in	   an	   environment	   of	   diverse,	  overlapping	  and	  hierarchical	  forms	  of	  political	  organisation,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  topics	   of	   debate,	   if	   not	   the	   key	   topic,	   was	   over	   precisely	   which	   kind	   of	  entities	   possessed	   the	   relevant	   properties	   for	   being	   war-­‐making	  authorities.78	  	  With	   this	  perspective	   in	  mind,	  one	  may	   reply	   to	   the	  putative	   counter-­‐examples	   that	   they	   arise	   from	   a	   myopic	   fixation	   on	   statehood,	   out	   of	  keeping	  with	   the	   just	  war	   tradition	   as	   a	  whole,	   and	   that	   a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  war-­‐making	  authority	  can	  resolve	  the	  objections	  to	  the	  authority	  criterion	  that	  they	  give	  rise	  to.	  Several	  theorists	  have	  aimed	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  account,	  which	  de-­‐couples	   the	  authority	   to	  wage	  war	   from	  the	  explicit	  notion	  of	  statehood.	  On	  one	  view,	  the	  possession	  of	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  is	  understood	   as	   requiring	   that	   belligerent	   entities	  meet	   certain	   political	   or	  organisational	   conditions,	   but	   which	   do	   not	   presuppose	   the	   formal	  characteristics	  of	  statehood.79On	  another	  view,	  authority	  requires	  only	  that	  a	  belligerent	  entity	  be	  sufficiently	  representative	  of	  those	  on	  whose	  behalf	  they	  fight.80	  Given	  these	  possible	  reformulations	  of	   the	  relevant	  authority-­‐conferring	   properties,	   the	   intuitive	   plausibility	   of	   justified	   non-­‐state	   war	  need	  not	  pose	  as	  great	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion	  as	  one	  might	  suppose.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  these	  debates,	  see	  Frederick	  Russell,	  The	  Just	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  
Ages	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   1977).	   See	   also,	   Heather	   Wilson,	  
International	  Law	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Force	  By	  National	  Liberation	  Movements,	  Ch.1.	  79	  Anthony	   Coates,	   The	   Ethics	   of	  War	   (Manchester:	   Manchester	   University	   Press,	   1997),	  Ch.1;	  Janna	  Thompson,	  ‘Terrorism	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Wage	  War’	  in	  C.A.J.	  Coady	  and	  Michael	  O’Keefe	   (eds),	  Terrorism	  and	  Justice:	  Moral	  Argument	   in	  a	  Threatened	  World	  (Melbourne:	  Melbourne	   University	   Press,	   2002),	   87-­‐96;	   Janna	   Thompson,	   ‘Terrorism,	   Morality	   and	  Right	   Authority’	   in	   Georg	   Meggle	   (ed),	   Ethics	   of	   Terrorism	   and	   Counter-­‐Terrorism	  (Frankfurt:	  Ontos,	  2005),	  51-­‐60.	  For	  criticism	  of	  Coates’	  and	  Thompson’s	  formulations	  of	  the	  criterion,	  see	  Steinhoff,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Terrorism,	  Ch.1	  80 	  See,	   for	   example,	   Finlay,	   ‘Legitimacy	   and	   Non-­‐State	   Political	   Violence’;	   Lionel	  McPherson,	   ‘Is	   Terrorism	   Distinctively	   Wrong?’,	   Ethics	   117,	   No.3	   (2007),	   524-­‐546;	  Schwenkenbecher,	  ‘Rethinking	  Legitimate	  Authority’.	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2.3.1	  The	  First	  Spectrum	  Argument	  
	  A	  reductivist	  view	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  deeper	  and	  more	  powerful	  objection	   to	   the	   restrictive	   authority	   criterion.	   Rather	   than	   simply	  appealing	   to	   counter-­‐examples,	   which	   challenge	   only	   the	   standard	  conception	   of	   the	   relevant	   authority-­‐generating	   properties,	   reductivism	  denies	  the	  normative	  effect	  directly,	  arguing	  that	  the	  possession	  or	  absence	  of	   any	   such	   properties	   are	   irrelevant	   to	   justifying	   the	   resort	   to	   war.	   If	  successful,	   such	   an	   argument	   will	   explain	   why	   the	   intuitive	   counter-­‐examples	  are	  genuine	  objections	   to	   the	   inclusion	  of	  an	  authority	  criterion	  within	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  	  	  	  	  The	  argument	  follows	  from	  the	  foundational	  reductivist	  claim	  that	  war	  is	   to	   be	   morally	   analysed	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   aggregations	   of	   individuals’	  permissions	  to	  use	  defensive	  force.	  On	  this	  view,	  war	   lies	  on	  a	  continuum	  with	   ordinary	   acts	   of	   interpersonal	   harming	   and	   killing.	   Jeff	   McMahan	  provides	  a	  concise	  statement	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  war	  and	  its	  ethical	  basis:	  	  	   First	   imagine	  a	   case	   in	  which	  a	  person	  uses	  violence	   in	   self-­‐defense;	   then	   imagine	   a	   case	   in	  which	   two	  people	   engage	   in	  self-­‐defense	   against	   a	   threat	   they	   jointly	   face.	   Continue	   to	  imagine	  further	  cases	  in	  which	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  people	  act	   together	   with	   increasing	   coordination	   to	   defend	   both	  themselves	  and	  others	  against	  a	  common	  threat,	  or	  a	  range	  of	  threats	   they	   face	   together.	   What	   you	   are	   imagining	   is	   a	  spectrum	   of	   cases	   that	   begins	   with	   acts	   of	   individual	   self-­‐defence	   and,	   as	   the	   threats	   become	   more	   complex	   and	  extensive,	   the	   threatened	   individuals	   more	   numerous,	   and	  their	   defensive	   action	   more	   integrated,	   eventually	   reaches	  cases	  involving	  a	  scale	  of	  violence	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  war.81	  	  Such	  a	  view	  enables	  what	   I	   term	  the	  First	  Spectrum	  Argument	   against	   the	  authority	   criterion.	   The	   main	   claim	   of	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   ordinary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  McMahan,	  	  ‘War	  as	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  p.75.	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principles	  of	  interpersonal	  morality	  are	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  both	  the	  resort	  to	   war	   and	   the	   individual	   acts	   of	   killing	   and	   injuring	   necessary	   for	   its	  prosecution.	   We	   can	   move	   from	   individual	   acts	   of	   justified	   defence	   to	   a	  state	   of	   justified	   war	   by	   a	   process	   of	   aggregating	   acts	   that	   are	   each	  independently	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  principles	  of	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defence	  (more	  specifically	  –	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  justifications).	  	  The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   these	   principles,	   at	   least	   as	   usually	   understood,	  contain	   no	   requirement	   that	   defence	   be	   authorised	   or	   carried	   out	   by	   a	  particular	  kind	  of	  entity.	   If	  a	   liability	  or	   lesser-­‐evil	   justification	  exists,	  any	  appropriately	  motivated	  individual	  may	  act	  on	  this	  justification.	  From	  this,	  reductivists	   are	   able	   to	   draw	   the	   conclusion	   that	   “it	   is	   not	   a	   necessary	  condition	  of	  just	  or	  justified	  war	  that	  it	  be	  initiated	  only	  by	  persons	  who	  are	  properly	   authorized	   to	  do	   so.”82	  On	   this	   view,	   all	   the	  normative	  materials	  required	  to	  justify	  war	  and	  its	  conduct	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  ordinary	  norms	  of	   interpersonal	   morality.	   The	   authority	   requirement	   is	   therefore	  redundant.	  The	   First	   Spectrum	  Argument	   can	   be	   put	  more	   forcefully	   by	   drawing	  out	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   opposing	   view	   –	   that	   authority	   is	   a	   necessary	  condition	  of	   justified	  war.	   If	   true,	   this	   implies	   that	  as	  we	  move	  across	   the	  spectrum	   of	   cases	   of	   defensive	   action,	   at	   some	   point	   the	   addition	   of	  additional	  acts	  would	  change	  the	  situation	  from	  a	  state	  of	  non-­‐war	  to	  one	  of	  war,	   thus	   activating	   an	   additional	  moral	   constraint	   –	   the	   requirement	   of	  authority.	  Past	  this	  point,	  the	  sum	  of	  defensive	  actions	  would	  be	  rendered	  morally	  unjustified	  if	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  war-­‐waging	  authority.	  But	  this	  seems	  implausible.	  How	  can	  the	  mere	  addition	  of	  justified	  actions	  to	  other	  justified	  actions	  render	  the	  sum	  of	  actions	  morally	  unjustified?	  Yet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Jeff	  McMahan	   ‘Just	  War’	   in	   Robert	   E.	   Goodin,	   Philip	   Pettit	   and	  Thomas	   Pogge	   (eds),	  A	  
Companion	  to	  Political	  Philosophy	  2nd	  Edition,	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2007),	  669-­‐677	  at	  p.671.	  For	   further	   reductivist	   rejections	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   as	   a	   requirement	   of	   jus	   ad	  
bellum,	   see	   Cecile	   Fabre,	   ‘Cosmopolitanism,	   Just	  War	   Theory	   and	   Legitimate	   Authority’,	  
Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  84,	  No.	  5	  (2008),	  963-­‐976;	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  Chs.	  3-­‐4;	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  ‘Just	  Cause	  for	  War’,	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  19,	  No.3	  (2005),	  1-­‐21	  at	  p.4;	  Steinhoff,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Terrorism,	  Ch.1.	  The	  criterion	  is	  also	  rejected	  as	  an	   ad	   bellum	   requirement	   in	   David	   K.	   Chan,	   Beyond	   Just	  War:	   A	   Virtue	   Ethics	   Approach	  (Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	   MacMillan,	   2012),	   pp.46-­‐48;	   Gabriel	   Palmer-­‐Fernandez,	  ‘Cosmopolitan	   Revisions	   to	   Just	   War	   Theory’,	   in	   Michael	   Boylan	   (ed),	   The	  Morality	   and	  
Global	   Justice	   Reader	   (Boulder:	   Westview	   Press,	   2011),	   325-­‐342;	   Darrel	   Moellendorf,	  
Cosmopolitan	  Justice	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2001),	  p.121.	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the	   defender	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   in	   its	   restrictive	   role,	   seems	  committed	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  Term	  this	  the	  aggregation	  problem.83	  	  One	   way	   to	   defend	   the	   authority	   criterion	   while	   avoiding	   this	  implication	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  authority	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	   permissible	   self-­‐	   and	   other-­‐defence.	   On	   this	   view,	   acts	   of	   individual	  defence	  are	  only	  morally	  permissible	  if	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  endorsement	  of	  a	  relevant	  authority.	  Defensive	  harming	  is	  thus	  unjustified	  across	  the	  whole	  spectrum	  of	  cases	  if	  not	  appropriately	  authorised.	  There	  is	  then	  no	  point	  at	  which	  the	  addition	  of	  individual	  acts	  of	  defence	  inverts	  the	  deontic	  status	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  defensive	  acts.	  However,	   this	   move,	   while	   successfully	   avoiding	   the	   aggregation	  problem,	  seems	  equally	  implausible.	  One	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  a	  Hobbesian	  to	  find	  it	  powerfully	  intuitive	  that	  individuals	  possess	  a	  pre-­‐institutional	  right	  of	  self-­‐defence.84	  To	  demonstrate,	  imagine	  that	  a	  generally	  legitimate	  state	  issues	  a	  blanket	  prohibition	  on	  its	  citizens	  using	  force	  in	  self-­‐defence.	  Is	  it	  plausible	   to	   think	   that	   a	   citizen	   of	   that	   state	   would	   be	   acting	   morally	  wrongly	  if,	   following	  the	  prohibition,	  they	  use	  lethal	  force	  against	  another	  individual	  who	  would	  otherwise	  kill	  two	  innocent	  persons?85	  Additionally,	  consider	   the	   case	   of	   individuals	  who	   exist	   outside	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   any	  political	   or	   institutional	   body,	   in	   a	   completely	   failed	   state	   for	   example.	  Would	   such	   individuals	   necessarily	   act	   wrongly	   if	   they	   inflict	   defensive	  harm	  on	  culpable	  aggressors?86	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  For	   discussion	   of	   related	   aggregation	   issues	   in	   the	   context	   of	   defensive	   harm,	   and	  endorsement	   of	   the	   claim	   that	   mere	   aggregation	   cannot	   affect	   the	   deontic	   status	   of	  individual	   acts	   of	   harming,	   see	   Ron	   Aboodi,	   Adi	   Borer	   and	   David	   Enoch,	   ‘Deontology,	  Individualism,	  and	  Uncertainty:	  A	  Reply	  to	   Jackson	  and	  Smith’,	   Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  105,	  No.5	  (2008),	  259-­‐272.	  84	  For	   defence	   of	   this	   view,	   see	  Kimberly	   Ferzan,	   ‘Self-­‐Defense	   and	   the	   State’,	  Ohio	  State	  
Journal	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  5,	  No.2	  (2008),	  449-­‐504.	  85	  A	  sentiment	  forcefully	  echoed	  in	  a	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  opinion,"It	  is	  difficult	  to	   the	   point	   of	   impossibility	   to	   imagine	   a	   right	   in	   any	   state	   to	   abolish	   self-­‐defense	  altogether.”	  Griffin	   v.	  Martin,	   785	  F.2d	  1172,	   1187	  n.37	   (4th	  Cir.	   1986).	   Cited	   in	   Ferzan,	  ‘Self-­‐Defense	  and	  the	  State’,	  n.111.	  86	  Those	  of	  a	  Kantian	  persuasion	  may	  be	  more	  sympathetic	   to	   the	  view	   that	   self-­‐defence	  requires	   authority.	   For	   example,	   Anna	   Stilz	   argues	   that	   private	   defence	   is	   morally	   sub-­‐optimal	   and	   regrettable	   compared	   to	   distributing	   harms	   under	   a	   legitimate	   legal	   order.	  Anna	  Stilz,	  ‘Authority,	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  Community	  in	  Cosmopolitan	  War’,	  Law	  and	  
Philosophy,	   (forthcoming).	   However,	   I	   am	   not	   aware	   of	   any	   contemporary	   theorist	   who	  defends	  the	  much	  stronger	  view	  that	  self-­‐defence	  is	  morally	  impermissible	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  authority.	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Making	  a	  similar	  point	  on	  more	  principled	  grounds,	  Cecile	  Fabre	  argues	  that	   if	   we	   accept	   the	   uncontroversial	   premise	   that	   individuals	   possess	  fundamental	  rights	  against	  certain	  forms	  of	  treatment	  qua	  individuals,	  then	  we	   must	   also	   accept	   that	   they	   have	   a	   right	   to	   defend	   those	   rights	   qua	  individuals.	  She	  writes,	  	   it	   would	   be	   incoherent,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   to	   claim	   that	  individuals’	   fundamental	   interests	   in	   life-­‐saving	   resources	   and	  basic	   freedoms	  are	   important	  enough	  to	  be	  protected	  by	  rights,	  and	   on	  the	   other	   hand,	   to	   deny	   that	   individuals’	   interest	   in	   the	  protection	  of	  those	  rights	  is	  important	  enough	  to	  be	  protected	  by	  a	  right	  to	  defend	  those	  rights	  themselves.87	  	  	  For	   Fabre,	   and	   for	   reductivists	   more	   generally,	   if	   one	   accepts	   a	   fairly	  minimal	   view	   of	   individuals’	   pre-­‐institutional	   moral	   rights,	   one	   cannot	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  authority	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  justified	  resort	  to	  war.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  right	  to	  wage	  war	  is	  ultimately	  an	  individual	  right.88	  According	   to	   the	   First	   Spectrum	   Argument,	   then,	   a	   defender	   of	   the	  restrictive	   authority	   criterion	   faces	   a	   dilemma	   between	   confronting	   the	  aggregation	   problem,	   or	   denying	   that	   individuals	   possess	   basic,	   pre-­‐institutional	   rights	   of	   self-­‐defence.	   Since	   neither	   of	   these	   options	   is	  plausible,	  the	  traditional	  just	  war	  requirement	  that	  a	  justified	  war	  must	  be	  fought	  by	  a	  certain	  kinds	  of	  entity	  has	  no	  principled	  moral	  basis	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  jettisoned	  from	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  The	  argument	  also	  shows	  how	  counter-­‐examples	   to	   the	   restrictive	  authority	   criterion	  can	  be	  generated,	  however	  the	  relevant	  properties	  are	  formulated.	  Since,	  for	  reductivists,	  justified	  war	  and	   individual	   self-­‐defence	   lie	   on	   a	   continuum,	   any	   formulation	   of	   the	  criterion	   will	   necessarily	   be	   under-­‐inclusive,	   failing	   to	   capture	   all	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87 	  Fabre,	   Cosmopolitan	   War,	   p.115.	   For	   an	   additional	   defence	   of	   the	   view	   that	   the	  possession	  of	   basic	   rights	   entails	   the	  possession	  of	   ‘remedial’	   defensive	   rights,	   see	  Tony	  Honore,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Rebel’,	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  8,	  No.1	  (1988),	  34-­‐54.	  88	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  p.144.	  See	  also,	  Uwe	  Steinhoff,	  “If,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  a	  
right	  to	  war	  comes	  into	  operation,	  it	  is,	  or	  is	  based	  upon,	  an	  individual	  right.”	  The	  Ethics	  of	  
War	  and	  Terrorism,	  p.20.	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possible	  cases	  of	  justified	  warfare.89	  Since	  anyone	  may	  potentially	  use	  force	  in	  self-­‐defence,	  permissible	  warfare	  cannot	  be	  non-­‐arbitrarily	  restricted	  to	  a	   certain	   class	   of	   entities.	   On	   this	   view,	   “groups	   of	   actors	   which	   act	   in	  unstructured,	  disorganized	  way,	  as	  well	  as	  individuals	  themselves,	  can	  have	  the	  right	  to	  wage	  war.”90	  	  
	  
2.3.2	  Deflating	  the	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion	  
	  Although	  reductivists	  reject	   the	   idea	  that	  a	  belligerent	  entity	  must	  be	  of	  a	  certain	   type	   in	   order	   to	   permissibly	   resort	   to	   war,	   this	   should	   not	   be	  interpreted	   to	  mean	  that	  reductivists	  are	  committed	   to	   the	  view	  that	   that	  certain	   properties	   of	   belligerent	   entities	   –	   such	   as	   their	   size,	   political	  organisation,	  possession	  of	   territory,	   etc.	   –	   are	   irrelevant	   to	  whether	   that	  entity	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  justified	  in	  resorting	  to	  war.	  This	  is	  because,	  even	   if	   the	  authority	   criterion	   is	  not	  a	   independent	   requirement	  of	   jus	  ad	  
bellum,	  a	  war	  must	  still	  satisfy	  the	  other	  ad	  bellum	  requirements	  in	  order	  to	  be	   justified.	   Whether	   these	   requirements	   are	   satisfied	   will	   often	   be	  determined	   by	   the	   possession	   of	   certain	   properties,	   including	   those	   that	  are	   standardly	   associated	   with	   the	   possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority.	  Given	   this,	   reductivists	   can	   support	   their	   rejection	   of	   the	   restrictive	  authority	  criterion	  by	  providing	  a	  deflationary	  account	  of	  the	  intuition	  that	  only	  certain	  kinds	  of	  groups	  are	  justified	  in	  resorting	  to	  war.	  91	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Unless,	   of	   course,	   one	   formulates	   the	   requirement	   so	   broadly	   as	   to	   include	   private	  individuals.	  But	  this	  is	  practically	  equivalent	  to	  rejecting	  the	  criterion	  altogether,	  since	  no	  actors	   will	   fail	   to	   possess	   it.	   Indeed,	   Fabre	   sometimes	   phrases	   her	   rejection	   of	   the	  authority	  criterion	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  individuals	  potentially	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  wage	  war.	  	  90	  Fabre,	   Cosmopolitan	  War	   pp.144-­‐145.	   For	   further	   endorsements	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	  justified	   wars	   fought	   by	   private	   individuals,	   see	   Uwe	   Steinhoff,	   ‘The	   Ethics	   of	   War	   and	  Terrorism’,	   p.20;	   Uwe	   Steinhoff	   ‘What	   is	   War?	   And	   Can	   a	   Lone	   Individual	   Wage	   One?’,	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Philosophy	  29,	  No.1	  (2009),	  133-­‐150;	  Pattison,	  ‘When	  Is	  It	  Right	   to	   Fight’,	   p.53.	   The	   right	   of	   private	   war	   is	   also	   endorsed	   by	   some	   philosophical	  anarchists,	  who	  reject	  the	  view	  that	  political	  authorities	  are	   in	  a	  morally	  special	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  any	  activity.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Michael	  Huemer,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Authority:	  
An	   Examination	   of	   the	   Duty	   to	   Obey	   and	   the	   Right	   to	   Coerce	   (Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2013),	  p.144.	  	  91	  The	  following	  two	  paragraphs	  draw	  on	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  pp.116-­‐118	  and	  p.147.	  See	  also,	  Schwenkenbecher,	  ‘Rethinking	  Legitimate	  Authority’,	  pp.167-­‐168.	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Most	   obviously,	   whether	   a	   potential	   war	   satisfies	   the	   requirement	   of	  reasonable	   prospect	   of	   success	   will	   depend	   heavily	   on	   whether	   the	  belligerent	   waging	   it	   has	   certain	   capacities,	   such	   as	   having	   sufficient	  combatants,	  military	  hardware,	  strategic	  competence,	  economic	  resources,	  etc.	  Given	  this,	  it	  will	  invariably	  be	  the	  case	  that	  certain	  kinds	  of	  entity	  lack	  the	   ability	   to	   successfully	   prosecute	   a	   war,	   or	   to	   prosecute	   it	   at	   a	  proportionate	  moral	  cost,	  and	  will	  therefore	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  resorting	  to	  war.	  In	   addition,	   the	   requirement	   of	   last	   resort	   will	   often	   rule	   out	   certain	  groups	  from	  permissibly	  resorting	  to	  war,	  even	  if	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  successfully	  prosecute	  it.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  members	  of	  a	  sub-­‐state	  ethnic	  group	   are	   threatened	   with	   rights	   violations	   of	   sufficient	   seriousness	   to	  provide	  a	  just	  cause	  for	  war,	  it	  may	  still	  be	  impermissible	  for	  them	  to	  resort	  to	   war	   themselves	   if	   their	   state,	   or	   some	   other	   institution,	   is	   able	   and	  willing	   to	  prevent	   those	   rights	   violations	   and	   can	  do	   so	   at	   a	   lesser	  moral	  cost.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  it	  would	  be	  impermissible	  for	  the	  prospective	  victims	  to	  exercise	  their	  rights	  of	  self-­‐defence	  themselves,	  since	  there	   is	  a	  morally	  superior	  alternative	  option	  available.	  Given	  the	  additional	  requirements	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum,	   it	  will	  often	  be	   the	  case	  that	  non-­‐state	  belligerents	  –	  disorganised	  groups	  of	  individuals	  more	  obviously	  –	  will	  not	  be	   justified	  in	  waging	  war,	  even	  if	   they	  possess	  a	   just	  cause.	   Moreover,	   these	   entities	   will	   lack	   justification	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	  failure	   to	   possess	   certain	   properties	   standardly	   associated	   with	   the	  possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority.	   But,	   importantly,	   reductivists	   can	  explain	   the	   absence	   of	   justification	   without	   invoking	   an	   independent	  authority	   requirement.	   The	  moral	   significance	   of	   these	   properties	   can	   be	  attributed	  to	  the	  contribution	  that	  they	  make	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  other	  ad	  
bellum	   requirements,	   which	   can	   be	   accounted	   for	   in	   wholly	   reductive	  terms.	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2.4	  Jettisoning	  the	  Permissive	  Authority	  Criterion	  
	  The	  reductivist	  critique	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  has	  primarily	  focussed	  on	  its	   traditional	   restrictive	   role	   within	   jus	   ad	   bellum.	   This	   makes	   perfect	  sense,	   for	   this	   is	   how	   most	   people	   have	   interpreted	   the	   criterion.	  Furthermore,	  I	  believe	  that	  reductivists	  have	  succeeded	  in	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	   justified	  war	   that	   it	  be	   fought	  by	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity.	  	  However,	  as	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  this	  restrictive	  function	  is	  not	  the	  only	  role,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  the	  main	  role,	  played	  by	  the	  authority	  criterion	  within	  the	   just	  war	  tradition.	  The	  criterion	  also	  has	  an	  important	   permissive	   function	   within	   jus	   in	   bello,	   which	   can	   be	  characterised	  as	  follows:	  	  
The	   Permissive	   Authority	   Criterion:	   If	   an	   agent	   participates	   in	   war	   on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  possesses	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  properties,	  then	  that	  agent	  is	  subject	   to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	  of	  permissions	   to	  cause	  harm	  than	   if	  they	   fought	   privately,	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   an	   entity	   which	   lacks	   that	   set	   of	  properties.	  	  Under	   the	   permissive	   interpretation,	   a	   different	   normative	   effect	   follows	  from	   the	   possession	   of	   war-­‐making	   authority	   than	   under	   the	   standard,	  restrictive	   interpretation.	   Moreover,	   these	   two	   effects	   are	   conceptually	  independent	   of	   one	   another,	   in	   that	   one	   can	   coherently	   reject	   the	  restrictive,	  while	  endorsing	  the	  permissive.	  On	  this	  conjunction	  of	  views,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  justified	  resort	  to	  war	  that	  it	  be	  waged	  by	  a	  certain	   kind	   of	   entity,	   but	  when	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entities	  wage	  war,	   their	  agents	   are	   subject	   to	  more	   extensive	  permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   in	  bello,	  that	  they	  would	  lack	  if	  they	  fought	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  authority.	  	  Given	   this	   possible	   combination	   of	   positions,	   arguments	   against	   the	  restrictive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   if	   successful,	   do	   not	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  authority	  criterion	  within	  just	   war	   theory	   is	   morally	   defensible.	   Further	   argument	   is	   required	   in	  order	  to	  support	  jettisoning	  the	  criterion	  completely.	  Critics	  of	  the	  criterion	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often	  overlook	  this	  since	  they	  assume,	  along	  with	  the	  majority	  of	   just	  war	  theorists,	   that	   the	   authority	   criterion	   functions	   solely	   in	   the	   standard,	  restrictive	  manner.92	  
	  
2.4.1	  The	  Continuity	  Thesis	  
	  Reductivism	   also	   contains	   the	   resources	   for	   rejecting	   the	   permissive	  authority	   criterion.	  As	   argued	   in	  Chapter	   1,	   a	  major	   source	   of	  motivation	  for	   the	   inclusion	  of	   an	  authority	   criterion	  within	   just	  war	   theory	   lies	   in	   a	  commitment	  –	  either	  explicit	  or	   implicit	   –	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  war	   is	  morally	  exceptional,	   so	   that	   conduct	   in	   war	   is	   governed	   by	   different	   moral	  principles	  to	  those	  that	  govern	  conduct	   in	  other	  circumstances.	  Given	  this	  commitment	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  have	  a	  means	  of	  distinguishing	  the	  class	  of	  activities	   governed	  by	  war-­‐specific	  moral	  principles.	  As	   I	   argued,	   it	   is	   the	  authority	   criterion	   that	   provides	   the	   resources	   for	   fulfilling	   this	   crucial	  demarcating	   function.	   What	   distinguishes	   combatants	   –	   those	   subject	   to	  additional	  war-­‐specific	  permissions	   to	   cause	  harm	  –	   from	  other	   violence-­‐users	  is	  that	  the	  former	  use	  force	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity.	  Given	   their	   central	   commitment	   to	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis,	   reductivists	  wholeheartedly	   reject	   the	   view	   that	   war	   is	   morally	   exceptional.	   As	  McMahan	   puts	   it,	   “a	   state	   of	   war…does	   not	   call	   forth	   a	   different	   set	   of	  principles,	  but	  merely	  complicates	  the	  application	  of	  moral	  principles	  that	  are	  of	  universal	  application.”93	  War	  and	  all	  other	  activities	  inhabit	  a	  single	  moral	   domain.	   Given	   such	   a	   view,	   the	   pressure	   to	   include	   an	   authority	  criterion	   completely	   disappears.	   There	   is	   no	   need	   to	   morally	   demarcate	  war	  and	  non-­‐war,	  since	  action	  in	  both	  domains	  is	  governed	  by	  exactly	  the	  same	  moral	  principles.	  The	  problem	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  is	  required	  to	   resolve	   simply	   does	   not	   arise	   on	   a	   view	   that	   endorses	   the	   Continuity	  Thesis.	  War	   can	   be	   defined	   in	   entirely	   non-­‐normative,	   quantitative	   terms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Cecile	  Fabre	  being	  an	  exception	  (see,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  p.160).	  However,	  despite	  this,	  Fabre	  still	  devotes	  the	  majority	  of	  her	  discussion	  to	  rejecting	  the	  criterion	  in	  its	  standard	  role.	  	  93	  Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘Précis	   of	   The	   Morality	   and	   Law	   of	   War’,	   Israel	   Law	   Review	   40,	   No.	   3	  (2007),	  310-­‐323	  at	  p.316.	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familiar	   from	   the	   social	   scientific	   literature	   on	   warfare,	   since	   nothing	  morally	   significant	   turns	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   particular	   act	   of	   violence	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  94	  	  
	  
2.4.2	  Rejecting	  the	  Orthodox	  View	  
	  Given	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis,	   reductivists	   reject	  theories	   of	   just	   war	   that	   presuppose	   the	   view	   that	   war	   is	   morally	  exceptional.	   Most	   saliently,	   reductivists	   typically	   reject	   an	   orthodox	  conception	   of	   just	   war	   theory,	   which	   endorses	   the	   Equality	   Thesis.	   As	  explained,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  ground	  the	  Equality	  Thesis	  in	  standard	  justifications	   for	   interpersonal	   harming,	   such	   as	   self-­‐defence.	   In	   non-­‐war	  contexts	   moral	   evaluation	   of	   the	   ends	   pursued	   is	   directly	   relevant	   to	  determining	   the	   moral	   permissibility	   of	   causing	   harm	   in	   furtherance	   of	  those	   ends.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   a	   conflict	   with	   the	   ordinary	   norms	   of	  interpersonal	   morality,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   combine	   a	   commitment	   to	  orthodox	   just	  war	   theory	  with	  a	   rejection	  of	   the	  view	   that	  war	   is	  morally	  continuous	  with	  all	  other	  spheres	  of	  activity.	  	  Reductivists	   resolve	   the	   conflict	   differently,	   by	   rejecting	   the	   orthodox	  conception	  of	  permissible	  conduct	  in	  war	  that	  generates	  the	  conflict.	  As	  Jeff	  McMahan	  puts	  it,	  	   “the	   reductive	   strategy	   is	   incompatible	  with	   the	   traditional	   just	  war	   theory—in	  particular	   the	   latter’s	  assumption	  that	   the	  rules	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  	  are	  independent	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  But	  the	  conclusion	  we	  should	  draw	  is	  not	  that	  the	  reductive	  strategy	  is	  false	  but	  that	  the	  traditional	  theory	  is.”95	  	  	  For	   reductivists,	   whether	   an	   agent	   acts	   permissibly	   in	   war	   cannot	   be	  determined	   independently	   of	   whether	   their	   war	   is	   ad	   bellum	   justified.	  Combatants	  who	  participate	   in	  unjust	  wars	  act	  seriously	  morally	  wrongly	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  David	  Rodin	  makes	  a	  similar	  observation	  in	  ‘The	  Myth	  of	  National	  Defence’,	  in	  Fabre	  and	  Lazar	  (eds),	  The	  Morality	  of	  Defensive	  War,	  69-­‐89	  at	  n.21.	  95McMahan,	  ‘War	  as	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  p.79.	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by	  doing	  so,	  because	  they	  typically	  lack	  a	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil	  justification	  for	   intentionally	   killing	   their	   opponents	   and	   collateral	   killing	   non-­‐combatants. 96 	  A	   commitment	   to	   reductivism	   thus	   generally	   entails	   a	  revisionary	   view	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war,	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	  fundamental	  moral	   inequality	  between	  combatants	  who	   fight	   in	   just	  wars	  and	   those	   who	   fight	   in	   unjust	   wars.97	  While	   killing	   in	   a	   just	   war	   can	   be	  justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   individual	   rights	   of	   self-­‐and	   other-­‐defence,	   those	  who	  kill	  in	  unjust	  war	  commit	  a	  species	  of	  unjustified	  homicide.	  	  It	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   despite	   this	   revisionary	   implication,	  reductivists	   do	   not	   argue	   that	   the	   current	   legal	   regime	   governing	   war	   –	  which	   grants	   equal	   legal	   permissions	   to	   combatants	   who	   participate	   in	  both	   just	   and	   unjust	   wars	   –	   should	   be	   abandoned.	   What	   reductivists	   do	  argue	  is	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  law’s	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war	  lies	  not	  in	  deep	  moral	  principle,	  but	  in	  largely	  pragmatic	  considerations	  concerning	  the	  difficulties	  and	  undesirable	  consequences	  of	  reforming	  the	  current	  legal	  regime.98	  Much	   of	   the	   recent	   discussion	   and	   controversy	   over	   reductivism	   has	  focused	   on	   this	   particular	   substantive	   conclusion,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   a	  rejection	  of	  the	  Equality	  Thesis	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  reductivism.	   Indeed,	   many	   writers,	   including	   the	   main	   proponents	   of	  reductivism,	   use	   the	   label	   ‘revisionism’	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   reductivist	   view.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Equality	  Thesis	   is	   simply	   an	   important	   implication	   of	   a	   broader	   theoretical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	  ‘typically’	  caveat	  is	  important,	  since	  there	  are	  possible	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  combatant	  is	  permitted	  to	  kill,	  on	  reductivist	  grounds,	  despite	  fighting	  in	  an	  unjust	  war.	  For	  example,	  a	  combatant	  on	   the	  unjust	  side	  may	  be	  permitted	   to	  kill	  a	  combatant	  on	   the	   just	  side	  who	  would	  otherwise	  commit	  war	  crimes.	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  pp.16-­‐17.	  In	  addition,	  Saba	  Bazargan	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	  on	  reductivist	  grounds	  for	  combatants	  to	  participate	   in	   justified	   phases	   of	   wars	   that	   are	   overall	   unjustified.	   Saba	   Bazargan,	   ‘The	  Permissibility	   of	   Aiding	   and	   Abetting	   Unjust	   Wars’,	   Journal	   of	  Moral	   Philosophy	  8,	   No.4	  (2011),	  513-­‐529.	  	  97	  For	   the	  most	  detailed	  and	  sustained	  argument	   for	   the	  moral	   inequality	  of	   combatants,	  see	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Chs	  1-­‐2.	  98	  See	  McMahan,	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’,	  at	  pp.729-­‐733;	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  ‘The	  Morality	  of	  War	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  War’,	  in	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  19-­‐43.	  For	  discussion	  and	  criticism,	  see	  David	  Rodin,	   ‘The	  Morality	  and	  Law	  of	  War,	  in	  Strachan	  and	  Scheipers	   (eds),	   The	   Changing	   Character	   of	  War,	   446-­‐463;	   Henry	   Shue,	   ‘Do	   We	   Need	   a	  ‘Morality	  of	  War’	  in	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  pp.87-­‐111.	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commitment.99	  For	  our	  purposes,	  what	  is	  noteworthy	  about	  the	  reductivist	  rejection	  of	  the	  Equality	  Thesis	  is	  that	  it	  removes	  an	  important	  motivation	  for	   the	   claim	   that	   individuals	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entity	  enjoy	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war.	  	  	  
2.4.3	  Rejecting	  the	  Classical	  View	  	  This	   last	   point	   can	   be	   emphasised	   by	   noting	   that	   reductivism	   equally	  rejects	  a	  classical	  conception	  of	   just	  war	  theory,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  views	   are	   united	   in	   rejecting	   the	   Equality	   Thesis.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	  explained	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   the	   classical	   view	   is	   also	   committed	   to	  idea	   that	   war	   is	   morally	   exceptional.	   It	   shares	   this	   feature	   with	   the	  orthodox	  view,	  despite	  their	  opposing	  positions	  on	  the	  Equality	  Thesis.	  	  On	  a	  classical	  view,	  the	  key	  challenge	  for	  just	  war	  theory	  is	  to	  square	  the	  non-­‐pacifist	  position	   that	  participation	   in	  war	  can	  be	  morally	  permissible	  with	   a	   fairly	   restrictive	   account	   of	   permissible	   interpersonal	   harming.	   It	  does	   so	  by	  endorsing	   the	  view	   that	  war	   is	  morally	  exceptional,	   subject	   to	  more	  permissive	  norms	  of	  conduct.	  Since	  the	  morality	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  norms	  of	   interpersonal	  morality,	   there	  is	  no	  conflict.	   It	   is	  this	   commitment	   that	   necessitates	   a	   role	   for	   the	   permissive	   authority	  criterion	  within	   a	   classical	   view.	   On	   both	   an	   orthodox	   and	   classical	   view	  there	   is	   a	   justificatory	   gap	   between	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war	   and	   the	  norms	  of	  private	  interpersonal	  morality,	  which	  is	  bridged	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  agents	   who	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entities	   enjoy	   additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  More	  generally,	  the	  conflation	  of	  reductivism	  and	  revisionism	  is	  unhelpful,	  since	  it	  runs	  together	  two	  dimensions	  along	  which	  we	  can	  distinguish	  positions	  within	  the	  ethics	  of	  war	  that	   ought	   to	   be	   kept	   separate:	   their	   theoretical	   commitments	   and	   their	   practical	  implications.	   It	   is	   often	   assumed	   that	   reductivism	   at	   the	   theoretical	   level	   entails	  revisionism	   in	   practice,	   and,	   conversely,	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	   entails	   a	  more	   traditional	  view.	  While	   there	   is	  a	  general	  correlation	  between	  these	  pairs	  of	  view,	   the	  connection	   is	  not	  necessary.	  Positions	  can	  be	  practically	  coextensive	  while	  diverging	  at	   the	   theoretical	  level.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐reductivist	  view	  that	  is	  revisionist	  in	  rejecting	  the	  Equality	  Thesis,	  see	  Noam	  Zohar,	  ‘Collective	  War	  and	  Individualist	  Ethics:	  Against	  the	  Conscription	  of	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  Political	  Theory	  21,	  No.4	   (1993),	  606-­‐622.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  minority	  reductivist	   view	   that	   defends	   the	   Equality	   Thesis,	   see	   Steinhoff,	   ‘Jeff	   McMahan	   on	   the	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants’.	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In	  response	  to	  each	  of	  these	  views,	  reductivists	  deny	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	   justificatory	  gap.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  orthodox	  view,	  reductivists	  close	  the	  gap	  by	  rejecting	  the	  conception	  of	  right	  conduct	  which	  conflicts	  with	  norms	  of	   interpersonal	   morality.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   classical	   view,	   by	   contrast,	  reductivists	   close	   the	   gap	   by	   rejecting	   the	   conception	   of	   interpersonal	  morality	  that	   leads	  to	   it.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  reductivists	  hold	  that	  the	  acts	  of	  killing	  and	  injuring	  required	  to	  wage	  justified	  wars	  can	  be	   accounted	   for	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   ordinary	   interpersonal	   morality.100	  Whereas	  a	  reductivist	  view	  rejects	  the	  orthodox	  view	  as	  overly	  permissive,	  it	  equally	  rejects	  the	  classical	  view	  for	  operating	  with	  an	  overly	  restrictive	  conception	  of	  permissible	   interpersonal	  harming,	   and	  of	  permissible	   self-­‐defence	   in	   particular.	   Since,	   for	   reductivists,	   the	   permissibility	   of	  participation	   in	   justified	   wars	   can	   be	   accounted	   for	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	  justifications	   of	   causing	   harm	   contained	   within	   ordinary	   interpersonal	  morality,	  a	  role	   for	   the	  authority	  criterion	   in	  grounding	  a	  more	  expansive	  set	  of	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war	  is	  removed.	  This	  comparison	  of	  the	  classical	  and	  reductivist	  views	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  positions	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  thus	  reveals	  the	  deep	  differences	   between	   them,	   which	   is	   obscured	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   give	  equivalent	  verdicts	  on	  certain	  substantive	  questions	  of	  permissible	  conduct	  in	  war,	  such	  as	   the	  truth	  of	   the	  Equality	  Thesis.101	  On	  both	  a	  classical	  and	  orthodox	   view	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   indispensible,	   whereas	   for	  reductivists	   it	   is	   a	   spare	  wheel.	   The	   source	   of	   this	   difference	   lies	   in	   their	  divergence	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  and	  the	  moral	  norms	  that	  govern	  interpersonal	  harming	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  See	  McMahan,	  ‘War	  as	  Self-­‐Defense’.	  101	  Given	  their	  mutual	  rejection	  of	  the	  Equality	  Thesis,	  some	  reductivists	  refer	  to	  their	  view	  as	  the	  ‘neo-­‐classical’	  view	  (for	  example,	  Fabre,	  ‘Guns,	  Food	  and	  Liability	  to	  Attack	  in	  War’).	  As	  the	  discussion	   in	  this	  section	  shows,	  reductivists	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  over-­‐emphasising	  the	   historical	   pedigree	   of	   their	   view.	   	   Despite	   their	   practical	   convergence	   on	   this	   issue,	  they	  remain	  very	  different	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  deeper	  theoretical	  commitments.	  
	  	   62	  
2.4.4	  The	  Second	  Spectrum	  Argument	  
	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   reductivist	   commitment	   to	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis	  removes	   a	   powerful	   source	   of	   motivation	   for	   the	   permissive	   authority	  criterion.	  However,	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  jettison	  the	   criterion.	   As	   explained	   above,	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis	   is	   purely	   formal,	  holding	   that	   the	  morality	   of	   conduct	   in	  war	   is	  wholly	   determined	   by	   the	  same	  moral	   principles	   that	   determine	   the	   permissibility	   of	   interpersonal	  harming	  in	  all	  other	  circumstances.	  Given	   this,	   there	   remains	   conceptual	   space	   for	   the	   view	   that	   that	  interpersonal	   morality	   assigns	   additional	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   to	  those	  who	  do	  so	  on	  behalf	  of	  certain	  kinds	  of	  entities	  or	  authority.	  This	   is	  not	  a	  claim	  about	  there	  being	  any	  discontinuity	  between	  war	  and	  ordinary	  life,	   or	   that	   individuals	   “stop	   being	   bound	   by	  morality	  when	   they	   put	   on	  their	  uniforms,	  or	  otherwise	  go	  on	  duty.”102	  Rather	   it	   is	  a	   claim	  about	   the	  precise	   content	   of	   a	   single,	   unified	   set	   of	  moral	   principles	   that	   govern	   all	  agents	  and	  all	  activities.	  	  The	  reductivist	  Content	  Thesis	  closes	  off	  the	  space	  for	  such	  a	  view,	  thus	  enabling	   the	   complete	   jettisoning	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   The	   thesis	  holds	   that	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   justifications	   exhaust	   the	   range	   of	  justifications	   for	   non-­‐consensual	   harming.	   As	   McMahan	   puts	   it,	   “On	   [a	  reductivist]	   view,	   the	   limits	   of	   individual	   self-­‐	   and	   other-­‐defense	   are	   also	  the	   limits	   of	   national	   defense.”103	  In	   other	   words,	   if	   an	   act	   of	   killing	   or	  injuring	  –	   in	  war	  or	  any	  other	   context	  –	   is	  not	   independently	   justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   liability	  or	   lesser-­‐evil,	   then	   that	   act	   is	  morally	   impermissible.	  This	  is	  true	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  agent	  performing	  the	  act	  does	  so	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity.104	  To	  demonstrate	  this	  position,	  the	  reductivist	  can	  offer	  what	  I	   term	  the	  
Second	   Spectrum	   Argument	   against	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   Recall,	   in	  McMahan’s	   spectrum	   example,	   we	   consider	   an	   escalating	   range	   of	   cases,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Gardner,	  ‘Criminals	  in	  Uniform’,	  p.116.	  	  103	  McMahan,	  ‘War’,	  p.310	  (my	  emphasis).	  104	  In	  a	  talk	  given	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Stockholm	  in	  May	  2014,	  McMahan	  explicitly	  labeled	  this	  view	  the	  ‘No	  Extensions	  Principle’	  and	  affirmed	  his	  commitment	  to	  it.	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starting	   with	   a	   small-­‐scale	   case	   of	   interpersonal	   harming	   involving	   a	  handful	  of	  individuals	  using	  force	  against	  others.	  We	  then,	  by	  a	  process	  of	  aggregating	  such	  cases,	  eventually	  reach	  a	  level	  of	  violence	  constitutive	  of	  a	  state	   of	  war.	  Whereas	   the	   First	   Spectrum	  Argument	   is	   designed	   to	   show	  that	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  justifications	  are	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  the	  kind	  of	  harming	  and	  killing	  constitutive	  of	  war	  (so	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  does	  not	  impose	  an	  additional	  constraint),	  the	  Second	  Spectrum	  Argument	  holds	  that	   these	   two	   forms	  of	   justification	  are	   also	  necessary	   for	   justifying	   such	  actions	   (so	   that	   the	   authority	   criterion	   does	   not	   give	   rise	   to	   additional	  permissions	  or	  justifications.)	  	  The	   argument	   holds	   that	   if	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	   harming	   is	  exhausted	   by	   considerations	   of	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   in	   the	   small-­‐scale	  cases,	  then	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  harming	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  All	  that	  changes	  as	  we	   move	   across	   the	   spectrum	   is	   that	   the	   cases	   become	   more	   complex,	  organised	  and	  protracted,	  but	  the	  basic	  moral	  principles	  remain	  the	  same	  throughout.	   The	   conditional	   claim	   seems	   highly	   plausible,	   as	   does	   the	  antecedent.	   In	   the	  small-­‐scale	  cases,	   it	   is	  uncontroversial	   that	   it	  would	  be	  impermissible	   for	   an	   individual	   to	   non-­‐consensually	   kill	   another	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil	  justification.	  While	   the	   First	   Spectrum	   Argument	   aims	   to	   deny	   that	   additional	  constraints	  on	  causing	  harm	  emerge	  as	  we	  move	  across	  the	  spectrum,	  the	  Second	  Spectrum	  Argument	  holds	   that	  no	   additional	   forms	  of	   permission	  emerge	   either.	   The	   limits	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war	   are	   set	   by	   the	  justifications	  for	  harming	  that	  apply	  to	   individuals	  pre-­‐institutionally.	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	  fights	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  cannot	  increase	  their	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   above	   this	   baseline.105	  For	   reductivists,	  then,	   the	  claim	  encapsulated	   in	   the	  permissive	  authority	  criterion	   is	   false.	  There	  are	  no	  relevant	  properties	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  this	  particular	  normative	  effect.	  	  It	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   reductivists	   are	   not	   (necessarily)	  committed	  to	  the	  much	  stronger	  view	  that	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  reasons	  for	  action	   that	   apply	   to	   agents	   in	   their	   institutional	   roles	   are	   exhausted	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  See	  Gardner,	  ‘Criminals	  in	  Uniform’,	  pp.112-­‐113.	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those	   that	   apply	   to	   individuals	   in	   their	   private	   capacity.	   They	   need	   only	  make	   the	   more	   specific	   and	   weaker	   claim	   that	   the	   limits	   of	   permissible	  harming	   are	   set	   by	   the	   limits	   of	   private	  morality.	   This	   view	   accepts	   that	  agents	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   additional	   moral	   reasons	   in	   favour	   of	   causing	  harm	  in	  virtue	  of	  occupying	  a	  role	  or	  position	  within	  an	  institution.	  What	  it	  denies	   is	   that	   these	   reasons	   are	   ever	   sufficient	   to	   justify	   causing	   serious	  non-­‐consensual	   harming	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   liability	   or	   lesser-­‐evil	  justification.	  	  
2.5	  Conclusion	  	  According	  to	  an	  increasingly	  influential	  reductivist	  approaches	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	   war,	   the	   standard	   forms	   of	   justification	   for	   causing	   harm	   contained	  within	  private	  interpersonal	  morality	  are	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  justifying	   the	   resort	   to	  war	   and	   the	  prosecution	  of	  wars.	   Given	   this	   dual-­‐claim,	   reductivism	   endorses	   jettisoning	   the	   authority	   criterion	   from	   just	  war	  theorising,	  in	  both	  its	  restrictive	  and	  permissive	  roles.	  Justified	  warfare	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  to	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  entities	  and	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  entity	  cannot	  generate	  any	  additional	  permissions	  to	  kill	  and	   injure	  beyond	   those	   that	  obtain	  between	  private	   individuals.	  At	  best,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  is	  redundant,	  at	  worst	  it	  is	  deeply	  pernicious.	  Given	  the	   centrality	   of	   considerations	   of	   authority	  within	   the	   just	  war	   tradition	  throughout	  its	  development,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  overstatement	  to	  say	  that	  the	  most	  revisionary	   aspect	   of	   a	   reductivist	   view	   is	   its	   rejection	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   I	  accept	   the	  reductivist	  critique	  of	   the	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  a	  war’s	  being	  justified	  that	   it	   be	  waged	   by	   a	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entity.	   In	   the	   following	   chapters	   I	  examine	  the	  prospects	   for	  a	  qualified	  defence	  of	   the	  authority	  criterion	   in	  its	   alternative,	   permissive	   role	   (though	   I	   will	   briefly	   return	   to	   the	  restrictive	  criterion	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  Given	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  reductivist	  view	  entails	   rejecting	   the	   permissive	   criterion,	   a	   rehabilitation	   of	   the	   criterion	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will	   need	   to	   show	   that	   one	   of	   the	   claims	   commonly	   associated	   with	  reductivism	  is	  in	  fact	  mistaken.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Non-­‐Reductivist	  Approaches	  to	  Just	  War	  Theory	  	  
3.1	  Introduction	  	  As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   a	   reductivist	   approach	   generates	  powerful	   objections	   to	   including	   an	   authority	   criterion	   within	   just	   war	  theory.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   fact	   that	   wars	   are	  waged	   by	   particular	   kinds	   of	  entity	   has	   no	   non-­‐derivative	   moral	   significance	   for	   justifying	   either	   the	  resort	   to	   war	   or	   individuals’	   conduct	   within	   wars.	   These	   questions	   are	  wholly	  settled	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  moral	  principles	  that	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  force	  between	  private	  individuals.	  Any	  defence	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  must	  therefore	  show	  that	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  the	  reductivist	  picture.	  To	  this	  end,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  consider	   a	   rival	   ‘non-­‐reductivist’	   approach	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   war.	   On	   this	  alternative	   view,	   reductivists	   are	  mistaken	   in	   holding	   that	   the	  morality	   of	  war	  is	  determined	  solely	  by	  considerations	  of	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil,	  on	  the	  ground	   that	  warfare	  differs	   from	  ordinary	   forms	  of	   interpersonal	  violence	  in	  some	  morally	  relevant	  respect.	  Proponents	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  typically	  locate	  this	  difference	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  war	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  groups	  of	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  morally	  significant	  relationships	  with	  one	  another.	  A	   central	   claim	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   is	   that	   these	   relationships	   are	  independently	  capable	  of	  generating	  permissions	  for	  killing	  and	  injuring	  in	  war,	  thus	  denying	  reductivism.	  An	  assessment	  of	  a	  non-­‐reductivist	  approach	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  the	   purposes	   of	   investigating	   the	   prospects	   for	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion.	   This	   is	   because	   non-­‐reductivism	   potentially	   provides	   the	  resources	  for	  justifying	  the	  central	  thought	  that	  I	  have	  argued	  underpins	  the	  inclusion	  of	   the	   criterion	  within	   just	  war	   theory	  –	   that	   combatants	   in	  war	  enjoy	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  virtue	  of	  fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity.106	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106 	  Jeff	   McMahan	   also	   suggests,	   albeit	   briefly,	   a	   possible	   connection	   between	   non-­‐reductivism	   and	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   though	   he	   does	   so	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   standard	  restrictive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  criterion.	  McMahan,	  ‘Just	  War’,	  p.672.	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However,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	   must	   be	   rejected.	   The	  argument	   works	   by	   pushing	   a	   dilemma	   onto	   non-­‐reductivists:	   If	   non-­‐reductivists	  are	  successful	  in	  showing	  that	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity	  gives	  rise	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war,	  they	  must	  also	   jettison	   the	   most	   intuitive	   restrictions	   on	   conduct	   in	   war	   –	   most	  saliently,	   the	   prohibition	   on	   intentionally	   killing	   morally	   innocent	   non-­‐combatants.	   Since	   this	   conclusion	   is	   unacceptable,	  we	  must	   conclude	   that	  non-­‐reductivism	  fails.	  	  
3.2	  Motivating	  Non-­‐Reductivism	  	  	  One	  way	  of	  motivating	  a	  non-­‐reductivist	  view	   is	  by	  arguing	   that	  a	  certain	  class	   of	   killing	   in	  war	   is	   intuitively	  permissible	   yet	   cannot	  be	   justified	  on	  grounds	   of	   liability	   or	   impartial	   lesser-­‐evil,	   which	   are	   the	   sole	   units	   of	  currency	  for	  morally	  evaluating	  warfare	  on	  a	  reductivist	  view.	  	  	  
3.2.1	  The	  Permissibility	  of	  Participation	  in	  Unjust	  Wars	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  one	  important	  aspect	  of	  a	  reductivist	  approach	  is	  that	   it	  rejects	   the	   view	   that	   the	   permission	   to	   kill	   in	   war	   applies	   equally	   to	   all	  combatants,	   independently	   of	   the	   justice	   of	   the	  wars	   in	  which	   they	   fight.	  The	  Equality	  Thesis	  is	  a	  central	  component	  of	  orthodox	  just	  war	  theory	  and	  the	   laws	   of	   war,	   yet	   has	   no	   analogue	   within	   ordinary	   interpersonal	  morality.	  More	  specifically,	   the	  permission	   to	  kill	   in	  an	  unjust	  war	  cannot	  be	   squared	  with	   liability-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   killing.	   Reductivists	   hold	  that	   there	   is	   a	   genuine	   incompatibility	   here,	   which	   must	   be	   resolved	   by	  rejecting	   the	   permissibility	   of	   fighting	   in	   unjust	   wars.	   Doing	   so	   involves	  intentionally	  killing	  morally	   innocent	   individuals	   and	   is	   straightforwardly	  morally	  impermissible	  for	  that	  reason.	  	  Many	  find	  the	  conclusion	  that	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory	  and	  the	  laws	  of	   war	   lack	   principled	  moral	   foundations	   too	   revisionary	   to	   be	   accepted	  and	  have	  sought	  to	  defend	  the	  permissibility	  of	  fighting	  in	  unjust	  wars.	  One	  common	   strategy	   for	   doing	   so	   is	   to	   deny	   the	   premise	   underpinning	   the	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reductivist	   critique	   –	   that	   warfare	   is	   morally	   continuous	   with	   all	   other	  forms	   of	   violence	   and	   justified	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   aggregated	   liability	   and	  lesser-­‐evil	   justifications.	   On	   this	   view,	   there	   need	   be	   no	   tension	   between	  the	   permissibility	   of	   fighting	   in	   unjust	   wars	   and	   standard	   forms	   of	  justification	  for	  interpersonal	  harming,	  since	  the	  morality	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  is	  grounded	  in	  some	  further	  moral	  considerations,	  which	  reductivism	  fails	  to	  accommodate.	  	  	  
3.2.2	  The	  Avoidance	  of	  Pacifism	  
	  A	  more	  general	  objection	  holds	  that	  reductivism	  cannot	  justify	  killing	  even	  in	  wars	   that	   are	   intuitively	   just	   and	   thus	   entails	   a	   form	   of	   pacifism.	   This	  objection	  is	  more	  troubling	  than	  the	  previous	  challenge,	  since	  it	  argues	  that	  reductivism	   cannot	   justify	   a	   class	   of	   killing	   which	   reductivists	   are	   not	  willing	  to	  accept	  as	  unjustified.	  The	  most	  forceful	  version	  of	  this	  objection	  has	   recently	   been	   put	   forward	   by	   Seth	   Lazar,	   who	   argues	   that	   the	  widespread	   intentional	   killing	   of	   combatants	   that	   is	   necessary	   to	   wage	  practically	  any	  war	  cannot	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  those	  combatants	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  killing.	  107	  	  Lazar	   derives	   this	   conclusion	   by	   arguing	   that	   reductivism	   faces	   a	  dilemma,	   resulting	   from	   the	   primacy	   it	   assigns	   to	   considerations	   of	  individual	   liability	   in	   justifying	   intentional	  killing	   in	  war.	  According	  to	  the	  dilemma,	   reductivists	   cannot	   consistently	  hold	   that	   the	   intentional	   killing	  of	   combatants	   in	  war	   is	   justified	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   those	  combatants	  have	  rendered	   themselves	   liable	   to	   defensive	   killing,	   while	   also	   maintaining	   a	  general	   prohibition	   on	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐combatants.	   One	   of	   these	  commitments	  has	  to	  go.	  	  Reductivists	   typically	   accept	   that	   some	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   the	   unjust	  side	   of	   a	   war	   will	   be	   liable	   to	   being	   killed,	   and	   so	   do	   not	   endorse	   an	  absolute	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants.	  For	  example,	  those	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Seth	  Lazar,	  ‘The	  Responsibility	  Dilemma	  for	  Killing	  in	  War:	  A	  Review	  Essay’,	  Philosophy	  
and	   Public	   Affairs	   38,	   No,2	   (2010),	   180-­‐213.	   For	   different	   arguments	   that	   a	   reductivist	  approach	   entails	   a	   form	   of	   pacifism,	   see	   Richard	   Norman,	   Ethics,	   Killing	   and	   War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  David	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,	  Ch.6.	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have	   made	   significant	   and	   culpable	   contributions	   to	   the	   initiation	   or	  continuation	   of	   an	   unjust	   war,	   such	   as	   war-­‐mongering	   politicians,	  propagandists,	   weapons	   scientists,	   etc.	   But	   reductivists	   are	   generally	  committed	   to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   an	  unjust	   side	   of	   a	   war	   may	   not	   be	   permissibly	   targeted,	   and	   explain	   this	  prohibition	   in	   terms	   of	   non-­‐combatants	   retaining	   full	   possession	   of	   their	  normal	   right	   not	   to	   be	   killed.	   For	   example,	   in	   virtue	   of	   having	   not	  made	  sufficiently	   large	   causal	   contributions	   to	   the	   unjust	   threats	   posed	   by	  combatants,	   by	   lacking	   sufficient	   moral	   responsibility	   for	   their	  contributions,	   or	   because	   of	   the	   causal	   remoteness	   of	   their	  contributions.108	  	  Lazar	  argues	   that	   this	  position	  cannot	  be	  squared	  with	   the	   reductivist	  position	   that	   intentionally	   killing	   combatants	   is	   primarily	   justified	   on	   the	  grounds	   that	   they	  have	  rendered	   themselves	   liable	   to	  defensive	  killing	  by	  participating	   in	   an	   unjust	   war.	   In	   order	   to	   argue	   that	   a	   sufficiently	   large	  proportion	  of	   enemy	  combatants	  are	   liable	   to	  be	  killed,	   reductivists	  must	  set	  the	  threshold	  for	  liability	  fairly	  low.	  	  This	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  render	  combatants	   liable	   who	   make	   relatively	   small	   contributions	   to	   unjust	  threats	  and	  who	  bear	   little	   culpability	   for	  doing	  so.	  Lazar	  claims	   that	   this	  will	   include	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  members	  of	  militaries	  engaged	  in	  unjust	  wars.	  	  However,	   the	   consequence	   of	   this	   necessarily	   low	   bar	   for	   liability,	  argues	   Lazar,	   is	   that	   it	   will	   also	   render	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   the	   unjust	   side	   liable	   to	   defensive	   killing.	   There	   are	  insufficient	  differences	  between	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  war	  effort	  and	  their	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  contributing	   that	   could	   ground	   a	   general	   difference	   in	   liability.	   Lazar	  argues	   that	   this	   implication	   is	   unacceptable	   and	   that	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   it	  reductivists	  must	   instead	   endorse	   a	   higher	   threshold	   of	   contributory	   and	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  killing.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	   that	   this	   now	   leads	   to	   a	   highly	   pacifistic	   conclusion,	   since	   this	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Ch.5;	  Fabre,	  ‘Guns,	  Food	  and	  Liability	  to	  Attack	  in	  War’;	  David	  Rodin,	   ‘The	  Moral	   Inequality	   of	   Combatants:	  Why	   jus	   in	  bello	  Asymmetry	   is	  Half-­‐Right’	   in	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  44-­‐68.
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demanding	   account	   of	   liability	   will	   now	   render	   large	   portions	   of	   unjust	  combatants	   non-­‐liable.	   Herein	   lies	   the	   ‘responsibility	   dilemma’	   for	  reductivism.	  Lazar	   argues	   that	   since	   pacifism	   is	   also	   unacceptable,	   we	  must	   reject	  reductivism	   as	   the	   correct	   account	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   war.	   What	   the	  dilemma	  reveals	   is	   that	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  wars,	  whether	   just	  or	  unjust,	  will	   involve	   the	   widespread	   intentional	   killing	   of	   non-­‐liable	   individuals.	  Hence,	  if	  warfare	  is	  to	  be	  justified,	  it	  cannot	  be	  because	  the	  combatants	  that	  would	  have	  to	  be	  killed	  have	  rendered	  themselves	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  The	   correct	   theory	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   war	   must	   appeal	   to	   other	   moral	  considerations.	  The	   jury	   is	   still	   out	   on	   the	   success	   of	   this	   objection.	   One	   line	   of	  resistance	  maintains	  that	  the	  dilemma	  can	  be	  denied,	  by	  arguing	  there	  are	  in	   fact	   morally	   relevant	   asymmetries	   between	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   ground	   liability. 109 	  Another	  response	  aims	   to	   show	   that	  modifying	   the	   relevant	   conception	  of	   liability	  can	   enable	   reductivists	   to	   draw	   the	   desired	   distinction	   between	  combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants. 110 	  A	   more	   radical	   view	   accepts	   the	  existence	   of	   the	   dilemma,	   but	   denies	   that	   the	   correct	   resolution	   requires	  rejecting	   reductivism.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   correct	   conclusion	   is	   that	   many	  non-­‐combatants	  on	  the	  unjust	  side	  of	  a	  war	  simply	  are	   liable	  to	  defensive	  killing.111	  The	   dilemma	   shows	   not	   that	   reductivism	   is	   false,	   but	   that	   the	  standard	  principle	  of	  non-­‐combatant	  immunity	  is.	  	  
3.3	  Non-­‐Reductivist	  Approaches	  	  The	   important	  point	   to	  note	   is	   that	  both	   lines	  of	  objection	   to	   reductivism	  surveyed	   in	  the	  previous	  section,	   though	  motivated	  by	  different	  concerns,	  are	   united	   in	   holding	   that	   reductivism	   cannot	   justify	   acts	   of	   intentional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  ‘Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable	  to	  be	  Killed	  in	  War’,	  Analysis	  71,	  No.3	  (2011),	  544-­‐559.	  See	  also,	  Bradley	  Jay	  Strawser,	   ‘Walking	  the	  Tightrope	  of	  Just	  War,	  Analysis	  71,	  No.3	  (2011),	  58-­‐66.	  110	  Saba	  Bazargan,	   ‘Complicitous	  Liability	   in	  War’,	  Philosophical	  Studies	  165	   (2013),	   177-­‐195.	  111	  Frowe,	  ‘Defensive	  Killing’,	  Chs.6-­‐8.	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killing	   that	   are,	   by	   hypothesis,	   morally	   permissible.	   For	   both,	   this	  conclusion	   shows	   that	   reductivists	   are	   mistaken	   to	   hold	   that	   the	  permissibility	   of	   killing	   in	  war	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   same	   considerations	  that	   determine	   the	   permissibility	   of	   killing	   in	   ordinary	   cases	   of	  interpersonal	   violence.	   More	   specifically,	   that	   reductivists	   are	   wrong	   to	  hold	   that	   liability	   is	   a	   near-­‐necessary	   condition	   of	   justified	   intentional	  killing	  in	  war.112	  This	   response	   expresses	   an	   alternative,	   non-­‐reductive	   view	   of	   the	  morality	   of	   war.	   Non-­‐reductivism	   encompasses	   a	   spectrum	   of	   possible	  positions,	  but	  the	  unifying	  idea	  is	  that	  warfare	  differs	  from	  standard	  cases	  of	   interpersonal	   violence	   in	   some	   morally	   relevant	   respect,	   so	   that	   our	  conclusions	  about	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	  in	  the	  latter	  cases	  cannot	  be	  straightforwardly	   imported	   into	   the	   former	   in	   the	   way	   that	   reductivists	  claim.	  Michael	  Walzer	   captures	   the	   spirit	   of	   this	   view	   nicely	   in	   his	   pithy	  objection	   to	   McMahan’s	   reductivism:	   “What	   Jeff	   McMahan	   provides	   is	   a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  killing	  in	  war	  would	  be	  permissible	  if	  war	  were	  a	  peacetime	   activity.” 113 	  While	   many	   are	   intuitively	   attracted	   to	   a	   non-­‐reductivist	   view,	   the	   crucial	   task	   for	   non-­‐reductivists	   is	   to	   identify	   a	  relevant	  differentiating	   feature	  of	  warfare	   that	   is	   both	  morally	   significant	  and	  supportive	  of	  a	  more	  extensive	  account	  of	  permissible	  killing	  in	  war.	  	  Proponents	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   typically	   locate	   the	   relevant	   moral	  difference	   in	   war’s	   collective	   and	   political	   character.	   They	   point	   out	   that	  war	   does	   not	   simply	   involve	   otherwise-­‐unconnected	   private	   individuals	  using	  force	  against	  one	  another,	  as	  in	  the	  simplified	  self-­‐defence	  cases	  that	  reductivists	   often	   draw	   on	   in	   deriving	   conclusions	   about	   the	  morality	   of	  conduct	   in	   war.	   Rather,	   war	   involves	   the	   use	   of	   force	   by	   groups	   or	  associations	   of	   individuals	   engaged	   in	   morally	   significant	   relationships	  with	  one	  another.	  War,	  on	  this	  view,	  is	  essentially	  an	  activity	  that	  people	  do	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  The	   ‘near’	   qualification	   is	   necessary,	   since	   reductivists	   are	   generally	   not	   absolutists	  regarding	   the	   constraint	   on	   intentionally	   killing	   non-­‐liable	   individuals.	   Reductivists	  typically	  hold	  that	  the	  constraint	  on	  intentionally	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable	  is	  much	  weightier	  than	   the	   constraint	   on	   unintentionally	   but	   foreseeably	   killing	   the	   non-­‐liable,	   so	   that	  intentional	  killing	  could	  be	  justified	  as	  the	  lesser-­‐evil	  provided	  that	  the	  evil	  averted	  were	  sufficiently	  great	  to	  outweigh	  the	  more	  stringent	  constraint	  on	  intentional	  killing.	  	  113	  Michael	  Walzer,	  ‘Response	  to	  McMahan’s	  Paper’,	  p.43.	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together.114	  Reductivists,	  it	  is	  charged,	  are	  blinded	  to	  this	  important	  feature	  of	  war	  by	  their	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  individuals.115	  	  	  
3.3.1	  The	  Collectivist	  View	  	  This	   focus	   on	   collectives	   rather	   than	   individuals	   continues	   a	   tradition	   of	  thinking	   about	   war	   with	   origins	   in	   Rousseau’s	   conception	   of	   political	  community	  and	  war.	  On	  Rousseau’s	  view,	  a	   legitimate	  polity	   is	  constituted	  not	  by	  any	  external	  markers	  but	  by	  an	  internal	  relation	  of	  its	  citizens’	  wills.	  When	   the	   polity	   acts,	   through	   the	   coordinated	   action	   of	   its	   citizens	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  general	  will,	  this	  act	  has	  a	  normative	  personality	  over	  and	  above	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  component	  actions.	  War	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  this	  form	  of	  action.	  It	  is	  this	  internal	  relation	  of	  wills	  which	  distinguishes	  war	  from	  merely	  private	  violence	  such	  as	  duels,	  riots,	  feuds	  and	  brigandry.	  War,	   properly	   understood,	   is	   an	   activity	   that	   individuals	   simply	   cannot	  perform,	   “War...is	   not	   a	   relationship	   between	   one	   man	   and	   another,	   but	  between	  one	  State	  and	  another.”116	  	  Christopher	  Kutz	  has	  developed	  a	  version	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  based	  on	  this	   collectivist	   understanding	   of	   war,	   which	   aims	   to	   defend	   a	   more	  orthodox	   conception	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war,	   which	   grants	   a	  permission	   to	   kill	   to	   combatants	   who	   participate	   in	   both	   just	   and	   unjust	  wars.117	  For	  Kutz,	  the	  norms	  governing	  conduct	  in	  war	  must	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	   when	   soldiers	   confront	   each	   other	   on	   the	   battlefield	   they	   do	   so	   not	  merely	   as	   private	   individuals,	   but	   as	   citizen-­‐representatives	   of	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  For	   examples,	   see	   Fletcher,	   Romantics	   at	   War;	   Christopher	   Kutz,	   ‘The	   Difference	  Uniforms	  Make:	  Collective	  Violence	  in	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  War’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  33,	  No.2	  (2005),	  148-­‐180;	  Seth	  Lazar,	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’,	  
Journal	  of	  Practical	  Ethics	  1,	  No.1	  (2013),	  6-­‐51;	  Seth	  Lazar,	   ‘Necessity	  in	  Self-­‐Defense	  and	  War’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  40,	  No.1	   (2012),	  3-­‐44;	  Tamar	  Meisels,	   ‘In	  Defence	  of	  the	  Defenceless:	  The	  Morality	  of	  the	  Laws	  of	  War’,	  Political	  Studies	  60,	  No	  4	  (2012),	  919-­‐935;	   Robert	   Sparrow,	   ‘Hands	   Up	   Who	   Wants	   to	   Die:	   Primoratz	   on	   Responsibility	   and	  Civilian	   Immunity	   in	   War’,	   Ethical	   Theory	   and	   Moral	   Practice	   8,	   No.3	   (2005),	   299-­‐319;	  Zohar,	  ‘Collective	  War	  and	  Individualist	  Ethics:	  Against	  the	  Conscription	  of	  Self-­‐Defense’.	  115	  This	   criticism	   of	   reductivism	   bears	   an	   interesting	   resemblance	   to	   communitarian	  objections	  to	  liberalism.	  	  116	  Jean	   Jacques	   Rousseau,	   ‘The	   Social	   Contract’	   cited	   in	   Gregory	   Reichberg,	   Henrik	   Syse	  and	   Endre	   Begby	   (eds),	   The	   Ethics	   of	  War:	   Classic	   and	   Contemporary	   Readings	   (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2006),	  p.482.	  117	  Kutz,	  ‘The	  Difference	  Uniforms	  Make’.	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communities	   engaging	   in	   collective	   political	   action.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  collective	  and	  political	  character	  of	   the	  activity	  and	  not,	  as	   reductivists	  argue,	   in	   the	   liability	  of	   combatants	  
qua	  individuals.	  Combatants	  in	  war	  possess	  what	  Kutz	  terms	  an	  “essentially	  political	  permission”	  to	  harm	  their	  opponents.118	  	  This	   collectivist	   strategy	   allows	   Kutz	   to	   reassert	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  permission	  to	  kill	   in	  war	  obtains	   independently	  of	  considerations	  of	   jus	  ad	  
bellum.	   Since	   combatants	   on	   all	   sides	   of	   a	   conflict	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	  political	  collective	  and	  this	  fact	  obtains	  independently	  of	  the	  justice	  of	  their	  cause,	  each	  possesses	  a	  permission	  to	   fight	  and	  kill	   in	  an	  unjust	  war,	  even	  though	  such	  actions	  would	  be	  “infamous	  crimes”	  if	  committed	  privately.119	  On	   this	   view,	   the	   clash	   that	   reductivists	   perceive	   between	   the	   traditional	  norms	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war	   and	   considerations	   of	   individual	  liability	   can	  be	  explained	  away	  as	   resting	  on	  an	  under-­‐appreciation	  of	   the	  normative	  significance	  of	  collective	  political	  action.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  although	  Kutz’s	  collectivist	  view	  is	  primarily	  intended	   to	  provide	  a	  defence	  of	  one	  specific	  class	  of	   intentional	  killing	   in	  war	   that	   is	   not	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   liability	   –	   the	   killing	   of	   just	  combatants	   by	   unjust	   combatants	   –	   it	   also	   provides	   the	   resources	   for	   a	  defence	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  more	  generally.	  If,	  as	  Lazar	  claims,	  participation	  in	  both	  unjust	  and	  just	  wars	  involves	  the	  widespread	  intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants,	  the	  collectivist	  permission	  to	  kill	  can	  also	  be	  invoked	  to	  cover	  the	  latter	  class	  of	  cases	  as	  well.	  Reductivists	   are,	   naturally,	   rather	   suspicious	   of	   this	   line	   of	   argument.	  For	  McMahan,	   it	   is	   straightforwardly	   bizarre,	   trading	   on	   “a	   form	  of	  moral	  alchemy.”120 	  For	   how	   can	   it	   be,	   he	   argues,	   that	   simply	   by	   forming	   a	  particular	   type	   of	   bond	   among	   themselves	   and	   together	   pursuing	   certain	  kinds	   of	   political	   goals,	   that	   members	   of	   a	   community	   can	   exempt	  themselves	  from	  the	  duties	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	  imposed	  by	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  non-­‐members?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Ibid.	  p.153.	  119	  Ibid.	  120	  Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘Collectivist	   Defences	   of	   the	   Moral	   Equality	   of	   Combatants’,	   Journal	   of	  
Military	  Ethics	  6,	  No.1	  (2007),	  50-­‐59	  at	  p.53.	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A	   version	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   as	   strong	   as	   this	   certainly	   does	   seem	  implausible.	   However,	   the	   view	   can	   be	   refined	   in	   at	   least	   two	   directions	  which	   may	   render	   this	   objection	   less	   than	   decisive.	   Crucially,	   the	   most	  plausible	  versions	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  will	  be	  those	  which	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  deny	  the	  reductivist	  insight	  that	  fighting	  in	  an	  unjust	  war	  involves	  violating	  the	   rights	   of	   one’s	   opponents.	   Rather,	   they	   will	   seek	   to	   show	   that	   the	  collective	  character	  of	  warfare	  is	  sufficiently	  morally	  important	  to	  support	  a	  norm	  permitting	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  wrongdoing	   that	   this	   involves.	   In	   fact,	  Kutz	  quite	  clearly	   indicates	   that	  his	   view	   is	   restricted	   in	   this	   manner,	   acknowledging	   that	   “the	   unjust	  combatant	  morally	  wrongs	  who	  he	  kills.”121	  The	   first	   refinement	   limits	   the	  collectivist	  view	  to	  offering	  a	  principled	  (rather	   than	   pragmatic)	   defence	   of	   the	   legal	   norms	   governing	   conduct	   in	  war.	  In	  particular,	  by	  providing	  support	  for	  the	  immunity	  from	  sanction	  the	  law	  grants	   to	   combatants	  who	  participate	   in	  unjust	  wars.	  There	  are	  many	  ways	   in	   which	   an	   agent	   can	   be	   legitimately	   exempted	   from	   the	   law’s	  sanction	   without	   it	   needing	   to	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   agent	   acted	   with	  justification.	   For	   example,	   the	   broad	   legal	   defence	   of	   excuse	   functions	   to	  defeat	  liability	  to	  sanction	  in	  precisely	  this	  way.	  	  If	  the	  tricky	  notion	  of	  a	  collectivist	  ‘political	  permission’	  is	  interpreted	  as	  justifying	   a	   special	   type	   of	   legal	   defence,	   grounded	   in	   the	   normative	  significance	   of	   collective	   political	   activity,	   then	   the	   traditional	   legal	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war	  may	  be	  defended	  against	  the	  reductivist	  challenge	  without	   having	   to	   make	   the	   difficult	   claim	   that	   the	   mere	   existence	   of	  political	  relationships	  can	  somehow	  render	  permissible	  otherwise	  wrongful	  conduct.	  This	  view	  can	  accept	  the	  reductivist	  claim	  that	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  acts	  of	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war	  are	  primarily	  determined	  by	  considerations	  of	   liability,	   but	   maintains	   that	   the	   collective	   character	   of	   war	   renders	   it	  morally	   inappropriate	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	   individuals	   in	  war	  with	  the	  same	  reactive	  practices	  and	  attitudes	  that	  are	  appropriate	   in	  cases	  of	  private	  violence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Kutz,	  ‘The	  Difference	  Uniforms	  Make’,	  p.173.	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One	   way	   of	   making	   this	   argument,	   which	   Kutz	   suggests	   in	   several	  passages,	   is	  to	  understand	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  collective	  political	  action	   as	   taking	   place	   at	   the	   level	   of	   how	   acts	   committed	   as	   part	   of	   a	  collective	   political	   action	   are	   attributable	   to	   specific	   individual	   agents	   for	  the	   purposes	   of	   determining	   their	   liability	   to	   blame	   and	   sanction.	   The	  thought	   is	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   private	   wrongdoers,	   those	   who	   inflict	  equivalent	   wrongs	   as	   participants	   in	   a	   collective	   political	   project	   bear	   a	  different	   normative	   relationship	   to	   those	   acts,	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   renders	  the	   usual	   attribution	   of	   responsibility	   for	   specific	   wrongs	   to	   particular	  agents	   inappropriate.122	  In	   these	   cases,	   the	  wrongs	   are	   attributable	   to	   the	  collective	   as	   a	  whole,	   and	   perhaps	   its	  members	   qua	  members,	   but	   not	   to	  individual	  combatants	  qua	  private	  individuals.123	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  agents	   do	   wrong	   as	   part	   of	   a	   collective	   political	   activity	   provides	   an	  important	   exculpatory	   consideration,	   which	   justifies	   the	   legal	   practice	   of	  not	  criminalising	  killing	  in	  war,	  including	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants.	  	  
3.3.2	  The	  Associative	  Duty	  View	  	  A	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  may	  also	  be	  refined	  in	  a	  second	  direction,	  which	  aims	  to	  preserve	  the	  stronger	  claim	  that	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  warfare	  is	  able	  to	  render	  it	  morally	  permissible	  for	  combatants	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  their	  non-­‐liable	   combatants.	   This	   view	   accepts	   that	   such	   killing	   involves	   a	   serious	  injustice,	  but	  denies	  that	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  render	  so	  doing	  impermissible.	  On	   one	   way	   of	   arguing	   for	   this	   position,	   the	   negative	   duty	   not	   to	  intentionally	   kill	   the	   non-­‐liable,	   while	   certainly	   stringent,	   may	   be	  overridden	   by	   weightier	   moral	   considerations,	   rendering	   the	   rights	  violation	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  justified.	  	  In	   a	   very	   recent	   article,	   Seth	   Lazar	   argues	   that	   certain	   features	   of	  collectives	   can	   generate	   these	   weighty	   reasons.124	  More	   specifically,	   such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Ibid,	  p.179.	  123	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  Judith	  Lichtenberg,	  ‘How	  to	  Judge	  Soldiers	  Whose	  Cause	  is	  Unjust’,	  in	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (eds),	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Warriors,	  112-­‐129	  at	  pp.125-­‐129.	  124	  Lazar,	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’.	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reasons	   arise	   from	   the	   value	   of	   a	   range	   of	   significant	   relationships	   that	  combatants	  share	  with	  many	  of	  their	  fellow	  group	  members,	  such	  as	  those	  that	   obtain	   between	   family	   members,	   loved	   ones,	   friends,	   colleagues,	  comrades-­‐in-­‐arms	   and	   co-­‐citizens.	   Lazar	   emphasises	   that	   participants	   in	  these	  relationships	   incur	  extremely	  stringent	  moral	  duties	   to	  protect	   their	  associates	  from	  harm.	  	  Crucially,	  for	  Lazar,	  these	  associative	  duties	  to	  protect	  may	  be	  weightier	  than	  the	  negative	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  non-­‐liable,	  so	  that	  when	  these	  duties	  come	   into	   conflict,	   harming	   the	   non-­‐liable	   may	   be	   justified	   as	   the	   lesser	  breach	   of	   duty.	   Lazar’s	   argument	   for	   this	   conclusion	   is	   sophisticated	   and	  lengthy,	  but	  the	  underlying	  thought	  appeals	  to	  our	  intuitions	  about	  cases	  in	  which	   the	   duty	   to	   protect	   appears	   to	   trump	   the	   duty	   not	   to	   kill	   the	   non-­‐liable.125	  For	   example,	   in	   a	   scenario	   in	   which	   a	   parent	   is	   able	   to	   divert	   a	  falling	   boulder	   that	   will	   otherwise	   crush	   her	   child	   onto	   a	   non-­‐liable	  bystander,	  many	  find	  it	  intuitive	  that	  the	  parent	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  doing	  so,	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  special	  relationship	  with	  their	  child.	  Extrapolating	  from	  such	   cases,	   Lazar	   argues	   that	   killing	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   in	  war	   can	   be	  justified	  on	   the	  same	  basis,	   since	  such	  killing	  may	  be	  necessary	   to	  protect	  one’s	  associates	  from	  serious	  harm.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  	  	   sometimes	  we	  can	  protect	  our	  associates	  only	  if	  we	  fight	  and	  kill.	  We	  have	  duties	  to	  protect	  our	  associates,	  grounded	  in	  the	  value	  of	   these	   special	   relationships.	   Our	   armed	   forces	   are	   the	  executors	   of	   those	   duties.	   When	   they	   fight,	   those	   duties	   may	  clash	  with	   the	   rights	   that	   they	  must	   violate	   to	  win	   the	  war.	   In	  some	   cases,	   the	   associative	   duty	   to	   protect	   can	   override	   those	  rights,	   thus	   rendering	   some	  acts	  of	  killing	  all	   things	   considered	  justified.”126	  	  The	   ‘associative-­‐duty	  view’	   is	  primarily	   intended	   to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  how	  intentional	  killing	  in	  ad	  bellum	  justified	  wars	  can	  be	  justified,	  since,	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Lazar	  supports	  his	  view	  with	  an	  argument	  from	  transitivity.	  Ibid.	  pp.19-­‐30.	  126	  Ibid.	  p.9.	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Lazar,	  such	  killing	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  liability.	  However,	  as	  Lazar	  recognises,	  the	  associative-­‐duty	  view	  also	  enables	  a	  qualified	  defence	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  participating	  in	  unjust	  wars,	  since	  fighting	  and	  killing	  may	  be	   necessary	   to	   protect	   one’s	   associates	   whether	   or	   not	   one’s	   war	   is	  justified	   or	   unjustified. 127 	  On	   the	   associative-­‐duty	   view,	   the	   facts	   that	  ground	   the	   permission	   to	   kill	   in	   war	   may	   obtain	   independently	   of	  considerations	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  The	  associative-­‐duty	  view	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  collectivist	  view	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  precise	  challenge	  that	  each	  poses	  to	  reductivism.	  	  A	  collectivist	  view	   may	   be	   characterised	   as	   denying	   the	   fundamental	   reductivist	  commitment	  to	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis,	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  is	   exhausted	  by	   the	   same	  principles	  of	   interpersonal	  morality	   that	   govern	  the	   use	   of	   force	   between	   private	   individuals.	   For	   collectivists,	   war,	   as	   a	  manifestation	  of	  collective	  political	  agency,	  is	  genuinely	  morally	  sui	  generis.	  	  The	  associative-­‐duty	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  accept	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis.	   Instead,	   it	   challenges	   the	   reductivist	   Content	   Thesis,	   which	   holds	  that	  considerations	  of	  liability	  and	  impartial	  lesser-­‐evil	  exhaust	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	   for	   non-­‐consensual	   harming	   and	   killing	   contained	   within	  interpersonal	   morality.	   For	   Lazar,	   interpersonal	   morality	   includes	   an	  additional	  class	  of	   justification,	  arising	   from	  the	  comparative	  stringency	  of	  one’s	   duties	   to	   protect	   one’s	   associates.	   On	   this	   view,	   war	   is	   not	   morally	  special	   in	  any	   strong	   sense,	   it	   is	   simply	  a	   case	   in	  which	   these	  duties	  most	  strikingly	   come	   into	  conflict	  with	   the	  weaker	  duty	  not	   to	   intentionally	  kill	  those	  who	  are	  non-­‐liable.	  
	  
3.4	  The	  Relevance	  of	  Non-­‐Reductivism	  	  As	  argued	   in	  Chapter	  1,	   the	   inclusion	  of	   the	  authority	  criterion	  within	   just	  war	   theory	   serves	   to	   capture	   the	   intuition	   that	   those	   who	   use	   force	   on	  behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entities	   are	   subject	   to	   additional	   permissions	   to	  cause	  harm.	  More	  specifically:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Ibid.	  pp.45-­‐46.	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The	   Permissive	   Authority	   Criterion:	   If	   an	   agent	   participates	   in	   war	   on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  possesses	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  properties,	  then	  that	  agent	  is	  subject	   to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	  of	  permissions	   to	  cause	  harm	  than	   if	  they	   fought	   privately,	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   an	   entity	   which	   lacks	   that	   set	   of	  properties.	  	  	  Non-­‐reductivist	  approaches	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war	  are	  particularly	  interesting	  for	   the	  purposes	   of	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	  defensibility	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion,	   since	   these	   views	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   providing	   a	   precise	  account	   of	   both	   what	   these	   additional	   permissions	   consist	   in	   and	   the	  relevant	  properties	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  them.	  	  On	  both	   variants	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   canvassed	   above,	   the	   fact	   that	   an	  agent	  uses	  force	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  group	  or	  association	  gives	  rise	   to	   a	   permission	   or	   justification	   to	   intentionally	   kill	   opposing	  combatants	   in	   war	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   liability	   or	   impartial	   lesser-­‐evil	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  On	  a	  collectivist	  view,	  the	  relevant	  properties	  that	  ground	  this	  permission	  (or	  exculpation)	  are	   the	  group’s	  ability	   to	  exercise	  collective	   political	   agency.	   On	   the	   associative-­‐duty	   view,	   the	   relevant	  properties	   are	   the	   weighty	   duties	   to	   protect	   that	   obtain	   between	  participants	  in	  certain	  forms	  of	  valuable	  relationship.	  The	  success	  of	  a	  non-­‐reductionist	  view	  thus	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  qualified	   defence	   of	   the	   authority-­‐criterion,	   in	   its	   permissive	   role,	   against	  the	   sceptical	   challenges	   surveyed	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   However,	   in	   the	   following	  two	  sections	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  such	  views	  are	  unsuccessful.	  	  	  
3.5	  The	  War	  Crimes	  Objection	  	  I	   offer	   a	   different	   objection	   to	   non-­‐reductivism	   than	   that	   standardly	   put	  forward	  by	  reductivists.	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  its	  own	  lights	  and	  granting	  its	  major	  assumptions	   about	   the	   moral	   significance	   of	   collectives	   or	   associative	  relationships,	   a	   non-­‐reductive	   approach	   fails	   to	   provide	   an	   acceptable	  account	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war.	   In	   particular,	   non-­‐reductivists	  cannot	  provide	  a	   convincing	  account	  of	   the	   fundamental	   idea	   that	   certain	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classes	  of	  person	  are	  immune	  from	  attack	  in	  war.	  The	  objection	  is	  intended	  to	   apply,	   mutatis	   mutandis,	   to	   each	   of	   the	   variants	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	  canvassed	  above.	  To	  date,	  the	  debate	  between	  reductive	  and	  non-­‐reductive	  approaches	  to	  war	  has	  largely	  centred	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  intentionally	  killing	  opposing	  combatants.	  This	  focus	  makes	  perfect	  sense.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  is	  common	  intuitions	  about	  this	  permission	  that	  have	  proved	  most	  problematic	  under	  a	  reductive	  view.	  However,	  the	  norms	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  are	  far	  from	  exhausted	  by	   the	   permission	   to	   kill.	   The	   majority	   of	   these	   rules	   are	   prohibitive	   in	  character,	   most	   notably	   the	   restrictive	   component	   of	   the	   requirement	   of	  discrimination,	  which	  prohibits	  attacks	  on	  certain	  classes	  of	  person	  in	  war.	  This	   is	   such	   a	   central	   and	  uncontroversial	   part	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   jus	   in	  bello	  that	   it	   is	  understandable	  that	   it	  does	  not	  receive	  as	  much	  attention	  as	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	  combatants.	  To	  paraphrase	  Walzer,	  the	  hard	  part	  in	  thinking	  ethically	  about	  war	  is	  not	  to	  explain	  why	  certain	  people	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   deliberately	   killed.	   It	   is	   to	   show	   how	   anyone	   can	  be.128	  	  Despite	   the	   consensus	   that	   attacks	   on	   certain	   persons	   are	   prohibited,	  there	  is	  considerable	  debate	  among	  just	  war	  theorists	  as	  to	  precisely	  which	  persons	   are	   immune	   from	   attack	   under	   the	   correct	   principle	   of	  discrimination.	  While	  virtually	  all	  accounts	  of	  discrimination	  start	  from	  the	  truism	  that	  clearly	  innocent	  people	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  deliberately	  targeted	  in	  war,	  there	  is	  dispute	  as	  to	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  innocence	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  how	  innocence	  can	  be	  lost.	  	  Disagreements	  about	   these	   two	   issues	  yield	  significance	  differences	   in	  how	   the	   distinction	   between	   legitimate	   and	   illegitimate	   targets	   in	  war	   is	  drawn.	   For	   example,	   the	   disagreement	   between	  Walzer’s	   and	  McMahan’s	  positions	  on	  how	  innocence	  is	  lost	  via	  liability	  to	  defensive	  force	  leads	  each	  to	  endorse	  a	  very	  different	  conception	  of	   the	  discrimination	  requirement.	  Walzer’s	   threat-­‐based	   account	   of	   liability	   yields	   an	   endorsement	   of	   the	  standard	   view	   of	   discrimination	   in	   war	   as	   drawn,	   roughly,	   between	  combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants.	   By	   contrast	   McMahan’s	   account,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  p.41.	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focuses	   on	  moral	   responsibility	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   threats	   of	   unjustified	  harm	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   liability,	   yields	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   revisionary	  principle	   of	   discrimination.	   It	   takes	   the	   correct	   distinction	   to	   be	   that	  combatants	   who	   lack	   a	   just	   cause	   are	   legitimate	   targets,	   whereas	   just	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  are	  illegitimate	  targets.129	  	  Despite	  the	  practical	  disagreement	  between	  these	  two	  influential	  views,	  it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   the	   similarities	   in	   the	   approach	   each	   takes	   to	   the	  question	  of	  discrimination.	  For	  both,	   it	   is	   impermissible	   to	   target	  persons	  who	   have	   done	   nothing	   to	   lose	   their	   normal	   immunity	   from	   attack.	   The	  dispute	   arises	   from	  competing	   conceptions	  of	   innocence	  and	   liability,	   not	  from	   disagreement	   as	   to	   the	   relevance	   of	   these	   concepts	   to	   the	  permissibility	   of	   targeting.	   In	   cases	   where	   innocence	   is	   clear	   and	  uncontroversial,	   such	   as	   young	   children,	   all	   the	   main	   views	   are	   in	  agreement	   that	   targeting	   these	   individuals	   is	   prohibited	   under	   the	  principle	   of	   discrimination	   and	   that	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   such	  individuals	   have	   done	   nothing	   to	   lose	   their	   normal	   right	   against	   being	  attacked.	  We	  may	   term	   this	   straightforward	  approach	   to	  discrimination	  a	  
target-­‐centred	   account.	   It	   explains	   why	   attacks	   on	   certain	   persons	   are	  prohibited	  or	  permitted	  by	  reference	  to	  certain	  facts	  about	  those	  persons.	  This	  account	  also	  underpins	  a	  commonsense	  understanding	  of	  why	  certain	  acts	   in	   war,	   such	   as	   the	   deliberate	   killing	   of	   non-­‐combatants,	   are	  appropriately	  criminalised	  as	  war	  crimes.	  The	  offence	  of	   the	  war	  crime	   is	  grounded	  in	  the	  rights	  violation	  suffered	  by	  the	  innocent	  victim.	  However,	   this	   straightforward	   and	   highly	   intuitive	   explanation	   of	   the	  restrictions	  on	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  not	  available	  to	  non-­‐reductivists.	  On	   the	   non-­‐reductivist	   views	   considered	   earlier,	   the	   permissibility	   (or	   at	  the	  least	  non-­‐criminality)	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  –	  the	  killing	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  This	   is	  a	  convenient	  oversimplification,	   in	  two	  respects.	  Firstly,	  as	  noted	  above	  and	  in	  fn.108,	   reductivists	   accept	   that	   some	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   an	   unjust	   side	   may	   render	  themselves	  liable	  to	  defensive	  force	  by	  making	  certain	  significant	  kinds	  of	  contribution	  to	  their	   side’s	   war	   effort	   (though,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   some	   dispute	   whether	   a	   general	  distinction	   between	   the	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   grounds	   of	   liability	   can	   be	  maintained).	  Secondly,	  as	  noted	  in	  fn.96,	  reductivists	  also	  accept	  that	  combatants	  on	  a	  just	  side	  can	  render	  themselves	  liable,	  by	  threatening	  harms	  that	  are	  not	  justified	  by	  the	  aims	  of	  their	  war.	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combatants	  by	  other	  combatants	  –	  is	  grounded	  not	  in	  the	  non-­‐innocence	  or	  liability	  of	   the	  combatants	  who	  are	  harmed,	  but	   in	  certain	   facts	  about	   the	  combatants	  who	   inflict	   the	  harms.	  For	  Kutz,	   it	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  combatants	  act	   as	   agents	   of	   their	   collectives	   which	   explains	   their	   permission	   to	   kill	  opposing	  combatants.	  On	  Lazar’s	  view,	  it	   is	  combatants’	  associative	  duties	  which	  do	  the	  normative	  heavy-­‐lifting.	  	  Since	  it	  is	  this	  fact	  about	  those	  who	  inflict	  harm	  in	  war,	  rather	  than	  facts	  about	   those	  who	   suffer	   harm,	  which	   determine	  whether	   such	   harming	   is	  permissible,	   we	   may	   understand	   non-­‐reductivists	   as	   offering	   an	   agent-­‐
centred	   account	   of	   permissible	   killing	   in	   war.	   On	   such	   an	   account,	   the	  question	   of	   the	   liability	   of	   the	   target	   of	   harm	   does	   not	   play	   the	   same	  decisive	   role	   in	   determining	   whether	   inflicting	   that	   harm	   is	   permissible	  that	  it	  does	  on	  a	  standard,	  target-­‐centred	  account	  of	  discrimination.130	  As	  explained	  above,	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  an	  agent-­‐centred	  view	  is	  clear.	  It	   enables	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   permission	   to	   fight	   in	   wars,	   including	   unjust	  wars,	   without	   having	   to	   argue	   that	   such	   action	   can	   be	   permitted	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   a	   target-­‐centred,	   liability-­‐based	   justification.	   However,	   the	  major	  difficulty	   facing	   an	  agent-­‐centred	  view	   is	   that	   if	   it	   succeeds	   in	   supporting	  the	   permission	   kill	   non-­‐liable	   combatants,	   it	   seems	  unable	   to	   account	   for	  the	  foundational	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  restrictions	  on	  who	  may	  be	  targeted.131	  For	   if	   the	  permission	  enjoyed	  by	  combatants	   to	  kill	   their	  opponents,	  who	  have	   done	   nothing	   to	   lose	   their	   normal	   right	   not	   to	   be	   killed,	   rests	   on	  certain	  facts	  about	  the	  unjust	  combatants,	  then	  there	  seems	  no	  reason	  why	  targeting	   and	   killing	   other	   non-­‐liable	   persons	   in	   war,	   such	   as	   non-­‐combatants,	   are	   not	   also	   rendered	   permissible	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   very	  same	  facts.	  Consider	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  examples:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  I	   borrow	   the	   terms	   ‘target-­‐centred’	   and	   ‘agent-­‐centred’	   from	  McMahan,	  who	  employs	  them	  to	  distinguish	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defence.	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  ‘Self-­‐Defense	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  the	  Innocent	  Attacker’,	  Ethics	  104,	  No.2	  (1994),	  252-­‐290	  at	  p.268.	  131	  The	   novelty	   of	   this	   objection	   should	   not	   be	   overstated.	   McMahan	   briefly	   raises	   its	  possibility,	  but	  does	  not	  pursue	  it	  at	  any	  length.	  Jeff	  McMahan	  ‘Précis	  of	  The	  Morality	  and	  
Law	  of	  War’,	  p.674.	  McMahan	  also	  pursues	  an	  analogous	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  agent-­‐centred	  accounts	   of	   self-­‐defence	   in	   his	   ‘Self-­‐Defense	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   the	   Innocent	   Attacker’,	  pp.270-­‐271.	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Siege	   1:	   Nation	   A,	   a	   fully-­‐functioning	   political	   collective,	   wages	   an	   unjust	  war	   against	   Nation	   B	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   annexing	   an	   area	   of	   Nation	   B’s	  territory.	  Nation	  B	  militarily	  opposes	   the	   invasion	  and	  a	  conventional	  war	  ensues,	   endangering	   the	   lives	   of	   combatants	   and	  non-­‐combatants	   on	  both	  sides.	   At	   a	   pivotal	   stage	   in	   the	   war	   Nation	   A	   has	   one	   of	   Nation	   B’s	  strategically	  vital	  cities	  surrounded.	   In	  order	  to	  win	  the	  war	   it	   is	  vital	   that	  the	  city	  be	  taken.	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  can	  only	  do	  so	  by	  bombarding	  the	  city’s	  armed	  defenders,	  killing	  10,000	  of	  Nation	  B’s	  combatants.	  	  	  
Siege	   2:	   The	   circumstances	   are	   exactly	   the	   same	   as	   Siege	   1,	   except	   that	  Nation	  A	  does	  not	  have	  the	  option	  of	  attacking	  the	  city’s	  armed	  defenders.	  Instead,	   in	  order	  to	  take	  the	  city,	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  can	  only	  do	  so	  by	  bombarding	   residential	   areas	   of	   the	   city,	   killing	   3,000	   of	   Nation	   B’s	   non-­‐combatants.	  	  According	  to	  both	  the	  law	  of	  war	  and	  orthodox	  accounts	  of	  just	  war	  theory,	  combatants	   who	   engage	   in	   Siege	   1	   would	   not	   act	   impermissibly	   nor	   be	  legitimately	   punished	   for	   doing	   so,	   since	   they	   act	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  rules	   of	   jus	   in	   bello.	   In	   particular,	   their	   actions	   respect	   the	   principle	   of	  discrimination	  as	  standardly	  interpreted.	  Combatants	  who	  engage	  in	  Siege	  2,	  by	  contrast,	  would	  be	  judged	  to	  act	  impermissibly.	  They	  clearly	  violate	  any	  plausible	   requirement	   of	   discrimination	   and	   may	   appropriately	   be	   held	  liable	   to	   prosecution	   for	  war	   crimes.	   I	   take	   it	   as	   uncontroversial	   that	   any	  adequate	  theory	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  war	  must	   judge	  participation	  in	  Siege	  2	   to	  be	  straightforwardly	  impermissible.	  The	   problem	   non-­‐reductivists	   face	   is	   that	   by	   explaining	   why	  participation	   in	   cases	   like	   Siege	   1	   can	   be	   permissible	   in	   terms	   of	   certain	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  about	  the	  combatants	  who	  participate,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  impermissibility	  of	  participation	  in	  cases	  like	  Siege	  2.	  	  Non-­‐reductivists	   such	   as	   Kutz	   and	   Lazar	   accept	   that	   Nation	   B’s	  combatants	  are	  in	  the	  same	  situation	  as	  Nation	  B’s	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  terms	  of	   liability.	   	  The	  members	  of	  neither	  group	  have	  acted	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	  lose	  their	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  killed.	  Furthermore,	  all	  the	  relevant	  agent-­‐centred	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facts	   that	   non-­‐reductivists	   may	   cite	   as	   grounding	   the	   permission	   to	  intentionally	  kill	  non-­‐liable	   individuals	   in	  Siege	  1	   also	  obtain	   in	  Siege	  2.	   In	  each	  case,	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  will	  be	  acting	  as	  participants	  in	  a	  collective	  political	   project,	   and	   in	   each	   case	   participation	   is	   a	   necessary	   means	   for	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  to	  discharge	  their	  associative	  duties	  to	  protect.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  if	  these	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  are	  capable	  of	  rendering	  participation	   in	   cases	   like	   Siege	   1	   permissible,	   and	   obtain	   to	   the	   same	  degree	   in	  Siege	  2,	   it	   seems	  that	  killing	  must	  also	  be	  permissible	   in	  Siege	  2.	  Nothing	  in	  these	  agent-­‐centred	  considerations	  provides	  a	  means	  for	  morally	  distinguishing	  between	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	   In	   fact,	   Siege	   2	   is	   morally	   preferable	   in	   one	   respect,	   since	   it	  involves	   significantly	   less	   killing	   of	   non-­‐liable	   persons	   than	   Siege	   1.	   Yet,	  presumably,	   non-­‐reductivists	   would	   want	   to	   resist	   the	   conclusion	   that	  participation	  in	  Siege	  2	  is	  permissible.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   non-­‐reductivists	   cannot	   make	   the	  obvious	   appeal	   to	   the	   non-­‐liability	   of	   the	   targets	   as	   accounting	   for	   the	  impermissibility	   of	   targeting	   innocent	   non-­‐combatants	   in	   war.	   To	   do	   so	  would	   be	   to	   concede	   that	   the	   target-­‐centred	   fact	   of	   non-­‐liability	   is	  determinative	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war,	  and	  not	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  facts.	  For	  if	   it	   is	  conceded	  that	  considerations	  of	   liability	  are	  determinative	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  harming	  in	  cases	  like	  Siege	  2,	  there	  is	  no	   reason	  whey	   this	   should	   not	   also	   be	   true	   in	   cases	   like	   Siege	  1.	   This	   is	  precisely	  the	  view	  that	  non-­‐reductivists	  set	  out	  to	  deny.	  	  So,	   while	   often	   invoked	   in	   defence	   of	   certain	   aspects	   of	   a	   traditional	  understanding	   of	   just	   conduct	   in	   war,	   a	   non-­‐reductive	   approach	   in	   fact	  seems	   to	   have	   deeply	   revisionary	   implications	   of	   its	   own	   that	   warrant	  rejecting	   the	   view.	   If	   successful	   in	   providing	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   permissive	  component	   of	   the	   in	   bello	   principle	   of	   discrimination	   the	   view	   lacks	   the	  resources	   to	   explain	   the	   more	   fundamental	   restrictive	   component	   of	   the	  principle.	   Term	   this	   the	   ‘war-­‐crimes	   objection’	   to	   non-­‐reductivism.	   The	  problem	  flows	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  prohibitions	  on	  targeting	  are	  most	  easily	  and	  naturally	  explained	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  non-­‐liability	  of	   the	   target	  of	  harm.	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Yet	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  is	  committed	  to	  rejecting	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  fact	  is	  decisive	  in	  determining	  the	  permissibility	  of	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war.	  The	  war	   crimes	   objection	   is	   a	   particular	   problem	   for	   non-­‐reductivists	  such	  as	  Lazar,	  who	  seek	  to	  motivate	  the	  view	  by	  arguing	  that	  a	  reductivist	  approach	   cannot	   justify	   warfare	   without	   also	   jettisoning	   the	   idea	   of	   non-­‐combatant	   immunity.	   If,	   as	   Lazar	   claims,	   a	   failure	   to	   accommodate	   this	  principle	  is	  sufficient	  for	  rejecting	  an	  approach	  to	  the	  morality	  of	  war,	  then	  non-­‐reductivism	  must	  be	  abandoned.	  	  
3.6	  Alternative	  Groundings	  for	  Constraints	  on	  Targeting	  	  What	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  highlights	  is	  that	  the	  acceptability	  of	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  approach	  rests	  not	  only	  on	  whether	  it	  can	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war,	  but	  also,	  more	  importantly,	  on	  whether	  it	  can	  provide	   a	   similarly	   non-­‐reductive	   account	   of	   the	   most	   intuitive	   in	   bello	  restrictions.	   To	   avoid	   the	   objection,	   a	   plausible	   distinction	   between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  targeting	  in	  war	  needs	  to	  be	  drawn	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   facts	   that	   non-­‐reductivists	   can	   accept	   as	   determinative	   of	   the	  permissibility	  of	  killing.	  This	  requires	  a	  revisionary	  account	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  As	   it	  stands,	   the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  holds	   that	   it	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  for	   non-­‐reductivists	   to	   appeal	   to	   non-­‐liability	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	  impermissibility	  of	  participation	  in	  cases	  like	  Siege	  2,	  while	  arguing	  that	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  trump	  considerations	  of	  non-­‐liability	  in	  cases	  like	  Siege	  
1.	  In	  response,	  non-­‐reductivists	  may	  object	  that	  this	  poses	  a	  false	  dilemma,	  resting	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  target-­‐centred	  fact	  of	  non-­‐liability	  is	  the	  sole	   consideration	   capable	   of	   accounting	   for	   the	   intuitive	   prohibitions	   on	  targeting	   in	   war.	   Perhaps	   these	   prohibitions	   can	   be	   grounded	   in	  considerations	  other	   than	  non-­‐liability.	   If	   such	  an	  argument	  can	  be	  made,	  then	  non-­‐reductivists	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  considerations	  discussed	  above	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  providing	  necessary,	  but	  not	  sufficient,	  conditions	  for	  the	  permissibility	  of	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  persons	  in	  war.	  The	  explanation	  of	  the	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intuitive	  prohibitions	  on	  targeting	  will	  arise	   through	  an	  elucidation	  of	   the	  further	  conditions	  required	  for	  sufficiency.	  This	  response	  accepts	  that	  both	  the	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   in	   Siege	  1	  and	   Siege	  2	  are	   not	   liable	  and	  that	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  that	  ground	  the	  non-­‐reductive	  permission	  obtain	  equally	   in	  both	  cases.	  But	   it	   aims	   to	   resist	   the	  conclusion	   that	   it	   is	  therefore	  permissible	  to	  participate	  in	  both	  cases	  by	  arguing	  that	  there	  are	  
additional	   considerations	   –	   either	   agent-­‐centred	   or	   target-­‐centred	   –	   that	  may	  render	  participation	  in	  Siege	  2	  impermissible,	  but	  which	  do	  not	  oppose	  participation	  in	  Siege	  1.	  	  To	  be	  successful,	  such	  a	  response	  must	  meet	  two	  requirements.	  It	  must	  identify	   an	   additional	   consideration	   which	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   genuine	   and	  sufficiently	  weighty	  moral	   constraint	  on	  harming.	   It	  must	   then	  be	   able	   to	  draw	  the	  desired	  distinction	  between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  targets	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   this	   consideration.	   This	   section	   considers	   several	   possible	  responses	  of	  this	  type	  and	  argues	  they	  fail	  to	  provide	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war.	  	  
3.6.1	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  I:	  Role-­‐based	  obligations	  	  One	   plausible,	   agent-­‐centred,	   candidate	   for	   the	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  appeals	  to	  a	  professional	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  on	  the	  part	  of	   combatants	   to	   refrain	   from	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants.132	  Members	   of	  many	  professions	  are	  considered	  subject	   to	   stringent	  constraints	  on	   their	  behaviour	  as	  a	   result	  of	   taking	  up	   their	   role.	  The	  military	  profession	  may	  plausibly	  be	  considered	  a	  paradigmatic	  source	  of	  such	  obligations.	  Coupled	  with	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants	   is	   a	  central	   role-­‐based	   obligation	   for	  military	   professionals,	   a	   response	   to	   the	  war	  crimes	  objection	  becomes	  available.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  permission	  to	  kill	  combatants	  and	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  are	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  soldiers	  have	  a	  stringent	  professional	  obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	  the	  latter	  but	  not	  the	  former.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Thanks	  to	  Jeff	  McMahan	  for	  suggesting	  this	  line	  of	  response.	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However,	  this	  response	  is	  susceptible	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  related	  objections.	  The	  first	   is	   that	   it	  makes	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  entirely	  contingent	   on	   whether	   the	   military	   organisation	   in	   question	   actually	  endorses	   a	   professional	   code	   that	   prohibits	   such	   action.	   For	   example,	  imagine	  a	  society	  that	  endorses	  an	  alternative	  (but	  not	  wildly	  implausible)	  professional	   military	   ethic	   that	   does	   not	   include	   a	   strict	   prohibition	   on	  targeting	   non-­‐combatants.	   Instead,	   it	   endorses	   a	   professional	   code	  which	  requires	   that	   targeting	   decisions	   be	   made	   so	   as	   to	   minimise	   the	   overall	  number	  of	  non-­‐liable	  people	  who	  are	  harmed.	  Now	  imagine	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  Siege	  examples	  in	  which	  Nation	  A	  has	  the	  option	  of	  waging	  their	  war	  by	  engaging	   in	  either	  Siege	  1	  or	  Siege	  2.	  This	  alternative	  military	  code	  would	  place	   combatants	   under	   a	   professional	   obligation	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   latter	  rather	   than	   the	   former.	   The	   role-­‐based	   response	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	  objection	   seems	   committed	   to	   accepting	   that	  members	   of	   such	   a	  military	  organisation	   would	   not	   possess	   a	   role-­‐based	   obligation	   to	   refrain	   from	  targeting	   non-­‐combatants	   and	   would	   therefore	   not	   be	   prohibited	   from	  participating	  in	  Siege	  2.	  But	  this	  is	  deeply	  unpalatable.	  Few,	  I	  take	  it,	  would	  want	  to	  defend	  the	  view	  that	  it	  is	  impermissible	  for	  soldiers	  to	  target	  non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   solely	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   that	   those	   soldier	   just	  happen	  to	  be	  members	  of	  an	  organisation	  whose	  conventions	   forbid	  such	  action.	  If	   this	   implication	  is	  to	  be	  avoided,	  the	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	   attacks	   on	   non-­‐combatants	   needs	   to	   be	   grounded	   in	   some	   relevant	  moral	  constraint	   that	   is	  not	   itself	  conventional.	  However,	  while	   this	  move	  may	   help	   alleviate	   the	   charge	   of	   contingency,	   it	   does	   so	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   a	  second	   objection,	   which	   is	   that	   the	   appeal	   to	   role	   obligations	   becomes	  redundant.	   For	   now,	   on	   this	   revised	   view,	   the	   actual	   source	   of	   the	  obligation	   not	   to	   target	   non-­‐combatants	   lies	   in	   a	  moral	   constraint	   that	   is	  external	   to	   the	   professional	   role.	   The	   role	   itself	   no	   longer	   does	   any	  independent	   moral	   work. 133 	  The	   deeper	   problem	   highlighted	   by	   this	  redundancy	   arises	  when	  we	   consider	  what	   external	   considerations	   could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  See	   also,	   A.	   John	   Simmons,	   ‘External	   Justifications	   and	   Institutional	   Roles’,	   Journal	   of	  
Philosophy	  93,	  No.1	  (1996),	  28-­‐36.	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be	  capable	  of	  explaining	   the	  prohibition	  on	  participation	   in	  Option	  2.	  One	  candidate	  seems	  obvious:	   the	  target-­‐centred	   fact	   that	   the	  non-­‐combatants	  are	   not	   liable	   to	   attack.	   But,	   as	   explained	   above,	   non-­‐reductivists	   are	  excluded	  from	  this	  intuitive	  explanation.	  	  The	   role-­‐based	   response	   to	   the	  war	   crimes	   objection	   is	   then,	   at	   best,	  unsatisfactorily	  contingent,	  or,	  at	  worst,	  no	  response	  at	  all.	  	  	  
3.6.2	   Appealing	   to	   additional	   agent-­‐centred	   facts	   II:	   The	   avoidance	   of	  
cowardice	  	  Lazar	   suggests	   an	   alternative	   agent-­‐centred	   constraint	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants,	  which	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  contingency.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  action	  manifests	   the	  vice	  of	  cowardice,	  whereas	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	   combatants	   does	   not.	   It	   is	   the	   avoidance	   of	   this	   vice	   which	  imposes	  the	  additional	  moral	  constraint	  required	  to	  avoid	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection.134	  There	  are,	  however,	  three	  problems	  with	  this	  response.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  it	   seems	   to	   get	   the	   order	   of	   explanation	   backwards.	   It	   seems	  much	  more	  natural	   to	   say	   that	   actions	   are	   cowardly	   because	   they	   are	   wrong,	   rather	  than	   wrong	   because	   cowardly.	   To	   accuse	   someone	   of	   cowardice	   is	   to	  provide	  an	  evaluation	  of	  their	  character	  –	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  culpably	  failed	  to	   respond	   appropriately	   to	   the	   reasons	   they	   had	   for	   action.	   It	   is	   not	   to	  claim	  that	  there	  existed	  an	  additional	  moral	  reason	  not	  to	  act	  as	  the	  agent	  did,	  which	  the	  agent	  failed	  to	  heed.	  Secondly,	   a	   problem	   for	   the	   argument-­‐from-­‐cowardice	   lies	   in	   the	  
inwardness	   of	   the	   moral	   constraint	   to	   which	   it	   appeals.	   On	   this	   view,	  combatants	  ought	  not	   to	   target	  non-­‐combatants	  because	  of	   the	  effect	   that	  this	  would	  have	  on	  the	  combatants	  themselves.	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  acting	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  would	   be	   bad	   for	   the	  agent	   does	   not	   usually	   impose	   a	  moral	  obligation	  on	  that	  agent	  not	  to	  act.	  Common-­‐sense	  morality	  permits	  agents	  to	  make	   self-­‐sacrifices	   in	  pursuing	   their	   aims,	   provided	   that	   the	   aims	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Lazar,	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’,	  p.39	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not	  morally	  prohibited	  on	  independent	  grounds.	  So,	  even	  if	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  is	  cowardly	  and	  combatants	  incur	  a	  moral	  cost	  by	  doing	  so,	  this	  cost	  should	  not,	  in	  itself,	  morally	  prohibit	  the	  agent	  from	  acting.	  	  Thirdly,	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  the	  avoidance	  of	  cowardice	  provides	  a	  weighty	  reason	   for	   action	   (weighty	   enough	   to	   justify	   the	   killing	   of	   an	   additional	  7,000	   non-­‐liable	   persons	   in	   the	   Siege	   cases),	   then	   we	   get	   some	   very	  counter-­‐intuitive	  results	  in	  other	  cases.	  For	  example,	  the	  argument	  implies	  if	  a	  group	  of	  combatants	  have	  a	  choice	  between	  attacking	  a	  small	  number	  of	  enemy	   combatants	   who	   they	   greatly	   outnumber,	   or	   attacking	   a	   much	  greater	  number	  of	  combatants	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	  the	  same	  military	  goal,	  they	   have	   a	   very	   strong	   cowardice-­‐based	   reason	   to	   attack	   the	   larger	  number,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   many	  more	   combatants	   will	   be	   killed	   as	   a	  result	  of	  doing	  so.	  This	  seems	  highly	  implausible.135	  	  
3.6.3	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  I:	  Modes	  of	  agency	  	  Appeals	   to	   additional	   agent-­‐centred	   considerations	   have	   proved	  insufficient	   to	   ground	   the	   required	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants.	  A	  more	  promising	  approach	  aims	  to	  ground	  the	  prohibition	  in	  the	  effect	  that	  such	  harming	  has	  on	  its	  targets,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  serious	  rights	   violation	   suffered.	   This	   move	   appeals	   to	   additional	   target-­‐centred	  considerations,	  other	  than	  that	  of	  non-­‐liability.	  One	  response	  of	  this	  type	  appeals	  to	  the	  moral	  distinction	  between	  acts	  of	   intentional	   harming	   that	   are	   manipulative	   –	   that	   involve	   using	   their	  victim	   as	   a	  means	   –	   and	   those	   that	   are	   eliminative	  –	   that	   are	   inflicted	   in	  order	   to	   remove	   a	   threat	   that	   their	   victim	   poses	   or	   contributes	   to.	  Many	  believe	   that	   acts	   of	   manipulative	   harming	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   higher	  justificatory	  burden	  than	  acts	  of	  eliminative	  harming,	  since	  they	   involve	  a	  more	  objectionable	  mode	  of	  agency.	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  one	  suffers	  a	  graver	   wrong	   if	   one	   is	   unjustly	   harmed	   manipulatively	   rather	   than	  eliminatively.	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  Thanks	  to	  Daniel	  Viehoff	  for	  this	  example.	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If	  we	   grant	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	   eliminative	   and	  manipulative	  harm	   has	   moral	   significance,	   a	   response	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	   objection	  becomes	  available.	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  that	  ground	  the	   non-­‐reductive	   permission	   are	   sufficiently	   weighty	   to	   permit	  eliminatively	   killing	   the	   non-­‐liable,	   but	   not	   manipulatively.136	  Combined	  with	  the	  descriptive	  claim	  that	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war	  functions	  manipulatively,	   whereas	   targeting	   combatants	   involves	   only	   eliminative	  killing,	   one	   can	   non-­‐arbitrarily	   limit	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   non-­‐reductive	  permission	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  only.137	  However,	  there	  are	  two	  problems	  with	  this	  response,	  which	  have	  been	  recognised	   by	   non-­‐reductivists.138	  The	   first	   is	   that	   targeting	   civilians	  may	  often	   function	  eliminatively.	   Imagine	  that	   the	  civilian	  areas	   to	  be	   targeted	  in	  Siege	  2	  are	  populated	  by	  industrial	  and	  financial	  workers	  and	  that	  killing	  them	   will	   contribute	   to	   Nation	   A’s	   victory	   by	   removing	   the	   contribution	  that	  they	  make	  to	  Nation	  B’s	  war	  effort.	   In	  such	  cases,	  then	  the	  constraint	  imposed	  on	  the	  non-­‐reductive	  permission	  by	  the	  eliminative/manipulative	  distinction	  would	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐combatants.	  	  This	   is	   a	   particular	   problem	   for	   those	   such	   as	   Lazar,	   who	   aim	   to	  motivate	   a	   non-­‐reductivist	   view	   by	   arguing	   that	   reductivism	   renders	   too	  many	   non-­‐combatants	   liable,	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   non-­‐combatants	   are	  causally	   and	  morally	   implicated	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   unjust	   threats	   to	   the	  same	  degree	  as	  many	  combatants.	   If	   this	   is	   true,	   the	   intentional	  killing	  of	  many	   non-­‐combatants	   will	   function	   eliminatively,	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	  killing	   combatants	   functions	   to	   prevent	   them	   from	   contributing	   to	   future	  threats.	  If	  this	  is	  false,	  then	  reductivists	  do	  not	  face	  the	  dilemma	  that	  Lazar	  claims	  that	  they	  do.	  Secondly,	   and	   conversely,	   it	   may	   often	   be	   the	   case	   that	   targeting	  combatants	  functions	  manipulatively.	  The	  deaths	  of	  these	  combatants	  may	  be	   intended	   to	   shock	   and	   coerce	   their	   side’s	   political	   leaders	   or	   civilian	  population	   into	   ending	   the	   war.	   It	   is	   also	   plausible	   that	   targeting	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  Jonathan	   Quong	   employs	   an	   analogous	   argument	   in	   order	   to	   constrain	   his	   agent-­‐centred	  account	  of	  permissible	  self-­‐defensive	  killing.	  	  See	  Quong,	  ‘Killing	  in	  Self-­‐Defense’.	  137	  Lazar,	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’,	  p.39	  138	  Ibid.	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combatants	   will	   routinely	   function	   manipulatively,	   in	   order	   to	   persuade	  military	   commanders	   to	   surrender	   or	   adopt	   an	   alternative	   strategy	  more	  amenable	  to	  the	  opposing	  party.	  Given	  such	  cases,	  the	  proposed	  constraint	  on	   the	   non-­‐reductive	   permission	   may	   often	   prohibit	   the	   targeting	   of	  combatants,	  undermining	  the	  ability	  of	   the	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  to	  support	  the	  permission	  to	  kill	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  in	  war.	  	  
3.6.4	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  II:	  Risk	  	  A	  different	   target-­‐centred	  approach	  aims	   to	   locate	  a	  response	   to	   the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  in	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  moral	  risk	  that	  accompanies	  killing	  in	  war.139	  On	   this	   view,	   intentionally	   killing	   a	   non-­‐liable	   person	   is	   certainly	   a	  grave	   moral	   wrong,	   but	   the	   wrong	   is	   greater	   the	   higher	   the	   ex	   ante	  probability	   that	   that	   individual	   targeted	   is	   non-­‐liable.	   Other	   things	   being	  equal,	   killing	   an	   individual	   when	   one	   is	   certain	   that	   they	   are	   not	   liable	  constitutes	  a	  more	  serious	  disrespect	  for	  their	  moral	  status	  than	  killing	  an	  individual	  when	  one	  is	  unsure	  of	  their	  non-­‐liability.	  	  	  Conjoining	   this	   idea	   the	   descriptive	   claim	   that	   non-­‐combatants	   are	  much	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   non-­‐liable	   than	   combatants	   generates	   a	   possible	  means	  of	  generating	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war.	  It	  may	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   agent-­‐centred	   facts	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   non-­‐reductive	  permission	  are	  sufficiently	  morally	  weighty	  to	  permit	  the	  killing	  of	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   –	   because	   the	   probability	   that	   such	   targets	   are	  non-­‐liable	  falls	  below	  some	  threshold	  –	  but	  not	  weighty	  enough	  to	  render	  the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   permissible	   –	   because	   the	  probability	  of	  these	  targets	  being	  non-­‐liable	  falls	  above	  that	  threshold.	  	  However,	   even	   granting	   the	   normative	   claim,	   this	   response	   does	   not	  seem	   to	   provide	   the	   desired	   result	   in	   the	   Siege	   cases,	   in	   two	   respects.	  Firstly,	  the	  descriptive	  claim	  that	  combatants	  “are	  undoubtedly	  more	  likely	  to	   be	   liable	   than	   non-­‐combatants”	   is	   not	   true	   when	   the	   combatants	   in	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question	   are	   participating	   in	   a	   war	   that	   is	   ad	   bellum	   justified.140	  In	   Siege	  neither	  Nation	  B’s	  combatants	  or	  non-­‐combatant	  members	  have	  behaved	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  liability.	  Hence,	  considerations	  of	  moral	  risk	  will	  not	  favour	  the	  targeting	  of	  one	  of	  these	  sub-­‐populations	  over	  the	  other.	  Secondly,	   when	   numbers	   are	   taken	   in	   consideration,	   the	   argument-­‐from-­‐risk	  may	  not	  in	  fact	  weigh	  against	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐combatants.	  To	  demonstrate,	   consider	   a	   variation	   on	   the	   Siege	   cases	   in	  which	  Nation	   B’s	  combatants	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   liable	   than	  Nation	   B’s	   non-­‐combatants.	  Let’s	  also	  assume,	  generously,	   that	   if	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  participate	   in	  
Siege	  1,	   every	  act	  of	   intentional	  killing	   runs	  a	  0.3	   chance	  of	  killing	  a	  non-­‐liable	  person,	  whereas	  if	  they	  participate	  in	  Siege	  2	  every	  act	  of	  killing	  runs	  a	  0.95	  chance	  of	  killing	  a	  non-­‐liable	  person.	  	  The	  argument-­‐from-­‐risk	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  these	  facts	  can	  explain	  why	  the	  non-­‐reductive	  permission	  does	  not	  permit	  participation	  in	  Siege	  2	  while	  permitting	  participation	  in	  Siege	  1,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  each	  act	  of	  killing	  in	  
Siege	  2	  is	  more	  morally	  objectionable	  than	  each	  act	  of	  killing	  in	  Siege	  1.	  However,	  this	  ignores	  the	  important	  fact	  that	  Siege	  1	  involves	  more	  acts	  of	   killing	   than	  Siege	  2.	   Taking	   this	   into	   consideration,	   it	   is	   true	  of	   each	  of	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	   that	   they	  will	  be	   taking	  part	   in	   the	  killing	  of	  3,000	  people	   who	   are	   near-­‐certainly	   non-­‐liable	   if	   they	   participate	   in	   Option	   1	  (10,000	   x	   0.3),	   whereas	   they	   will	   be	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   killing	   of	   2,850	  people	   who	   are	   near-­‐certainly	   non-­‐liable	   if	   they	   participate	   in	   Option	   2	  (3000	  x	  0.95).	  Assessed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  considerations	  of	  moral	  risk	  would	  not	  seem	  to	  favour	  targeting	  combatants	  over	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  the	  revised	  Siege	  cases.	  	  
3.6.5	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  III:	  Vulnerability	  	  One	  further	  proposal,	  endorsed	  by	  several	  authors,	  appeals	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war	  are	  especially	  defenceless	  or	  vulnerable	  to	  harm	  as	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grounding	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  them.141	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	   something	   significantly	   and	   independently	  morally	   objectionable	   about	  harming	   a	   person	   who	   is	   vulnerable,	   which	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   general	  humanitarian	  duty	  to	  refrain	  from	  so	  acting.	  	  If	   defensible,	   this	   may	   provide	   a	   means	   of	   avoiding	   the	   war	   crimes	  objection.	   Non-­‐reductivists	   may	   argue	   that	   while	   the	   relevant	   agent-­‐centred	  considerations	  have	  priority	  over	  considerations	  of	  non-­‐liability	  in	  determining	   the	   permissibility	   of	   targeting	   in	   war,	   they	   remain	  insufficiently	  weighty	   to	   trump	   the	  duty	  not	   to	  harm	   the	  vulnerable.	  This	  duty	  then	  limits	  the	  range	  of	  actions	  that	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  can	  permit	  in	   war.	   Since,	   by	   hypothesis,	   non-­‐combatants	   typically	   exhibit	   the	   duty-­‐generating	   property	   of	   vulnerability	   in	   wartime	   whereas	   combatants	  generally	  do	  not,	  only	  attacks	  on	  combatants	  are	  rendered	  permissible	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   agent-­‐centred	   considerations,	   whereas	   attacks	   on	   non-­‐combatants	  are	  not.	  Interestingly,	  the	  appeal	  to	  vulnerability	  also	  provides	  a	   means	   of	   rehabilitating	   the	   Walzerian	   thought	   that	   the	   permission	   to	  target	   combatants	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   combatants	   pose	   threats,	  since	   presumably	   the	   ability	   to	   pose	   a	   threat	   negates	   an	   individual’s	  vulnerability,	   even	   if	   does	   not	   vitiate	   their	   right	   not	   be	   killed.	   The	  invocation	   of	   vulnerability	   also	   provides	   a	   way	   of	   substantiating	   the	  argument-­‐from-­‐cowardice	   discussed	   above	   –	   the	   thought	   being	   that	   the	  constraint	  on	  acts	  of	  harming	  that	  manifest	  cowardice	  is	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constraint	  on	  attacking	  the	  vulnerable.	  	  This	  response	  can	  be	  challenged	  on	  two	  fronts.	  Firstly,	  we	  can	  question	  whether	   the	   property	   of	   vulnerability	   does	   generate	   an	   additional	   and	  significant	   constraint	   on	   harming.	   One	   difficulty	   is	   that	   there	   seem	   to	   be	  clear	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  target	  of	  harm	  is	  vulnerable	  seems	  to	  provide	   no	   moral	   reason	   against	   inflicting	   harm,	   much	   less	   rendering	   it	  morally	  impermissible.	  Consider	  the	  following	  example:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  For	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  of	  this	  view,	  see	  Lazar,	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War,	  pp.40-­‐41;	  Larry	  May,	  War	  Crimes	  and	  Just	  War	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	   pp.67-­‐117;	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   ‘In	   Defence	   of	   the	   Defenceless:	   The	   Morality	   of	   the	   Laws	   of	  War’;	  Henry	  Shue,	  ‘Torture’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  7,	  No.2	  (1978),	  124-­‐143.	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Crime	  Boss:	  A	  crime	  boss,	  who	   is	  paralysed	   from	  the	  neck	  down,	  offers	  a	  cash	   reward	   to	   anyone	   who	   assassinates	   a	   crusading	   government	  prosecutor.	  The	  prosecutor’s	  bodyguards	  learn	  of	  the	  plot	  and	  can	  prevent	  the	  assassination	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways.	  One	  involves	  confronting	  and	  killing	  each	  assassin.	  The	  other	  involves	  killing	  the	  crime	  boss	  in	  his	  hospital	  bed,	  thus	  preventing	  the	  assassination	  by	  removing	  the	  possibility	  of	  reward.	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  crime	  boss	  would	  be	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  harm	  inflicted	  by	  the	  bodyguards	  if	  they	  take	  the	  latter	  option,	  yet	  there	  is	  no	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   this	   renders	  killing	  him	   impermissible,	   or	   even	  counts	   against	   killing	   him.	   Such	   cases	   provide	   counter-­‐examples	   to	   the	  claim	  that	  the	  property	  of	  vulnerability	  has	  sufficient	  moral	  significance	  to	  ground	  a	  prohibition	  on	  certain	  types	  of	  killing	  in	  war.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  plausible	  response	  available	  here.	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	   the	  moral	   force	   of	   the	  property	   of	   vulnerability	   is	   conditional	  on	   the	  target	  also	  being	  non-­‐liable.142	  On	  this	  revised	  view,	  it	  is	  the	  target-­‐centred	  properties	   of	   vulnerability	   and	   non-­‐liability	   in	   conjunction	   that	   constrain	  the	  agent-­‐centred	  permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war.	  This	  would	  explain	  why	  the	  fact	  of	  vulnerability	  does	  not	  render	  it	  impermissible	  to	  kill	  the	  crime	  boss,	  but	  could	  decisively	  count	  against	  participation	  in	  Option	  2	  in	  Siege.	  However,	  there	   are	   cases	   which	   tell	   against	   the	   moral	   significance	   of	   vulnerability	  even	  when	  the	  targets	  of	  harm	  are	  also	  non-­‐liable.	  Consider	  the	   following	  example:143	  	  
Bandits:	   A	   gang	   of	   bandits	   plan	   to	   steal	   the	   possessions	   of	   a	   group	   of	  innocent	   villagers,	   thereby	   reducing	   the	   villagers	   to	   poverty.	   The	   bandits	  can	   achieve	   their	   aim	   in	   one	   of	   two	   ways.	   The	   first	   involves	   lethally	  targeting	  10	  villagers	  at	  random.	  This	  option	  gives	  the	  victims	  a	  5%	  chance	  of	  survival,	  since	  the	  villagers	  may	  be	  able	  to	  hide	  from	  their	  attackers.	  	  The	  second	  involves	  providing	  the	  villagers	  with	  10	  slingshots	  and	  then	  lethally	  targeting	   the	   10	   villagers	   who	   opt	   to	   arm	   themselves.	   Again,	   this	   option	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  Lazar	   p.42.	   An	   alternative	   view	   would	   be	   to	   make	   the	   significance	   of	   vulnerability	  conditional	  on	  the	  target	  not	  being	  culpable,	  independently	  of	  considerations	  of	  liability.	  	  143	  Based	  on	  a	  case	  raised	  by	  Jeff	  McMahan	  in	  discussion.	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gives	  the	  victims	  a	  5%	  chance	  of	  survival,	  since	  the	  villagers	  may	  be	  lucky	  enough	  to	  avoid	  being	  killed	  by	  slinging	  gravel	  into	  their	  assailants’	  eyes.	  	  If	  it	  were	  true	  that	  attacks	  on	  individuals	  who	  are	  both	  vulnerable	  and	  non-­‐liable	   are	   significantly	   and	   distinctly	   morally	   worse	   than	   attacks	   on	  individuals	  who	  exhibit	  only	  the	  property	  of	  non-­‐liability,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	   judge	   that	   the	   bandits	   to	   act	   much	   more	   objectionably	   if	   they	  successfully	  kill	  10	  villagers	  via	  the	  first	  option	  rather	  than	  the	  second.	  But	  this	   isn’t	   the	   case.	   Both	   options	   intuitively	   seem	   morally	   on	   a	   par.	   This	  result	  gives	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  the	  property	  of	  vulnerability	  has	  the	  moral	  significance	   required	   to	   constrain	   the	   non-­‐reductive	   permission	   to	   kill	   in	  war	  and	  thereby	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	  	  Of	   course,	  perhaps	  one	  does	  not	   share	   this	   intuition.	  However,	  even	   if	  we	  grant	  that	  vulnerability	  has	  independent	  moral	  significance,	  it	  remains	  unlikely	   that	   it	   is	   sufficiently	   weighty	   to	   enable	   a	   defence	   of	   non-­‐reductivism.	  To	  demonstrate	  this,	  consider	  the	  following	  variations	  on	  the	  
Bandits	  example:	  	  
Bandits	   2:	   Exactly	   the	   same	   as	   Bandits,	   except	   that	   the	   second	   option	  (slingshots)	  involves	  killing	  one	  additional	  villager.	  	  
Bandits	  3:	  Exactly	  the	  same	  as	  Bandits,	  except	  that	  the	  10	  villagers	  targeted	  in	  the	  first	  option	  (hiding)	  have	  a	  15%	  chance	  of	  survival.	  	  In	   these	   variations	   it	   seems	   uncontroversial	   that	   the	   bandits	   would	   act	  more	   wrongfully,	   all-­‐things-­‐considered,	   if	   they	   opt	   for	   the	   second	   option	  rather	  than	  the	  first.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  whatever	  moral	  significance	  vulnerability	  may	  have,	   it	  can	  be	  overridden	  by	  relatively	  small	  variations	  in	  other	  morally	  relevant	  factors.	  	  Given	  this,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  appealing	  to	   an	   independent	   constraint	   on	   harming	   the	   vulnerable	   can	   provide	   an	  alternative	  basis	  for	  the	  standard	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war,	  since	  this	  prohibition	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  extremely	  stringent.	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A	  second	  type	  of	  challenge	  may	  be	  raised	  over	  whether	  the	  properties	  of	   vulnerability	   and	   non-­‐vulnerability,	   even	   if	   sufficiently	   morally	  significant,	   successfully	   pick	   out	   the	   required	   distinction	   between	   non-­‐combatants	   and	   combatants.	   The	   concept	   of	   vulnerability	   obviously	  requires	  much	  greater	  elaboration,	  but	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  understand	  the	  core	  idea	  as	  grounded	  in	  an	  individual’s	  inability	  or	  powerlessness	  to	  avoid	  threats	   of	   harm.	   There	   are	   at	   least	   two	  ways	   in	  which	   an	   individual	  may	  suffer	  from	  this	  inability.	  Most	  obviously,	  an	  individual	  may	  lack	  means	  of	  defence	  against	  a	  threat.	  Alternatively,	  an	  individual	  may	  lack	  an	  ability	  to	  remove	   themselves	   from	   a	   threat	   of	   harm,	   by	   fleeing	   for	   example.	   The	  intuition	  driving	  the	  distinction	  between	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  terms	  of	  vulnerability	  rests	  on	  the	  seemingly	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  non-­‐combatants	   are	   relevantly	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   far	   greater	   extent	   than	  combatants.	   This	   assumption	   explains	  why	   the	   humanitarian	   duty	   not	   to	  harm	  the	  vulnerable	  prohibits	  only	  attacks	  on	  the	  former	  and	  not	  the	  latter,	  thus	  providing	  a	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   obvious	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case.	   Attacks	   on	   many	  combatants	   seem	   to	   constitute	   breaches	   of	   a	   humanitarian	   duty	   not	   to	  harm	   the	  vulnerable,	   if	   such	  a	  duty	   exists.	  Understanding	  vulnerability	   in	  terms	   of	   an	   inability	   to	   offer	   defence	   against	   harm,	   it	   seems	   clearly	   true	  that	   combatants	   are	   often	   completely	   unable	   to	   defend	   themselves	   from	  attack	  in	  war.	  In	  particular,	  consider	  the	  means	  by	  which	  modern	  wars	  are	  fought,	  at	  long	  range	  and	  with	  overwhelming	  force.	  The	  typical	  combatant	  harmed	  in	  war	  does	  not	  ‘go	  down	  fighting’.	  Rather	  they	  are	  struck	  down	  by	  an	   unseen	   enemy	   whom	   they	   had	   no	   real	   possibility	   of	   defending	  themselves	   against.	   Consider,	   once	   more,	   the	   Siege	   cases.	   Imagine,	  plausibly,	   that	   participation	   in	   Siege	   1	   involves	   shelling	   the	   enemy	   from	  distance.	   Does	   it	   really	   seem	  plausible	   to	  maintain	   that	   those	   targeted	   in	  
Siege	  1	  are	  not	  relevantly	  vulnerable,	  whereas	  those	  who	  would	  be	  targeted	  by	   the	   same	  methods	   in	   Siege	   2	   are?	  Whether	   an	   individual	   is	   rendered	  vulnerable	   through	   an	   inability	   to	   resist	   being	   harmed	   seems	   to	   depend	  less	   on	   whether	   they	   fulfil	   the	   role	   of	   combatant	   or	   non-­‐combatant	   and	  more	   on	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   force	   is	   used	   against	   them.	   The	   necessary	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assumption	  that	  attacks	  on	  combatants	  rarely	  constitute	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  vulnerable	  seems	  to	  trade	  on	  an	  implausibly	  romanticised	  view	  of	  in	  war	  in	  which	  opponents	  give	  their	  enemies	  ‘a	  fighting	  chance’.	  	  Drawing	   the	   desired	   distinction	   between	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   is	  also	  problematic	   if	  we	  understand	  vulnerability	   in	   terms	  of	  an	  individual’s	  inability	  to	  remove	  themselves	  from	  a	  threat	  of	  harm.	  This	  is	  because	   in	   many	   cases	   non-­‐combatants	   will	   be	   better	   able	   to	   remove	  themselves	   from	   threats	   than	   combatants	   are.	   Whereas	   non-­‐combatants	  may	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   flee	   the	   fighting	   and	   potentially	   become	  refugees,	   this	   option	   is	   less	   available	   to	   combatants	   who	   will	   often	   face	  serious,	  perhaps	   lethal,	  sanction	   for	   fleeing	  the	  threats	   they	   face	   in	  battle.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  that	  non-­‐combatants	  and	  refugees	  are	  not	  vulnerable,	  but	  that	  if	  they	  are	  (and	  surely	  they	  are)	  then	  many	  combatants	  will	  also	  be	  vulnerable	   to	  an	  equivalent	  or	  greater	  extent,	  since	  non-­‐combatants	  often	  possess	  a	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  their	  fates	  which	  combatants	  lack.	  The	  preceding	  observations	  are	  designed	  to	  show	  that	  even	  if	  we	  grant	  the	   existence	   of	   an	   independent	   duty	   not	   to	   harm	   the	   vulnerable,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  appealing	  to	  this	  duty	  will	  assist	  non-­‐reductivists	   in	  arguing,	  
contra	   the	   war-­‐crimes	   objection,	   that	   their	   view	   can	   support	   both	   the	  permissive	  and	  restrictive	  components	  of	   the	   traditional	   in	  bello	  principle	  of	  discrimination.	  If	  this	  duty	  is	  able	  to	  constrain	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  from	  permitting	  attacks	  on	  non-­‐combatants,	   it	  will	   also	  often	  prevent	   the	  view	  from	  permitting	  the	  targeting	  of	  combatants.	  To	   conclude	   this	   section,	   it	   is	   worth	   making	   overt	   a	   very	   general	  objection	   that	   is	  present	   in	  some	  of	  my	  preceding	  arguments.	  This	   is	   that	  even	   if,	   contra	   my	   arguments,	   one	   accepts	   that	   the	   considerations	  canvassed	  above	  provide	  genuine	  moral	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  over	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants,	   this	   is	  not	  sufficient	   to	  establish	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	   can	   be	   made	   safe	   from	   the	   war	   crimes	  objection.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   what	   must	   be	   shown	   is	   not	   just	   that	   these	  considerations	  may	  provide	  reasons,	  but	  that	  these	  reasons	  are	  sufficiently	  weighty	  to	  prohibit	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  even	  when	  other	   considerations	   –	   the	   numbers	   of	   innocent	   lives	   at	   stake	   most	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obviously	  –	  weigh	  in	  favour	  of	  doing	  so.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  a	  candidate	  consideration	  is	  morally	  relevant	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	   harm	   among	   non-­‐liable	   persons,	   capable	   of	   being	   a	   moral	   tie-­‐breaker	  when	  all	  other	  factors	  held	  equal.	  Rather,	  it	  must	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  consideration	  generates	  reasons	  to	  target	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  over	  non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   that	   are	   extremely	   weighty,	   comparable	   to	   the	  reasons	  we	  have	  to	  target	  liable	  individuals	  over	  non-­‐liable	  individuals.	  It	  is	  no	  less	  a	  challenge	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  a	  candidate	  consideration	  has	  this	  moral	  weight	  than	  it	  is	  to	  show	  that	  it	  has	  intuitive	  moral	  significance	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
3.7	  Conclusion	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  should	  be	  rejected	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  cannot	  support	  the	  most	  intuitive	  prohibitions	  on	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war.	  These	   are	  most	   naturally	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   target-­‐centred	   fact	   of	  non-­‐liability,	  yet	  non-­‐reductivists	  are	  committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  this	  fact	  is	  not	  generally	  sufficient	  to	  render	  targeting	  impermissible.	  This	  is	  especially	  problematic	  for	  those	  who	  aim	  to	  motivate	  non-­‐reductivism	  by	  arguing	  that	  reductivism	   renders	   many	   non-­‐combatants	   liable	   to	   defensive	   killing.	  While	  I	  have	  not	  attempted	  to	  show	  that	  reductivism	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  avoid	   this	   implication,	   or	   even	   that	   it	   has	   to	   avoid	   it	   –	   another	   thesis	   in	  itself	  –	  I	  aim	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  alternative.	  	  So	  where	  does	  this	  result	  leave	  my	  wider	  inquiry	  into	  the	  defensibility	  of	   the	   authority	   criterion?	   As	   explained	   in	   Section	   3.4,	   non-­‐reductivism	  potentially	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  authority-­‐criterion,	  in	   its	  permissive	  role	  against	   reductivist	   sceptics.	  Rejecting	  non-­‐reductive	  views	  as	  unacceptable	  on	   independent	  grounds	  provides	   indirect	   support	  for	  a	  reductivist	  view	  and	  therefore	  further	  strengthens	  the	  reductivist	  case	  in	   favour	   of	   jettisoning	   the	   criterion	   entirely.	   	   The	   discussion	   here	   also	  provides	  an	  adequacy	  condition	  on	  any	  potential	  defence	  of	  the	  authority-­‐criterion	  –	  it	  must	  explain	  why	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  in	  war	  generates	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war,	  but	  which	  does	  
	  	   98	  
not	  permit	  the	  widespread	  intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  begin	  the	  positive	  task	  of	  providing	  a	  qualified	  defence	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  Authority	  and	  Harm	  	  
4.1	  Introduction	  	  To	  summarise	   the	  story	  so	   far:	   I	  began	  by	  arguing	   that	  a	  major	   source	  of	  motivation	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  authority	  criterion	  within	  just	  war	  theory	  is	   the	   intuition	   that	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   entity	  makes	   an	  important	   difference	   to	   whether	   individuals	   act	   morally	   permissibly	   by	  participating	  in	  war.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  thought	  is	  that	  individuals	  who	  act	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   entities	   acquire	   additional	   permissions	   to	   cause	  harm,	  which	  private	  individuals,	  acting	  in	  relevantly	  similar	  circumstances,	  would	  lack.	  I	   then	   set	   out	   an	   influential	   reductivist	   position	  within	   contemporary	  just	  war	  theory,	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  must	  be	  jettisoned.	  This	   conclusion	   follows	   from	   a	   certain	   conception	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	  war	  and	  all	  other	  cases	  of	  interpersonal	  violence,	  combined	  with	  a	  particular	  account	  of	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	  for	  killing	  and	  injuring	  that	  apply	   in	   these	   cases.	   For	   reductivists,	   acts	   of	   non-­‐consensual	   killing	   and	  injuring	  in	  war,	  as	  in	  any	  other	  context,	  are	  morally	  permissible	  only	  when	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	   conduct	   in	   war	   are	   set	   by	   the	   limits	   of	   conduct	   between	   private	  individuals.	  Reductivists	  thus	  conclude	  that	  the	  central	  intuition	  underlying	  the	  authority	  criterion	  –	  that	  those	  who	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  certain	  entities	  gain	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  –	  cannot	  be	  defended.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  provided	  indirect	  support	  for	  this	  conclusion	  by	   arguing	   that	   the	   main	   rival	   to	   reductivism	   –	   which	   holds	   that	   moral	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  relationships	  that	  obtain	   between	   co-­‐members	   in	   certain	   kinds	   of	   association	   –	   must	   be	  rejected.	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   develop	   the	   resources	   for	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion.	   I	   do	   so	   by	   exploring	   the	   connections	   between	   two	  central	   topics	   in	   moral	   and	   political	   philosophy:	   the	   justification	   of	  interpersonal	  harming	  and	  the	  moral	  legitimacy	  of	  practical	  authority.	  Each	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of	   these	   has	   received	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   discussion	   in	   isolation,	   with	  normative	  and	  applied	  ethicists	   concentrating	  on	   the	   former	  and	  political	  and	  legal	  philosophers	  focusing	  on	  the	  letter,	  but	  comparatively	  little	  work	  has	  been	  done	  exploring	  the	  implications	  of	  certain	  views	  about	  authority	  for	  theories	  of	  permissible	  harming,	  and	  vice	  versa.144	  	  As	   I	   aim	   to	   show,	   reflection	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   two	  topics	  reveals	  that	  certain	  common	  and	  intuitive	  views	  about	  the	  ethics	  of	  harming	   require	   revision.	   In	   particular,	   I	   argue	   that,	   when	   certain	  conditions	   are	   met,	   the	   command	   of	   an	   authority	   can	   provide	   an	  independent	  source	  of	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  provide	  the	   resources	   for	   denying	   the	   reductivist	   position	   that	   acts	   of	   non-­‐consensual	   harming	   are	   necessarily	   impermissible	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil	  justification.	  The	  arguments	  of	   this	  chapter	  are	   intended	  to	  provide	  a	   fairly	  general	  account	   of	   how	   considerations	   of	   practical	   authority	   are	   relevant	   to	  understanding	   the	   permissibility	   of	   causing	   harm.	   I	   postpone	   the	   further	  question	  of	  how	  these	  arguments	  apply	  to	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  war	  until	  Chapter	   5,	   though	   I	   employ	   some	   war-­‐based	   examples	   for	   illustrative	  purposes.	  	  In	  sections	  4.2–4.5	   I	  clarify	   the	  specific	  questions	   to	  be	  addressed	  and	  set	   out	   two	  main	   claims	   I	   aim	   to	   defend.	   Sections	   4.6–4.11	   argue	   for	   the	  first	   claim,	   while	   Sections	   4.12–4.16	   argue	   for	   the	   second.	   Section	   4.17	  concludes.	  	  
4.2	  Authority:	  The	  Basics	  	  A	   pervasive	   feature	   of	   the	   social	   world	   is	   that	   certain	   persons	   or	  institutions	  claim	  to	  possess	  practical	  authority	  over	  others.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144An	   exception	   being	   a	   recent	   pair	   of	   articles	   by	  Malcolm	   Thorburn	   and	   John	   Gardner,	  although	  these	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  authority	  to	  criminal	   law	  defences	  for	  acts	  of	  harming,	   rather	   than	   to	  moral	  permissibility	   and	   justification.	  Malcolm	  Thorburn	  ‘Justifications,	   Powers,	   and	   Authority’,	   Yale	   Law	   Journal	   117	   (2008),	   1070-­‐1130;	   John	  Gardner	   ‘Justification	   Under	   Authority’,	   Canadian	   Journal	   of	   Law	   and	   Jurisprudence	   23,	  No.1	   (2010),	   73-­‐98.	   	  David	   Estlund	   also	   provides	   an	   important	   discussion,	   which	   this	  chapter	   builds	   upon.	   David	   Estlund	   ‘On	   Following	   Orders	   in	   an	   Unjust	   War’,	   Journal	   of	  
Political	  Philosophy	  15,	  No.2	  (2007),	  213-­‐234.	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claim	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  issue	  commands	  and,	  by	  doing	  so,	  place	  those	  to	  whom	  the	  command	  is	  directed	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey.	  Paradigmatic	  examples	  include	  a	  parent	  directing	  their	  child	  to	   ‘Clean	  up	  your	  room!’,	  a	  policewoman	   ordering	   a	   car	   driver	   to	   ‘Stop	   right	   there!’,	   and	   an	   army	  officer	  commanding	  his	  troops	  to	  ‘Hold	  your	  positions!’.	  At	  a	  more	  general	  level,	   states	   and	   legal	   systems	   claim	   the	   authority	   to	   place	   their	   subjects	  under	   obligations	   by	   enacting	   laws	   and	   through	   the	   pronouncements	   of	  officials.	   In	  all	   these	  cases	  the	  commander	   intends	  their	  directive	  to	  bring	  an	   entirely	   new	   reason	   for	   action	   into	   existence	   for	   those	   to	   whom	   it	  applies.	  	  Despite	  the	  prevalence	  of	  authority	  claims,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  philosophical	  puzzle	  here.	  How	  can	  someone	  conjure	  something	  as	  morally	  serious	  as	  an	  obligation	  merely	  by	  communicating	  her	  intention	  that	  it	  be	  the	  case?	  Two	   features	   of	   authoritative	   commands	   further	   contribute	   to	   the	  puzzle.	   Firstly,	   commands	   are	   intended	   to	   provide	   subjects	  with	   reasons	  for	  action	  whose	  validity	  is	  not	  conditional	  on	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  reasons	  for	  and	   against	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   act	   commanded.	   The	   subject	   of	   a	  command	  to	  ϕ	  gains	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  so	   in	  virtue	  of	  being	  commanded	  and	  not	   because	   of	   the	  merits	   of	  ϕ-­‐ing.	   Valid	   commands	   thus	   create	   ‘content-­‐independent’	  reasons	  for	  action.	  Secondly,	   commands	   are	   intended	   to	   play	   a	   particular	   role	   in	   the	  practical	  reasoning	  of	  the	  subject.	  When	  an	  authority	  issues	  a	  command	  to	  
ϕ,	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  to	  treat	  that	  command	  as	  simply	  an	  additional	  reason	  to	   ϕ	   to	   be	   weighed	   alongside	   the	   range	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   reasons	   for	   and	  against	  ϕ-­‐ing.	   Instead,	   the	  command	   is	  meant	   to	  both	  provide	   the	  subject	  with	  a	  new	  reason	  to	  ϕ	  and	  also	  prevent	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  ϕ-­‐related	  reasons	  (or	  at	  least	  some	  of	  them)	  from	  bearing	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  she	  ought	  to	  act.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  ‘peremptory’	  feature	  of	  authoritative	  commands.	  	  Once	  these	  two	  features	  are	  made	  overt,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  commands	  are	  problematic	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  genesis	  and	  their	  status,	  purporting	  not	  only	  to	  create	  new	  reasons,	  but	  reasons	  that	  have	  an	  extremely	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  practical	  reasoning	  of	  subjects.	  In	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contexts,	  commands	   are	  meant	   to	   give	   subjects	   decisive	   reason	   to	  perform	  actions	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they	  would	  have	   insufficient	   reason	   to	  perform	  –	  or	  even	  decisive	   reason	  not	  to	  perform	  –	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  command.	  The	   nature	   of	   authority	   claims	   raises	   two	   tasks	   for	   political	   and	   legal	  philosophy.	   The	   first	   lies	   in	   establishing	   the	   conditions	   –	   if	   any	   –	   under	  which	   claims	   to	   practical	   authority	   can	   be	   morally	   justified,	   so	   that	   a	  subject	  may	  have	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  obey	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  authority,	  independently	  of	  both	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason	  and	  of	   the	   actual	   balance	   of	   command-­‐independent	   reasons.	   Answering	   this	  may	   be	   thought	   the	   ‘first	   question’	   of	   political	   philosophy,	   and	   a	   major	  theme	  within	  the	  discipline	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  possession	  of	  such	  power	  can	   be	   reconciled	   with	   important	   values	   that	  may	   be	   thought	   to	   conflict	  with	  it,	  such	  as	  individual	  liberty,	  moral	  equality,	  or	  rational	  autonomy.	  	  Secondly,	   if	   the	  possession	  of	   authority	   can	  be	   justified	   this	   raises	   the	  further	  task	  of	  delineating	  its	  proper	  limits.	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  authorities	  are	   able	   to	   place	   subjects	   under	   content-­‐independent	   duties,	   it	   is	  presumably	  not	  true	  that	  any	  and	  every	  command	  creates	  these	  duties,	  or	  that	  duties	  to	  obey	  are	  entirely	  unconditional	  and	  absolute.	  An	  account	  of	  authority’s	   justification,	   then,	   not	   only	   has	   to	   explain	   when	   obeying	   an	  authority	  is	  ever	  justified,	  but	  also	  when	  it	  is	  not.	  	  These	  two	  tasks	  are	  fundamentally	  connected,	  in	  that	  an	  account	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  authority	  will	  fall	  out	  of	  an	  account	  of	  authority’s	  justification.	  The	  subject’s	  duty	  to	  obey	  an	  authority	  will	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  justify	   the	   authority’s	   possession	   of	   normative	   power	   over	   the	   subject.	  Justification	  and	  limitation	  are	  thus	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  	  
4.3	  Authority	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Harming	  	  	  The	  core	  concern	  of	   those	  working	  on	   the	  ethics	  of	  harming	   is	   fairly	   self-­‐explanatory.	  While	  causing	  physical	  harm	  to	  others	  is	  normally	  considered	  paradigmatically	  morally	  impermissible,	  we	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	  is	  always	  the	   case.	   Under	   certain	   exceptional	   circumstances	   deliberately	   causing	  harm	  may	  be	  morally	  justified,	  even	  required.	  Theories	  of	  permissible	  harm	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aim	   to	   provide	   a	   systematic	   account	   of	   all	   the	   normative	   factors	   that	  determine	  when	  such	  exceptions	  arise.	  	  The	   topics	   of	   authority	   and	   the	   ethics	   of	   harming	   are	   routinely	  discussed	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another,	  by	  different	  branches	  of	  normative	  philosophy.	   This	   is	   understandable	   but	   unfortunate.	   Ultimately,	   theorists	  working	   in	   both	   these	   areas	   are	   engaged	   in	   the	   wider	   project	   of	  establishing	   what	   reasons	   moral	   agents	   have	   for	   action	   –	   with	   what	  individuals	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  ought	  and	  ought	  not	  to	  do.	  Those	   working	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   harming	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	  question,	   ‘When,	   if	   ever,	   do	   individuals	   have	   undefeated	  moral	   reason	   to	  cause	  harm	  to	  others?’,	  which	  they	  aim	  to	  answer	  by	  providing	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  all	  the	  reasons	  for	  action	  capable	  of	  defeating	  whatever	  reasons	  normally	   render	   harming	   impermissible.	   Those	   working	   on	   the	   moral	  justification	   of	   authority,	   by	   contrast,	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	   different	  question,	   ‘When,	   if	   ever,	   do	   individuals	   have	   undefeated	  moral	   reason	   to	  obey	   the	   commands	   of	   another?’	   The	   former	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	  justification	  of	  harm,	  the	  latter	  with	  the	  justification	  of	  obedience.	  Set	  up	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  see	  that	   there	  are	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  cases	   in	  which	   determining	   whether	   an	   agent	   is	   justified	   in	   causing	   a	   particular	  harm	   –	   with	   whether	   she	   has	   undefeated	   reason	   to	   do	   so	   –	   requires	   an	  answer	   to	   an	   important	   third	   question,	   which	   combines	   our	   response	   to	  each	  of	   the	  above,	  namely,	   ‘When,	   if	   ever,	  do	   individuals	  have	  undefeated	  moral	   reason	   to	   obey	   commands	  which	   require	   them	   to	   cause,	   or	   refrain	  from	  causing,	  harm	  to	  others?	  These	   are	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   content	   of	   a	   command	   from	   a	   putative	  authority	   concerns	   the	   causing	   of	   harm.	   Term	   these	   ‘authorised	   harm’	  cases.	   	   These	   are	  not	  merely	  hypothetical.	   For	   example,	  members	  of	   law-­‐enforcement	   and,	   especially,	   military	   organisations	   are	   routinely	  commanded	   to	   cause	   harm,	   or	   refrain	   from	   causing	   harm,	   by	   those	  who	  claim	  practical	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  Given	   the	   possibility	   of	   authorised	   harm	   cases,	   there	   is	   an	   important	  and	  open	  question	  here	  concerning	  the	  extent,	  if	  any,	  to	  which	  the	  presence	  of	   a	   command	  makes	   a	   difference	   to	   the	  moral	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   the	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subject	  regarding	  the	  causing	  of	  harm.	  More	  strongly,	  we	  must	  ask	  whether	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  command	  can	  alter	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  an	  act	  of	  harming.	  This	   is	  raised	  most	  saliently	  by	  cases	   in	  which	  a	  subject	   is	  commanded	  to	  cause	  harm	  that,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  command,	  they	  would	  have	  decisive	  reason	   not	   to	   cause.	   In	   such	   cases	   there	   is,	   at	   very	   least,	   a	   prima	   facie	  tension	   between	   considerations	   of	   authority	   and	   standard	   theories	   of	  justified	  harm.	  Two	  putative	  sources	  of	  decisive	  practical	   reasons	   require	  opposing	  and	  mutually	  incompatible	  courses	  of	  action.	  	  The	   best	   theory	   of	   permissible	   harming	   then	   requires	   a	   position	   on	  whether	   the	  commands	  of	  authorities	  can	  provide	  an	   independent	  source	  of	   reasons	   for	   and	   against	   harming	   and,	   if	   so,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	  reasons	  may	  determine	   the	  moral	  status	  of	  such	  acts.	  The	  correct	  answer	  may	  well	  be	   that	   commands	  play	  no	   such	   role	  and	  make	  no	  difference	   to	  whether	  an	  agent	  is	  justified	  in	  causing	  harm.	  But	  this	  conclusion	  requires	  positive	  argument	  and	  engagement	  with	  theories	  of	  authority.	  	  
4.4	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Harm:	  Completeness	  and	  Immunity	  	  I	   aim	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   relevance	  of	   authority	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   harming,	  focussing	  on	  two	  topics	  of	  debate	  in	  this	  field.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  very	  general	  question	  of	  precisely	  which	  types	  of	  reasons	  are	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  acts	  of	  harming.	   Term	   this	   the	   question	   of	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	   causing	  harm.	   The	   second	   aspect	   arises	   from	   a	   debate	   within	   the	   self-­‐defence	  literature.	  It	  concerns	  the	  permissibility	  of	  defensively	  harming	  individuals	  who	  will	   otherwise	   cause	   harm	   to	   others,	   but	  who	   possess	   an	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   justification	   for	   doing	   so.	   This	   issue	   rests	   on	   a	   more	   general	  question	   regarding	   how	   agents’	   reasons	   for	   harming	   are	   related	   and	  responsive	  to	  other	  agents’	  reasons	  for	  harming.	  Term	  this	  the	  question	  of	  
interaction.	  	  	  The	   standard	   account	   of	   why	   acts	   of	   harming	   are	   presumptively	  impermissible	  is	  that	  individuals	  possess	  basic	  rights	  against	  being	  harmed,	  which	   impose	   stringent	   duties	   on	   others	   to	   refrain	   from	   doing	   so.	   Given	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this,	   it	   is	  typically	  thought	  that	  justifications	  for	  harming	  must	  take	  one	  of	  two	  basic	  forms.	  	  Firstly,	  an	  act	  of	  harming	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  showing	  that	   its	  recipient	  has	   lost	   their	   normal	   right	   against	   its	   infliction,	   thus	   removing	   the	  constraint	   against	   harming	   them.	   There	   are	   a	   variety	   of	   mechanisms	   by	  which	  this	  can	  occur.	  An	  individual	  may	  voluntarily	  waive	  their	  right	  not	  to	  be	   harmed	   by	   consenting	   to	   its	   infliction,	   such	   as	   in	   cases	   of	   voluntary	  euthanasia,	  as	  well	  as	  certain	  kinds	  of	  sporting	  contests.	  The	  loss	  of	  rights	  against	   harm	  may	   also	   occur	   non-­‐voluntarily.	   For	   example,	   an	   individual	  may	   lose	   this	   right	  because	   they	  deserve	   to	   suffer	  harm	   in	  virtue	  of	   some	  prior	  wrongdoing.	  This	  idea	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  retributivist	  justifications	  of	  punishment.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  harm	  an	  individual	  without	  acting	  against	  their	   rights	   if	   inflicting	   that	   harm	   is	   instrumental	   to	   averting	   a	   threat	   of	  wrongful	  harm	  for	  which	  they	  are	  appropriately	  responsible.	  This	  form	  of	  justification	  is	  known	  as	  liability	  and	  provides	  the	  standard	  justification	  for	  harming	  in	  self	  and	  other-­‐defence.	  	  Secondly,	   harm	  may	   be	   justified	   even	  when	   the	   recipient	   possesses	   a	  right	   against	   its	   infliction.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   reasons	   against	   harming	  provided	  by	  the	  right	  are	  overridden	  by	  weightier	  moral	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  causing	  harm.	  The	  most	  straightforward	  cases	  of	  this	  are	  those	  in	  which	  inflicting	  a	  harm	  against	  a	   right	   serves	   to	  avert	  an	   impartially	   considered	  much	   greater	   harm.	   For	   example,	   diverting	   a	   falling	   boulder	   from	   a	   path	  where	  it	  will	  crush	  ten	  strangers	  onto	  an	  alternate	  path	  where	  it	  will	  crush	  one	  stranger.	  In	  such	  cases	  there	  exists	  a	  lesser-­‐evil	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm.	  	  The	  preceding	   forms	  of	   justification	  may	  all	  be	  classed	  as	  grounded	   in	  
agent-­‐neutral	   reasons	   for	   action.	   As	   standardly	   understood,	   a	   reason	   is	  agent-­‐neutral	  if	  it	  can	  be	  fully	  stated	  without	  making	  essential	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  agent	  for	  whom	  it	  is	  a	  reason.	  Agent-­‐neutral	  reasons	  thus	  apply	  to	   all	   agents	   universally.	   For	   example,	   the	   fact	   that	   Betty	   is	   experiencing	  undeserved	   suffering	   gives	   all	   agents	   a	   reason	   to	   see	   to	   it	   that	   Betty’s	  suffering	   is	   relieved.	   Accordingly,	   justifications	   for	   harming	   grounded	   in	  agent-­‐neutral	   reasons	   apply	   to	   all	   agents.	   For	   example,	   if	   inflicting	  minor	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harm	   on	   one	   individual	   would	   avert	   a	   serious	   harm	   to	   many	   innocent	  people,	  then	  any	  appropriately	  motivated	  agent	  is	  able	  to	  act	  on	  this	  reason	  and	  justifiably	   inflict	   that	  harm.	  Similarly,	   if	   John	  is	   liable	  to	  be	  killed	  as	  a	  result	   of	   culpably	   posing	   a	   lethal	   threat	   to	  Bob,	   then	   this	   fact	   about	   John	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  justification	  for	  killing	  him	  in	  defence	  of	  Bob	  that	  applies	  to	  all	  agents.145	  Agent-­‐neutral	   reasons	   stand	   in	   contrast	   to	   agent-­‐relative	   reasons,	  whose	  articulation	  necessarily	  requires	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  agent	  for	  whom	   they	   are	   reasons.	   Paradigmatic	   examples	   of	   agent-­‐relative	   reasons	  are	  those	  grounded	  in	  special	  relationships	  and	  partiality.	  For	  example,	  the	  fact	   that	   Alex	   is	   Barry’s	   child	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   reason	   only	   for	   Barry	   to	  promote	  Alex’s	  welfare,	  and	  not	  for	  all	  agents	  in	  general.146	  	  Controversially,	  some	  argue	  that	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  can	  provide	  an	  independent	   source	  of	   justification	   for	   causing	  harm.	  On	  one	  view	  of	   this	  type,	   morality	   affords	   agents	   a	   ‘personal	   prerogative’	   to	   assign	   greater	  weight	   to	   their	  own	   interests,	   or	   the	   interests	  of	   those	   to	  whom	   they	  are	  specially	  related,	   than	   these	   interests	  would	  command	   from	  the	   impartial	  perspective.147	  In	  cases	  where	  these	  interests	  are	  seriously	  threatened,	  and	  acting	  against	   individuals’	  rights	  not	   to	  be	  harmed	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  them,	  this	  prerogative	  may	  provide	  the	  agent	  with	  an	  overriding	  reason	  to	  do	  so.148	  A	  second	  type	  of	  view,	   familiar	   from	  Chapter	  3,	   locates	  an	  agent-­‐relative	   form	   of	   justification	   in	   weighty	   associative	   duties,	   rather	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  This	  view	  of	  liability-­‐based	  justifications	  as	  agent-­‐neutral	  and	  universally	  applicable	  is	  probably	  the	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  literature.	  See	  for	  example,	  Thomson	  ‘Self-­‐Defense’,	  For	  discussion	  and	  criticism,	  see	  Cecile	  Fabre	  ‘Permissible	  Rescue	  Killings’,	  Proceedings	  of	  
the	  Aristotelian	  Society	  109	  (2009),	  149-­‐164.	  146	  For	  a	  lucid	  overview	  of	  the	  agent-­‐neutral/agent-­‐relative	  distinction,	  see	  Michael	  Ridge,	  'Reasons	   for	   Action:	   Agent-­‐Neutral	   Vs.	   Agent-­‐Relative',	   in	   Edward	   N.	   Zalta	   (ed),	   The	  
Stanford	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy	   (Winter	   2011	   Edition).	   Available	   at	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-­‐agent/	  147	  The	   notion	   of	   a	   personal	   prerogative	   comes	   from	   Samuel	   Scheffler,	   The	   Rejection	   of	  
Consequentialism	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1982).	  148	  Jonathan	   Quong	   has	   done	   most	   to	   articulate	   and	   defend	   a	   view	   of	   this	   type.	   Quong	  ‘Killing	  in	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  507-­‐537.	  See	  also,	  Fabre	  ‘Permissible	  Rescue	  Killings’;	  Nancy	  Ann	  Davis	  ‘Abortion	  and	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  13,	  No.3	  (1984),	  175-­‐207;	  McMahan	   ‘The	   Basis	   of	   Moral	   Liability	   to	   Defensive	   Killing’;	   Jeff	   McMahan	   ‘Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability	  in	  War’,	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  16,	  No.2	  (2008),	  227-­‐244.	  Hobbes	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  endorsing	  an	  extreme	  version	  of	  this	  view.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  ‘Self-­‐Defense:	  Agent-­‐Neutral	  and	  Agent-­‐Relative	  Accounts’,	  California	  
Law	  Review	  88	  (2000),	  711-­‐750.	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personal	   prerogatives.149	  On	   this	   view,	   participants	   in	  morally	   significant	  relationships	   incur	   extremely	   stringent	   duties	   to	   protect	   their	   associates	  from	  harm.	  Controversially,	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  associative	  duty	  comes	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  general	  duty	  not	  to	  act	  against	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  the	  associative	   duty	   may	   be	   the	   weightier,	   thus	   rendering	   the	   harming	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  justified	  as	  the	  lesser	  breach	  of	  duty.	  	  A	   basic	   assumption	   running	   throughout	   the	   literature	   on	   harming	   is	  that	  the	  above	  forms	  of	   justification	  –	  consent,	  desert,	   liability,	   lesser-­‐evil,	  personal	   prerogative	  or	   associative	  duty	   –	   or	   some	   combination	  of	   these,	  exhaust	   the	   range	  of	   justifications	   for	   causing	  harm.	   I	  will	   term	   this	   view	  
Completeness,	  which	  can	  be	  stated	  in	  more	  general	  terms	  as:	  	  
Completeness:	   For	   any	   act	   of	   harming,	   if	   the	   recipient(s)	   of	   harm	   retain	  their	   rights	   not	   to	   be	   harmed	   and	   their	   rights	   are	   neither	   waived	   nor	  overridden	   by	   a	   weightier	   moral	   consideration,	   then	   there	   is	   decisive	  reason	  not	  to	  cause	  that	  harm	  and	  agents	  are	  morally	  unjustified	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	   the	  debate	  on	  permissible	  harming	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  Completeness.150	  	  I	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   question	   of	   Interaction,	   which	   concerns	   the	  permissibility	   of	   defensively	   harming	   individuals	   who	   will	   otherwise	  transgress	  other’s	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  but	  who	  possess	  an	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   justification	   for	   doing	   so.	  151	  As	   mentioned	   above,	   this	   issue	  rests	   on	   a	   more	   general	   question	   regarding	   how	   agents’	   reasons	   for	  harming	  are	  related	  and	  responsive	  to	  other	  agents’	  reasons	  for	  harming.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Lazar	  ‘Associative	  Duties	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War’.	  150	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  thorough	  recent	  discussions	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  harm,	  which	   ‘points	   tantalizingly’	   towards	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   ‘grand	   unified	   theory’	   of	  permissible	   harming,	   consists	   almost	   entirely	   in	   an	   analysis	   of	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	  justifications.	  David	  Rodin,	  ‘Justifying	  Harm’,	  Ethics	  122,	  No.1	  (2011),	  74-­‐110.	  	  	  151	  I	  follow	  Frances	  Kamm	  in	  using	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  rights	  transgression	  to	  pick	  out	  actions	  that	  wrong	  an	  individual	  while	  remaining	  neutral	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  wronging	  is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   permissible	   or	   impermissible.	   Frances	   Kamm,	   ‘Rights’	   in	   Jules	  Coleman	  and	  Scott	  Shapiro	  (eds),	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Jurisprudence	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  
Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  476-­‐513	  at	  n.8.	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An	  intuitive	  view	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  relationship	  here,	  so	  that	  if	  an	  agent	   is	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   justified	   in	   causing	   harm	   then	   this,	   at	   the	  very	  least,	  provides	  a	  reason	  against	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  against	  that	  agent	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  that	  harm	  from	  occurring.	  While	  this	  much	  may	  be	  uncontroversial,	  the	  debate	  is	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  is	  raised.	  Recently,	  some	  have	  argued	  for	  the	  stronger	  view	  that	  an	  agent’s	   justification	   for	   harming	   provides	   decisive	   reason	   against	  defensively	  harming	   them.	  On	  this	  view,	   there	  can	  be	  no	   justified	  defence	  against	  the	  infliction	  of	  justified	  harm.152	  I	  will	  term	  this	  view	  Immunity:	  	  	  
Immunity:	   If	   an	   agent	   is	   justified	   in	   causing	   harm	   to	   others,	   then	   this	  justification	  defeats	  all	   the	  available	   reasons	   for	  defensively	  harming	   that	  agent.	  It	  is	  therefore	  morally	  unjustified	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  	  
4.5	  Two	  Claims	  	  	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	   taking	  a	  certain	  view	  of	  how	  authority	  can	  be	   justified	  and	  extending	   it	   to	  authorised-­‐harm	  cases	  generates	  counter-­‐examples	   to	  both	  Completeness	  and	  Immunity.	  	  To	  home	  in	  on	  the	  issue,	   it	   is	  useful	  to	  consider	  two	  specific	  questions	  we	   can	   ask	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   authority	   and	   harming,	  corresponding	   to	   the	   general	   questions	   of	   range	   and	   interaction	   outlined	  above.	  The	   first	   concerns	   the	   extent	   –	   if	   any	   –	   to	  which	   the	   command	   of	   an	  authority	   may	   affect	   the	   moral	   status	   of	   an	   act	   of	   harming.	   More	  specifically,	  we	  ask	  whether	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  can	  render	  an	  act	  of	   harming	   morally	   justified,	   when	   the	   act	   would	   be	   straightforwardly	  unjustified	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   command.	   Can	   the	   command	   of	   an	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  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  Ch.9.	   In	  his	  most	   recent	  work	  on	   this	   issue,	  McMahan	  also	  endorses	   a	   version	   of	   Immunity,	   albeit	   more	   tentatively.	   Jeff	   McMahan	   ‘Self-­‐Defense	  Against	   Justified	   Threateners’,	   in	   Helen	   Frowe	   and	   Gerald	   Lang	   (eds),	   How	   We	   Fight	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	   2014),	   104-­‐137.	  A	  view	  analogous	   to	   Immunity	   can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Locke,	  who	  writes	  that	  “Force	  is	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  nothing,	  but	  to	  unjust	  and	  unlawful	   Force”.	   John	   Locke,	   ‘Two	   Treatises	   of	   Government’,	   Peter	   Laslett	   (ed),	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  p.402.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Waldron,	  ‘Self-­‐Defense:	  Agent-­‐Neutral	  and	  Agent-­‐Relative	  Accounts’.	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authority	  can	  give	  an	  agent	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  cause	  harm,	  when	  they	  would	  otherwise	  have	  decisive	  reason	  not	  to	  do	  so?	  We	  can	  also	  ask	  a	  second	  question,	  which	  is	  conditional	  on	  our	  response	  to	   the	   first.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   command	  of	   an	   authority	   can	  provide	   an	  agent	  with	   a	   justification	   for	   causing	   harm,	  we	   can	   then	   ask	  whether	   the	  existence	   of	   this	   justification	  makes	   a	   difference	   to	  whether	   other	   agents	  are	  permitted	  to	  defensively	  harm	  the	  authorised	  agent,	  when	  doing	  would	  be	   straightforwardly	  permissible	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   the	   authorised	  agent’s	  justification.	  	  I	  will	  defend	  a	  revisionary	  pair	  of	  responses	  to	  these	  two	  questions:	  	  
First	   claim:	   Under	   certain	   conditions,	   the	   command	   of	   an	   authority	   can	  provide	  an	  agent	  with	  a	  moral	  justification	  for	  an	  act	  of	  harming,	  when	  it	  is	  both	   true	   that	   the	   act	   transgresses	   a	   right	   and	   that	   the	   right	   is	   not	  overridden	  by	  a	  weightier	  moral	  consideration.	  	  This	   claim	   denies	   Completeness,	   since	   it	   holds	   that	   an	   agent	   may	   have	  undefeated	   reason	   to	   cause	   harm	   even	   when	   none	   of	   the	   standard	  justifications	  outlined	  above	  obtain.	  It	  posits	  an	  additional	  and	  independent	  source	  of	  justification	  for	  harming.	  If	  defensible,	  this	  reveals	  that	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	  for	  harming	  is	  broader	  than	  commonly	  supposed	  by	  those	  working	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  harm.	  This	  strong	  response	  to	  the	  first	  question	  is	  tempered	  by	  a	  more	  modest	  response	  to	  the	  second:	  	  
Second	   Claim:	   The	   fact	   that	   an	   agent	   is	   commanded	   by	   an	   authority	   to	  cause	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   to	   others	   does	   not,	   in	   itself,	  raise	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  on	  defensively	  harming	  that	  agent.	  	  This	  may	   seem	   like	  a	  more	   conservative	  and	  conciliatory	   claim	  about	   the	  relationship	  between	  authoritative	  commands	  and	  the	  morality	  of	  harming	  than	   the	   first,	   since	   it	   limits	   the	   normative	   effect	   of	   commands	   to	   inflict	  harm.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   so.	   The	   second	   claim	   is	   also	   a	   revisionary	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position	  within	   the	  ethics	  of	  harming	  when	   taken	   in	  conjunction	  with	   the	  first,	  since	  they	  together	  deny	  Immunity.	  If	  both	  claims	  are	  defensible,	  then	  there	   can	   be	   cases	   in	   which	   an	   agent	   is	   justified	   in	   harming	   another	   (in	  virtue	  of	  being	  commanded	  to	  do	  so),	  but	  this	  justification	  does	  not	  render	  the	   infliction	   of	   defensive	   harm	  on	   the	   authorised	   agent	  more	  difficult	   to	  justify	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  their	  justification.	  	  Before	  beginning	  a	  defence	  of	  these	  two	  claims,	  three	  clarifications	  are	  in	   order.	   Firstly,	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   commands	   of	   authorities	   can	   provide	  agents	  with	  undefeated	  reasons	   for	  causing	  harm	  refers	   to	   justification	   in	  the	  ‘fact-­‐relative’	  sense.	  On	  this	  view,	  commands	  bring	  genuine	  reasons	  for	  action	  into	  existence	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that,	  for	  example,	  valid	  promises	  do.	  Commands	  do	  not	  merely	  provide	  subjects	  with	  reasons	  for	  forming	  beliefs	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  authority-­‐independent	  reasons,	  justifying	  action	  only	  in	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐relative’	  sense.153	  Secondly,	   to	   avoid	   confusion,	   it	   is	  worth	   distinguishing	  my	   first	   claim	  from	  a	  different	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  commands	  of	  authorities	  may	  give	  rise	  to	   undefeated	   reasons	   to	   cause	   otherwise-­‐unjustified	   harm.	   To	  demonstrate,	   consider	   a	   case	   in	   which	   a	   subject’s	   failure	   to	   obey	   an	  authority’s	  command	  to	  cause	  unjust	  harm	  will	  result	  in	  a	  bad	  consequence	  occurring.	  For	  example,	   that	   if	  disobeyed	   the	  authority	  will	  get	  angry	  and	  violently	  unleash	  her	  wrath	  on	  innocent	  people.154	  If	  this	  bad	  consequence	  is	   sufficiently	   grave	   then	   the	   subject	   may	   well	   be	   justified	   in	   complying	  with	  the	  command	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  it.	  In	  such	  cases,	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	   command	   results	   in	   reasons	   that	   justify	   causing	   harm,	   the	   command	  
itself	  does	  not	  create	  the	  reasons.155	  Rather,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  command	  simply	   affects	   the	   causal	   architecture	   of	   the	   situation	   so	   as	   to	   activate	   a	  non-­‐authority-­‐based	   justification	   for	   harming,	   in	   this	   case	   a	   lesser-­‐evil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  fact-­‐relative	  and	  evidence-­‐relative	  permissibility,	  see	  Derek	  Parfit,	   On	   What	   Matters,	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2011),	   Ch.7.	   For	   detailed	  discussion	  and	  application	  to	  harming,	  see	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  Ch.10.	  154	  This	   is	   a	  version	  of	   the	   ‘Dictator’s	  Child’	   example,	  discussed,	   independently,	  by	  David	  Estlund	   and	   David	   Enoch.	   David	   Estlund,	   Democratic	   Authority	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.118;	  David	  Enoch,	  ‘Authority	  and	  Reason-­‐Giving’,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Phenomenological	   Research	   (forthcoming).	   The	   original	   example	   is	   attributed	   to	   John	  Deigh.	  155	  In	   Enoch’s	   terminology,	   the	   authority	   only	   succeeds	   in	   ‘triggering’	   reasons	   for	   the	  subject	  to	  act,	  rather	  than	  creating	  new	  reasons.	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justification.	  The	  possibility	  of	  such	  cases	  does	  not	  challenge	  Completeness	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  support	  my	  first	  claim.	  Thirdly,	  the	  arguments	  of	  this	  chapter	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  authority	  and	  harm	  yields	  interesting	  and	  important	  results	  for	  normative	  theory.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  elucidating	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  authority	  may	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  reasons	  that	   apply	   to	   agents	   regarding	   harm.	   It	   does	   not	   tackle	   the	   empirical	  question	   of	   whether	   specific	   real-­‐world	   authorities	   in	   fact	   satisfy	   these	  conditions.	  I	  address	  certain	  aspects	  of	  this	  question	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
4.6	  Opposing	  the	  First	  Claim	  	  	  I	   anticipate	   many	   will	   find	   my	   first	   claim	   highly	   unintuitive,	   even	  repugnant.	   To	   begin	   a	   defence	   of	   this	   claim,	   which	   denies	   this	   common-­‐sense	  reaction,	  I	  will	  outline	  three	  broad	  views	  about	  the	  justification	  and	  limitation	   of	   authority	   that	   are	   compatible	   with	   a	   commitment	   to	  
Completeness.	  With	  this	  in	  place,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  see	  what	  an	  account	   of	   authority	   must	   provide	   if	   my	   first	   claim	   is	   to	   be	   defended.	  Conversely,	   doing	   so	   also	   reveals	   which	   views	   of	   authority’s	   justification	  and	  limitation	  must	  be	  defended	  in	  order	  to	  vindicate	  Completeness.	  	  	  
4.6.1	  A	  Priori	  Philosophical	  Anarchism	  	  This	   first	   position	   denies	   my	   first	   claim	   at	   the	   most	   general	   level,	   by	  denying	   that	   the	   commands	  of	   an	   authority	   could	  ever	   create	   reasons	   for	  action.	   If	   true,	   this	   view	  guarantees	   that	  my	   first	   claim	  never	   gets	   off	   the	  ground	  and	  so	  ensures	  that	  Completeness	  (and,	  derivatively,	  Immunity)	  can	  be	  made	  safe	  from	  counter-­‐examples	  that	  appeal	  to	  authority.	  Philosophical	   anarchists	   object	   that	   commands’	   status	   as	   content-­‐independent	  and	  peremptory	  reasons	  for	  action	  is	  incompatible	  with	  some	  fundamental	  value.	  On	  one	   influential	  version	  of	   this	  objection,	  obedience	  to	   an	   authority	   can	   never	   be	   justified	   because	   doing	   so	   is	   irreconcilable	  with	  the	  basic	  requirements	  of	  rational	  and	  autonomous	  agency.	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The	  challenge	  can	  be	  stated	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  paradox,	  starting	  from	  the	  plausible	   assumption	   that	   agents	   should	   always	   aim	   to	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  them.156	  Given	  this,	  in	  cases	  where	  an	   authority	   commands	  us	   to	   act	   against	   the	   balance	   of	   reasons,	   obeying	  the	  command	   involves	  acting	  against	  reason.	  Reason	  then	  requires	  us	  not	  to	  obey.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  are	  commanded	  to	  act	  as	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  recommends,	   then	  we	  ought	   to	  do	  so,	  but	  not	   for	   the	  reason	  that	  we	   have	   been	   commanded.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   command	   is	   redundant.	  Either	   way,	   the	   objection	   holds	   that	   treating	   commands	   as	   reasons	   for	  action	   involves	   directing	   one’s	   rational	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   reasons	  that	  apply	   to	  oneself.	  The	   range	  of	   reasons	   for	  action	   is	  exhausted	  by	   the	  content-­‐dependent.	   On	   this	   view,	   it	   is	   no	   wonder	   that	   we	   find	   claims	   to	  authority	  puzzling,	  since	  they	  are	  incoherent.	  While	  philosophical	  anarchism	  may	  be	  considered	  an	  extreme	  view	   in	  the	   circles	   in	   which	   it	   is	   usually	   discussed,	   it	   nevertheless	   provides	  extremely	  strong	  support	   for	  Completeness.	  The	  case	   for	  anarchism	  might	  be	  strengthened	  once	  we	  see	  that	   it	  provides	  a	  defence	  of	  a	  very	   intuitive	  position	  within	  discussions	  of	  permissible	  harming.	  That	  said,	  this	  defence	  might	  be	   thought	   to	  kill	   the	  baby	   in	  order	   to	   save	   the	  bath	  water.	   If	   true,	  authorities	   never	   possess	   the	  moral	   power	   to	   impose	   any	   obligations	   on	  subjects.	  Fortunately,	   the	  choice	  between	  endorsing	  philosophical	  anarchism	  or	  accepting	   my	   first	   claim	   is	   a	   false	   one.	   Those	   who	   wish	   to	   preserve	  
Completeness	  may	   adopt	   one	   of	   two	  broad	   positions,	  which,	   if	   defensible,	  serve	   to	   defeat	  my	   first	   claim	  without	   endorsing	   the	   global	   scepticism	   of	  the	   anarchist.	   Both	   these	   views	   grant	   that	   there	   is	   some	   successful	  response	   to	   the	  anarchist	   challenge	  –	   so	   that	  authorities	  may	  possess	   the	  moral	  power	  to	  create	  content-­‐independent	  obligations	  –	  but	  deny	  that	  this	  possibility	  entails	  that	  subjects	  can	  have	  decisive	  reason	  to	  obey	  commands	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  For	  the	  most	  influential	  formulation	  of	  the	  paradox,	  see	  Robert	  Paul	  Wolff,	  In	  Defense	  of	  
Anarchism,	   (New	   York:	   Harper,	   1970).	   For	   detailed	   discussion,	   see	   Scott	   Shapiro,	  ‘Authority’	   in	   Coleman	   and	   Shapiro	   (eds),	   The	   Oxford	   Handbook	   of	   Jurisprudence	   and	  
Philosophy	  of	  Law,	  382-­‐439.	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Whereas	  the	  anarchist	  response	  protects	  Completeness	  by	  denying	  that	  the	  possession	  of	  authority	  can	  ever	  be	  moral	  legitimate,	  these	  views	  reject	  my	   first	   claim	   by	   appeal	   to	   the	   uncontroversial	   requirement	   that	   any	  plausible	  account	  of	   the	   justification	  of	  authority	  must	  place	   limits	  on	   the	  obligation	   to	  obey.	  Given	   this,	   it	   is	   natural	   to	   conclude	   that	  wherever	   the	  precise	   limits	   lie,	   commands	   to	   perform	   acts	   of	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	   harming	  must	   surely	   exceed	   them,	   given	   the	  moral	   gravity	   of	  such	  actions.157	  Each	  of	  the	  following	  two	  defences	  of	  Completeness	  appeals	  to	  a	  distinct	  way	  in	  which	  authority	  may	  be	  morally	  limited.	  	  
4.6.2	  The	  Invalidation	  View	  	  The	  first-­‐view,	  which	  I	  shall	  term	  the	  ‘Invalidation	  View’,	  seeks	  to	  deny	  my	  first	   claim	  by	   appealing	   to	   the	   jurisdictional	   limits	   on	   authority.	   The	   idea	  here	  is	  that	  those	  who	  have	  authority	  do	  not	  possess	  it	  over	  any	  and	  every	  area	  of	  action.	  Authority	  is	  always	  held	  relative	  to	  a	  specific	  domain.	  To	  say	  that	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  is	  always	  to	  say	  that	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  in	  
domain	   X.	   If	   A	   issues	   a	   command	   to	   B	   regarding	   domain	   Y,	   then	   the	  authority	  is	  acting	  ultra	  vires	  and	  its	  commands	  do	  not	  give	  B	  any	  content-­‐independent	   reasons	   to	   act	   as	   commanded.	   For	   example,	   while	   a	  policewoman	  may	   be	   able	   to	   place	  me	   under	   a	   duty	   to	   cease	  walking	   by	  shouting	  ‘Stop	  right	  there!’,	  she	  is	  not	  able	  to	  place	  me	  under	  a	  duty	  to	  wash	  behind	   my	   ears	   by	   shouting	   words	   to	   that	   effect.	   While	   she	   may	   have	  authority	  over	  me	  in	  a	  certain	  range	  of	  domains,	  my	  personal	  hygiene	  is	  not	  one	  of	  them.	  None	   of	   this	   is	   controversial.	   All	   plausible	   theories	   of	   authority	  recognise	   that	   authority	   claims	   are	   limited	   in	   terms	  of	   domain-­‐specificity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  As	   Matthew	   Noah	   Smith	   puts	   it	   in	   a	   recent	   article,	   “The	   first	   characteristic	   of	   the	  obligation	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  is	  that	  there	  are	  very	  few	  limits	  on	  what	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey	  the	   law	   can	   require	   a	   subject	   to	   do.	   There	   are,	   of	   course,	   some	   limits.	   Presumably,	   if	  
obedience	  to	  the	  law	  requires	  commission	  of	  serious	  moral	  wrongs,	  then	  one	  is	  not	  obligated	  
to	  obey	   the	   law.	   But	   this	   limit	   is	   at	   the	  moral	   extremes.”	  Matthew	  Noah	   Smith,	   ‘Political	  Obligation	  and	  the	  Self’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  86,	  No.2	  (2013),	  347-­‐375	  at	  p.349	  (emphasis	  added).	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and	   aim	   to	   provide	   an	   account	   of	   when	   and	   why	   an	   authority	   is	   acting	  outside	   its	   legitimate	   sphere.	  The	  distinctiveness	  of	   the	   Invalidation	  View	  lies	   is	   its	  specific	  account	  of	  where	  these	   limits	   lie.	  On	  this	  view,	  when	  an	  authority	   commands	   an	   agent	   to	   perform	   an	   action	   that	   is	   content-­‐dependently	  morally	  impermissible,	  the	  authority	  is	  acting	  ultra	  vires.	  Such	  commands	  are	  void	  and	  fail	  to	  provide	  subjects	  with	  any	  reason	  for	  action,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  policewoman’s	  command	  to	  wash	  behind	  my	  ears	  fails	  to	  do	  so.158	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   full-­‐blooded	   anarchist,	   who	   denies	   that	   commands	  ever	  create	  content-­‐independent	  obligations,	  this	  view	  is	  more	  selective	  in	  its	   denial	   of	   content-­‐independence.	   Whereas	   the	   anarchist	   asserts	   the	  primacy	  of	  the	  content-­‐dependent	  reasons	  in	  all	  domains,	  the	  Invalidation	  View	  does	  so	  only	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  moral	  reasons	  (or,	  more	  plausibly,	  the	  domain	  of	  moral	  reasons	  that	  pass	  some	  threshold	  of	  seriousness).	  On	  this	   view,	   commands	   may	   in	   general	   possess	   content-­‐independent	   force,	  but	  this	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  command	  being	  pre-­‐approved	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  moral	  reasons.	  Commands	  to	  act	  morally	  wrongfully	  are	  void,	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	   promises	   to	   perform	   actions	   that	   are	  morally	  wrong	  may	  sometimes	  be	  invalidated	  by	  their	  content.159	  This	  view	  then	  denies	  my	  first	  claim,	  since	  it	  would	  deem	  an	  authority	  commanding	  the	  infliction	  of	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  to	  have	  overstepped	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  legitimacy,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  command	  void.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  Invalidation	  View	  yields	  the	  same	  substantive	  verdict	  as	  the	  philosophical	  anarchist	  (that	  commands	  cannot	  provide	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm)	  and	  does	  so	  on	  the	  same	  basis	  (that	  such	  commands	  fail	  to	  generate	  reasons	  for	  action.)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  For	  a	  defence	  of	  this	  view,	  see	  Dudley	  Knowles,	   ‘The	  Domain	  of	  Authority’,	  Philosophy	  82,	  No.1	  (2007),	  23-­‐43.	  	  159	  On	   the	   conditions	   of	   validity	   for	  promises	  with	   immoral	   content,	   see	   Seanna	   Shiffrin,	  ‘Immoral,	   Conflicting	   and	   Redundant	   Promises’	   in	   R.	   Jay	   Wallace,	   Rahul	   Kumar,	   and	  Samuel	  Freeman	   (eds),	  Reasons	  and	  Recognition:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  T.M.	  Scanlon	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  155-­‐178.	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4.6.3	  The	  Pro	  Tanto	  View	  	  The	   Invalidation	   View	   provides	   one	   strategy	   for	   reconciling	   the	   moral	  legitimacy	   of	   authority	   with	   a	   defence	   of	   Completeness	   by	   appeal	   to	  authority’s	  moral	   limits.	   Alternatively,	   one	  may	   also	   reject	  my	   first	   claim	  without	  endorsing	  either	  anarchism	  or	  the	  Invalidation	  View.	  Instead,	  one	  may	  accept	  that	  commands	  to	  inflict	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  fall	  within	  an	  authority’s	  sphere	  of	   legitimacy	  and	  thus	  succeed	  in	  placing	  subjects	   under	   an	   obligation	   to	   obey,	   but	   deny	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   this	  obligation	  gives	  subjects	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  cause	  harm.	  On	  this	  view,	  such	   commands	   are	   not	   void,	   but	   function	   only	   as	   pro	   tanto	   reasons	   for	  action,	  which	  may	  be	  defeated	  by	  stronger	  reasons	  against	  acting.160	  Again,	  we	   may	   invoke	   an	   analogy	   with	   the	   moral	   limits	   of	   promises.	   In	   cases	  where	  fulfilling	  a	  valid	  promise	  involves	  doing	  what	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  the	  promisor	  may	  remain	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  keep	  their	  promise,	  but	  this	  is	  overridden	  by	  weightier	  reasons	  against	  doing	  so	  (though	  it	  the	  obligation	  manifest	   itself	   in	   the	   form	  of	  an	  obligation	   to	  apologise	   to	  or	   compensate	  the	  promisee.)	  The	   ‘Pro	  Tanto	   View’,	   as	   I	  will	   call	   it,	   provides	   an	   intuitively	  plausible	  rebuttal	  of	  my	  first	  claim	  by	  combining	  two	  uncontroversial	   ideas.	  Firstly,	  just	  as	  any	  plausible	  theory	  of	  authority	  recognises	  that	  the	  reason-­‐giving	  force	   of	   commands	   is	   limited	   by	   jurisdictional	   considerations,	   so	   too	   are	  they	   limited	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   weight.	   While	   the	   duty	   to	   obey	   may	   be	  stringent,	  it	  is	  not	  of	  absolute	  weight	  and	  may	  potentially	  be	  overridden	  by	  competing	  reasons.	  	  	  	  Secondly,	   it	   is	   close	   to	   an	   axiom	   in	  moral	   philosophy	   that	   individuals’	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  seriously	  harmed	  provide	  the	  most	  stringent	  moral	  reasons	  available.	   Given	   this,	   it	   is	   natural	   to	   think	   that	   if	   the	   duty	   to	   obey	   an	  authority	  may	  be	  overridden	   in	  certain	  cases,	   it	  will	  be	   in	  precisely	   those	  cases	  in	  which	  obeying	  a	  command	  involves	  acting	  against	  these	  rights.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  p.88.	  See	  also,	  Anna	  Stilz,	   ‘Authority,	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  Community	   in	   Cosmopolitan	   War’,	   n.22.	   In	   the	   surrounding	   text,	   Stilz	   also	   endorses	   a	  version	  of	  the	  Invalidation	  View.	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The	  Pro	  Tanto	   View	   is	  more	   conciliatory	   towards	  my	   first	   claim	   than	  both	  philosophical	  anarchism	  and	  the	  Invalidation	  View,	  since	  it	  grants	  that	  commands	  may	  provide	  genuine	  reasons	   for	  causing	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm.	  But	  it	  remains	  in	  extensional	  agreement	  with	  both	  these	  views	   in	   denying	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   command	   can	   justify	   acts	   of	  harming	   that	   would	   be	   unjustified	   in	   its	   absence.	   While	   commands	   may	  provide	   reasons	   to	   inflict	   a	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm,	   they	  crucially	  do	  not	  provide	  undefeated	   reasons,	  which	   is	  what	  my	   first	   claim	  requires.	  	  Again,	  this	  point	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  promising.	  In	  cases	  where	  fulfilling	  a	  valid	  promise	  involves	  doing	  what	  is	  seriously	  morally	  wrong,	  the	  promisor	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  fulfil	  their	  duty	  to	  the	  promises,	  but	   this	   reason	   is	  overridden	  by	  a	  weightier	   reason	  against	  doing	  so	   (though	   it	  may	  reappear	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	  duty	   to	  compensate	  or	  apologise	  to	  the	  promisee).	  	  	  
4.7	  Service	  Accounts	  of	  Authority	  	  The	   previous	   section	   set	   out	   a	   range	   of	   views	   about	   the	   justification	   and	  limitation	  of	  authority	  that	  are	  entailed	  by	  a	  commitment	  to	  Completeness.	  If	  Completeness	   is	   true,	   then	   one	   of	   these	   views,	   or	   a	   view	  with	   a	   similar	  structure,	  must	  also	  be	   true.	  This	   is	  an	   interesting	   result	   in	   itself.	  A	   fairly	  uncontroversial	   assumption	   in	   one	   area	   of	   normative	   philosophy	   entails	  commitments	  to	  certain	  positions	  within	  another.	  More	  pertinently,	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  see	  what	  is	  required	  if	  my	  first	  claim	  is	  to	  be	  defended.	  A	   plausible	   account	   of	   authority	   is	   needed	   that	   shows	   all	   three	   of	   these	  views	  to	  be	  mistaken.	  	  This	   section	   begins	   this	   positive	   task.	   This	   requires	   two	   components.	  Firstly,	   an	   account	   of	   how	   one	   person’s	   possession	   of	   authority	   over	  another	   –	   understood	   as	   the	  moral	   power	   to	   create	   content-­‐independent	  and	   peremptory	   obligations	   –	   can	   ever	   be	   justified.	   This	   is	   necessary	   to	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  the	  anarchist’s	  general	  challenge.	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  specifically,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   shown	   that	   commands	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐
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dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  do	  not	  exceed	   the	  moral	   limits	  of	   authority	  and	  may	  therefore	  provide	  undefeated	  reason	  for	  action.	  This	  component	  is	  required	  to	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  the	  two	  moderate	  objections	  to	  my	  first	  claim.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  certain	  account	  of	  authority	  is	  able	  to	  meet	  both	  these	  requirements.	   This	   approach,	   influentially	   defended	   by	   Joseph	   Raz,	   holds	  that	   one	   person’s	   possession	   of	   authority	   over	   another	   is	   justified	  when,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  the	  authority’s	  having	  this	  normative	  power	  serves	  the	  subject’s	  ends.	  Service-­‐based	   accounts	   aim	   to	   provide	   a	   general	   model	   of	   how	  authority	   may	   be	   legitimate	   that	   meets	   the	   anarchist’s	   challenge	   that	  obedience	   is	   fundamentally	   incompatible	   with	   acting	   in	   accordance	   with	  reason.	  A	  service-­‐based	  view	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  reason	  and	  authority	  can	  be	  reconciled.	  I	  will	  argue	  that,	  if	  successful,	  service	  accounts	  also	  provide	  the	  resources	  to	  show	  that	  the	  two	  moderate	  objections	  to	  my	  first	  claim	  also	  fail.	  That	  is,	  if	  a	  service	  account	  succeeds	  in	  showing	  that	  subjects	  can	  ever	  have	  reason	  to	  obey	  an	  authority,	  then	  it	  also	  shows	  that	  subjects	  may	  have	  undefeated	   reasons	   to	   obey	   commands	   to	   cause	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm.	  Raz’s	  well-­‐known	   ‘service	   conception’	   of	   authority	   provides	   a	   starting	  point	  for	  our	  reflection.	  The	  service	  conception	  advances	  two	  main	  theses:	  The	  first	  –	  the	  ‘pre-­‐emption	  thesis’	  –	  provides	  a	  precise	  account	  of	  what	  the	  possession	   of	   practical	   authority	   consists	   in,	   by	   explicating	   the	   role	   that	  legitimate	   commands	   are	  meant	   to	   play	   in	   the	   practical	   reasoning	   of	   the	  subject.161	  The	   second	   –	   the	   ‘normal	   justification	   thesis’	   –	   provides	   an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  possession	  of	  such	  authority	  can	  be	  justified.	  	  According	   to	   the	   pre-­‐emption	   thesis,	   the	   reasons	   provided	   by	   the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  are	   intended	  to	  have	  a	  specific	  character.	  When	  an	  authority	  commands	  a	  subject	  to	  ϕ	  this	  does	  not	  simply	  provide	  another	  reason	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  balance	  of	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	   ϕ-­‐ing.	   Rather,	   the	   command	   both	   provides	   an	   additional	   ‘first-­‐order’	  reason	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  and	  a	  ‘second-­‐order’	  exclusionary	  reason	  not	  to	  act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Joseph	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1986),	  p.46.	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on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   first-­‐order	   ϕ-­‐related	   reasons	   (or,	   more	  accurately,	   not	   to	   act	   for	   a	   subset	   of	   these	   reasons).	   These	   pre-­‐existing	  reasons	  are	  replaced	  or	  ‘pre-­‐empted’	  by	  the	  reason	  for	  action	  provided	  by	  the	  command.	  	  The	   pre-­‐emption	   thesis	   provides	   the	   first	   step	   in	   responding	   to	   the	  anarchist	   challenge.	   On	   this	   hierarchical	   account	   of	   practical	   reasoning,	  commands	  need	  not	  necessarily	  compete	  with	   the	  pre-­‐existing	   first-­‐order	  reasons	  for	  the	  rational	  attention	  of	  the	  subject,	  including	  the	  reasons	  that	  would	  otherwise	  count	  against	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  action	  commanded.	  In	   virtue	   of	   the	   command’s	   existence,	   these	   reasons	   are	   excluded	   and	  no	  longer	  apply	  to	  the	  subject.	  This	  view	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  response	  to	   the	   anarchist’s	   complaint	   that	   obedience	   entails	   acting	   against	   the	  reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   oneself,	   since	   one	   function	   of	   commands	   is	   to	  determine	  precisely	  which	  reasons	  apply.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  fact	  that	  commands	  are	  intended	  to	  play	  this	  precise	  role	  in	   the	  practical	   reasoning	  of	   the	   subject	   does	  not	   show	   that	   it	   is	   justified	  that	   they	   do	   so.	   This	   crucial	   second-­‐step	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   normal	  justification	   thesis,	   which	   elucidates	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   the	  possession	   of	   the	  moral	   power	   to	   create	   pre-­‐emptive	   reasons	   is	   morally	  legitimate.	  According	  to	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis:	  	   the	   normal	   way	   to	   establish	   that	   a	   person	   has	   authority	   over	  another	  person	  involves	  showing	  that	  the	  alleged	  subject	  is	  likely	  better	   to	   comply	   with	   reasons	   which	   apply	   to	   him	   .	   .	   .	   if	   he	  accepts	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  alleged	  authority	  as	  authoritatively	  binding	  and	  tries	  to	  follow	  them,	  rather	  than	  by	  trying	  to	  follow	  the	  reasons	  which	  apply	  to	  him	  directly.162	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  possession	  of	  authority	  is	  justified	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  rational	  benefit	   it	   provides	   to	   its	   subjects.	   An	   authority	   is	   entitled	   to	   create	   pre-­‐emptive	   obligations	   only	  when	   their	   commands	   enable	   subjects	   to	   better	  achieve	   the	   aims	   that	   they	   have	   reason	   to	   achieve	   independently.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  p.53.	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normal	   justification	   thesis	   thus	   offers	   a	   broadly	   instrumental	   account	   of	  authority.163	  	  Authorities	  can	  satisfy	  the	  test	  of	  normal	  justification	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  Firstly,	   they	   can	   enable	   groups	   of	   individuals	   to	   better	   coordinate	   their	  behaviour,	   thus	   enabling	   them	   to	   resolve	   the	   various	   collective	   action	  problems	  they	  may	  encounter	  in	  pursuing	  valuable	  projects.	  By	  obeying	  an	  authority,	  each	  member	  can	  better	  comply	  with	   the	  reasons	   that	  apply	   to	  them	  –	  known	  as	  ‘dependent	  reasons’	  –	  than	  they	  would	  if	  each	  tried	  to	  act	  on	   their	   own	   assessment	   of	   these	   reasons.	   Secondly,	   an	   authority	   may	  possess	   greater	   expertise	   than	   the	   subject	   regarding	   important	   matters,	  and	   thus	   be	   able	   to	   issue	  directives	   that	  more	   reliably	   track	   right	   reason	  than	   the	   subject	   is	   able	   to.	   In	   both	   cases,	   subjects	   can	   better	   conform	   to	  right	   reason	   by	   deferring	   to	   the	   authority	   and	   treating	   its	   directives	   as	  binding,	  than	  by	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason.	  	  We	  can	  now	  appreciate	  how	  a	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  provides	  a	  response	  to	  the	  anarchist	  objection	  that	  obedience	  is	  inherently	  irrational.	  On	   a	   service-­‐based	   view,	   obedience	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   rational	   on	  instrumental	   grounds.	   Given	   that	   agents	   have	   certain	   aims,	   they	   have	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  adopt	  the	  means	  to	  best	  achieving	  those	  aims.	  Obeying	  an	  authority	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  optimal	  means	  of	  achieving	  greater	  overall	  conformity	  with	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  oneself.164	  	  Furthermore,	   a	   service	   account	   explains	   why	   the	   commands	   of	  legitimate	   authorities	   have	   the	   particular	   role	   within	   the	   practical	  reasoning	   of	   the	   subject	   that	   the	   pre-­‐emption	   thesis	   claims.	   Again,	   the	  reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   it	   is	   rationally	   optimal	   for	   the	   subject	   to	   treat	  authoritative	  commands	  as	  wholly	  replacing	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason,	   rather	   than	   as	   pro	   tanto	   reasons	   to	   be	   weighed	   alongside	   this	  assessment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  This	  is	  an	  overly	  simplistic	  way	  of	  putting	  things,	  since,	  as	  Daniel	  Viehoff	  has	  argued,	  a	  service-­‐based	   	   account	   can	   also	   accommodate	   the	   view	   that	   subjects	   may	   have	   non-­‐instrumental	   reasons	   to	   obey	   an	   authority.	   Daniel	   Viehoff,	   ‘Debate:	   Procedure	   and	  Outcome	   in	   the	   Justification	  of	  Authority’,	   Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  19,	  No.2	   (2011),	  248-­‐259.	   However,	   since	   the	   cases	   I	   discuss	   are	   not	   of	   this	   type,	   I	   will	   continue	   to	  characterise	  service	  accounts	  as	  providing	  an	  instrumental	  justification.	  164	  Joseph	  Raz,	  ‘On	  Respect,	  Authority	  and	  Neutrality:	  A	  Response’,	  Ethics	  120,	  No.2	  (2010),	  279-­‐301	  at	  p.299.	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It	  is	  easiest	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point	  by	  considering	  a	  case	  of	  authority	  that	  is	   legitimated	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   superior	   expertise	   (another,	   though	  broadly	  parallel,	   story	  would	   have	   to	   be	   told	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	   pre-­‐emptive	  quality	  of	  the	  commands	  issued	  by	  coordinative	  authorities.)	  To	  put	  things	  slightly	   crudely,	   authorities	   that	   are	   legitimated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   expertise	  are	  those	  that	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  mistakes	  as	  to	  what	  reason	  requires	  within	  an	  identifiable	  class	  of	  cases	  than	  the	  subject	  is.	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  if	  the	  subject	  allows	  the	  command	  to	  play	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  role	  in	  her	  practical	  reasoning,	  she	  will	  achieve	  an	  identical	  level	  of	  conformity	  with	  reason	  that	  the	   authority	   achieves.	   Now	   imagine,	   instead,	   that	   the	   subject	   adopts	   a	  mixed	  policy	  of	  reasoning,	   in	  which	  she	   forms	  her	  own	  assessment	  of	   the	  balance	  of	  dependent	  reasons	  and	  then	  adds	  some	  additional	  weight	  to	  the	  reasons	  that	  favour	  the	  course	  of	  action	  commanded	  by	  the	  authority.	  In	  a	  sub-­‐class	  of	  cases,	  this	  extra	  weight	  will	  tip	  the	  balance	  in	  favour	  of	  acting	  as	  commanded.	  Within	  this	  sub-­‐class	  she	  achieves	  the	  same	  rate	  of	  mistake	  that	  the	  authority	  achieves.	  But	  in	  others	  it	  will	  not,	  and	  the	  subject	  will	  act	  according	   to	   her	   own	   assessment.	   In	   this	   sub-­‐class	   of	   cases,	   her	   rate	   of	  mistake	  will	  be	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  the	  authority.	  Across	  the	  whole	  class	  of	  cases,	   then,	  her	   rate	  of	  mistake	  will	  be	  greater	   than	   that	  of	   the	  authority.	  The	  weighing	  strategy	  can	  only	  serve	  to	  reduce	  her	  overall	  conformity	  with	  reason,	  compared	  to	  wholesale	  pre-­‐emption.	  Instrumental	  reasoning	  itself	  dictates	   that	  valid	  commands	  play	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  role	  within	   the	  subject’s	  practical	   reasoning,	   wholly	   replacing	   the	   reasons	   upon	   which	   they	  depend.165	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165 	  Raz,	   The	   Morality	   of	   Freedom,	   p.67-­‐69.	   In	   addition	   to	   considerations	   of	   rational	  optimality,	   the	   pre-­‐emptive	   character	   of	   valid	   commands	   can	   also	   be	   defended	   by	   an	  argument	   from	  double-­‐counting.	  Since,	  on	  a	  service	  account,	  valid	  commands	  are	  wholly	  grounded	  in	  the	  dependent	  reasons	  that	  apply,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  recipient	  of	  such	  commands	   cannot	   simultaneously	   be	   subject	   to	   the	   dependent	   reasons	   upon	  which	   the	  command	   is	   based,	   because	   the	   rational	   weight	   of	   these	   reasons	   has	   already	   been	  accounted	   for	   in	   producing	   the	   command.	   For	   commands	   to	   then	   compete	   with	   these	  dependent	   reasons	   would	   be	   to	   count	   the	   dependent	   reasons	   twice.	   To	   avoid	   double-­‐counting,	   the	   command	   must	   either	   replace	   the	   reasons	   on	   which	   it	   depends,	   or	   not	  function	   as	   a	   reason	   at	   all.	   Since,	   by	   hypothesis,	   the	   subject	   will	   do	   worse	   in	   terms	   of	  conforming	   to	   right	   reason	   if	   the	  dilemma	   is	   resolved	   in	   the	   latter	  manner,	   reason	   itself	  dictates	   that	   legitimate	   commands	   have	   pre-­‐emptive	   force.	   See	   Raz,	   The	   Morality	   of	  
Freedom,	  pp.58-­‐59	  
	  	   121	  
A	  service	  account	  also	  explains	  how	  mistaken	  commands	  –	  commands	  that	   fail	   to	   reflect	   the	  actual	  balance	  of	  dependent	   reasons	   in	  a	  particular	  case	   –	  may	   still	   provide	   subjects	  with	   undefeated	   reason	   to	   obey.	   This	   is	  because	  authorities	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  infallible	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  the	  test	  of	  normal	   justification.	   Subjects	   may	   be	   able	   to	   improve	   their	   overall	  conformity	   with	   reason	   in	   a	   particular	   domain	   by	   obeying	   a	   fallible	  authority,	   than	  by	  acting	  on	   their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason	   in	  each	  instance.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  the	  service	  upon	  which	  their	  legitimacy	  rests,	  an	  authority	  need	  only	  be	  superior	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  terms	  of	  bringing	  about	  their	  conformity	  with	  right	  reason.	  The	  standard	  of	  normal	   justification	  is	  essentially	  comparative.	  Crucially,	  subjects	  are	  only	  able	  to	  gain	  the	  rational	  benefits	  of	  obeying	  a	  (fallible)	  authority	  if	  the	  authority’s	  commands	  are	  obeyed	  even	  when	  they	  fail	   to	   correctly	   reflect	   right	   reason.	   For,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   acting	   against	  right	   reason	   in	   particular	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   authority	   errs,	   the	   subject	  would	   have	   to	   assess	   each	   and	   every	   command	   against	   their	   own	  assessment	  of	   right	   reason	  and	  disregard	   those	  commands	  which	  conflict	  with	   this	   assessment.	   But	   by	   adopting	   this	   policy	   the	   subject	   would	   be	  forsaking	   the	   benefits	   of	   obedience.	   She	   overall	   does	   worse	   in	   terms	   of	  achieving	   conformity	  with	   right	   reason	  by	   doing	   so,	   since,	   by	   hypothesis,	  the	   authority	   in	   question	   meets	   the	   condition	   of	   normal	   justification	   in	  spite	  of	  its	  fallibility.	  	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  a	  simple	  case	  of	  advisory	  authority	  grounded	  in	   expertise.	   Imagine	   that	   A	   is	   an	   expert	   regarding	   B	   in	   the	   domain	   of	  financial	   investments	   in	   the	   stock	  market.	  Within	   this	   domain,	   he	   is	   less	  likely	   to	   incorrectly	   assess	   right	   reason	   than	   B.	   In	   one	   instance,	   A	   may	  mistakenly	  direct	  B	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  certain	  company,	  which	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  poor	  investment.	  B	  will	  lose	  one	  hundred	  dollars	  by	  doing	  so.	  However,	  the	  only	  way	   that	   B	   can	   detect	   this	   mistake	   would	   be	   to	   go	   through	   the	   same	  consideration	   of	   financial	   factors	   that	   B	   went	   through	   in	   crafting	   his	  directive	   in	   each	   case.	   But	   if	   he	   does	   so,	   and	   acts	   on	   his	   judgements,	   he	  would	   overall	   make	   more	   mistakes	   in	   terms	   of	   maximising	   investment	  returns.	  B	   therefore	  has	   sufficient	   reason	   to	   act	   as	  A	  directs,	   including	   in	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cases	  where	  A	  errs.	  The	   subject’s	   aim	  of	   improving	   their	   conformity	  with	  reason	   itself	   requires	   that	   mistaken	   commands	   be	   obeyed,	   subject	   to	  certain	  limits	  to	  be	  discussed	  shortly.	  An	   important	   feature	   of	   a	   service	   account	   is	   that	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  authority	  is	  inherently	  individualised.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  command	  to	  impose	  an	  obligation,	   the	  authority	   in	  question	  must	  not	  only	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  normal	  justification	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  particular	  domain	  of	  action	  in	  which	  it	   is	   issued,	  but	  also	  with	  regard	  to	  each	  person	  to	  whom	  it	   is	   issued.	  The	  very	  same	  authority	  may	  be	  legitimate	  in	  domain	  X	  with	  regard	  to	  Jones	  but	  not	  regarding	  Smith.	  This	  is	  because	  individuals	  are	  differently	  situated	  in	  many	   respects,	   affecting	   both	   the	   degree	   of	   conformity	   with	   reason	   that	  each	   can	   achieve	   independently	   and	   the	   kind	   of	   service	   that	   each	   may	  require	   in	   order	   to	   better	   conform.	   Given	   this,	   some	   individuals	   may	   be	  situated	   so	   that	   a	   particular	   authority	   is	   able	   to	   serve	   them	   regarding	  certain	  matters,	  whereas	   others	   are	  not.	  An	   important	   implication	  of	   this	  ‘piecemeal’	   account	   of	   authority	   is	   that	   the	   authority	   of	   states	   and	   legal	  systems	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   far	   less	   extensive	   than	   that	   which	   they	   claim	   for	  themselves.	  	  The	  test	  of	  normal	  justification	  provides	  a	  necessary,	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	   for	   the	   justification	   of	   authority.	   For	   sufficiency,	   two	   further	  conditions	   are	   required,	   which	   together	   account	   for	   authority’s	   limits	  under	  a	  service-­‐based	  account.	  The	   first	   provides	   a	   principled	   restriction	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   authority’s	  legitimacy,	   by	   specifying	   certain	   domains	   of	   reasons	   in	   which	   authority	  cannot	  be	  possessed.	  At	   first	  glance	  one	  might	   think	  this	  odd.	   If	  we	  think,	  plausibly,	   that	   rational	   agents	   always	   have	   the	   aim	   of	   improving	   their	  conformity	  with	  reason,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  wherever	  we	  encounter	  reasons,	  we	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   there	   being	   legitimate	   authority	   over	   those	  reasons	  under	  a	  service	  account.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Given	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy,	   there	   will	   be	   a	   range	   of	   domains	   in	   which	   agents’	   overriding	  rational	   aim	   is	   to	   choose	   for	   themselves,	   rather	   than	   achieve	   the	   optimal	  outcome.	  In	  these	  cases,	  achieving	  conformity	  with	  reason	  is	  incompatible	  with	  obeying	  an	  authority.	  Such	  domains	  are	  just	  not	  ‘authority-­‐apt’.	  These	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include	   domains	   that	   intuitively	   fall	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   the	   liberal	  ‘personal	  sphere’,	  such	  as	  one’s	  choice	  of	  leisure	  activity,	  romantic	  partner,	  religious	   affiliation,	   etc.	   In	   these	   cases,	   it	  may	  well	   be	   true	   that	   someone	  else	   is	  better	  placed	  than	  the	  agent	  with	  regard	  to	  which	  course	  of	  action	  will	  maximise	   their	  well-­‐being	   or	   preferences,	   but	   this	   fact	   does	   not	   give	  them	   the	   authority	   to,	   for	   example,	   command	   the	   agent	   to	   play	   tennis	  rather	  than	  football	  after	  work,	  or	  marry	  Tim	  rather	  than	  Dorothy.	  	  Given	   this,	   in	   order	   for	   A	   to	   possess	   authority	   over	   B	   in	   domain	   X,	   it	  must	   not	   only	   be	   true	   that	   B	   will	   better	   achieve	   conformity	   with	   the	   X-­‐related	  reasons	  by	  obeying	  A	  than	  by	  acting	  on	  his	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason,	  but	  must	  also	  be	  true	  that	  domain	  X	  is	  not	  one	  in	  which	  B	  has	  more	  reason	   to	   choose	   autonomously	   than	   achieve	   the	   optimal	   outcome.	   Raz	  terms	  this	  additional	  requirement	  the	  ‘independence	  condition’.166	  	  A	   service	   account	   not	   only	   places	   limits	   on	   authority	   in	   terms	   of	  domains	  of	  reasons,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  level	  of	  specific	  commands.	  As	  explained	  above,	   this	   view	  provides	   an	   account	   of	   how	  directives	  may	   still	   be	   valid	  and	   binding	   on	   subjects	   even	   when	   they	   fail	   to	   reflect	   right	   reason.	   A	  mistaken	  directive	   remains	  valid	  when	   the	   subject	  would	  have	   to	   forsake	  the	  benefits	  of	  obeying	  the	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  particular	  command	  is	  mistaken.	  	  But,	   importantly,	   this	   rationale	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   all	   mistaken	  directives	   are	   binding	   in	   this	   way.	   Imagine	   a	   variation	   on	   the	   financial	  advisor	  example,	  in	  which	  A	  directs	  B	  to	  burn	  ten	  of	  his	  dollars.	  In	  this	  case,	  B	  can	  detect	  that	  this	  command	  fails	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason	  without	  having	  to	   go	   through	   a	   complex	   chain	   of	   financial	   reasoning.	   B	   can	   therefore	  disregard	   such	   directive	   without	   forfeiting	   the	   benefits	   of	   generally	  conforming	  to	  B’s	  directives.	  	  The	   same	   reasoning	   applies	   to	   service	   accounts	   of	   practical	   authority,	  which	  justify	  obedience	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  maximising	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Joseph	   Raz,	   Between	   Authority	   and	   Interpretation,	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  2009),	  p.137.	  The	  independence	  condition	  is	  also	  present	  in	  Raz’s	  earlier	  writings,	  though	  less	  overtly.	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  p.57;	  Joseph	  Raz,	  ‘Facing	  Up:	  A	  Reply’,	  Southern	  
California	  Law	  Review	  62	  (1989),	  1153-­‐1235	  at	  p.1180.	  For	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  Adam	  Tucker,	  ‘The	  Limits	  of	  Razian	  Authority’,	  Res	  Publica	  18,	  No.3	  (2012),	  225-­‐240.	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the	   subject’s	   overall	   conformity	   with	   reason.	   Commands	   that	   require	  obedience	   beyond	   this	   point	   are	   invalid,	   providing	   no	   reasons	   for	   action,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  benefit	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  their	  having	  this	  status.	  	  Importantly,	  whether	  a	  command’s	  departure	  from	  right	  reason	  serves	  to	  invalidate	  it	  does	  not	  depend	  simply	  on	  how	  much	  of	  a	  mistake	  it	   is.	  In	  the	   example	   above,	   conforming	   to	   the	   first	   directive	   loses	   B	   ten	   times	   as	  much	   money	   as	   conforming	   to	   the	   second.	   Yet	   the	   first	   is	   valid	   and	   the	  second	  invalid.	  Instead,	  validity	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  mistake.	  As	  Raz	  puts	  it,	   what	   matters	   is	   the	   clarity	   of	   a	   mistake,	   not	   its	   gravity.167	  Only	   clear	  mistakes	   invalidate	   commands,	   because	   only	   disobeying	   clearly	  mistaken	  commands	  is	  compatible	  with	  optimising	  conformity	  with	  reason.	  The	   independence	   condition	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   clear	   mistakes	   thus	  provide	   two	   sources	   of	   principled	   limits	   on	   authority.	   A	   subject	   has	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  obey	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  provided	  –	  (i)	   the	   authority	   meets	   the	   normal	   justification	   test	   with	   regard	   to	   that	  subject	  and	  the	  domain	  of	  reasons	  in	  which	  the	  command	  is	  issued,	  (ii)	  the	  domain	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  independence	  condition	  is	  satisfied,	  and	  (iii)	  the	  command	  is	  not	  clearly	  mistaken.	  	  
4.8	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm	  	  The	  preceding	  provided	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  justification	  and	  limitation	  of	  authority	  under	  a	  service	  account.	   If	  successful,	   the	  anarchist	  challenge	  can	   be	  met	   and	   one	   source	   of	   support	   for	   Completeness	   can	   be	   removed	  from	  contention.	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   argue	   that	   if	  we	   accept	   a	   service	   account	   of	   how	   the	  commands	   of	   authorities	   can	   ever	   create	   content-­‐independent	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	  reasons	  for	  action,	  it	  is	  a	  relatively	  short	  step	  to	  showing	  that	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  may	  provide	  a	  subject	  with	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  perform	  an	  otherwise-­‐unjustified	  act	  of	  harming.	  I	  outline	  this	  argument	  below	   and	   discuss	   some	   of	   its	   intricacies	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   where	   I	  explain	  how	  it	  refutes	  the	  two	  moderate	  objections	  to	  my	  first	  claim.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  p.62.	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A	  service-­‐based	  view	  provides	  a	  very	  general	  account	  of	  the	  justification	  of	   authority	   –	   An	   authority	   A	   is	   legitimate	   with	   regard	   to	   subject	   B	   in	  domain	   X,	   provided	   that	   obeying	   A’s	   commands	   enables	   B	   to	   better	  conform	   to	   the	  X-­‐related	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   them.	  The	   argument	   from	  this	  general	  account	  of	  authority	  to	  a	  defence	  of	  my	  first	  claim	  proceeds	  in	  four	  steps.	  	  The	   first	   is	   to	   make	   one	   element	   of	   this	   three-­‐place	   relation	   more	  specific:	   the	   domain	   in	   which	   the	   authority	   is	   legitimate.	   Presumably,	  unless	  extreme	  pacifism	  is	  true,	  there	  are	  possible	  domains	  in	  which	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  reason	  may	  involve	  causing	  harm	  to	  others.	  Term	  such	  domains	  ‘harm-­‐apt’.	  I	  mentioned	  two	  possible	  examples	  in	  the	  introduction	  –	   the	   domains	   of	   military	   service	   and	   law	   enforcement.	   Agents	   in	   these	  domains	   (indeed,	   agents	   in	   all	   domains)	   have	   the	   rational	   aim	  of	   causing	  harm	  only	  when	  doing	  so	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  moral	  reasons	  that	  apply	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	   harm.	   Indeed,	  we	  may	   take	  Completeness	   (or	  some	   sub-­‐set	   of	   the	   justifications	   contained	   within	   Completeness)	   as	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  these	  reasons.168	  	  The	   second	   step	   is	   to	   note	   that	   agents	   operating	   in	   these	   harm-­‐apt	  domains	   may	   be	   differently	   situated	   regarding	   their	   abilities	   to	   reliably	  assess	  and	   successfully	   act	  on	   the	   reasons	   that	   govern	   the	  distribution	  of	  harm.	  Term	  this	  ‘agent-­‐variability’.	  	  The	   third	   step	   combines	   the	   first	   two.	   The	   facts	   of	   harm-­‐aptness	   and	  agent-­‐variability	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  agents	  operating	  within	  harm-­‐apt	   domains	   may	   better	   achieve	   conformity	   with	   reason	   by	   obeying	   the	  commands	   of	   another,	   rather	   than	   by	   acting	   on	   their	   own	   assessment	   of	  right	  reason	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Such	  domains	  are	  not	  only	  harm-­‐apt	  but	   also	   ‘authority-­‐apt’.	   This	   conjunction	   of	   possibilities	   suffices	   to	   show	  how	  one	  agent	  may	  acquire	  legitimate	  authority	  over	  another	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm.	  If	  an	  agent	  will	  better	  avoid	  causing	  unjustified	  harm	   to	   others	   by	   obeying	   the	   commands	   of	   an	   authority,	   it	   seems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  On	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   dependent	   reasons	   which	   determine	   the	   justification	   of	  harm	  are	  the	  same	  in	  all	  domains.	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uncontroversial	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  what	  they	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  ought	  to	  do.	  	  A	  fourth	  and	  final	  step	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  derive	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	   commands	   of	   an	   authority	   may	   give	   a	   subject	   undefeated	   reason	   to	  cause	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm.	   This	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   fact	  that,	   as	   explained	   above,	   authorities	   can	   be	   fallible	   yet	   legitimate	   on	   a	  service	   account	   of	   authority.	   	   On	   this	   view,	   subjects	   can	   be	   all	   things-­‐considered	   morally	   required	   to	   obey	   commands	   that	   fail	   to	   reflect	   right	  reason.	   Hence,	   when	   an	   authority	   serves	   its	   subjects	   within	   a	   harm-­‐apt	  domain,	  valid	  commands	  may	  include	  those	  that	  are	  mistaken	  and	  require	  subjects	  to	  distribute	  harm	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  dependent	  reasons.	  Term	  this	  four-­‐stage	  argument	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  
Harm.	  To	  demonstrate,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  an	  example:	  	  
Volcano	  Rescue:	   A	   volcano	   erupts	   in	   the	  middle	   of	  Nation	  A.	   In	   order	   to	  save	  as	  many	  lives	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  surrounding	  area,	  the	  lava	  flow	  needs	  to	   be	   diverted	   from	   areas	   of	   higher	   population	   density	   to	   lower.	   This	  requires	  Nation	  A’s	  citizens	  to	  dig	  an	  integrated	  system	  of	  trenches,	  along	  which	  the	  lava	  can	  be	  redirected.	  	  	  Let’s	   imagine	   that	   Nation	   A’s	   citizens	   will	   overall	   do	   better	   in	   terms	   of	  harming	   some	   to	   save	  others	  by	  obeying	   their	   government	  on	  matters	   of	  lava-­‐redirection,	   compared	   to	   not	   obeying.	   Under	   the	   Authority	   View,	  Nation	   A’s	   government	   acquires	   legitimate	   authority	   over	   its	   subjects	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	  lava	  redirection	  on	  grounds	  of	  service.	  This	  service	  may	   be	   grounded	   in	   the	   government’s	   expertise	   (it	   overall	   makes	   better	  decisions	   regarding	   lava	   redirection	   than	   its	   subjects,	   or	   makes	   its	  decisions	   faster)	   or	   its	   ability	   to	   achieve	   coordination	   among	   its	   subjects	  (because	   whether	   any	   individual’s	   acts	   of	   trench-­‐digging	   contribute	   to	  redirecting	  lava	  is	  dependent	  on	  what	  other	  trench-­‐diggers	  are	  doing.)	  	  The	  Authority	  View	  maintains	   that,	  under	   these	  circumstances,	  Nation	  A’s	   citizens	   are	   morally	   required	   to	   obey	   the	   commands	   of	   their	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government	   on	   matters	   of	   lava	   redirection,	   including	   in	   certain	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   command	   fails	   to	   reflect	   right	   reason	   (but	   not	   clearly	   so)	   and	  requires	   redirecting	   lava	   towards	   non-­‐liable	   persons	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  lesser-­‐evil	   justification.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   explained	   above,	   mistaken	  directives	  remain	  binding	  because,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  the	  subject	  would	  have	  to	  forsake	  the	  benefit	  of	  obeying	  the	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  that	   a	   particular	   command	   is	   mistaken.	   Given	   that	   obeying	   their	  government’s	   commands	   on	   matter	   of	   lava-­‐redirection	   –	   including	  mistaken	   commands	   –	   is	   the	   citizens’	   best	   means	   of	   saving	   lives,	  instrumental	  reasoning	  dictates	  that	  this	  is	  what	  they	  morally	  ought	  to	  do,	  all	  things	  considered.	  While	   a	   service	   account	   of	   authority	   may	   be	   complex,	   the	   inference	  from	  the	  plausibility	  of	  a	   service	  account	   to	  a	  defence	  of	  my	   first	   claim	   is	  fairly	   straightforward.	   If	   a	   service	   account	   succeeds	   in	   showing	   how	   a	  command	  can	  ever	  provide	  pre-­‐emptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	   action,	   it	   follows	   that	   commands	   can	   provide	   agents	  with	   undefeated	  reason	  to	  cause	  harms	  that	  they	  would	  have	  decisive	  reason	  not	  to	  cause	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  command.	  In	  other	  words,	  certain	  acts	  of	  harming	  may	  be	   justified	  even	  when	  none	  of	   the	   justifications	  specified	   in	  Completeness	  obtain.	  	  If	  correct,	  this	  shows	  that	  Completeness	  is	  too	  narrow	  an	  account	  of	  the	  range	   of	   justifications	   for	   causing	   harm.	  While	  Completeness	  may	  well	   be	  correct	  as	  an	  exhaustive	  account	  of	  the	  first-­‐order,	  dependent	  reasons	  that	  can	  justify	  harming,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  be	  made	  for	  an	  additional	  form	  of	   justification	   that	   is	   partly	   second-­‐order	   in	   character.	   Whereas	   it	   is	  standardly	   held	   that	   justifications	   for	   harming	   fall	   into	   one	   of	   two	  categories	   –	   where	   the	   reasons	   against	   harming	   are	   either	   vitiated	   or	  overridden	   –	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm	   posits	   an	   additional	   form	   of	  justification,	  where	  the	  reasons	  against	  harming	  are	  defeated	  by	  exclusion.	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4.9	  Three	  Clarifications	  
	  The	  Authority	  View	  is	  derived	  by	  applying	  a	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  to	  a	   particular	   class	   of	   harm-­‐apt	   domains.	   While	   this	   move	   is	   relatively	  straightforward	   in	   principle,	   certain	   features	   of	   harm-­‐apt	   domains	   raise	  complications	  for	  the	  Authority	  View	  that	  require	  clarification.	  
	  
4.9.1	  The	  Irrelevance	  of	  Certain	  Services	  	  
	  On	   a	   service	   account	   of	   authority,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   domain	   over	   which	  authority	   may	   be	   possessed	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   service	   that	   can	  morally	  justify	  authority	  within	  that	  domain.	  To	  demonstrate,	  one	  common	  way	  in	  which	  an	  authority	  may	  serve	  its	  subjects	  on	  a	  certain	  matter	  is	  by	  reducing	  certain	  costs	  that	  subjects	  would	  incur	  by	  deliberating	  on	  the	  matter	  themselves.	  Deliberation	  often	  takes	  a	  lot	   of	   time	   and	   effort,	   which	   could	   be	   used	   to	   pursue	   other	   valuable	  projects.	   An	   authority	   may	   thus	   successfully	   serve	   its	   subjects	   by	   taking	  this	  deliberation	  out	  of	  the	  subject’s	  hands.169	  This	  may	  be	  the	  case	  even	  if	  the	  authority’s	  deliberations	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  track	  right	  reason	  than	  those	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  deliberation	  costs	  that	  the	  subject	  avoids	  by	  obeying	  an	  authority	  may	  outweigh	  a	  degree	  of	  sub-­‐optimality	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  quality	  of	   the	   authority’s	   decisions.	   The	   subject	   will	   better	   conform	   to	   reason	  overall	  by	  obeying	   the	  authority	   than	  by	  not	  doing	  so,	  even	   if	   they	  would	  have	  reached	  better	  decisions	  by	  deliberating	  themselves.	  	  However,	  this	  will	  not	  be	  true	  in	  domains	  where	  significant	  moral	  costs	  attach	  to	  sub-­‐optimal	  decision-­‐making.	  This	   is	  especially	   true	  of	  harm-­‐apt	  domains.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  subject	  will	  avoid	  deliberation	  costs	  by	  obeying	  an	  authority	  does	  not	   justify	  doing	  so,	  because	  the	  subject	  has	  greater	   overall	   reason	   to	   achieve	   optimal	   outcomes	   within	   that	   domain	  than	  to	  avoid	  deliberation	  costs.	  	  What	   this	   shows	   is	   that	   on	   a	   service-­‐account,	   an	   authority	   may	   be	  morally	   legitimate	  with	   regard	   to	  one	  domain	  but	  not	  another,	   even	   if	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  p.75.	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decisions	  are	  of	  equal	  quality	  in	  each	  domain.	  This	  is	  because	  certain	  means	  by	   which	   an	   authority	   may	   serve	   its	   subjects	   are	   more	   appropriate	   in	  certain	   domains	   than	   in	   others.	   So,	   when	   applying	   a	   service	   account	   of	  authority	  to	  harm-­‐apt	  domains,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  certain	  services	  –	   such	   as	   the	   reduction	   of	   deliberation	   costs	   –	   will	   not	   be	   sufficient	   to	  justify	   authority.170	  In	   these	   domains,	   the	   justification	   of	   authority	   will	  largely	   depend	   on	   the	   service	   provided	   by	   the	   quality	   of	   an	   authority’s	  directives.	  
	  
4.9.2	  The	  Option	  of	  Inaction	  	  The	   comparative	   nature	   of	   the	   justification	   of	   authority	   under	   a	   service	  account	   also	   requires	   clarification.	   As	   Raz	   formulates	   the	   normal	  justification	   thesis,	   a	   subject’s	  obligation	   to	  obey	  an	  authority	  arises	   from	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   subject	   better	   complies	   with	   the	   relevant	   reasons	   by	  obeying	   compared	   to	   trying	   to	   follow	   the	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   them	  directly.	  This	   implies	  that	  the	  relevant	  comparison	  is	  between	  the	   level	  of	  compliance	   a	   subject	   would	   achieve	   by	   positively	   acting	   on	   their	   own	  assessment	   of	   right	   reason	   within	   a	   certain	   domain	   and	   the	   level	   of	  compliance	  they	  would	  achieve	  by	  obeying	  the	  authority.	  However,	   this	   is	   an	   overly	   narrow	   account	   of	   the	   comparison	   class,	  since	  the	  subject	  may	  also	  have	  the	  option	  of	  adopting	  a	  policy	  of	  inaction	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  certain	  domain	  –	  neither	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason	  nor	  obeying	  an	  authority.	  Importantly,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  subject	  will	  better	  overall	  conform	  with	  reason	  via	  a	  policy	  of	  inaction,	  compared	  to	  obeying	  an	  authority,	  even	  if	  obedience	  is	  superior	  compared	  to	  the	  subject	  positively	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  right	  reason.	  Yet	  the	  narrow	   formulation	  of	   the	  comparison	  class	   implies	   that,	  under	   these	  conditions,	  the	  subject	  has	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  obey	  the	  authority.	  That	   this	   cannot	   be	   correct	   comes	   out	   most	   starkly	   when	   a	   service	  account	  is	  applied	  to	  harm-­‐apt	  domains.	  To	  demonstrate,	  imagine	  a	  group	  of	   individuals	  who	   are	   fairly	   poor	   at	   coordinating	   their	   actions	  with	   one	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  Except	  perhaps	  in	  cases	  where	  deliberation	  gains	  come	  at	  no	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  outcomes.	  	  	  
	  	   130	  
another	   in	   order	   to	   distribute	   harms.	   If	   they	   try	   to	   do	   so,	   they	   are	   very	  likely	   to	  cause	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  By	  obeying	  an	  authority,	   they	  could	  improve	   their	   coordination	   and	   thereby	   do	   better	   at	   distributing	   harm.	  However,	  even	  at	  this	  improved	  level	  they	  are	  still	  likely	  to	  do	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  narrow	  formulation	  implies	  they	  are	  required	  to	  obey	  the	  authority.	  But	  this	  is	  surely	  false.	  They	  have	  a	  morally	  superior	  option	  available	  to	  them	  –	  to	  refrain	  from	  distributing	  harm	  at	  all.	  	  In	  order	  for	  authority	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  service,	  then,	  obedience	  has	  to	  be	  superior	  compared	  to	  all	  the	  alternative	  feasible	  options	  available	  to	   the	   subject,	   and	   not	   just	   superior	   compared	   to	   the	   sub-­‐set	   of	   those	  policies	   which	   involve	   the	   subject	   positively	   acting.171	  In	   terms	   of	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm	  specifically,	  this	  means	  that	  authorities	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  place	  subjects	  under	  undefeated	  obligations	  to	  cause	  harm	  within	  a	  harm-­‐apt	   domain,	   when	   their	   having	   and	   exercising	   this	   moral	   power	  enables	  their	  subjects	  to	  achieve	  greater	  overall	  conformity	  with	  the	  harm-­‐related	  reasons,	  compared	  to	  both	  acting	  on	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  those	  reasons	  and	  adopting	  a	  policy	  of	  refraining	  from	  causing	  harm	  within	  that	  domain.	  
	  
4.9.3	  Cumulative	  Effects	  
	  Finally,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	   clarifying	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   morally	   legitimating	  service	   according	   to	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm.	   On	   an	   intuitive	  understanding,	   an	   authority	   serves	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   a	   harm-­‐apt	  domain	  if,	  in	  each	  case	  in	  which	  harm	  needs	  to	  be	  distributed,	  subjects	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   comply	   with	   right	   reason	   by	   obeying	   the	   authority,	  compared	  with	  not	  obeying.	  However,	  this	  is	  insufficient	  to	  justify	  authority,	  since	  an	  authority	  may	  fail	  to	  serve	  its	  subject	  despite	  it	  being	  true	  that	  the	  subject	  will	  more	  likely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171 	  Daniel	   Viehoff’s	   revised	   version	   of	   the	   normal	   justification	   thesis	   captures	   this	  requirement.	  According	  to	  this	  formulation,	  an	  authority	  A	  is	  legitimate	  regarding	  subject	  S	   if	   “the	   subject	   S	  better	   conforms	   to	   reason	   that	   apply	   to	   it	   if	   it	   receives	   and	  obeys	   the	  directives	  of	  the	  authority	  A	  than	  it	  would	  if	  it	  did	  not	  receive	  these	  directives	  or	  did	  not	  obey	  
them.”	  Daniel	  Viehoff,	  The	  Authority	  of	  Democracy	  (manuscript)	  Ch.5	  (emphasis	  added).	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comply	  with	  right	  reason	  in	  any	  particular	  instance.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  policy	  of	   distributing	   harms	   by	   obeying	   an	   authority	   may	   produce	   certain	  cumulative	  effects	   that	  are	  not	  present	   in	  any	  one	  case	   taken	   in	   isolation,	  but	  only	  when	  several	  iterated	  cases	  are	  taken	  together.	  To	   demonstrate,	   consider	   a	   group	   of	   individuals	   acting	   together	   to	  distribute	  harms	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   an	  authority.	  Assume	   that	  by	  doing	   so	  they	  will	  mistakenly	   distribute	   harm	   in	   10%	  of	   cases.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	  burdens	  of	  their	  mistakes	  are	  randomly	  distributed	  among	  possible	  victims	  over	   time.	   Now,	   imagine	   that	   these	   individuals	   could	   achieve	   greater	  coordination	   by	   obeying	   an	   authority.	   If	   they	   do	   so,	   they	   will	   distribute	  harm	   mistakenly	   in	   only	   5%	   of	   cases.	   However,	   the	   burdens	   of	   these	  mistakes	  will	   be	   concentrated	   on	   a	   particular	   sub-­‐set	   of	   possible	   victims	  over	  time.	  Given	   the	   possibility	   of	   cumulative	   distributive	   effects	   such	   as	   this,	  subjects	  may	  in	  fact	  fail	  to	  improve	  their	  overall	  conformity	  with	  reason	  by	  obeying	   an	   authority,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   make	   a	   mistake	   by	  obeying	   in	   any	   particular	   case.	   This	   is	   simply	   because	   the	  moral	   reasons	  that	  govern	  causing	  harm	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  distributive	  patterns	  that	  may	  be	  brought	   about	   by	   adopting	   certain	  procedures	   rather	   than	  others.	   For	  example,	   if	   the	   burdens	   produced	   by	   obeying	   an	   authority	   fall	  disproportionately	  on	  certain	  individuals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  morally	  arbitrary	  characteristics	  –	  such	  as	  age,	  race	  or	  gender	  –	  then	  this	  gives	  rise	  to	  moral	  reasons	   against	   adopting	   that	   procedure	   on	   grounds	   of	   fairness	   or	  impartiality.	   Certain	   distributive	   patterns	   may	   also	   be	   morally	  objectionable	   on	   purely	   axiological	   grounds.	   For	   example,	   Larry	   Temkin	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good-­‐making	  feature	  of	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐affairs	  if	  a	  given	   amount	   of	   harm	   is	   spread	   as	   thinly	   as	   possible	   across	   a	   larger	  number	  of	  victims,	  rather	  than	  concentrated	  in	  a	  smaller	  number.172	  	  So,	   in	   order	   to	   acquire	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   give	   subjects	   undefeated	  reasons	   to	   cause	   harm	   to	   others	   under	   the	   Authority	   View,	   an	   authority	  must	   enable	   its	   subjects	   to	   better	   comply	   with	   the	   full	   range	   of	   harm-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Temkin	   labels	   this	   principle	   ‘Disperse	   Additional	   Burdens’.	   Larry	   Temkin,	  Rethinking	  
the	  Good:	  Moral	   Ideals	   and	   the	  Nature	   of	   Practical	   Reasoning	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	  2012),	  Ch.3.	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related	  reasons	  by	  obeying,	  including	  both	  cumulative	  and	  non-­‐cumulative	  considerations.	   If	   subjects	  will	  worse	   conform	   to	   the	   culminative	   reasons	  by	   obeying,	   then	   the	   authority	   may	   fail	   to	   serve	   its	   subjects,	   even	   if	   the	  subjects	  will	  better	  comply	  with	  the	  non-­‐culminative	  reasons.173	  	  
4.10	  The	  Moderate	  Objections	  Revisited	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  if	  a	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  is	  defensible,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	   to	   claim	   –	   as	   the	   Pro	   Tanto	   and	   Invalidation	   Views	   do	   –	   that	   a	  certain	   sub-­‐set	   of	   commands	   (those	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harms)	  necessarily	  fail	  to	  provide	  undefeated	  reasons	  for	  action.	  This	   section	   elaborates	   upon	   and	   refines	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm	   by	  explaining	  precisely	  why	  these	  two	  views	  fail.	  	  
4.10.1	  Against	  the	  Pro	  Tanto	  View	  	  According	  to	  the	  Pro	  Tanto	  View,	  commands	  to	  inflict	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	   harms	   may	   give	   subjects	   reason	   to	   do	   so,	   but	   never	   an	  undefeated	  reason.	  While	  valid,	  such	  commands	  are	  necessarily	  overridden	  by	  the	  extremely	  strong	  reasons	  agents	  have	  not	  to	  inflict	  such	  harm.	  The	  content-­‐independent	   reasons	   created	   by	   the	   command	   compete	  with	   the	  content-­‐dependent	   reasons	   not	   to	   inflict	   the	   harm,	   and	   are	   defeated	   by	  weight.	  	  However,	  under	  the	  Authority	  View,	  treating	  all	  such	  cases	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  competition	   of	   reasons	   is	   mistaken.	   As	   explained	   above,	   in	   order	   for	  authorities	   to	   successfully	   serve	   their	   subjects	   within	   a	   certain	   domain,	  their	   commands	  must	   have	   the	   status	   of	   pre-­‐emptive	   reasons	  within	   the	  practical	   reasoning	   of	   the	   subject,	   wholly	   supplanting	   the	   dependent	  reasons	   on	   which	   they	   are	   based.	   Those	   subject	   to	   an	   authority	   that	   is	  justified	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   its	   service	   can	  only	   reduce	   their	   conformity	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  The	  converse	  may	  also	  be	  true,	  in	  that	  an	  authority	  may	  acquire	  legitimacy	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	   enabling	   a	   subject	   to	   better	   comply	  with	   the	   cumulative	   reasons,	   even	   if	   the	   subject	  does	  worse	  at	  the	  bar	  of	  the	  non-­‐cumulative	  reasons	  by	  obeying.	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reason	   by	   weighing	   its	   command	   against	   their	   own	   assessment	   of	   right	  reason.	  This	  is	  equally	  true	  in	  harm-­‐apt	  domains	  as	  in	  any	  other.	  In	  the	  kinds	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Authority	  View	  applies,	  when	  an	  authority	  is	  justified	  on	  service	  grounds	  regarding	  a	  harm-­‐apt	  domain,	  and	  issues	  a	  mistaken	  (but	  not	   clearly	  mistaken)	   command	   to	   cause	   harm,	   the	   instrumental	   basis	   of	  that	   justification	  dictates	   that	   the	  dependent	   reasons	  which	  count	  against	  causing	  harm	  are	  defeated	  by	  exclusion,	  and	  so	  cannot	  be	  brought	  back	  so	  as	  to	  outweigh	  command.174	  	  Importantly,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   valid	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	   commands	  can’t	   be	   overridden	   by	   weightier	   first-­‐order	   reasons.	   This	   is	   perfectly	  admissible	  under	  a	  service	  account,	  provided	  that	  the	  reasons	  in	  question	  do	   not	   fall	  within	   the	   class	   of	   dependent	   reasons	   that	   the	   authority	   took	  into	  consideration	  in	  producing	  its	  command.175	  To	  demonstrate,	   imagine	  that	  Smith	  has	   the	  aim	  of	  acting	  correctly	  on	  some	  morally	  important	  matter.	  The	  correct	  course	  of	  action	  in	  this	  domain	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  complex	  trade-­‐off	  between	  three	  distinct	  variables,	  X,	  Y	  and	   Z.	   Furthermore,	   imagine	   that	   Jones	   passes	   the	   test	   of	   normal	  justification	  regarding	  Smith	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  variable	  X	  and	  Y,	  but	  not	  Z.	  Jones	   then	   issues	   a	   command	   to	   Smith	   to	   act	   in	   a	   certain	   manner.	   This	  command	   then	   pre-­‐empts	   Smith’s	   assessment	   of	   variables	   X	   and	   Y.	   The	  reasons	  created	  by	  the	  command	  cannot,	  on	  pain	  of	  sub-­‐optimality,	  weigh	  against	   the	   dependent	   reasons	   grounded	   in	   these	   two	   variables.	   But	   the	  reasons	   created	   by	   the	   command	   may	   perfectly	   permissibly	   be	   weighed	  against	  the	  reasons	  relating	  to	  variable	  Z.	  These	  dependent	  reasons	  are	  not	  summed	  up	  in	  Jones’	  command	  and	  are	  hence	  not	  excluded	  from	  featuring	  in	  Smith’s	  practical	  reasoning.	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  the	  non-­‐excluded	  Z-­‐related	  reasons	  are	  sufficiently	  weighty	  to	  defeat	  the	  first-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  The	  same	  conclusion	  can	  also	  be	  reached	  from	  the	  argument	  from	  double-­‐counting.	  See	  n.165	  above.	  175	  Raz,	  Between	  Authority	  and	  Interpretation,	  pp.144-­‐146.	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order	  reason	  for	  action	  provided	  by	  the	  command,	  giving	  Smith	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  disobey.176	  	  Given	   this,	   the	   Authority-­‐View	   of	   harming	   is	   compatible	   with	   there	  being	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Pro	  Tanto	  view	  provides	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  normative	   situation.	   These	   will	   be	   cases	   in	   which	   three	   conditions	   hold.	  First,	  the	  authority	  issuing	  a	  valid	  command	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	   harm	   is	   legitimate	   regarding	   only	   a	   sub-­‐set	   of	   the	   dependent	  reasons	   that	   govern	   causing	   harm.	   Second,	   the	   sub-­‐set	   of	   reasons	   falling	  outside	   its	   sphere	   of	   authority	   count	   against	   causing	   harm	   in	   this	   case.	  Third,	   these	   reasons	   are	   sufficiently	   weighty	   to	   defeat	   the	   first-­‐order	  weight	  of	  the	  command.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  subject	  will	  have	  both	  a	  content-­‐independent	   reason	   to	   inflict	   the	   harm	   and	   a	   weightier	   countervailing	  reason	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  that	  while	  there	  may	  be	  possible	  cases	  –	  or	  even	  many	  cases	  –	  of	  this	  type,	  it	  not	  true	  that	  all	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  subject	  is	  commanded	   to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  will	  have	   this	  structure.	   This	   is	   what	   the	  Pro	  Tanto	   View	   requires	   to	   be	   true	   if	   it	   is	   to	  refute	  my	  first	  claim	  and	  preserve	  Completeness.	  	  All	  the	  Authority	  View	  requires	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  my	  first	  claim	  is	  the	  possibility	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   an	   authority	   possesses	   legitimacy	   over	   a	  sufficiently	  important	  sub-­‐set	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm.	   When	   this	   condition	   is	   met,	   subjects	   may	   come	   to	   possess	   an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm.	  	  
4.10.2	  Against	  the	  Invalidation	  View	  	  The	  Invalidation	  View	  endorses	  a	  localised	  denial	  of	  content	  independence,	  which	   treats	   the	   reason-­‐giving	   force	   of	   a	   command	   as	   conditional	   on	   its	  content	   not	   conflicting	   (or	   conflicting	   too	   seriously)	   with	   the	   balance	   of	  moral	  reasons.	  The	  scope	  of	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  require	  action	  is	  limited	  to	  those	  actions	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  (seriously)	  morally	  wrong	  to	  perform	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  This	  raises	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  determining	  the	  positive	  first-­‐order	  weight	  of	  pre-­‐emptive	  reasons,	  which	  I	  cannot	  attempt	  to	  answer	  here.	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the	   absence	   of	   a	   command.	   Commands	   to	   cause	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  are	  therefore	  void	  and	  my	  first	  claim	  false.	  	  A	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  –	  on	  which	  the	  Authority	  View	  is	  based	  –	  provides	   a	   model	   of	   how	   commands	   may	   achieve	   the	   status	   of	   content-­‐independent	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	   reasons	   that	   both	   responds	   to	   the	   general	  anarchist	  challenge	  and	  generalises	  across	  domains	  of	  reasons.	  Given	  this,	  it	   is	   difficult	   to	   provide	   a	   principled	   rationale	   for	   the	   localised	   denial	   of	  content-­‐independency	   required	   by	   the	   Invalidation	   View.	   If	   the	   subject’s	  aim	  of	  improving	  their	  conformity	  with	  reason	  can	  explain	  why	  commands	  that	   require	   acting	   against	   the	   balance	   of	   content-­‐dependent	   reasons	   can	  ever	   provide	  undefeated	   reasons	   for	   action,	  why	   should	   it	   not	   also	   do	   so	  regarding	   moral	   reasons,	   including	   those	   governing	   the	   distribution	   of	  harm?	   It	   would	   be	   arbitrary	   and	   ad	   hoc	   to	   simply	   carve	   off	   a	   subset	   of	  reasons	  as	  immune	  from	  a	  service-­‐based	  form	  of	  justification.	  	  This	  may,	  however,	  be	  too	  quick.	  Recall	  that	  under	  a	  service	  account	  of	  authority	   there	   are	   certain	   domains	   of	   action	   in	   which	   commands	   are	  necessarily	   void.	   These	   are	   the	   domains	   covered	   by	   the	   independence	  condition,	   in	   which	   agents	   have	   more	   reason	   to	   exercise	   autonomous	  choice	   than	   to	   achieve	   optimal	   outcomes.	   The	   invalidity	   of	   commands	  issued	  within	  these	  domains	   is	  not	  ad	  hoc.	  Given	  this,	  one	  way	   in	  which	  a	  version	  of	  the	  Invalidation	  View	  could	  be	  true,	  and	  therefore	  my	  first	  claim	  false,	   is	   if	   it	  were	   the	   case	   that	   the	   reasons	   governing	   the	   distribution	   of	  harm	  fell	  within	  a	  domain	  covered	  by	  the	  independence	  condition.	  If	  agents	  have	   more	   reason	   to	   distribute	   harms	   autonomously,	   than	   to	   maximise	  conformity	   with	   the	   balance	   of	   reasons,	   then	   commands	   to	   inflict	  unjustified	   harm	  would	   necessarily	   be	   invalid.	   They	  would	   be	   invalid	   for	  precisely	   the	   same	   reason	   that	   commands	   directing	   subjects	   to	   marry	  certain	  partners	  are	  invalid.177	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  This	   revised	  version	  of	   the	   Invalidation	  View	   is	  broader	   than	   its	  original	   formulation.	  On	  the	  original	  view,	  it	   is	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  the	  act	  commanded	  which	  accounts	  for	  its	  invalidity.	   On	   the	   revised	   view,	   it	   is	   the	  domain	   in	  which	   the	   command	   is	   issued	  which	  accounts	   for	   its	   invalidity.	   The	   revised	   view	   is	   thus	   broader	   than	   the	   original,	   since	   it	  invalidates	  both	  commands	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  and	  commands	  to	  cause	  content-­‐dependently	  justified	  harm,	  whereas	  the	  original	  version	  invalidates	  only	  the	  former.	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However,	   this	   is	   hard	   to	   believe.	   The	   distribution	   of	   harm	   seems	   a	  paradigmatic	   domain	   in	   which	   improving	   one’s	   conformity	   with	   reason	  trumps	   the	   value	   of	   exercising	   one’s	   autonomy.	   This	   is	   a	   domain	   whose	  authority-­‐aptness	   is	   least	   controversial.178	  Appealing	   to	   the	   independence	  condition	   is	   thus	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   rescuing	   the	   Invalidation	   View	   from	   the	  charge	  of	  arbitrariness.179	  	  The	   Invalidation	   View	   may	   also	   be	   revised	   in	   a	   second	   direction	   in	  defence	   of	   the	   claim	   that	   commands	   to	   cause	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  are	  non-­‐arbitrarily	  invalidated.	  This	  revision	  appeals	  to	  a	  further	   limit	   a	   service	   account	   places	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   commands.	   As	  explained	   above,	   even	   when	   an	   authority	   is	   generally	   legitimate	   with	  regard	  to	  a	  certain	  domain,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  its	  commands	  issued	  in	  that	  domain	  will	  automatically	  be	  binding	  on	  the	  subject.	  While	  mistaken	  commands	   may	   provide	   agents	   with	   undefeated	   reasons	   for	   action,	  commands	  that	  are	  clearly	  mistaken	  are	  void	  and	  provide	  no	  such	  reasons.	  	  Given	  this,	  while	  the	  Invalidation	  View	  may	  be	  mistaken	  to	  simply	  claim	  that	   commands	   are	   necessarily	   voided	   by	   their	   morally	   unmeritorious	  content,	   it	   may	   nevertheless	   be	   argued	   that	   commands	   with	   seriously	  immoral	   content	   (including	   commands	   to	   cause	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	   harm)	   will	   also	   constitute	   clear	   mistakes.	   And	   whether	   a	  command	  is	  clearly	  mistaken	   is	  determined	  by	  its	  content.	  On	  this	  revised	  view,	  it	  is	  the	  clarity	  of	  the	  command’s	  departure	  from	  right	  reason,	  and	  not	  its	  immorality	  per	  se,	  which	  accounts	  for	  its	  invalidity.180	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  For	  example,	  Jonathan	  Quong,	  who	  is	  otherwise	  critical	  of	  service	  accounts,	  agrees	  that	  they	   provide	   a	   convincing	   account	   of	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   authority	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   the	  important	  moral	  reasons,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  arise	  from	  our	  basic	  rights	  and	  duties	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  one	   another.	   Jonathan	   Quong,	   Liberalism	  Without	   Perfection	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	  2011),	  Ch.4.	  This	  domain	  will	  presumably	  include	  the	  moral	  reasons	  governing	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm.	  179	  This	  objection	  does	  not	  require	  denying	  the	  idea	  that	  agents	  may	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  achieve	  autonomous	  choice	  over	  optimising	  outcomes	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  harm-­‐distribution.	  It	   only	   requires	   denying	   the	   stronger	   position	   that	   agents	   have	  most	   reason	   to	   achieve	  autonomous	  choice	  over	  optimizing	  outcomes	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  distributing	  harms.	  	  180	  Again,	   this	   revision	   results	   in	   a	   broader	   account	   of	   which	   commands	   are	   invalid	  compared	   to	   the	   original	   Invalidation	   View,	   since	   the	   set	   of	   commands	   that	   are	   clearly	  mistaken	   in	  virtue	  of	   their	   immoral	  content	   is	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	   the	  set	  of	  all	  clearly	  mistaken	  commands.	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However,	  while	   this	   revision	  may	   avoid	   the	   charge	   of	   arbitrariness,	   it	  does	  so	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  providing	  an	  objection	  to	  my	   first	  claim.	  This	   is	  because	   the	   revised	   view	   is	   only	   incompatible	  with	  my	   first	   claim	   if	   it	   is	  necessarily	   true	   that	   any	   command	   with	   immoral	   content	   (or,	   more	  modestly,	   that	   any	   command	   to	   inflict	   a	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	  harm)	  will	  also	  constitute	  a	  clear	  mistake.	  This	   is	  a	  very	  strong	  claim	  and	  one	  that	  does	  not	  seem	  true.	  Recall	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  particular	  command	  to	  constitute	  a	  clear	  mistake,	  the	  subject	  must	  be	  able	  to	  form	  the	  judgment	  that	  the	  command	  fails	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason	  without	  having	  to	  go	  through	  the	   same	   process	   of	   assessing	   the	   dependent	   reasons	   that	   the	   authority	  went	  through	  in	  producing	  the	  command.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  judgement	  can	  be	  formed	  is	  determined	  not	  only	  by	  the	  command’s	  content,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  command	  is	  issued.	   Consider	   the	   example	   invoked	   above,	   in	   which	   A	   possesses	  authority	   over	   B	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   financial	   investments	   and	   mistakenly	  commands	  him	   to	  burn	   ten	  dollars.	  Although	  one	  might	   think	   that	   such	  a	  ludicrous	  command	  is	  intrinsically	  clearly	  mistaken,	  B	  is	  only	  able	  to	  form	  the	   judgement	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case	  by	  making	   a	   comparison	  between	   the	  act-­‐type	   commanded	   [Burn	   ten	   dollars!]	   and	   the	   particular	   domain	   in	  which	  the	  command	  is	  being	  issued	  [Financial	  Investment].	  	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  a	  fanciful	  variation	  on	  this	  case:	  	  	  
Vending	  Machine	  Island:	  Bert	  and	  Ernie	  are	  washed	  up	  on	  a	  desert	  island	  with	  fifty	  one	  dollar	  bills	  each.	  The	  weather	  on	  the	  island	  is	  changeable	  and	  the	  only	  source	  of	   food	   is	  a	  vending	  machine.	   In	  order	   to	  survive	   the	   two	  weeks	  until	  help	  arrives,	  Bert	  and	  Ernie	  must	  each	  day	  decide	  how	  much	  money	   they	  will	   burn	  as	   tinder	   in	  order	   to	   start	   fires	   to	  keep	   themselves	  warm,	  and	  how	  much	  to	  use	   to	   feed	   themselves	  via	   the	  vending	  machine.	  These	   decisions	   are	   quite	   tricky,	   requiring	   expertise	   on	   meteorology,	  nutrition	  and	  mathematics.	  Bert	  is	  far	  better	  placed	  than	  Ernie	  with	  regard	  to	  assessing	  these	  reasons.	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Given	   these	   facts,	   let	   us	   grant	   that	   Bert	   gains	   legitimate	   authority	   over	  Ernie	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  dollar	  bill	  reserve,	  given	  his	  superior	  expertise.	  Now	  imagine	  that	  Bert	   issues	   the	  command	  [Burn	  ten	  dollars!].	  However,	   the	  command	   is	  mistaken.	  They	  would	  be	  better	  off	  spending	   it	  on	  Twinkies	   in	   this	   particular	   instance.	  However,	   in	   the	   context	   [Vending	  
Machine	   Island],	   Ernie	   cannot	   form	   the	   judgement	   that	   the	   command	   is	  mistaken	   without	   going	   through	   same	   assessment	   of	   dependent	   reasons	  that	   Bert	   went	   through	   in	   producing	   the	   command.	   The	   command	  therefore	  remains	  binding	  on	  Ernie,	  giving	  him	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  burn	  ten	  dollars.	  	  	  This	  example	  shows	  us	  that	   the	  very	  same	  command	  may	  constitute	  a	  clear	  mistake	  in	  one	  context,	  but	  not	  in	  another.	  Once	  we	  recognise	  this,	  we	  can	  see	  why	  the	  revised	  Invalidation	  View	  is	  implausible.	  In	  order	  to	  work	  it	   must	   presuppose	   that	   commands	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  constitute	  clear	  mistakes	  in	  all	  possible	  domains.	  In	  other	  words,	   it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  a	  class	  of	  non-­‐comparatively	  clear	  mistakes	   and	   that	   commands	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	  harm	   are	   an	   instance	   of	   it.	   Perhaps	   there	   are	   instances	   of	   non-­‐comparatively	  clear	  mistaken	  commands	  –	  such	  as	  commands	  to	  perform	  a	  logically	   impossible	   action	   [Do	   X	   and	   not-­‐X!	  Now!].	   But	   the	   idea	   that	  any	  command	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   can	   be	   clearly	  detected	   is	   surely	   false.	   If	   mistaken	   commands	   of	   the	   form	   [Burn	   ten	  dollars!]	  constitute	  clear	  mistakes	  only	  in	  certain	  contexts,	  then	  so	  too	  are	  mistaken	   commands	   of	   the	   form	   [Cause	   harm!].	   Harm-­‐apt	   domains	   are	  precisely	  those	  contexts	  in	  which	  such	  commands	  need	  not	  constitute	  clear	  mistakes.	  Both	   the	   Pro	   Tanto	   and	   Invalidation	   Views	   are	   thus	   unsuccessful	   in	  refuting	  my	  first	  claim.	  Under	  the	  Authority	  View	  it	  may	  well	  be	  true	  that	  commands	   to	   inflict	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   are	   often	  invalidated	  or	  overridden,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  all	  such	  commands	  are	  so	  defeated.	  This	  is	  all	  that	  my	  first	  claim	  requires.	  Importantly,	   I	   have	   not	   argued	   that	   these	   two	   views	   are	   mistaken	  because	   they	  misidentify	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  moral	  power	  of	  authorities	   is	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limited.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  service	  accounts	  also	  impose	  limits	  on	  the	  duty	  to	  obey	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   the	   validity	   and	   weight	   of	   commands,	   as	   any	  plausible	  account	  of	  authority	  must	  do.	  Instead,	  the	  objections	  fail	  because	  they	  assume	   that	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   specific	   commands	   issued	  by	  a	  legitimate	  authority	  exceed	  these	   limits	  can	  be	  settled	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  specific	   account	   of	   why	   that	   authority	   is	   legitimate.	   	   However,	   while	  intuitive,	  this	   is	  not	  true.	  To	  repeat	  a	  point	  made	  earlier	  in	  Section	  4.2,	  an	  account	  of	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  authority	  must	  be	  derived	  from	  an	  account	  of	  its	   justification.	  Whatever	  considerations	  account	  for	  why	  we	  should	  have	  authorities	  in	  the	  first	  place	  will	  determine	  the	  precise	  limits	  of	  the	  moral	  powers	  that	  legitimate	  authorities	  possess.	  Different	  accounts	  of	  authority	  will	  thus	  yield	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  above	  question.	  On	  the	  view	  that	  authorities	  are	  justified	  because,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  they	   serve	   their	   subjects’	   ends,	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  moral	   power	   to	   require	  action	   will	   be	   calibrated	   to	   what	   is	   required	   to	   successfully	   provide	   the	  relevant	   service.	   	   As	   I	   have	   argued,	   when	   the	   relevant	   service	   is	   that	   of	  enabling	   subjects	   to	   better	   conform	   to	   the	   reasons	   that	   govern	   the	  distribution	   of	   harm,	   an	   authority	   cannot	   provide	   this	   service	   unless	   its	  directives	   are	   capable	   of	   providing	   undefeated	   reasons	   for	   causing	   harm,	  even	  in	  certain	  cases	  where	  the	  command	  fails	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason.	  	  	  
4.11	  The	  ‘Irrelevant	  Reasons’	  Objection	  
	  Before	  moving	  on,	  it	  is	  worth	  considering	  an	  interesting	  objection	  that	  may	  be	   pressed	   against	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm,	   which	   targets	   the	   more	  general	   service-­‐based	   account	   of	   authority	   on	   which	   it	   depends.181	  The	  objection	   focuses	   on	   the	   compensatory	   nature	   of	   authority	   on	   a	   service	  account.	   More	   specifically,	   on	   the	   fact	   that,	   on	   this	   view,	   subjects	   have	  reason	   to	   obey	   an	   authority	   because	   doing	   so	   enables	   them	   to	   better	  conform	  to	  reasons	   that	   they	  would	  not	  otherwise	  be	  able	   to,	   in	  virtue	  of	  certain	  deficiencies	  or	  inabilities	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  This	   objection	  has	  been	   raised	  by	  Victor	  Tadros	   in	  personal	   communication.	  Another	  version	  of	  it	  is	  suggested	  in	  Kimberley	  Brownlee,	  ‘The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Criminal	  Justice	  Officials’,	  p.130.	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Given	   this,	   one	   may	   object	   that	   the	   commands	   of	   service-­‐based	  authorities	   cannot	   create	   practical	   reasons	   that	   are	   capable	   of	   morally	  justifying	  action.	  While	  there	   is	  a	  sense	   in	  which	  those	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  such	  an	  authority	  ought	  to	  obey	  its	  commands	  –	  since,	  by	  hypothesis,	  they	  will	  worse	   conform	   to	   reason	   by	   not	   obeying	   –	   the	   ‘ought’	   in	   question	   is	  relativised	  to	  the	  subject’s	  abilities.	  However,	  it	  is	  argued,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  moral	  justification	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  what	  the	  subject	  ought	  to	  do	  in	  a	  different,	  unrestricted	  sense	  that	  is	  not	  relativised	  to	  their	  abilities.182	  If	   this	   is	   correct,	   my	   argument	   in	   defence	   of	   authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  harming	  rests	  on	  a	  mistake,	  since	  authoritative	  commands	  do	  not	  provide	  the	  kind	  of	  reasons	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  justifying	  any	  actions.	  The	   Authority	   View	   of	   Harm,	   and	   service	   accounts	   of	   authority	   more	  generally,	  trade	  on	  a	  conflation	  of	  two	  senses	  of	  justification.	  	  Term	  this	  the	  
Irrelevant	  Reasons	  objection.	  The	   underlying	   thought	   behind	   the	   objection	   is	   that	   an	   agent’s	  inabilities	  are	   irrelevant	   to	  whether	   they	  possess	  a	  moral	   justification	   for	  action.	  Term	  this	  the	  Irrelevance	  Principle.	  The	  principle	  can	  be	  illuminated	  and	  supported	  by	  considering	  certain	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  following183:	  	  
The	  Two	  Nazis:	  Steve	  is	  a	  guard	  in	  a	  Nazi	  concentration	  camp.	  If	  he	  follows	  his	  own	  judgement	  of	  right	  reason	  he	  will	  murder	  all	   the	  prisoners	   in	  the	  camp.	  Dave	  is	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  camp	  and	  is	  slightly	  less	  immoral	  than	  Steve.	   If	   Steve	   obeys	   Dave’s	   commands	   rather	   than	   act	   on	   his	   own	  judgment,	  he	  will	  murder	  only	  the	  adult	  prisoners	  and	  spare	  the	  children.	  	  In	   this	  case	   it	   is	  clear	   that	  Steve	   is	  not	  morally	   justified	   in	  obeying	  Dave’s	  commands	  to	  kill	  the	  adult	  prisoners,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  true	  that	  he	  will	  act	  less	  wrongly	   by	   doing	   so	   than	   if	   he	   acts	   on	   his	   own	   assessment	   of	   right	  reason.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  ought	  to	  murder	  only	  the	  adult	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Cf.	   Brownlee’s	   view	   that	   an	   official	   who	   causes	   or	   upholds	   injustice	   as	   a	   result	   of	  obeying	  an	  authority	  or	  procedure	  whose	   judgements	  are	  superior	  to	  her	  own	  “does	  not	  act	   as	   she	   ought,	   even	   though	   she	   acts	   better	   than	   she	  would	   if	   she	   attended	   to	   her	   own	  
judgment	  directly.”	  Ibid.	  (Emphasis	  added)	  183	  This	  example	  is	  Victor	  Tadros’s	  (personal	  communication).	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prisoners	   rather	   than	   act	   on	   his	   judgment	   and	  murder	   all	   the	   prisoners,	  what	   he	   actually	   ought	   to	   do	   is	   not	   murder	   anybody.	   His	   inability	   to	  recognise	   and	   conform	   to	   moral	   reasons	   does	   not	   generate	   the	   kind	   of	  reasons	  for	  action	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  moral	  justification.	  In	   response	   to	   the	   Irrelevant	   Reasons	   objection,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  Irrelevance	   Principle	   is	   too	   strong.	   It	   is	   not	   true	   that	   all	   inabilities	   are	  irrelevant	  to	  justification.	  Some	  are	  intuitively	  relevant.	  Furthermore,	  once	  we	   appreciate	   that	   the	   correct	   distinction	   is	   between	   inabilities	   that	   are	  justification-­‐relevant	   and	   those	   that	   are	   justification-­‐irrelevant,	   it	   is	   far	  from	  obvious	   that	   the	   kinds	   of	   inabilities	  which	  may	   generate	   reasons	   to	  obey	  an	  authority	  fall	  on	  the	  justification-­‐irrelevant	  side	  of	  the	  distinction.	  Most	   uncontroversially,	   an	   agent’s	   physical	   inabilities	   are	   relevant	   to	  whether	  they	  are	  morally	  justified	  in	  acting.	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  
Double	  Trolley	  1:	  Dana	  is	  taking	  a	  walk	  along	  the	  street	  and	  comes	  across	  two	   trolley	   cars	   that	   are	   out	   of	   control.	   Trolley	   A	   is	   hurtling	   towards	   1	  innocent	   person,	   Trolley	   B	   is	   hurtling	   towards	   5	   innocent	   persons.	  Fortunately,	   each	   trolley	   may	   be	   diverted	   onto	   an	   empty	   side-­‐track	   by	  pulling	   a	   lever,	   though	   there	   is	   only	   time	   to	   divert	   one	   trolley.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  lever	  to	  divert	  Trolley	  B	  is	  rusty	  and	  Dana	  is	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  pull	  it.	  	  It	   seems	   clear	   that	   Dana	   is	   morally	   justified	   in	   saving	   the	   1.	   But	   her	  justification	  is	  certainly	  relativised	  to	  her	  abilities.	  If	  Dana	  had	  the	  physical	  ability	   to	   save	   the	   five	   by	   pulling	   the	   rusty	   switch	   she	  would	   be	  morally	  unjustified	   in	   saving	   the	   1.184	  But	   since	   she	   lacks	   this	   ability,	   what	   she	  straightforwardly	   ought	   to	   do	   is	   save	   the	   single	   victim.	   	   This	   shows	   that	  some	  inabilities	  are	  perfectly	  admissible	   in	  determining	  whether	  an	  agent	  possesses	   a	   moral	   justification	   for	   action.	   The	   Irrelevance	   of	   Inabilities	  Principle	  is	  too	  strong,	  since	  it	  implies	  that	  Dana	  is	  unjustified	  in	  saving	  the	  single	  victim,	  which	  is	  false.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Though	  some	  would	  deny	  this.	  See,	  most	  famously,	  John	  Taurek,	   ‘Should	  the	  Numbers	  Count?’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  6,	  No.4	  (1977),	  293-­‐316.	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At	  this	  point	  the	  objector	  may	  happily	  concede	  that	  not	  all	  inabilities	  are	  justification-­‐irrelevant	   and	   offer	   a	   weakened	   version	   of	   the	   Irrelevance	  Principle.	  The	  revised	  principle	  holds	  that	  while	  agents’	  physical	  inabilities	  may	  be	  justification-­‐relevant,	  their	  non-­‐physical	  or	  cognitive	  inabilities	  are	  not.	  This	  seems	  sufficient	  to	  avoid	  implausible	  implications	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  
Double	   Trolley	   1,	   while	   maintaining	   the	   general	   objection	   to	   service	  accounts	  of	  authority.	  	  However,	   once	   we	   allow	   that	   physical	   inabilities	   can	   be	   justification-­‐relevant,	   a	   certain	   class	  of	   reasons	   to	  obey	  an	  authority	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  objection	  –	  those	  that	  arise	  from	  individuals’	  inability	  to	   successfully	   coordinate	   their	   actions	   with	   others.	   This	   is	   because	   the	  inability	   to	  achieve	  coordination	  seems	  relevantly	  analogous	  to	  a	  physical	  inability.	   A	   group’s	   coordinative	   inability	   need	   not	   result	   from	   any	  cognitive	   inabilities	   on	   the	   part	   of	   any	   individual	   member.	   What	   is	  distinctive	  of	  coordination	  problems	  (and	  collective	  action	  problems	  more	  generally)	   is	   that	  they	  can	  arise	  even	  when	  participants	  are	  appropriately	  motivated	  and	  fully	  aware	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  facts.	  	  Furthermore,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   means	   of	   coordination,	   each	  participant’s	   ability	   to	   bring	   about	   desirable	   outcomes	   is	   limited	   by	  external	   physical	   facts.	   While	   each	   participant	   in	   a	   situation	   requiring	  coordination	  may	   be	   physically	   able	   to	   perform	   the	   action	   that	  would	   be	  necessary	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  desirable	  outcome,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  action	  is	  actually	   causally	   effective	   in	   bringing	   about	   the	   outcome	   depends	   on	  whether	  coordination	  with	  others	  is	  possible.	  	  If	   the	   analogy	   between	   physical	   inabilities	   and	   the	   inability	   to	  coordinate	   is	   plausible,	   we	   may	   appropriately	   class	   the	   latter	   as	  justification-­‐relevant.	   To	   demonstrate,	   consider	   a	   variation	   on	   the	   above	  case:	  	  
Double	  Trolley	  2:	  Dana	  is	  taking	  a	  walk	  along	  the	  street	  and	  comes	  across	  two	   trolley	   cars	   that	   are	   out	   of	   control.	   Trolley	   A	   is	   hurtling	   towards	   1	  innocent	   person,	   Trolley	   B	   is	   hurtling	   towards	   5	   innocent	   persons.	  Fortunately,	  each	  trolley	  can	  be	  diverted	  onto	  an	  empty	  side-­‐track,	  though	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there	  is	  only	  time	  to	  divert	  one	  trolley.	  Dana	  can	  divert	  Trolley	  A	  by	  pulling	  a	   well-­‐oiled	   lever.	   However,	   in	   order	   to	   divert	   Trolley	   B,	   Dana	   must	   act	  together	  with	   four	  other	  potential	   co-­‐rescuers.	   Each	  must	  pull	   a	   separate	  lever	  at	  a	  certain	  time	  and	  in	  a	  certain	  sequence.	  Unfortunately,	  due	  to	  time	  constraints	   and	   the	   distance	   between	   them,	   the	   five	   are	   unable	   to	  coordinate	  their	  lever-­‐pulling	  with	  one	  another.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  Dana	  is	  morally	  justified	  in	  saving	  the	  1	  in	  this	  case,	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  she	   is	   justified	   in	   the	  original	  case.	  She	  simply	   lacks	   the	  ability	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  saving	  of	  the	  5.	   If	  correct,	   this	  shows	  that	  moral	  justification	   may	   be	   relativised	   to	   agents’	   coordinative	   abilities.	  Furthermore,	   this	   point	   suggests	   that	  when	   an	   authority	   is	   legitimate	   on	  grounds	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   secure	   coordination,	   those	   subject	   to	   it	   can	   be	  morally	  justified	  in	  obeying	  its	  directives,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  reasons	  to	  do	  so	  arise	  from	  an	  inability	  on	  their	  part.	  Of	  course,	   this	  point	  only	  provides	  a	  partial	  response	  to	  the	  Irrelevant	  Reasons	  objection.	  Even	  if	  coordinative	  inabilities	  are	  relevantly	  analogous	  to	   physical	   inabilities	   and	   are	   therefore	   not	   problematic,	   one	   may	   still	  endorse	   the	   revised	  version	  of	   the	   Irrelevance	  Principle	  which	  holds	   that	  non-­‐physical	   or	   cognitive	   inabilities	   are	   justification-­‐irrelevant.	   	   In	  particular,	  one	  may	  hold	   that	  agents’	   suboptimal	  powers	  of	   reasoning	  are	  not	   relevant	   to	   whether	   they	   are	   morally	   justified	   in	   acting.185	  If	   this	   is	  correct,	   then	   the	   objection	   may	   still	   succeed	   in	   showing	   that	   subjects	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  obeying	  authorities	  that	  are	  legitimate	  on	  grounds	  of	  superior	  expertise,	  since	  their	  reasons	  to	  do	  so	  will	  be	  relativised	  to	  their	  cognitive	  inabilities	  or	  limitations.	  	  Agent’s	   non-­‐physical	   inabilities	   undoubtedly	   seem	   justification-­‐irrelevant	  in	  certain	  cases,	  such	  as	  The	  Two	  Nazis,	  in	  which	  the	  inability	  in	  question	   is	   a	   specifically	  moral	  disability,	   or	   where	   the	   agent	   is	   morally	  culpable	   for	   their	   inability	   to	   recognise,	   assess	   and	   conform	   to	   reasons.	  However,	   restricting	   the	   Irrelevant	   Reasons	   objection	   to	   non-­‐physical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185 	  Tadros	   focuses	   on	   this	   particular	   inability	   in	   presenting	   the	   Irrelevant	   Reasons	  objection.	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inabilities	   is	   still	   too	  strong.	   It	   is	   implausible	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  justification-­‐relevant	   and	   justification-­‐irrelevant	   inabilities	   neatly	   tracks	  the	   distinction	   between	   physical	   and	   non-­‐physical	   inabilities. 186 	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  the	  following	  example187:	  	  	  
Disease	   Cure:	   Dana	   spends	   her	   days	  working	   for	   a	  worthy	   and	   effective	  charity.	   She	   could,	   alternatively,	   sit	   down	  at	  her	   computer	   each	  day,	   type	  out	  the	  cure	  for	  a	  terrible	  disease,	  and	  send	  it	  to	  a	  top	  medical	  journal.	  The	  consequences	  of	  doing	   so	  would	  be	  overwhelmingly	  good.	  But	  Dana	  does	  not	  do	  so,	  not	  because	  she	  believes	  that	  curing	  terrible	  diseases	  would	  have	  suboptimal	   consequences,	   or	   because	   she	   has	   no	   desire	   to	   bring	   about	  overwhelmingly	   good	   consequences,	   but	   rather	   because	   she	   has	   no	   clue	  what	  the	  cure	  for	  these	  diseases	  is,	  or	  how	  to	  write	  them	  down.	  In	  this	  case	  Dana	  is	  perfectly	  physically	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  overwhelmingly	  good	  consequences	  –	  all	  she	  has	  to	  do	  is	  push	  the	  buttons	  on	  her	  keyboard	  in	  whatever	  order	  spells	  out	  the	  cure	  for	  a	  deadly	  disease.	  Her	  inability	  to	  do	   so	   arises	   from	  a	   lack	   of	   expertise.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   such	   inabilities	   are	  justification-­‐irrelevant,	   then	   we	   must	   conclude	   that	   Dana	   is	   morally	  unjustified	   in	   going	   to	  work	   for	   the	  worthy	   charity	   each	  day,	   rather	   than	  disseminating	   the	   cures	   for	   terrible	   diseases.	   This	   seems	   implausible.	  Furthermore,	   generalising	   this	   conclusion	   renders	   practically	   all	   actions	  morally	  unjustified,	  since	  agents	  will	  be	  in	  an	  analogous	  position	  to	  Dana	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases,	  having	  the	  means	  of	  producing	  extremely	  good	  consequences	  within	  their	  physical	  abilities,	  which	  they	  do	  not	  act	  on.188	  I	  take	  it	  that	  few	  of	  us	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  accept	  this	  result.	  But	  avoiding	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  A	  further	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  cleanly	  distinguish	  between	  physical	  and	  non-­‐physical	  inabilities	  in	  the	  manner	  suggested	  by	  the	  revised	  Irrelevance	  Principle.	  This	  is	  because	  many	  disabilities	  we	  may	  intuitively	  classify	  as	  non-­‐physical	  –	  such	  as	  our	  limited	   powers	   of	   reasoning	   –	  will	   often	   be	   attributable	   to	   our	   physical	   limitations.	   For	  example,	   it	   seems	   rather	   arbitrary	   to	   classify	   my	   inability	   to	   run	   faster	   as	   a	   physical	  inability	   –	   and	   therefore	   justification-­‐relevant	   –	  while	   holding	   that	  my	   inability	   to	   think	  faster	   is	   a	   non-­‐physical	   inability	   –	   and	   therefore	   justification-­‐irrelevant	   –	   given	   that	  my	  cognitive	  performance	  is	  presumably	  also	  limited	  by	  certain	  facts	  about	  my	  physiology.	  	  	  187	  This	   example	   and	   the	   following	   paragraph	   draws	   on	  Dale	  Dorsey,	   ‘Consequentialism,	  Cognitive	   Limitations	   and	   Moral	   Theory’,	   in	   Mark	   Timmons	   (ed),	   Oxford	   Studies	   in	  
Normative	  Ethics:	  Volume	  3	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  179-­‐202	  at	  p.181.	  188	  See	  Ibid.	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requires	   accepting	   that	   agents’	   cognitive	   abilities	   are	   admissible	   to	  judgements	  of	  moral	  justification..	  	  If	  we	  accept	   that	  non-­‐physical	   inabilities	  may	  be	   justification-­‐relevant,	  the	  objection	  that	  subjects	  necessarily	  lack	  a	  moral	  justification	  for	  obeying	  authorities	   that	   are	   legitimate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   superior	   expertise	  becomes	   correspondingly	  weaker.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   subject’s	   reasons	   to	  obey	   the	   authority	   are	   relativised	   to	   their	   non-­‐physical	   abilities,	   such	   as	  their	  powers	  of	  reasoning.	  But,	  as	  the	  example	  above	  suggests,	  this	  kind	  of	  relativity	  need	  not	  always	  be	  problematic.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	   these	  brief	  remarks	  decisively	  refute	  the	  Irrelevant	  Reasons	   objection.	   To	   do	   so	   would	   require	   a	   complete	   account	   of	   the	  distinction	  between	   justification-­‐relevant	   and	   justification-­‐irrelevant.	  This	  is	  an	  enormously	  complex	  and	  difficult	  task,	  which	  involves	  resolving	  some	  of	  the	  very	  deepest	  issues	  in	  normative	  ethics.	  What	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  show	  is	   that	   the	   initial	   intuitive	   force	  of	   the	  objection	   rests	  on	  either	   a	   false	  or	  overly	   simplistic	   view	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   abilities	   and	   moral	  justification.	   	  All	   justification-­‐talk	  has	   to	  be	   relativised	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  are	   limited	   and	   finite	   beings.	   The	   key	   question	   is	   which	   limitations	   and	  inabilities	  are	  relevant	   to	   judgements	  about	  moral	   justification	  and	  which	  are	   not.	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   no	   obvious	   or	   natural	   account	   of	   how	   this	  distinction	   ought	   to	   be	   drawn.	   Once	  we	   appreciate	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  issues	  at	  stake,	  we	  can	  see	   that	   the	   Irrelevant	  Reasons	  objection	  needs	   to	  do	  much	  more	  than	  simply	  point	  out	  that,	  on	  a	  service	  account,	  a	  subject’s	  reasons	  to	  obey	  an	  authority	  are	  relativised	  to	  their	  abilities.	  	  	  
4.12	  Defending	  The	  Second	  Claim	  
	  In	   the	   following	   section	   I	   shift	   focus	   from	   the	   question	   of	   the	   range	   of	  justifications	  for	  harming	  to	  that	  of	  how	  justifications	  for	  harming	  interact	  with	   each	   other.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   morality	   of	   harm,	   the	   question	   of	  
interaction	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  agent’s	  possession	  of	  a	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm	  affects	  whether	  other	  agents	  are	   justified	   in	  defensively	  harming	  that	  agent.	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Within	  debates	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  self-­‐defence,	  several	  theorists	  defend	  a	  version	  of	  the	  view	  I	  labelled	  Immunity:	  	  
Immunity:	   If	   an	   agent	   is	   justified	   in	   causing	   harm	   to	   others,	   then	   this	  justification	  defeats	  all	   the	  available	   reasons	   for	  defensively	  harming	   that	  agent.	  It	  is	  therefore	  morally	  unjustified	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  If	  my	  first	  claim	  is	  defensible,	  and	  the	  commands	  of	  authorities	  can	  provide	  an	   independent	  source	  of	   justification	   for	  causing	  harm,	  we	  can	  apply	  the	  question	   of	   interaction	   to	   this	   particular	   form	   of	   justification.	   More	  specifically,	   we	   are	   here	   concerned	   with	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   an	   agent’s	  possession	  of	  an	  authority-­‐based	   justification	  for	  harming	  affects	  whether	  other	  agents	  are	  permitted	  to	  defensively	  harm	  that	  agent.	  I	   will	   defend	   the	   following	   account	   of	   interaction	   in	   the	   case	   of	  authority-­‐based	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm:	  	  
Second	   Claim:	   The	   fact	   that	   an	   agent	   is	   commanded	   by	   an	   authority	   to	  cause	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   to	   others	   does	   not,	   in	   itself,	  raise	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  on	  defensively	  harming	  that	  agent.	  	  This	  second	  claim,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  first,	  denies	  Immunity.	  Together,	  they	  hold	  that	  there	  may	  be	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  agent	  is	  justified	  in	  causing	  harm	  (in	  virtue	  of	  a	  legitimate	  command	  to	  do	  so),	  but	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  justification	  does	  not	  count	  against	  the	  infliction	  of	  defensive	  harm	  on	  that	  agent.189	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  The	  Second	  Claim	   is	  compatible	  with	  the	  view	  that	  authorised	  harm-­‐doers	  may	  not	  be	  
culpable	  for	  threatening	  harm	  and	  that	  this	  may	  raise	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  for	  inflicting	  defensive	  harm	  upon	  them.	  The	  claim	  is	  specifically	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	   justification	  does	  not	  affect	   the	  normative	  situation	  of	  others,	  which	   is	  separate	   from	  the	  question	  of	  culpability.	  
	  	   147	  
4.13	  Interaction	  and	  Standard	  Justified	  Threat	  Cases	  	  As	   argued	   above,	   when	   certain	   conditions	   obtain,	   agents	   who	   cause	  content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	  harm	  in	  conformity	  with	  a	  command	  may	  be	   justified	   in	  doing	  so.	  Considered	   from	  the	  causal/temporal	  perspective	  in	  which	  their	  harms	  are	   imminent	  but	  yet	  to	  eventuate,	   these	  authorised	  harm-­‐doers	   can	   be	   classed	   as	   a	   species	   of	   what	   are	   known	   as	   ‘justified	  threateners’	   in	   the	   self-­‐defence	   literature.	   Justified	   threateners	  are	  agents	  who	  act	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that,	  unless	  prevented,	   they	  will	   transgress	  others’	  rights	   not	   to	   be	   harmed,	   but	  who	  possess	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   sufficient	  reason	  to	  do	  so.190	  To	   date,	   discussions	   of	   justified	   threateners	   and	   interaction	   have	  focussed	   on	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   threatener	   possesses	   a	   lesser-­‐evil	  justification.	  Term	   these	   ‘standard’	   justified	   threat	   cases.	  These	  provide	   a	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  assessing	  the	  question	  of	  interaction	  in	  the	  case	  of	  threateners	  who	  possess	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification.	  	  The	   classic	   case	   employed	   in	   discussions	   of	   interaction	   is	   that	   of	   the	  
Tactical	  Bomber:	  	  
Tactical	  Bomber:	  A	  bomber	   crew	  of	   five	   combatants	   are	  on	  a	  mission	   to	  bomb	  a	  munitions	   factory	   as	   part	   of	   a	   just	  war.	  Bombing	   the	   factory	  will	  result	   in	   the	  deaths	  of	   five	   innocent	  bystanders	  as	  a	  side-­‐effect.	  However,	  the	  good	  achieved	  by	  bombing	  the	  factory	  is	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  doing	  so	  as	  the	  lesser-­‐evil.	  The	  five	  bystanders	  have	  access	  to	  an	  anti-­‐aircraft	  gun	  and	  are	  able	  to	  shoot	  down	  the	  bomber	  before	  they	  drop	  their	  bombs.	  	  The	  question	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  bystanders	  are	  permitted	  to	  defensively	  kill	   the	   bombers,	   given	   that	   the	   bombers	   are	   justified	   in	   causing	   their	  deaths.	  Many	  find	  it	  intuitive	  that	  the	  bystanders	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  do	  so.191	  On	   this	   view,	   this	   is	   a	   case	   in	   which	   two	   parties	   simultaneously	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190 	  See	   McMahan,	   ‘Self-­‐Defense	   Against	   Justified	   Threateners’	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	  characterisation.	  191	  McMahan,	   ‘The	  Basis	  of	  Moral	  Liability	   to	  Defensive	  Killing’;	   ‘Debate:	   Justification	  and	  Liability	   in	  War’;	   Steinhoff,	   ‘Debate:	   Jeff	  McMahan	  on	   the	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants’;	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possess	   a	   justification	   for	   harming	   the	   other.	   	   However,	   several	   theorists	  have	  recently	  defended	  the	  view	  that	  Immunity	  holds	  in	  standard	  cases	  of	  justified	  threateners.192	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  bombers	  are	  justified	  in	  causing	  harm	  entails	  that	  defensively	  harming	  them	  is	  unjustified.	  The	  debate	  between	   these	   two	  views	  ultimately	   turns	  on	   the	  position	  that	  each	   takes	  on	   the	  range	  of	   justifications	   for	  harming.	  As	  explained	   in	  Section	  4.4,	  justifications	  for	  harming	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  those	  grounded	  in	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons	  and	  those	  grounded	  in	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons.	  Agent-­‐neutral	  justifications	  –	  such	  as	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  –	  apply	  to	  all	  agents,	  whereas	   agent-­‐relative	   justifications	   –	   grounded	   in	   personal	   prerogatives	  and	  associative	  duties	  –	  apply	  only	  to	  specific	  agents.	  If	   one	   takes	   the	   view	   that	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	   harming	   is	  thoroughly	   agent-­‐neutral,	   then	   a	   commitment	   to	   Immunity	   follows	   quite	  naturally.	   If	   the	   reasons	   that	   determine	   how	   harm	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  ought	   to	   be	  distributed	   in	   any	  particular	   case	   apply	   equally	   to	   all	   agents,	  then	  this	  this	  gives	  every	  agent	  the	  common	  aim	  of	  seeing	  to	  it	  that	  that	  this	  distribution	   comes	   about,	   or	   at	   least	   refraining	   from	   preventing	   it	   from	  coming	   about.193	  For	   the	   agent-­‐neutralist,	   it	   is	   contradictory	   to	   hold	   that	  certain	  agents	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  bringing	  about	  one	  distribution	  of	  harm,	  while	  other	  agents	  are	  justified	  in	  bringing	  about	  an	  opposing	  distribution.	  A	   normative	   situation	   like	   this	   would	   imply	   that	   the	   very	   same	   pool	   of	  reasons	   could	   simultaneously	   recommend	   opposing	   and	   incompatible	  courses	   of	   action.	   On	   this	   view,	   there	   cannot	   be	   cases	   of	   ‘symmetrical	  justification’	  or	  ‘conflicts	  of	  permissible	  harming.’194	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  David	  Mapel,	  ‘Moral	  Liability	  to	  Defensive	  Harm	  and	  Symmetrical	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Philosophy	  18,	  No.2	  (2010),	  198-­‐217;	  Rodin,	  ‘Justifying	  Harm’;	  Adil	  Ahmed	  Haque,	  ‘Rights	   and	   Liabilities	   at	   War’,	   in	   Paul	   Robinson,	   Stephen	   Garvey	   and	   Kimberly	   Ferzan	  (eds),	  Criminal	  Law	  Conversations	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  395-­‐396;	  Adam	  Hosein,	  ‘Are	  Justified	  Aggressors	  a	  Threat	  to	  the	  Rights	  Theory	  of	  Self-­‐Defense?’,	  in	  Frowe	  and	  Lang	  (eds)	  How	  We	  Fight,	  87-­‐103.	  192	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  Ch.9;	  McMahan,	  ‘Self-­‐Defence	  Against	  Justified	  Threateners’.	  	  193	  For	  the	  characterisation	  of	  agent-­‐neutrality	  in	  terms	  of	  common	  aims,	  see	  Derek	  Parfit,	  
Reasons	  and	  Persons,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  p.27.	  	  194	  For	   example,	   Victor	   Tadros	   defends	   a	   thoroughly	   agent-­‐neutral	   view	   of	   permissible	  harming	  and	  explicitly	  appeals	  to	  this	  view	  in	  order	  to	  reject	  the	  possibility	  of	  conflicts	  of	  permissible	  harming	  (excluding	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  conflict	   is	   itself	  valuable	  –	   in	  sporting	  contests	  for	  example).	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  Ch.9.	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Conversely,	   if	   one	   endorses	   a	   broader	   account	   of	   the	   range	   of	  justifications	   for	   harming	   which	   includes	   agent-­‐relative	   forms	   of	  justification,	  then	  one	  need	  not	  endorse	  Immunity.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  reasons	  that	   determine	   how	  harm	  ought	   to	   be	   distributed	   are	   not	   common	   to	   all	  agents.	   There	   are	   forms	  of	   justification	   that	   apply	   only	   to	   specific	   agents.	  Given	  this	  commitment,	   it	  need	  not	  be	  contradictory	  to	  hold	  that,	   in	  cases	  like	   the	   Tactical	   Bomber,	   one	   party	   is	   justified	   in	   bringing	   about	   one	  distribution	   of	   harm	  whereas	   another	   party	   is	   justified	   in	   bring	   about	   an	  opposing	   distribution.	   While	   the	   bombers	   may	   possess	   a	   lesser-­‐evil	  justification	   for	   causing	   harm,	   the	   innocent	   bystanders	  may,	   for	   example,	  be	   justified	   in	   resisting	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   personal	   prerogative	   to	   assign	  greater	  weight	  to	  their	  own	  interests.	  Hence,	  on	  an	  account	  of	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	   for	   harming	   which	   includes	   agent-­‐relative	   justifications,	  
Immunity	   need	   not	   be	   true	   and	   cases	   of	   symmetrically	   justified	   harming	  may	  be	  possible.195	  	  
4.14	  Authorised	  Threateners	  and	  Immunity	  	  Let	   us	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   question	   of	   interaction	   in	   the	   case	   of	   threateners	  who	  possess	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm.	  	  It	   is	  tempting	  to	  endorse	  Immunity	   in	  these	  cases	  and	  treat	  authorised	  agents	  as	  equivalent	   to	  standard	   justified	  threateners	  such	  as	   the	  Tactical	  
Bombers.	   On	   this	   view,	   if	   an	   agent	   possesses	   an	   authority-­‐based	  justification	   for	   causing	   harm,	   then	   other	   agents	   lack	   justification	   for	  defensively	  harming	  the	  authorised	  agent.	  This	  view	  is	  appealing	  because	  it	  generates	   the	   intuitively	   right	   result	   in	   a	   range	   of	   cases,	   such	   as	   the	  following:	  	  
Police	  Officer:	  A	  police	  officer	  acts	   to	  arrest	  an	   individual	  as	  a	   result	  of	  a	  command	  to	  do	  so	   from	  a	   legitimate	  authority.	  However,	   the	  command	   is	  mistaken	  (but	  not	  clearly	  so)	  and	  the	  prospective	  arrestee	  is	  innocent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  For	   further	   discussion,	   see	   Waldron,	   ‘Self-­‐Defense:	   Agent-­‐Neutral	   vs	   Agent-­‐Relative	  Accounts’.	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Intuitively,	   it	   seems	   impermissible	   for	   the	   mistaken	   arrestee	   to	   use	  defensive	  force	  against	  the	  police	  officer.	  Combining	  the	  authority-­‐view	  of	  harming	  with	  Immunity	  provides	  a	  neat	  and	  principled	  explanation	  for	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  The	  Authority	  View	  allows	  us	  to	  characterise	  the	  police	  officer	  as	  posing	  a	   justified	   threat	   to	   the	   innocent	  arrestee,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  harm	   is	   not	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   content-­‐dependent	   reasons.196	  The	  addition	   of	   Immunity	   allows	   us	   to	   make	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   police	  officer’s	  justification	  for	  harming	  the	  arrestee	  serves	  to	  defeat	  the	  reasons	  that	   the	   arrestee	  would	   otherwise	   have	   for	   using	   defensive	   force	   against	  the	   police	   officer,	   thus	   rendering	   resistance	   unjustified.197	  Furthermore,	  this	   analysis	   also	   yields	   the	   intuitively	   right	   result	   in	   a	   variation	   on	   the	  case:	  	  
Vigilante:	  A	  private	  citizen	  acts	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  citizen’s	  arrest	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	   reasonable	   and	   good-­‐faith	   suspicion	   that	   the	   arrestee	   will	   otherwise	  commit	   a	   serious	   crime.	  However,	   they	  are	  mistaken	  and	   the	  prospective	  arrestee	  is	  innocent.	  	  In	   this	   case	   it	   does	   seem	   intuitively	   justified	   for	   the	   arrestee	   to	   use	  defensive	  force	  against	  the	  vigilante.	  Again,	  combining	  the	  Authority	  View	  with	  Immunity	  provides	  a	  neat	  explanation	  of	  why	  this	   is	  so.	  Though	  both	  the	   police	   officer	   and	   the	   vigilante	   threaten	   an	   identical	   harm,	   only	   the	  police	   officer	   possesses	   a	   justification	   for	   doing	   so,	   since	   only	   the	   police	  officer	   threatens	  harm	   in	   conformity	  with	   a	   legitimate	   command.	  Though	  the	  vigilante	  may	  reasonably	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  justified	  in	  harming	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Those	  who	  endorse	  Completeness	  would	  seem	  to	  lack	  the	  resources	  to	  account	  for	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  police	  officer	  acts	  with	  justification.	  They	  either	  have	  to	  treat	  the	  police	  officer	   as	   merely	   excused	   (making	   it	   difficult	   to	   explain	   why	   resistance	   would	   not	   be	  justified)	   or	   else	   adopt	   an	   evidence-­‐relative	   account	   of	   justification	   (on	   the	   assumption	  that	  the	  command	  gives	  the	  officer	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  arrest	   is	   justified	  on	  content-­‐dependent	  grounds).	  	  197	  This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   that	   there	   are	   alternative	   explanations	   of	   the	   intuition	   that	   it	   is	  impermissible	   for	   the	   innocent	   arrestee	   to	   resist	   that	   are	   compatible	  with	  Completeness.	  For	  example,	  defence	  may	  be	  futile	  or	  counter-­‐productive,	  given	  that	  other	  police	  officers	  will	   act	   to	   make	   the	   arrest	   even	   if	   the	   initial	   arresting	   officer	   is	   successfully	   resisted.	  However,	   such	   explanations	   offer	   an	   unsatisfactorily	   contingent	   defence	   of	   the	  impermissibility	  of	  resistance.	  Thanks	  to	  Jeff	  McMahan	  and	  James	  Lenman	  for	  raising	  this	  point.	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arrestee,	   they	   in	   fact	   lack	   an	   undefeated	   reason	   to	   do	   so.198	  Since	   this	  analysis	   classifies	   the	   vigilante	   as	   a	   species	   of	   unjustified	   threatener,	  
Immunity	   does	  not	   apply	   to	  his	   case	   and	   resistance	  may	   then	  be	   justified	  (subject	  to	  the	  usual	  requirements	  of	  necessity	  and	  proportionality).	  However,	  consideration	  of	  other	  cases	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  Immunity	  cannot	   be	   the	   right	   approach	   to	   interaction	   in	   the	   case	   of	   authorised-­‐threateners.	  Consider	  the	  following:	  	  
Combatants:	   A	   group	   of	   combatants	   act	   to	   annex	   an	   area	   of	   territory	  belonging	  to	  a	  neighbouring	  state	  as	  a	  result	  of	  legitimate	  command	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  the	  command	  is	  mistaken	  (but	  not	  clearly	  so)	  and	  the	  invasion	  is	  unjustified.199	  	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  seems	  clearly	  justified	  for	  those	  threatened	  by	  the	  authorised	  combatants	   to	   use	   defensive	   force	   against	   them.	   It	   also	   seems	  uncontroversial	  that	  disinterested	  third-­‐parties	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  doing	  so	  on	   their	   behalf.	  However,	   applying	   Immunity	   to	   the	   case	   of	   authorised	  threateners	   generates	  precisely	   the	  opposite	   result.	   If	   it	   is	   true,	   as	   I	   have	  argued,	  that	  authorised-­‐threateners	  are	  appropriately	  classed	  as	  a	  species	  of	  justified	  threatener,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  infliction	  of	  defensive	  harm	  on	  justified	  threateners	  is	  unjustified,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  threatened	  by	  the	  authorised	  combatants	  would	  be	  unjustified	  in	  using	  defensive	  force	  against	   them.	   Surrender	   would	   be	   morally	   required,	   which	   is	   highly	  counter-­‐intuitive.200	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Evidence-­‐relative	   accounts	   of	   justification	   will	   thus	   struggle	   to	   explain	   the	   intuitive	  differences	  between	  the	  Police	  Officer	  and	  Vigilante	  case.	  Since,	  on	  this	  view,	  both	  agents	  threaten	  the	  innocent	  with	  harm	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  reasonable	  belief,	  each	  should	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  justified	  threat.	  199	  Estlund,	  ‘On	  Following	  Orders	  in	  an	  Unjust	  War’	  also	  argues	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  cases	  of	  this	  sort.	  200	  The	  right	   to	  resist	  all	   forms	  of	  military	  aggression	  has	  recently	  come	  under	  sustained	  criticism,	   so	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   counter-­‐intuitive	   to	   claim	   that	   resistance	   may	   be	  unjustified	   in	   a	   case	   like	   the	   one	   I	   describe	   here.	   See,	   especially,	   Rodin,	   ‘The	   Myth	   of	  National	  Defence’.	  However,	  what	  is	  counter-­‐intuitive,	  even	  on	  the	  most	  pacifistic	  views,	  is	  the	   conclusion	   that	   resistance	  may	  be	  unjustified	   in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	   the	  aggressors	  act	  with	  justification.	  Hence,	  the	  oddity	  of	  the	  conclusion	  generated	  by	  applying	  Immunity	  in	  the	  Combatants	  case	  can	  be	  appreciated	  regardless	  of	  one’s	  position	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  right	  to	  resist	  military	  aggression.	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Applying	   Immunity	   to	   the	   case	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	  harming	   then	   results	   in	   a	   dilemma.	   Since,	   by	   hypothesis,	   both	   the	   police	  officer	   and	   the	   combatants	   possess	   the	   same	   form	   of	   justification	   for	  harming,	  we	  cannot	  claim	  that	   Immunity	  applies	   to	  one	  but	  not	   the	  other.	  Either	   Immunity	  holds	   in	  both	  cases	  –	  generating	  an	   implausible	   result	   in	  the	   Combatants	   case	   –	   or	   fails	   to	   apply	   in	   both	   cases	   –	   generating	   an	  unintuitive	  result	  in	  the	  Police	  Officer	  case.	  	  	  
4.15	  Authorised	  Threateners	  and	  Agent-­‐Relativity	  	  I	  propose	  an	  account	  of	  interaction	  for	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  which	  aims	   to	   avoid	   the	   above	   dilemma.	   The	   proposal	   has	   two	   parts.	   Firstly,	   it	  argues	   that	   Immunity	   does	   not	   apply	   in	   the	   case	   of	   authority-­‐based	  justifications	   for	   harming,	   thus	   avoiding	   the	   first	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma.	  Secondly,	  it	  avoids	  the	  second	  horn	  by	  providing	  an	  alternative	  and	  non-­‐ad	  
hoc	  account	  of	  why	  defence	  may	  be	  unjustified	   in	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  Police	  
Officer.	  This	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  first	  argument	  –	  that	  Immunity	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  authority-­‐based	  justifications.	  Recall	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  views	  about	  the	  
range	  and	  interaction	  of	  justifications	  for	  causing	  harm.	  Those	  who	  take	  an	  entirely	   agent-­‐neutral	   view	   of	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   are	   typically	  committed	   to	   Immunity	   as	   an	   account	   of	   interaction,	   whereas	   those	  who	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  agent-­‐relative	  forms	  of	  justification	  are	  able	  to	  deny	  
Immunity.	  	  Given	   this,	   a	   promising	   strategy	   for	   denying	   that	   Immunity	   applies	   to	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   is	   by	   showing	   that	   it	   a	   species	   of	   agent-­‐relative	  justification.	  If	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  consist	  in	  reasons	  for	  action	   that	   apply	   only	   to	   the	   authorised	   agent,	   and	   not	   to	   others,	   then	  
Immunity	  need	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  possession	  of	  such	  a	  justification,	  since	  agent-­‐relative	   reasons	   need	   not	   affect	   the	   normative	   situation	   of	   other	  agents.	  The	  possession	  of	  an	  agent-­‐relative	  justification	  for	  bringing	  about	  a	  certain	   distribution	   of	   harm	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   other	   agents	   also	   have	  reason	   to	   bring	   about	   that	   distribution.	   In	   fact,	   the	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	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others	  may	   justify	   them	   in	  harming	   the	  authorised-­‐threatener	   in	  order	   to	  prevent	  the	  threatened	  harm	  from	  eventuating.	  The	   argument	   for	   this	   view	   is	   tentative,	   but	   fairly	   straightforward	   –	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   fit	   the	   standard	   characterisation	   of	   agent-­‐relative	  reasons.	  One	  can	  only	  give	  a	  full	  statement	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  action	  provided	   by	   a	   legitimate	   command	   by	   making	   explicit	   and	   ineliminable	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  agent	  for	  whom	  it	  is	  a	  reason.	  When	  an	  authority	  issues	  a	  command	  to	  ϕ,	  this	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  bring	  a	  new	  reason	  for	  ϕ-­‐ing	  into	  existence	  for	  all	  agents	  everywhere,	  but	  only	  for	  the	  addressees	  of	  the	  command.	   The	   agent-­‐relativity	   of	   the	   reasons	   created	   by	   legitimate	  commands	   is	   particularly	   salient	   under	   service	   accounts	   of	   authority,	  where	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  authority	  must	  be	  demonstrated	  anew	  with	  regard	  to	  each	  putative	  subject	  and	  their	  particular	  circumstances.	  On	  views	  of	  this	  type,	  a	  subject	  can	  only	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey	  by	  making	  ineliminable	  reference	  to	  specific	  facts	  about	  that	  subject.	  	  If	   this	   characterisation	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   as	   agent-­‐relative	   is	   defensible,	   we	   can	   explain	   why	   Immunity	   need	   not	   hold	   in	  authorised	   threatener	   cases	   such	   as	  Combatants	  –	   thus	   avoiding	   the	   first	  horn	   of	   our	   dilemma.	   Though	   the	   combatants	   possess	   undefeated	   reason	  for	   causing	   harm,	   the	   reasons	   do	   not	   affect	   the	   normative	   situation	   of	  others.	  This	   is	   true	  only	  of	  agent-­‐neutral	   forms	  of	   justification.	  Given	  this,	  the	  victims	  may	  resist	  their	  aggressors	  in	  precisely	  the	  same	  way	  that	  they	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  do	  had	  the	  aggressors	  lacked	  their	  authority-­‐based	  justifications.	  This	  supports	  my	  Second	  Claim	  –	  that	  an	  agent’s	  possession	  of	  an	   authority-­‐based	   justification	   for	   posing	   a	   threat	   of	   harm	   does	   not	   in	  itself	  raise	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  for	  defensively	  harming	  that	  agent.	  It	   may	   be	   objected	   here	   that	   my	   Second	   Claim	   is	   too	   strong.201	  The	  objection	  proceeds	  from	  the	  following	  assumption	  –	  that	  all	  agents	  have	  a	  
pro	   tanto	   reason	   to	   promote	   all	   other	   agents’	   conformity	   with	   reason,	  which	  may	   include	   enabling	   them	   to	   be	   served	   by	   legitimate	   authorities.	  Given	  this,	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  in	  cases	  like	  Combatants	  the	  prospective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  This	   objection	   has	   been	   put	   to	   me,	   independently,	   by	   Massimo	   Renzo	   and	   Yitzhak	  Benbaji.	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victims	   have	   a	   pro	   tanto	   reason	   not	   to	   resist	   the	   authorised	   threateners,	  since	  doing	  so	  prevents	  the	  authorised	  threateners	  from	  conforming	  to	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  them	  provided	  by	  their	  authority.	  Hence,	  my	  Second	  
Claim	   is	   wrong	   to	   hold	   that	   authorised-­‐threatener’s	   possession	   of	  justification	  does	  not	  count	  against	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  their	  victims.	  However,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   this	   conclusion	   follows	   from	   the	  assumption.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  true	  that	  I	  have	  the	  aim	  of	  promoting	  all	  other	  agents’	  conformity	  with	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  them,	  and	  that	  doing	  so	  may	   involve	   bringing	   it	   about	   that	   others	   are	   subject	   to	   legitimate	  authorities.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  this	  that	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  promote	  others	   obeying	   commands	   from	   those	   authorities	   that	   fail	   to	   reflect	   the	  balance	   of	   dependent	   reasons. 202 	  While	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   mistaken	  command	  has	  an	  undefeated	  reason	   to	  obey	   it,	   they	  do	  so	  only	  because	  a	  policy	   of	   general	   obedience	   is	   an	   optimal,	   though	   imperfect,	   strategy	   for	  
them	   to	   achieve	   greater	   overall	   conformity	   with	   their	   ultimate	   reasons.	  When	  the	  strategy	  goes	  awry	  in	  particular	  cases,	  I	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  subject’s	  ultimate	  reasons,	  not	  their	   instrumental	  reasons.	  Hence,	   in	  cases	  like	   Combatants,	   the	   victims’	   aim	   of	   promoting	   others’	   conformity	   with	  reason	  does	  not	  give	  then	  a	  reason	  to	  refrain	  from	  resisting	  their	  attackers.	  If	  anything,	  it	  gives	  them	  a	  reason	  to	  resist.203	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Provided	   that	   the	  mistaken	   directive	   is	   not	   also	   binding	   on	  me.	   This	   is	   an	   important	  caveat,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  203One	   further	   possibility	   is	   worth	   considering,	   which	   is	   that	   there	   may	   be	   value	   in	   an	  individual’s	  conforming	  to	  instrumental	  reasons,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  ultimate	  values	  that	  justify	   the	   existence	   of	   these	   reasons.	   For	   example,	   children	   and	   students	   may	   have	  instrumental	  reasons	  to	  obey	  the	  directives	  of,	  respectively,	  their	  parents	  and	  teachers	  (in	  order	  to,	  say,	  acquire	  virtue	  or	  knowledge),	  but	  there	  may	  also	  be	  value	  in	  the	  obedience	  itself	   (perhaps	   the	   hierarchical	   relationship	   is	   itself	   valuable,	   or	   perhaps	   obedience	   is	  constitutive	  of	  showing	  respect	  for	  the	  parent	  or	  teacher).	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then,	  contra	  what	  I	  have	  claimed	  above,	  there	  may	  be	  possible	  cases	  in	  which	  agents’	  aim	  of	  promoting	  all	  other	  agent’s	  conformity	  with	  reason	  does	  give	  them	  a	  
pro	  tanto	  reason	  not	  to	  prevent	  subjects	  from	  obeying	  authorities,	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  authority’s	  command	  fails	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason.	  	  Of	  course,	  we	  may	  be	  sceptical	  that	  there	  are	  such	  values,	  or	  that	  this	  value	  is	  present	  in	   the	   kind	   of	   cases	   which	   we	   are	   concerned	   with	   here,	   where	   the	   authority-­‐subject	  relationship	  is	  less	  intimate	  and	  where	  the	  domain	  of	  authority	  concerns	  the	  distribution	  of	   harm.	  But	   I	   am	  willing	   to	   accept	   that	   if	   such	   value	  were	  present,	   then	   all	   agents	  may	  have	   a	   pro	   tanto	   reason	   not	   to	   interfere	   with	   a	   subject	   obeying	   a	   command	   to	   cause	  content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   (though	   this	   reason	   would	   almost	   always	   be	  overridden	  by	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  preventing	  unjust	  harm).	  	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  concession	  is	  consistent	  with	  what	  I	  claimed	  in	  the	  above	  text	  –	  that	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  subject	  is	  justified	  in	  obeying	  a	  mistaken	  command	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Before	   moving	   on,	   it	   is	   worth	   highlighting	   two	   implications	   of	   the	  authority-­‐based	   case	   for	   agent-­‐relativity	   sketched	   in	   this	   section.	   Firstly,	  the	  argument	  suggests	  that	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  can	  be	  generated	  even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  dependent	  reasons,	  upon	  which	  legitimate	  commands	  are	  based,	   are	   entirely	   agent-­‐neutral.	   Even	   in	   a	   world	   populated	   solely	   by	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons,	  authorities	  may	  still	  be	  able	   to	  serve	  their	  subjects	  by	   issuing	   commands	   enabling	   them	   to	   achieve	   greater	   conformity	   with	  those	  (agent-­‐neutral)	  reasons.	  But	  the	  reasons	  created	  by	  these	  commands	  will	   be	   agent-­‐relative.	   Legitimate	   commands	   may	   be	   understood	   as	   a	  species	  of	  what	  John	  Gardner	  and	  Brad	  Hooker	  have	  independently	  termed	  ‘derivative’	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons.204	  These	  are	  reasons	  for	  action	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  certain	  agents,	  but	  whose	  normative	  force	  is	  derived	  solely	  from	  their	  role	  in	  enabling	  the	  agent	  to	  achieve	  greater	  overall	  conformity	  with	  the	  ultimate,	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons.	  Secondly,	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  harm	  provides	  a	  novel	  argument	  for	  the	  existence	   of	   agent-­‐relative	   justifications	   for	   harming	   and,	   hence,	   for	   the	  possibility	   of	   conflicts	   of	   permissible	   harming,	   which	   is	   immune	   from	  objections	   pressed	   against	   standard,	   partiality-­‐based	   accounts	   of	   agent-­‐relative	   justification.	   These	   two	   forms	   of	   agent-­‐relative	   justification	   –	  partiality-­‐based	   and	   authority-­‐based	   –	   are	   entirely	   separable,	   in	   that	   one	  can	   reject	   the	   former	   while	   endorsing	   the	   latter.	   Hence,	   it	   is	   not	   only	   a	  commitment	  to	  Completeness	  that	  is	  undermined	  by	  reflection	  on	  authority.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	   others	   have	   a	   reason	   not	   to	   prevent	   them	   from	   doing	   –	   since	   there	   will	   be	   cases	  (perhaps	  the	  majority	  of	  cases)	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  has	  undefeated	  instrumental	  reasons	  to	  obey,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  intrinsic	  value	  realised	  by	  obedience.	  	  Furthermore,	  and	  more	   importantly,	   I	  believe	   that	   this	  concession	   is	  consistent	  with	  my	   core	   claim	   that	   Immunity	  does	   not	   apply	   to	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   harm,	  even	   if	   it	   shows	   that	   my	   Second	   Claim	   –	   interpreted	   strictly	   –	   requires	   modification.	   It	  remains	   the	   case	   that	   the	   subject’s	   justification	   for	   obeying	   a	   command	   to	   cause	   unjust	  harm	  does	   not	   give	   other	   agents	   reason	   to	   refrain	   from	  defensively	   harming	   them.	   In	   a	  case	   in	  which	  some	  intrinsic	  value	   is	  realised	  by	  a	  subject	  obeying	  such	  a	  command,	  this	  value	   does	   not	   justify	   the	   subject	   in	   doing	   so.	   Her	   justification	   lies	   in	   her	   instrumental	  reasons.	  So,	  even	  if	  we	  accept	  that,	  in	  such	  cases,	  agents	  do	  have	  a	  pro	  tanto	  reason	  not	  to	  defensively	  harm	  the	  subject,	  this	  reason	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  justify	  the	   subject	   in	   causing	   unjust	   harm.	   It	   remains	   the	   case	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   subject	   is	  
justified	  does	  not	  raise	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  on	  defensively	  harming	  them,	  even	  if	  other	  facts	   –	   such	   as	   the	   intrinsic	   value	   realised	  by	   the	   subject’s	   obedience	   –	  may	   give	   rise	   to	  reasons	  against	  defensively	  harming	  the	  subject.	  204	  John	  Gardner,	  Offences	  and	  Defences	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.65.	  Brad	  Hooker,	  Ideal	  Code,	  Real	  World	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  p.110.	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If	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   harm	   is	   defensible,	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   agent-­‐neutrality	  of	   justifications	   for	  harm	  and	  to	  the	   impossibility	  of	  conflicts	  of	  permissible	  harming	  are	  also	  not	  tenable.	  	  I	   will	   return	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   agent-­‐relativity	   of	   authoritative	  commands	  in	  Sections	  5.10	  and	  5.11.	  	  
4.16	  Authority	  and	  Constraints	  	  The	  preceding	   section	  provided	   an	   argument	   for	  why	   Immunity	   need	  not	  hold	  in	  the	  case	  of	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  harming,	  thus	  allowing	  us	  to	  avoid	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  encountered	  earlier.	  An	  additional	  argument	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  second	  horn	  –	  that	   defensively	   harming	   authorised	   agents	   is	   justified	   in	   cases	   such	   as	  
Police	   Officer,	   in	   which	   resistance	   seems	   intuitively	   impermissible.	   This	  conclusion	   seems	   to	   follow	   from	   the	   denial	   of	   Immunity	   in	   the	   case	   of	  authority-­‐based	  justifications.	  This	  final	  section	  provides	  an	  additional	  argument	  for	  why	  resisting	  an	  authorised	   threatener	   may	   be	   impermissible	   in	   cases	   of	   this	   type.	   The	  argument	   needs	   to	   provide	   a	   plausible,	   non-­‐ad	   hoc	   account	   of	   the	  conditions	   under	   which	   resisting	   an	   authorised	   threatener	   is	   unjustified	  which	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   threatener	   possesses	  justification.	  This	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  tacit	  appeal	  to	  Immunity,	  which	  must	  be	  avoided	  on	  pain	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma.	  	  Thus	   far,	   I	  have	   focussed	  on	  one	   important	  normative	  consequence	  of	  legitimate	   commands	   –	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   justification	   for	   causing	   harm	  where	   none	   existed	   antecedently.	   In	   order	   to	   explain	   why	   resisting	  authorised	  threateners	  is	  sometimes	  impermissible	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  wider	  range	  of	  normative	  consequences	  that	  commands	  are	  able	  to	  effect.	  In	   particular,	   in	   addition	   to	   providing	   agents	   with	   decisive	   reasons	   for	  performing	   content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   action,	   commands	   may	   also	  create	   decisive	   reasons	   for	   refraining	   from	   performing	   content-­‐dependently	   justified	   actions.	   If	   the	   idea	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	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for	   harming	   is	   defensible,	   the	   possibility	   of	   authority-­‐based	   constraints	  should	  also	  be.	  Once	   we	   recognise	   that	   legitimate	   commands	   may	   be	   capable	   of	  effecting	   this	  additional	   form	  of	  deontic	  alteration,	  we	  have	  an	  account	  of	  why,	   in	   cases	   like	   Police	   Officer,	   it	   may	   be	   impermissible	   to	   resist	   an	  authorised	  threat.	  The	  key	  feature	  of	  such	  cases	  is	  that	  the	  command	  that	  harm	  be	  caused	  is	  addressed	  to	  both	  the	  agent	  who	  carries	  out	  the	  harmful	  action	   and	   the	   agent	   who	  will	   suffer	   the	   resulting	   harm.	   	   Given	   this,	   the	  command	  affects	  the	  normative	  situation	  of	  both	  agents.	  The	  command	  [Joe	  be	   arrested!]	   may	   give	   the	   police	   officer	   a	   decisive	   reason	   to	   inflict	   the	  harm	   of	   arrest	   on	   Joe	   and	   give	   Joe	   a	   decisive	   reason	   not	   to	   exercise	   his	  normal	   right	   of	   self-­‐defence.205	  The	   idea	   here	   is	   that	   authorities	   acquire	  these	  twin	  moral	  powers	  because	  their	  having	  them	  serves	  their	  subjects,	  by	  enabling	  them	  to	  achieve	  the	  coordinative	  and	  adjudicative	  benefits	  of	  a	  system	   of	   law.206	  It	   is	   this	   dual	   exercise	   of	   authority,	   I	   contend,	   which	  explains	  why	   resisting	   authorised-­‐threateners	   is	   impermissible	   in	   certain	  cases.	  To	   clarify,	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   authority-­‐based-­‐constraint	   is	   not	   a	   tacit	  reaffirmation	   of	   Immunity.	   On	   this	   view,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   fact	   that	   that	   the	  authorised-­‐threatener	   possesses	   a	   justification	   for	   causing	   harm	   which	  explains	   why	   their	   victim	   is	   not	   justified	   in	   resisting	   in	   cases	   like	   Police	  
Officer.	  This	  is	  what	  Immunity	  would	  hold,	  since	  Immunity	  is	  an	  account	  of	  how	   justifications	   interact	   interpersonally.	   Rather,	   according	   to	   the	  authority-­‐based-­‐constraints	   explanation,	   both	   the	   authorised	   agent’s	  justification	   for	   causing	   harm	   and	   their	   victim’s	   lack	   of	   justification	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Of	  course,	  this	  reason	  will	  not	  always	  be	  decisive.	  If	  the	  harm	  faced	  by	  Joe	  were	  more	  serious	   –	   long	   term	   imprisonment	   for	   example	   –	   then	   Joe	   may	   be	   morally	   justified	   in	  resisting,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  subject	  to	  an	  authoritative	  command	  that	  he	  be	  harmed	  in	  this	  way.	  While	  the	  legal	  authority	  may	  be	  legitimate	  regarding	  Joe,	  in	  virtue	  of	  enabling	  to	  better	  comply	  with	  his	  reasons	  to,	   for	  example.	  coordinate	  with	  others	  and	  adjudicate	  disagreements	   impartially,	   these	   reasons	   are	   not	   absolute	   and	   may	   be	   overridden	   by	  countervailing	  considerations	  that	  fall	  outside	  of	  this	  domain,	  such	  as	  the	  costs	  Joe	  would	  have	  to	  bear	  by	  obeying	  the	  authority.	  206	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  authorities	  may	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects	  on	  grounds	  of	  adjudication,	   see	   Viehoff,	   ‘Debate:	   Procedure	   and	   Outcome	   in	   the	   Justification	   of	  Authority’.	  
	  	   158	  
resisting	   are	   explained	   by	   the	   same	   antecedent	   condition	   –	   a	   legitimate	  command	   issued	   by	   an	   authority.	   Each	   of	   these	   normative	   effects	   are	  independent	  of	  one	  another,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  one	  does	  not	  entail	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   other.	   There	   is	   no	   interaction	   between	   an	  authorised-­‐threatener’s	   justification	   for	   harming	   and	   the	   normative	  situation	  of	  their	  victim,	  though	  the	  two	  are	  related	  by	  a	  shared	  antecedent.	  This	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   there	  may	   be	   cases	   in	  which	  subjects	  are	  prohibited	  from	  using	  defensive	  force	  by	  the	  command	  of	   an	   authority,	   but	   where	   the	   agent	   who	   threatens	   them	   lacks	   any	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  
Invasion 207 :	   A	   small	   island	   nation	   (A)	   is	   facing	   wholly	   unjustified	  annexation	  by	  a	  more	  powerful	  neighbour	   (B).	  A’s	   government	  possesses	  legitimate	   authority	   over	   its	   citizens	   regarding	   the	   domain	   of	   national	  defence	  and,	  after	  assessing	  the	  expected	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  commands	  its	  citizens	  not	  to	  resist	  B’s	  agents.	  	  	  In	   this	   case,	   under	   the	   Authority	   View,	   resistance	   is	   rendered	  impermissible	   by	   the	   authority’s	   command.	   But	   it	   is	   clearly	   not	   the	   case	  that	  the	  prohibition	  on	  resistance	  is	  tracking	  justification	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  aggressors,	   since	   the	   aggressors	   lack	   any	   justification.	   Cases	   such	   as	   this	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   authority-­‐based	   constraints	   are	   entirely	   separable	  from	   the	   threatener’s	   justification	   and,	   therefore,	   that	   no	   tacit	   appeal	   to	  
Immunity	  is	  being	  made	  	  
4.17	  Conclusion	  	  Reflection	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   justification	   of	   harm	   and	   the	  justification	  of	   authority	   reveals	   that	   certain	  widely	  held	   views	   about	   the	  ethics	   of	   harm	   –	   Completeness	   and	   Immunity	   –	   are	   only	   tenable	   in	  conjunction	  with	   the	   view	   that	   the	   command	  of	   an	   authority	   cannot	   give	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	  This	   case	   is	   inspired	   by	   Anna	   Stilz’s	   description	   of	   the	   annexation	   of	   Hawaii	   by	   the	  United	   States	   in	   1893.	   Stilz	   ‘Authority,	   Self-­‐Determination	   and	   Community	   in	  Cosmopolitan	  War’.	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Chapter	  5	  –	  Authority	  and	  War	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  set	  out	  and	  defended	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm,	  which	  aimed	  to	  demonstrate	  that,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  the	  commands	  of	  authorities	  may	  alter	  the	  deontic	  status	  of	  acts	  of	  harming.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  apply	  this	  fairly	  abstract	  account	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	   justification	  of	  authority	  and	  the	  morality	  of	   interpersonal	  harming	  to	  the	   specific	   case	   of	  warfare	   and	   to	   draw	  out	   its	   implications	   for	   just	  war	  theorising.	   In	   particular,	   I	   assess	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   Authority	   View	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion.	  I	  begin	  by	  providing	  a	  rough	  account	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  an	  authority	  may	   be	   legitimate	   regarding	  warfare	   under	   the	   Authority	   View	  and	   the	   normative	   consequences	   that	   follow	   from	   the	   possession	   of	   such	  authority	  (Section	  5.2).	  	  I	  then	  explain	  how	  these	  normative	  consequences	  enable	  a	  qualified	  defence	  of	   the	  authority	  criterion	   in	   its	  permissive	  role	  (Section	  5.3)	  and,	   to	  a	   lesser	  extent,	   its	  restrictive	  role	  (Section	  5.4).	  Most	  saliently,	  the	  Authority	  View	  holds	  that,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  individuals	  may	  be	  morally	  justified	  in	  obeying	  commands	  to	  participate	  in	  unjust	  wars.	  In	   Section	   5.5	   I	   compare	   and	   contrast	   the	   Authority	   View	   with	  reductivist	   approaches	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   war.	   I	   argue	   that	   while	   the	   two	  positions	  come	  apart	   in	   important	  respects,	   the	  Authority	  View	  is	  broadly	  compatible	   with	   the	   basic	   commitments	   underlying	   reductivism.	   I	  emphasise	  this	  point	  in	  Section	  5.6,	  where	  I	  point	  out	  that,	  contrary	  to	  what	  is	   often	   supposed,	   the	   view	   that	   the	   permissibility	   of	   conduct	   in	   war	   is	  authority-­‐sensitive	   need	   not	   invoke	   the	   idea	   that	   combatants	   who	   act	  under	   authority	   are	   thereby	   less	   morally	   responsible	   for	   their	   actions.	  Under	   the	   Authority	   View	   individuals	   remain	   fully	   responsible	   moral	  agents	  even	  when	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  authoritative	  institutions.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  clarify	  and	  refine	  the	  Authority	  View	  in	   light	   of	   two	   objections	   that	  may	   be	   pressed	   against	   it.	   In	   Section	   5.7	   I	  outline	   an	  objection	  which	  holds	   that	   the	  Authority	  View,	   even	   if	   correct,	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has	  very	  little	  practical	  relevance,	  because	  no	  real-­‐world	  authorities	  will	  in	  fact	   satisfy	   the	   conditions	   it	   requires	   for	   having	   legitimacy	   regarding	  warfare.	  In	  response	  (Section	  5.8),	  I	  argue	  that	  authority	  over	  warfare	  can	  be	  justified	  from	  much	  more	  modest	  assumptions	  about	  the	  character	  and	  competence	   of	   existing	   political	   authorities	   than	   one	  might	   think.	   This	   is	  because	   authority	   over	   warfare	   need	   not	   be	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing.	   Rather,	   an	  authority	  may	  be	   legitimate	   regarding	   certain	   aspects	   of	  warfare	   and	  not	  others,	  depending	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  In	  Sections	  5.9	  and	  5.10	  I	  refine	  my	   initial	  presentation	  of	   the	  Authority	  View	   in	   light	  of	   this	   ‘fine-­‐grained’	  approach	  to	  justifying	  authority	  over	  warfare.	  In	   Section	   5.11	   I	   outline	   a	   second	   objection,	   which	   argues	   that	   the	  Authority	  View,	  when	  applied	  to	  war,	  falls	  foul	  of	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection	  that	   I	   pressed	   against	   non-­‐reductivist	   views	   in	   Chapter	   3.	   The	   objection	  draws	   its	   force	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   the	   Authority	   View	   and	   non-­‐reductivist	   views	   offer	   agent-­‐relative	   forms	   of	   justification	   for	   killing	   in	  war.	   	   In	   response	   (Section	   5.12),	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   subtle,	   but	  important,	  difference	  between	   the	   forms	  of	   agent-­‐relativity	   that	  underpin	  each	  view,	  which	  shows	  that	  that	  Authority	  View	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection	  to	  nearly	  the	  extent	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  is.	  However,	  I	  concede	  that	  there	  will	  be	  special	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  justify	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants,	   but	   I	   argue	   that	   this	  conclusion	  is	  defensible	  in	  these	  cases.	  Section	  5.13	  concludes.	  	  
5.2	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War:	  A	  First	  Cut	  	  According	  to	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm,	  defended	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  under	   certain	   conditions,	   the	   command	   of	   an	   authority	   is	   capable	   of	  altering	   the	   deontic	   status	   of	   acts	   of	   harming.	   This	   view	  was	   derived	   by	  applying	  a	  more	  general	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  to	  a	  particular	  class	  of	  harm-­‐apt	  domains.	  According	  to	  resulting	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm:	  	  
The	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm:	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  regarding	  a	  domain	  of	  reasons	  that	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm,	   if	  B	  achieves	  greater	  overall	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conformity	   with	   these	   reasons	   by	   obeying	   A’s	   commands	   than	   by	   not	  obeying.	  	  On	  this	  view,	  when	  an	  authority	   is	   legitimate	  regarding	  a	  subject	  within	  a	  harm-­‐apt	  domain,	   that	  authority	  has	   the	  moral	  power	  to	  give	  that	  subject	  undefeated	   reasons	   to	   cause	   or	   refrain	   from	   causing	   harm.	   Importantly,	  this	  may	   be	   true	   even	   in	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   agent	  would	   otherwise	   have	  sufficient	   or	   decisive	   reason	   not	   to	   act	   as	   commanded.	   This	   is	   because	  authorities	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  infallible	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  their	  legitimating	  service.	  The	  commands	  of	  legitimate	  authorities	  remain	  binding	  even	  when	  they	  are	  (non-­‐clearly)	  mistaken	  and	  fail	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason.	  Commands	  are	   thus	   capable	   of	   providing	   an	   independent	   source	  of	   both	   justification	  for	  causing	  harm	  and	  constraints	  on	  causing	  harm.	  	  We	  can	  draw	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm	  for	  just	  war	  theorising	  by	  a	  further	  stage	  of	  domain-­‐specification.	  For	  our	  purposes,	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  one	  particular	  harm-­‐apt	  domain	  –	  that	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	   govern	   the	   distribution	   of	   harm	   by	  means	   of	   war.	  According	   to	   the	  resulting	  Authority	  View	  of	  War:	  
	  
The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War:	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	   warfare,	   if,	   by	   obeying	   A’s	   commands,	   B	   achieves	   greater	   overall	  conformity	  with	  the	  reasons	  that	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  war	  than	  by	  not	  obeying.	  	  The	   Authority	   View	   of	  War	   provides	   a	   very	   general	   account	   of	   what	   the	  possession	   of	  war-­‐waging	   authority	   consists	   in	   and	   the	  normative	   effects	  that	   follow	   from	   its	  possession.	  To	  possess	   legitimate	  authority	  regarding	  war	   is	   to	   possess	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   provide	   subjects	   with	   undefeated	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  action	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare,	  including	  actions	   that	   involve	   causing	   serious	  harm	   to	  others.208	  I	  will	   offer	   a	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208For	  a	  different	  application	  of	  a	  service	  account	  of	  authority	  to	  warfare,	  see	  Adil	  Ahmed	  Haque,	  ‘Law	  and	  Morality	  at	  War’,	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  8	  (2014),	  79-­‐97.	  Haque	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  war,	  whereas	  I	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  leaders	  and	  governments.	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refined	  version	  of	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	   in	  Section	  5.9	   in	   light	  of	   the	  discussion	  to	  follow.	  
	  
5.3.	  A	  Qualified	  Defence	  of	  the	  Permissive	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  	  With	  this	  account	  of	  legitimate	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  to	  hand,	  we	  are	  now	  in	   a	   position	   to	   provide	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	   traditional	   just	   war	  authority	   criterion.	   I	   start	   with	   the	   permissive	   role	   of	   the	   criterion.	  According	  to	  the	  permissive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  criterion,	  as	  formulated	  in	  Chapter	  2:	  
	  
The	   Permissive	   Authority	   Criterion:	   If	   an	   agent	   participates	   in	   war	   on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  possesses	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  properties,	  then	  that	  agent	  is	  subject	  to	  more	  extensive	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  than	  if	  they	  fought	  privately,	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  which	  lacks	  that	  set	  of	  properties.	  	  	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  the	  properties	  that	  are	  capable	   of	   generating	   this	   normative	   effect,	   through	   the	   notion	   of	   an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm.	  If	  an	  authority	  is	  legitimate	  over	  a	  subject	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	  reasons	  that	  determine	  right	  action	  in	  war,	   that	   authority’s	   commands	  may	  provide	   the	   subject	  with	  decisive	  reason	   for	   causing	  harm,	   even	  when	   that	   harm	  would	  not	   be	   justified	   on	  the	   basis	   of	   the	   command-­‐independent	   reasons.	  More	   specifically,	   acts	   of	  killing	  and	  injuring	  in	  war	  may	  be	  morally	  justified	  even	  when	  the	  recipient	  of	   harm	   possesses	   a	   right	   against	   its	   infliction	   and	   their	   right	   is	   neither	  waived	  nor	  overridden	  by	  weightier	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  harming.	  	  	  The	  most	   salient	   implication	   of	   the	  Authority	   View	   of	  War	   is	   that	   the	  command	   of	   an	   authority	   may	   provide	   an	   agent	   with	   a	   justification	   for	  participating	   in	  a	  war	   that	   is	  ad	  bellum	  unjustified.	   If	  a	  subject	  will	  better	  conform	   to	   reason	   by	   obeying	   an	   authority	   on	   matters	   of	   jus	   ad	   bellum	  compared	   to	   not	   obeying,	   then	   they	   have	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	   reason	   to	  obey	   the	   commands	   of	   that	   authority	   regarding	   participation	   in	   wars.	  Importantly,	   this	   includes	   commands	   that	   fail	   to	   reflect	   right	   reason	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(though	  not	  clearly	  so),	  and	  require	  participation	  in	  wars	  that	  are	  ad	  bellum	  
unjustified.	  I	  discuss	  this	  implication	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  5.8.	  It	   is	   worth	   making	   clear	   that,	   on	   this	   view,	   it	   is	   the	   command	   of	   a	  legitimate	  authority	   itself	   that	  provides	   the	  subject	  with	  a	   justification	   for	  causing	  harm,	  by	  placing	  them	  under	  an	  undefeated	  obligation	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  view	   is	   not,	   as	   some	   have	   suggested,	   that	   the	   normative	   effect	   of	  participating	   in	   war	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   legitimate	   authority	   is	   to	   alter	   the	  conditions	  of	  permissible	  self-­‐defence.	  On	  this	  alternative	  view,	  agents	  who	  obey	  legitimate	  commands	  to	  fight	  in	  unjust	  wars	  are	  permitted	  in	  causing	  harm	   to	   their	   opponents	   because	   they	   retain	   their	   normal	   rights	   of	   self-­‐defence,	  which	   they	  would	  have	   forfeited	   if	   they	   fought	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  authority. 209 	  The	   Authority	   View,	   by	   contrast,	   makes	   no	   appeal	   to	  considerations	   of	   self-­‐defence.	   It	   holds	   that	   authorised	   agents	   may	   be	  justified	  in	  causing	  unjust	  harm	  in	  war,	  despite	   lacking	  a	  permission	  to	  do	  so	  on	  grounds	  of	  self-­‐defence.210	  
	  
5.4	  A	  Qualified	  Defence	  of	  the	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion	  	  I	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   War	   can	  provide	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  in	  its	  standard	  restrictive	  role.	  As	   formulated	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   restrictive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion:	   In	   order	   for	   a	  war	   to	   be	   justified,	   it	  must	   be	   initiated	   and	   fought	   by	   an	   entity	   that	   possesses	   a	   certain	   set	   of	  properties.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  Estlund,	   ‘On	  Following	  Orders	  in	  an	  Unjust	  War’,	  p.226.	  (Though	  Estlund	  qualifies	  this	  at	  p.228.)	  See	  also,	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  pp.160-­‐161.	  	  210	  The	  Authority	   View	   is	   therefore	   consistent	  with	  McMahan’s	   claim	   that	   “a	   person	   can	  have	  no	  right	  of	  defense	  against	  a	  threatened	  harm	  to	  which	  he	  has	  made	  himself	  liable.”	  
Killing	   in	  War,	   p.14.	  What	   it	   denies	   is	   that	   a	   person’s	   liability	   for	   threatening	   an	   unjust	  harm	  entails	  that	  they	  have	  no	  permission	  to	  cause	  that	  harm,	  since	  it	  posits	  an	  additional	  form	   of	   justification	   that	   obtains	   independently	   of	   considerations	   of	   liability	   and	   self-­‐defence.	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The	  Authority	  View	  does	  not	  support	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  criterion.	  It	  provides	   an	   account	   of	   what	   legitimate	  war-­‐waging	   authority	   consists	   in	  and	  the	  normative	  consequences	  that	  follow	  from	  its	  possession.	  It	  makes	  no	   particular	   claims	   about	   the	   normative	   consequences	   of	   its	   absence.211	  More	   specifically,	   it	   does	   not	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   impermissible	   for	   agents	   to	  initiate	  and	  wage	  wars	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  legitimate	  authority.	  	  In	  fact,	  more	  strongly,	  the	  Authority	  View	  cannot	  support	  such	  a	  claim.	  As	   explained	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   restrictive	   authority	   criterion	   rests	   on	   a	  certain	  view	  about	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	  for	  causing	  harm	  that	  apply	  to	  individuals	  qua	  private	  actors,	  independently	  of	  authoritative	  institutions	  –	  that	   these	   justifications	   are	   insufficient	   to	   justify	   the	   scale	   and	   type	   of	  harming	   constitutive	   of	   war.	   Given	   the	   justificatory	   structure	   of	   service	  accounts	  of	  authority,	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  is	  incompatible	  with	  this	  position.	  Service	  accounts	  are	  based	  on	  what	  Stephen	  Perry	  has	  termed	  the	  ‘Political	   Subordination	   Thesis’,	   which	   holds	   that	   the	   only	   reasons	  which	  may	   be	   ultimately	   be	   appealed	   to	   in	   justifying	   authority	   are	   those	  which	  apply	  to	   individuals	   in	  their	  private	  capacity.212	  Given	  this,	   in	  order	  for	  an	  authority	  to	  legitimately	  command	  subjects	  to	  perform	  certain	  acts	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  act	  is	  of	  a	  type	  that	  could	  be	  justified	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  private	  reasons.	  Hence,	  if	  it	  were	  true	  that	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  individuals	  qua	  private	  actor	  are	  incapable	  of	  justifying	  the	  waging	  of	  wars,	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  render	  participation	  in	  war	   permissible	   on	   service-­‐based	   grounds.	   In	   other	  words,	   if	   pacifism	   is	  true	  at	  the	  level	  of	  private	  morality,	  it	  remains	  true	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  morality.	   In	   the	   terminology	   that	   I	   have	   adopted,	   if	   this	   conception	   of	  permissible	   interpersonal	  harming	   is	   true,	  warfare	  would	  not	  be	   a	  harm-­‐apt	  domain.	  	  This	  point	  highlights	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  war	  and	  the	  conception	  of	  war	  and	  authority	  present	   in	  classical	   just	  war	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  Beyond	  the	   trivial	  point	   that,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  authority,	   the	  permissibility	  of	  agent’s	  conduct	  in	  war	  will	  be	  determined	  solely	  by	  authority-­‐independent	  reasons.	  212	  Stephen	  Perry,	   ‘Political	  Authority	   and	  Political	  Obligation’,	   in	  Leslie	  Green	  and	  Brian	  Leiter	   (eds),	   Oxford	   Studies	   in	   Philosophy	   of	   Law:	   Volume	   2	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	   2013),	   1-­‐74	   at	   p.58.	   	   For	   Raz’s	   endorsement	   of	   the	   thesis,	   see	   The	   Morality	   of	  
Freedom,	  p.72.	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theory,	   discussed	   in	   Chapters	   1	   and	   2.	   While	   both	   views	   hold	   that	  individuals	  who	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  legitimate	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  enjoy	  a	  more	   extensive	   range	   of	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm,	   the	   classical	   view	  denies	  the	  Political	  Subordination	  Thesis.	  Since,	  on	  this	  view,	  the	  waging	  of	  wars	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  permissible	  interpersonal	  harming,	  the	  role	  played	  by	  authority	   in	   justifying	  participation	  cannot	  be	  explained	   in	  terms	  of	   private	  morality.	  On	   the	   classical	   view,	   if	   acting	  under	   authority	  serves	   to	   justify	   actions	   in	   war	   that	   would	   not	   otherwise	   be	   morally	  permitted,	   it	   must	   be	   because	   actions	   carried	   out	   under	   authority	   are	  governed	  by	  moral	  principles	  that	  are	  sui	  generis.	  	  This	   discussion	   also	   reveals	   an	   interesting	   tension	   between	   my	  qualified	  defence	  of	   the	  permissive	  authority	   criterion	  put	   forward	   in	   the	  previous	   section	   and	   the	   standard,	   restrictive	   understanding	   of	   the	  criterion’s	  role.	  The	  affirmation	  of	  the	  former	  entails	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  order	  for	  individuals	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  causing	  harm	  in	  war	  in	  virtue	  of	  an	  authoritative	   command	   –	   as	   the	   former	   claims	   –	   it	   has	   to	   be	   true	   that	  individuals	   could	   potentially	   be	   morally	   justified	   in	   inflicting	   warlike	  violence	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  authority	  –	  as	  the	  latter	  denies.	  	  However,	   the	   inability	  of	   the	  Authority	  View	  to	  support	   the	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion	  need	  not	  count	  against	  the	  view.	  As	  explained	  Chapter	  2,	  the	   permissive	   and	   restrictive	   interpretations	   of	   the	   criterion	   make	  logically	   independent	  claims,	   in	   that	  a	  commitment	  to	  one	  does	  not	  entail	  any	  commitment	  to	  the	  other.	  Furthermore,	  as	  we	  saw,	  there	  are	  powerful	  objections	   to	   the	   view	   that	   aggregates	   of	   private	   individuals	   cannot	   fight	  justified	  wars,	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  First	  Spectrum	  Argument.	  Given	  this,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  not,	  indeed	  cannot,	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  justified	  private	  war	  may	  count	  in	  its	  favour.	  Reductivists	  are	  correct	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  traditional	  restrictive	  criterion	  is	   indefensible	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  jettisoned.	  213	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Despite	   the	   incompatibility	   of	   the	   Authority	   View	   with	   the	   restrictive	   criterion,	   it	   is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  under	  certain	  contingent	  circumstances,	  the	  Authority	  View	  could	  support	  something	  like	  this	  version	  of	  the	  criterion.	  For	  example,	  it	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  group	   of	   individuals,	   acting	   on	   their	   own	   assessment	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	   govern	   the	  initiation	   and	   waging	   of	   war,	   would	   achieve	   a	   sufficiently	   poor	   level	   of	   success	   at	  conforming	   to	   reason	   that	   they	  would	   be	  morally	   required	   to	   adopt	   a	   blanket	   policy	   of	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The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  does,	  however,	  contain	   the	  resources	   for	  a	  revised	  and	  weakened	  interpretation	  of	  the	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion.	  This	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  authority-­‐based	  constraint	  on	  causing	  harm,	  as	  outlined	   in	  Section	  4.15.	  Under	   the	  Authority	  View,	  an	  authority	  that	  is	  legitimate	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  reasons	  governing	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm	   by	   means	   of	   war	   possesses	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   give	   its	   subjects	  decisive	  reasons	  not	  to	  initiate	  or	  participate	  in	  wars.	  This	  may	  be	  so	  even	  in	   cases	   in	  which	   the	  war	   satisfies	   all	   the	   conditions	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	   and	  participation	   would	   be	   straightforward	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  authority-­‐independent	  reasons.	  The	  Authority	  View	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  additional	  and	  independent	  constraint	  on	  participation	  in	  war.	  A	  group	  of	  individuals	  may	  possess	  a	  just	  cause	  and	  the	  means	  to	  prosecute	  it	  at	  a	  proportionate	   cost,	   and	   yet	   be	   under	   an	   undefeated	   obligation	   to	   refrain	  from	  doing	  so.214	  	  One	   might	   think	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   authority-­‐based	   constraint	   on	  participation	  in	  war	  has	  very	  narrow	  scope,	  since	  it	  only	  applies	  to	  agents	  who	   are	   subject	   to	   authorities	   that	   are	   legitimate	   over	   the	   domain	   of	  warfare.	   It	   therefore	   cannot	   really	   provide	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   restrictive	  authority	   criterion,	  which	  claims	   to	  provide	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	   the	  justification	   of	   all	   wars.	   However,	   we	   can	   reformulate	   the	   criterion	   as	  follows:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  never	   resorting	   to	  war.	   In	   other	  words,	   given	   their	   abilities	   they	  ought	   to	  be	   contingent	  pacifists.	   Furthermore,	   it	   could	   be	   the	   case	   that	   an	   authority	   is	   able	   to	   serve	   these	  individuals	   regarding	   the	  ad	  bellum	   reasons,	   thereby	  enabling	   them	   to	  achieve	  a	   level	  of	  conformity	  with	   reason	   above	   the	   threshold	   below	  which	   pacifism	   is	  mandatory.	   Under	  these	  background	  conditions,	   it	  would	  perhaps	  be	  true	  that	  these	  individuals	  would	  only	  be	   permitted	   to	   resort	   to	   war	   if	   sanctioned	   by	   the	   authority.	   In	   other	   words,	   these	  individuals,	   in	   these	   circumstances,	   would	   subject	   to	   something	   like	   the	   restrictive	  authority	  criterion.	  But,	  of	  course,	  these	  conditions	  are	  highly	  stipulative	  and	  do	  not	  hold	  universally.	   The	   possibility	   of	   such	   cases	   therefore	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   defence	   of	   the	  traditional	  restrictive	  authority	  criterion,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  wars.	  214	  Again,	   clearly	  mistaken	  commands	  do	  not	   impose	  such	  obligations,	  even	  when	   issued	  by	  an	  authority	  that	  is	  generally	  legitimate.	  In	  such	  cases,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  use	  of	  force	  may	  be	  justified	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  command	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  To	  give	  a	  speculative	  example,	  it	  may	  have	  been	   the	  case	   that	  UN	  peacekeeping	   forces	   in	  Rwanda	   in	  early	  1994,	   led	  by	  Gen.	   Romeo	   Dallaire,	   would	   have	   been	   justified	   in	   using	   force	   to	   prevent	   the	   unfolding	  genocide,	   despite	   being	   ordered	   not	   to	   intervene	   by	   their	   superiors.	   If	   we	   grant	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   UN	   leadership	   at	   the	   time	   possessed	   legitimate	   authority	   over	   its	  agents	   on	   service-­‐based	   grounds,	   such	   a	   command	   may	   still	   have	   been	   invalidated	   as	  clearly	  mistake,	  given	  the	  obviousness	  of	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  ground.	  For	  a	  first-­‐hand	  account,	  see	   Romeo	   Dallaire,	   Shake	   Hands	   With	   the	   Devil:	   The	   Failure	   of	   Humanity	   in	   Rwanda	  (Toronto:	  Random	  House,	  2003).	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The	  Revised	  Restrictive	  Authority	  Criterion:	  An	  agent’s	  participation	  in	  a	  war	  is	  justified	  only	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  authoritative	  command	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so.	  	  	  This	  negative	  formulation	  of	  the	  criterion	  is	  attractive	  in	  that	  it	  is	  universal	  in	   scope	   –	   placing	   an	   authority-­‐based	   requirement	   on	   permissible	  participation	   in	   all	  wars	   –	  while	   not	   ruling	   out	   the	   possibility	   of	   justified	  wars	   fought	  by	   individuals	   in	   their	  private	  capacity.	  This	   is	  because	   there	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  criterion	  can	  be	  satisfied.	  Firstly,	  a	  war	  may	  be	  sanctioned	   by	   an	   agent	   or	   institution	   with	   the	   appropriate	   war-­‐making	  authority.	  Secondly,	  a	  war	  may	  be	  fought	  by	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  legitimate	  war-­‐making	  authority.	  In	  both	  kinds	  of	  case,	  the	  potential	   belligerents	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   an	   authority-­‐based	   constraint	   on	  participation.	  	  	  
5.5	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  and	  Reductivism	  	  This	  qualified	  defence	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  sceptical	   arguments	   offered	   by	   reductivists	   in	   support	   of	   jettisoning	   the	  authority	   criterion	   from	   just	  war	   theorising.	   In	   particular,	  my	   defence	   of	  the	   permissive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   criterion	   denies	   the	   core	   reductivist	  claim	  that	  acts	  of	  killing	  and	  injuring	  in	  war	  are	  only	  permissible	  given	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil	  justification,	  thus	  providing	  a	  qualified	  defence	   of	   the	   permissibility	   of	   fighting	   in	   unjust	   wars.	   In	   this	   section	   I	  clarify	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  by	  drawing	  out	  more	  precisely	  the	  points	  at	   which	   it	   diverges	   from	   reductivism.	   I	   aim	   to	   show	   that,	   despite	   their	  important	  differences,	  my	  defence	  of	  the	  authority	  criterion	  shares	  some	  of	  the	  core	  commitments	  of	  a	  reductivist	  view.	  	  As	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  a	  major	  source	  of	  motivation	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	   authority	   criterion	   within	   the	   just	   war	   tradition	   is	   a	   commitment	   –	  either	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   –	   to	   the	   view	   that	   conduct	   in	   war	   is	   morally	  exceptional,	   governed	   by	   a	   distinct,	   and	   more	   permissive,	   set	   of	   moral	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norms	   than	   those	   that	   apply	   to	   ordinary	   cases	   of	   interpersonal	   harming.	  Given	   this,	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   2	   that	   the	   reductivist	   commitment	   to	   the	  Continuity	   Thesis	   –	   which	   holds	   that	   killing	   and	   injuring	   in	   war	   are	  governed	   by	   precisely	   the	   same	  moral	   principles	   that	   govern	   killing	   and	  injuring	   in	   all	   other	   contexts	   –	   undermines	   one	   powerful	   source	   of	  conceptual	   pressure	   for	   including	   an	   authority	   criterion	   within	   just	   war	  theory.	  	  My	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   is	   wholly	   compatible	   with	   the	  Continuity	   Thesis.	   It	   does	   not	   argue	   that	   war,	   or	   political	   action	   more	  generally,	   is	  in	  any	  sense	  morally	  sui	  generis.	  Rather,	  it	  aims	  to	  defend	  the	  criterion	   by	   applying	   a	   very	   general	   account	   of	   how	   one	   individual’s	  authority	   over	   another	   can	   be	   justified	   –	   which	   does	   so	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  individuals	  in	  their	  private	  capacity	  –	  to	  the	  particular	  domain	  of	  warfare.	  The	  argumentative	  strategy	  has	  been	  to	  show	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  a	  service-­‐based	  account	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  more	  mundane	  domains	  of	  action	  in	  which	  authority	  is	  usually	  discussed,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  basis	   for	   denying	   that	   subjects	   may	   have	   duties	   to	   obey	   in	   harm-­‐apt	  domains,	  including	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare.	  In	  fact,	  this	  argument	  only	  goes	  through	   given	   the	   truth	   of	   the	   Continuity	   Thesis.	   To	   deny	   that	   a	   service	  account	  of	  authority	   is	  applicable	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare	  would	  require	  one	   to	   argue	   that	   war	   is	   morally	   anomalous	   in	   some	   important	   respect,	  thus	  violating	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis.	  Furthermore,	   the	   employment	   of	   a	   service	   account	   in	   defence	   of	   the	  authority	   criterion	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   individualistic	   and	   aggregative	  approach	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   warfare	   endorsed	   by	   reductivists.	   On	   such	   an	  account,	   authority	   claims	   are	   evaluated	   solely	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   authority	   and	   each	   individual	   over	   whom	   it	  claims	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  obligations.	  The	  relationships	  between	  subjects	  plays	  no	   independent	   role	  here.	  The	  extent	  of	  an	  authority’s	   legitimacy	   is	  simply	   the	   sum	  of	   its	   legitimacy	  over	   individuals.	   As	  Raz	  puts	   it,	   “it	   is	   an	  advantage	   of	   the	   analysis…that	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   accounting	   for	   authority	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over	  a	  group	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  authority	  relations	  between	  individuals.”215	  	  So,	  while	   my	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion	   places	   substantial	   moral	  significance	  on	  the	   fact	   that	  wars	  are	  often	  waged	  by	  political	  authorities,	  which	   reductivists	   are	   deeply	   hostile	   to,	   it	   does	   so	   while	   maintaining	   a	  commitment	   to	   the	   view	   that	   individuals	   are	   the	   ultimate	   unit	   of	   moral	  concern.216	  	  Where	   the	   Authority	   View	   and	   reductivism	   do	   come	   apart	   sharply	   is	  over	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  Content	  Thesis	  –	  the	  view	  that	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  justifications	   exhaust	   the	   range	  of	   justifications	   for	   killing	   and	   injuring	   in	  war.	   The	   Authority	   View	   denies	   the	   Content	   Thesis,	   since	   it	   holds	   that	  subject	  of	  authorities	  may,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  be	  obligated	  to	  cause	  harm	   that	   is	   not	   justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   these	   twin	  principles.	   But	   if	   the	  arguments	   of	   Chapter	   4	   are	   successful,	   this	   is	   the	   correct	   conclusion	   to	  draw.	   The	   Content	   Thesis	   is	   false,	   for	   the	   same	   reason	   that	   the	   broader	  view	  that	  I	   termed	  Completeness	   is	   false.	  Reductivists,	  and	  theorists	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  harming	  more	  generally,	  hold	  a	  mistakenly	  narrow	  view	  of	  the	  range	  of	  justifications	  for	  causing	  harm.	  	  The	   Authority	   View	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   reductivist	   insight	   that	   certain	  actions	  in	  war	  commonly	  assumed	  to	  be	  permissible	  –	  such	  as	  participating	  in	   an	   unjust	   war	   –	   involve	   extremely	   grave	   rights	   violations.	   Rather,	   it	  denies	  the	  intuitive	  assumption	  upon	  which	  the	  Content	  Thesis	  rests	  –	  that	  commands	  to	  perform	  such	  actions	  cannot	  give	  subjects	  undefeated	  reason	  to	   obey.	   The	   Authority	   View	   sets	   out	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   such	  commands	  need	  not	  exceed	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  obey.	  However,	  while	   the	  Authority	  View	  denies	   that	   liability	  and	   lesser-­‐evil	  exhaust	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	   killing	   and	   injuring	   in	   war,	   the	  Content	   Thesis	   may	   still	   play	   an	   important	   justificatory	   role	   within	   the	  Authority	  View.	  On	  a	  service-­‐based	  view,	  authorities	  are	  justified	  in	  virtue	  of	   their	   enabling	   subjects	   to	   better	   conform	   to	   the	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	  Raz,	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  p.71.	  216	  The	  Authority	  View	  is	  thus	  consistent	  with	  McMahan’s	  position	  that	  “There	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  relations	  that	  people	  establish	  among	  themselves	  within	  a	  state	  that	  can	  extend	  their	  permissions	  to	  harm	  people	  outside	  the	  state”.	  McMahan,	   ‘War’,	  p.310	  (emphasis	  added).	  What	   the	   Authority	   View	   denies	   is	   that	   the	   relations	   between	   each	   individual	   and	   a	  common	  authority	  cannot	  extend	  their	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm.	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them	  independently.	  But	  service	  accounts	  are	  entirely	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  these	  substantive	  first-­‐order	  reasons	  consist	  in.217	  Given	  this,	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  Content	  Thesis	  being	   correct	   as	   an	   exhaustive	   account	   of	   the	   authority-­‐independent	  reasons	   that	   govern	   the	   permissibility	   of	   causing	   harm	   in	   war.	   While	   it	  denies	   that	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   exhaust	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	  harming,	  it	  can	  accept	  the	  view	  that	  all	  justifications	  for	  harming	  in	  war	  are	  ultimately,	  if	  sometimes	  indirectly,	  grounded	  in	  those	  two	  principles.	  	  This	   potential	   justificatory	   relationship	   between	   the	   notion	   of	   an	  authority-­‐based	   justification	   for	   harm	   and	   the	   forms	   of	   justification	  specified	   in	   the	   Content	   Thesis	   highlights	   a	   key	   difference	   between	   the	  Authority	  View	  and	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  that	  also	  aim	  to	  deny	  the	  Content	  Thesis,	  such	  as	  the	  associative-­‐duty	  view	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  These	  views	  aim	  to	  deny	  the	  Content	  Thesis	  by	  positing	  the	  existence	  of	  additional	  justifications	  for	  harming	  at	  the	  level	  of	   the	   first-­‐order,	   authority-­‐independent	   reasons.	   They	   thus	   reject	   the	  Content	  Thesis	  at	  a	  more	  fundamental	   level	  than	  the	  Authority	  View	  need	  do.	  	  Of	  course,	  since	  service	  accounts	  are	  neutral	  regarding	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  subjects	  independently,	  the	  Authority	  View	  is	  also	  compatible	  with	  accounts	   of	   the	   ethics	   of	  war	   that	   deny	   the	   Content	   Thesis.	   For	   example,	  one	  could	  endorse	  both	   the	  associative-­‐duty	  view	  and	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	   War.	   On	   this	   combination	   of	   views,	   killing	   in	   war	   can	   be	   justified	   in	  virtue	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  individual’s	  duties	  to	  protect	  their	  associates,	  and	  an	   authority	   may	   acquire	   legitimacy	   over	   the	   domain	   of	   warfare	   by	  enabling	   its	   subjects	   to	   better	   discharge	   these	  duties.	   So,	   although	   I	   have	  stressed	  the	  (qualified)	  compatibility	  of	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  with	  a	  reductivist	  outlook,	   this	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  one	  has	  to	  be	  a	  reductivist	  in	  order	  to	  accept	  the	  Authority	  View.	  	  I	   conclude	   this	   section	  by	  providing	  a	  deflationary	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  Second	  Spectrum	  Argument	  for	  the	  Content	  Thesis,	  set	  out	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  
seems	   highly	   persuasive.	   Recall,	   in	   McMahan’s	   spectrum	   example,	   we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  Raz,	  ‘Facing	  Up’,	  pp.1184-­‐1185	  
	  	   172	  
consider	   an	   escalating	   range	   of	   cases,	   starting	   with	   a	   small-­‐scale	   case	   of	  interpersonal	   harming	   involving	   a	   handful	   of	   individuals	   exercising	   their	  rights	  of	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defence.	  We	  then,	  by	  a	  process	  of	  aggregating	  such	  cases,	   move	   along	   a	   spectrum	   of	   cases	   which	   eventually	   reach	   a	   level	   of	  violence	  constitutive	  of	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  	  Reductivists	   argue	   that	   if	   the	   range	   of	   justifications	   for	   harming	   is	  exhausted	   by	   considerations	   of	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	   in	   the	   small-­‐scale	  cases,	  then	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  harming	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  that	   the	   Content	   Thesis	   is	   true.	   All	   that	   changes	   as	   we	   move	   across	   the	  spectrum	   is	   that	   the	   cases	   become	   more	   complex,	   organised	   and	  protracted,	   but	   the	   basic	   moral	   principles	   are	   invariant.	   Given	   that	   the	  conditional	   claim	   seems	   highly	   plausible,	   as	   does	   the	   antecedent,	  reductivists	   conclude	   that	  we	  must	   reject	   the	   idea	   that	   individuals	   enjoy	  any	  additional	  permissions	   to	  cause	  harm	   in	  wars	   in	  virtue	  of	   fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity.	  	  The	   Authority	   View	   obviously	   rejects	   this	   conclusion.	   It	   accepts	   the	  conditional	   claim	   but	   denies	   the	   antecedent,	   holding	   that	   the	   range	   of	  potential	  justifications	  for	  harming	  is	  broader	  across	  the	  whole	  spectrum	  of	  cases.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  positing	  the	  possibility	  of	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  harming.	  The	   truth	  of	   the	  antecedent	  merely	  seems	  highly	  plausible	   in	  the	   small-­‐scale	   cases	   because	   these	   are	   case	   in	   which	   considerations	   of	  authority	   have	   little	   practical	   relevance.	   In	   these	   cases,	   as	   a	   contingent	  matter,	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   harming	   are	   very	   unlikely	   to	   be	  activated.	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   an	   authority	   could	   potentially	   serve	   its	  subjects	   regarding	   the	   reasons	   that	   govern	   the	   distribution	   of	   harm	   in	  small-­‐scale	  self-­‐defence	  cases.	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  well	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	   permissible	   self-­‐defence	   that	   the	   relevant	   authorities	   are	   not	   able	   to	  intercede.	   Such	   cases,	  while	   being	  harm-­‐apt,	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	  authority-­‐
apt	   on	   a	   service-­‐based	   view.218	  It	   is	   this	   contingent	   feature	   of	   the	   small-­‐scale	  cases	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  I	  contend,	  which	  accounts	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  could	  potentially	  be	  small-­‐scale	  defence	  cases	  in	  which	  an	  authority	  is	  well	  placed	  to	  serve	  its	  subjects.	  My	  point	  here	  is	  just	  that	  the	  more	  small-­‐scale	  and	  unstructured	  the	  case	   is,	   the	   less	   likely	   it	   is	   that	  an	  authority	  will	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  this	  service.	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the	  intuitive	  plausibility	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  justifications	  for	  harming	   in	   these	   cases	   is	   exhausted	  by	   considerations	  of	   liability	   and	  lesser-­‐evil.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  move	  across	  the	  spectrum	  and	  the	  cases	  become	  more	  complex,	   protracted	   and	   organised,	   the	   situation	   becomes	   increasingly	  authority-­‐apt.	  At	  some	  point	  along	  the	  spectrum,	  an	  authority	  may	  be	  well	  placed	  to	  serve	  its	  subjects	  regarding	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm,	  by	  enabling	  them	  to	  coordinate	  their	  actions	  or	  by	  offering	  expert	  guidance.	  When	  this	  is	  so,	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  but	  latent	  form	  of	  justification	  for	  causing	  harm	  may	  be	  activated.	  	  
	  
5.6	  Authority	  and	  Responsibility	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  distinguish	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  from	  an	  alternative	  argument	   that	   is	  often	  made	   in	  support	  of	   the	  conclusion	   that	   individuals	  may	   be	   permitted	   to	   fight	   in	   unjust	   wars	   in	   virtue	   of	   doing	   so	   under	  authority.	   On	   this	   alternative	   view,	   the	   source	   of	   an	   authority-­‐based	  permission	   to	   cause	   harm	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   individuals	   acting	   under	  authority	   are	   not	   responsible	   for	   their	   actions	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	   they	  would	   if	   they	   were	   acting	   privately. 219 	  The	   thought	   here	   is	   that	  responsibility	  for	  the	  subject’s	  actions	  lies	  solely	  with	  the	  authority	  under	  which	  they	  act,	  thereby	  absolving	  the	  subject	  of	  wrongdoing	  if	  their	  actions	  are	  unjust,	  including	  participation	  in	  an	  unjust	  war.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Authority	  View	  makes	  no	  such	  claims	  about	  diminished	  or	  transferred	  responsibility.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Authority	  View	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  idea	   that	   subjects	   remain	   fully	   responsible	   moral	   agents	   even	   when	  obeying	  an	  authority.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  provides	  reasons	   for	   action,	   which	   the	   subject	   recognises	   and	   responds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	  This	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  Augustine’s	  view,	  see	  The	  City	  of	  God	  Against	  the	  Pagans,	  R.W	  Dyson	   (ed),	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  Bk.1.	  Ch.21.	  For	  discussion,	  see	   Langan,	   ‘The	   Elements	   of	   St.	   Augustine’s	   Just	   War	   Theory’.	   Graham	   Parsons	   has	  recently	  put	  forward	  an	  explicit	  version	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  normative	  effect	  of	  a	  fighting	  on	   behalf	   of	   an	   is	   to	   negate	   the	   subject’s	   moral	   responsibility	   for	   acts	   of	   wrongdoing.	  Graham	   Parsons,	   ‘Public	  War	   and	   the	  Moral	   Equality	   of	   Combatants’,	   Journal	  of	  Military	  
Ethics	  11,	  No.4	  (2012),	  299-­‐317.	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appropriately	   to	   by	   obeying.	   This	   emphasis	   on	   reason-­‐responsiveness	   is	  hard	  to	  square	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  subject’s	  responsibility.	  This	  feature	  of	  the	  Authority	  View	  highlights	  another	  respect	  in	  which	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  core	  commitment	  of	  the	  reductivist	  view.	  Reductivists	  are	  keen	  to	  insist	  that	  individuals	  remain	  fully	  autonomous	  and	  responsible	  moral	  agents	  even	  if	  they	  are	  members	  of	  hierarchical	  organisation	  such	  as	  the	  military,	  and	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  avoid	  unjustly	  harming	  and	  killing	  others	  which	  cannot	  be	  evaded	  by	  claims	  of	  superior	  orders.	  The	  Authority	  View	  is	  in	  complete	  agreement	  with	  this.	  Where	  the	  Authority	  View	  diverges	  from	  reductivism	   is	   in	   claiming	   that,	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   obeying	   an	  authority	  is	  the	  appropriate	  means	  of	  discharging	  this	  duty.	  	  As	  well	  as	  being	  consistent	  with	  reductivism	  on	  this	  point,	  the	  Authority	  View	   of	   War	   also	   has	   a	   number	   of	   independent	   advantages	   over	   the	  alternative	   ‘Responsibility	  View’.	  Firstly,	   the	  claim	  that	  those	  acting	  under	  authority	   lack	   moral	   responsibility	   for	   their	   actions	   lacks	   intuitive	  plausibility.	   Normally,	   a	   successful	   defence	   of	   non-­‐responsibility	   to	   a	  charge	   of	   wrongdoing	   involves	   claims	   to	   limited	   cognitive	   capacity,	  irrationality	   or	   insanity.220	  Yet	   (at	   least	   the	   majority	   of)	   combatants	   are	  clearly	   capable	   of	   rational	   deliberation	   and	   have	   control	   over	   their	   own	  behaviour.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  responsibility	  can	  be	  negated	   by	   acting	   under	   authority,	   the	   Responsibility	   View	   is	  unsatisfying.221	  The	  Authority	  View,	  by	  contrast,	  does	  need	  to	  provide	  any	  such	  account.	  Secondly,	   even	   if	   such	   an	   account	   can	   be	   provided,	   the	  Responsibility	  View	  is	  unable	  to	  support	   the	  conclusion	  that	   those	  who	  participate	   in	  an	  unjust	  war	  possess	  a	  genuine	  moral	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  The	  fact	  that	  one	  would	  not	  be	  responsible	  cannot	  provide	  one	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  fight	  in	  an	   unjust	   war,	   since	   the	   fact	   that	   one	  would	   not	   be	   responsible	   is	   not	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  See,	  Gardner,	  Offences	  and	  Defences,	  pp.77-­‐90.	  221	  Frances	  Kamm	  has	  defended	  the	  view	  that	  permissibility	  may	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  moral	  responsibility	   of	   others,	   but	   the	   cases	   she	   discusses	   are	   disanalogous	   to	   those	   under	  discussion	   here.	   Frances	   Kamm,	   Intricate	   Ethics:	   Rights	   Responsibilities	   and	   Permissible	  
Harm	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  Ch.10.	  For	  criticism	  of	  aspects	  of	  Kamm’s	  position,	   see	   Jeff	   McMahan,	   ‘Responsibility,	   Permissibility	   and	   Vicarious	   Agency’,	  
Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  80,	  No.3	  (2010),	  673-­‐680.	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reason	  to	  do	  anything.	  At	  best,	  the	  Responsibility	  View	  can	  give	  rise	  only	  to	  an	   excuse	   for	   fighting	   in	   an	   unjust	   war	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   legitimate	  command,	   not	   a	   permission	   or	   justification.222	  The	   Authority	   View,	   by	  contrast,	   is	   straightforwardly	   able	   to	   claim	   that	   those	  who	   fight	   in	  unjust	  wars	   under	   authority	   may	   be	   justified	   in	   doing	   so,	   since	   it	   treats	  authoritative	   commands	   as	   providing	   reasons	   for	   action,	   rather	   than	  defeaters	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  Thirdly,	   the	   Responsibility	   View	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   war-­‐crimes	  objection	  that	   I	  pressed	  against	  non-­‐reductive	  approaches	   to	   the	  morality	  of	  war	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  if	  acting	  under	  authority	  serves	  to	  negate	  an	  agent’s	   responsibility	   for	  killing	  non-­‐liable	   combatants,	   such	  as	  by	  fighting	  in	  an	  unjust	  war,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  acting	  under	  authority	  does	  not	   also	   negate	   responsibility	   for	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants.	  I	  discuss	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Authority	  View	  in	  detail	  in	  Sections	  5.10	  and	  5.11.	  Fourthly,	  the	  Responsibility	  View	  runs	  into	  an	  additional	  problem	  when	  we	   consider	   the	   question	   of	   the	   permissibility	   of	   using	   defensive	   force	  against	  those	  who	  threaten	  unjust	  harm	  but	  do	  so	  under	  authority.	  A	  major	  topic	   of	   debate	   within	   the	   self-­‐defence	   literature	   concerns	   the	  permissibility	  of	  defensively	  killing	  individuals	  who	  causally	  threaten	  lethal	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people,	  but	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  doing	  so.	  Most	  theorists	  hold	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  posing	  a	  threat	  is	  a	  necessary	   condition	   for	   liability	   to	   defensive	   force.223	  Defensive	   harms	  inflicted	  on	  non-­‐responsible	  threateners	  are	  therefore	  unjust	  and	  subject	  to	  a	  much	  more	  stringent	  burden	  of	  justification	  than	  defensive	  harm	  inflicted	  on	  morally	   responsible	   threateners.	   If,	   as	   the	   Responsibility	   View	   claims,	  those	  who	  participate	   in	  unjust	  wars	  under	  authority	  are	  not	   responsible	  for	   doing	   so,	   this	   suggests	   that	   authorised	   threateners	   should	   be	  understood	  as	  a	  species	  of	  non-­‐responsible	  threatener.	  However,	  this	  leads	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222 	  McMahan,	   Killing	   in	   War,	   pp.89-­‐90.	   For	   discussion	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  responsibility	  and	  excuse,	  see	  Gardner,	  Offences	  and	  Defences,	  Ch.4.	  223	  See,	   for	   example,	   McMahan,	   ‘The	   Basis	   of	   Moral	   Liability	   to	   Defensive	   Force’;	   Rodin,	  
War	   and	   Self-­‐Defense,	   Ch.4;	   Quong,	   ‘Killing	   in	   Self-­‐Defense’;	   Michael	   Otsuka,	   ‘Killing	   the	  Innocent	  in	  Self-­‐Defense’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  23,	  No.1	  (1994),	  74-­‐94.	  For	  dissent,	  see	  Thomson,	  ‘Self-­‐Defense’.	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to	   some	   implausibly	   pacifistic	   implications.	   It	   implies	   that	   the	   victims	   of	  unjust	   military	   aggression	   may	   be	   morally	   required	   to	   suffer	   the	  threatened	   harm,	   if	   avoiding	   it	   involves	   intentionally	   killing	   authorised	  threateners.	   Furthermore,	   it	   generates	   different	   results	   in	   cases	   that	   are	  morally	  similar,	  since	  the	  permissibility	  of	  resisting	  aggression	  will	  turn	  on	  whether	   the	   threateners	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   an	   authority	   or	   not,	   even	   if	   the	  threatened	  harms	  are	  identical.	  Again,	  the	  Authority	  View	  avoids	  this	  problem.	  Since	  it	  treats	  authorised	  threateners	  as	   fully	  responsible	  agents,	   they	  are	  straightforwardly	  able	   to	  render	   themselves	   liable	   to	   defensive	   force	   when	   they	   threaten	   unjust	  harm	  to	  others.	  As	  argued	  in	  Section	  4.14,	  under	  the	  Authority	  View	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	  possesses	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	  for	  causing	  unjust	  harm	   does	   not,	   in	   itself,	   raise	   the	   justificatory	   burden	   for	   defensively	  harming	  that	  agent,	  since	  such	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  the	  agent	  in	  obeying	  are	  fully	  agent-­‐relative.	  An	  agent’s	  lack	  of	  responsibility,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  gives	   rise	   to	   an	   agent-­‐neutral	   reason	  against	   inflicting	  defensive	  harm	  on	  them	  that	  applies	  to	  all	  agents,	  including	  their	  victims.	  	  	  
5.7	  The	  A	  Posteriori	  Objection	  	  Thus	   far,	   my	   qualified	   defence	   of	   permissive	   authority	   criterion	   has	  primarily	  been	  constructed	   in	  opposition	  to	  reductivist	   just	  war	  theorists,	  who	  defend	  the	  intuitive	  position	  that	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  cannot	  possibly	   render	   justified	   acts	   of	   harming	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	  impermissible.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  consider	  a	  different	  form	  of	  challenge,	  which	  accepts	  the	  notion	   of	   an	   authority-­‐based	   justification	   for	   harming	   in	   principle,	   but	  holds	  that	  their	  possibility	  has	  very	  little	  practical	  significance	  for	  just	  war	  theorising.	  This	  is	  because,	  the	  objection	  holds,	  it	  is	  extremely	  unlikely	  that	  real-­‐word	   authorities	   of	   the	   kind	   we	   are	   familiar	   with	   –	   states	   most	  obviously	   –	   will	   in	   fact	   satisfy	   the	   conditions	   required	   to	   generate	   such	  justifications.	   According	   to	   this	   objection,	   my	   defence	   of	   the	   permissive	  authority	   criterion,	   while	   theoretically	   distinct,	   will	   be	   practically	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equivalent	   to	   a	   reductivist	   view.	   In	   particular,	   critics	   of	   this	   stripe	   argue	  that	   realistic	   states	   lack	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   give	   their	   subjects	   decisive	  reason	   to	   fight	   in	   unjust	   wars.224	  While	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	  participating	  in	  unjust	  wars	  are	  possible,	  no	  individuals	  in	  fact	  possess	  such	  a	  justification.	  	  The	   difference	   between	   these	   two	   forms	   of	   objection	   has	   a	   structural	  similarity	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  priori	  and	  a	  posteriori	  arguments	  for	  philosophical	  anarchism	  –	  the	  view	  that	  no	  states	  are	  legitimate	  and	  that	  no	  individuals	  have	  political	  obligations.	  Whereas	  a	  priori	  anarchists	  hold	  that	  states	   necessarily	   lack	   legitimacy	   and	   that	   the	   justification	   of	   political	  obligations	   is	   impossible,	   a	   posteriori	   anarchists	   accept	   that	   states	   could	  potentially	   be	   legitimate	   under	   certain	   conditions,	   but	   argue	   that	   certain	  contingent,	   yet	   deeply	   pervasive,	   features	   of	   states	   prevent	   them	   from	  satisfying	   these	   conditions. 225 	  We	   may	   then	   characterise	   the	   current	  objection	   to	  my	   defence	   of	   the	   permissive	   authority	   criterion	   as	   a	   much	  more	   limited	   form	   of	   a	   posteriori	   anarchism.	   Whereas	   the	   a	   posteriori	  anarchist	  denies	   that	   states	  possess	  general	   authority	  over	   their	   subjects,	  the	  a	  posteriori	   objection	   to	  my	  proposal	  denies	  only	   that	   states	  have	   the	  authority	   to	   place	   their	   subjects	   under	   undefeated	   obligations	   to	   cause	  content-­‐dependently	   unjustified	   harm	   in	  war,	   such	   as	   by	   participating	   in	  wars	   that	   are	   unjust.	   Since,	   according	   to	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   War,	  authorities	  acquire	  this	  moral	  power	  because	  they	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  govern	  warfare,	  the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  holds	   that	  no	  real-­‐world	  authorities	   successfully	  provide	  such	  a	  service.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   holds	   that	   individuals’	   optimal	   policy	   for	  achieving	   conformity	   with	   the	   war-­‐related	   reasons	   will	   not	   be	   that	   of	  obeying	  the	  commands	  of	  their	  state.226	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  224	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War’,	  pp.69-­‐70.	  Jeff	  McMahan	  and	  Thomas	  Hurka	  have	  also	  raised	  versions	  of	  this	  objection	  in	  correspondence	  and	  in	  conversation,	  respectively.	  225	  For	  this	  distinction,	  see	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  ‘Philosophical	  Anarchism’	  in	  John	  T.	  Sanders	  and	   Jan	   Narveson	   (eds),	   For	   and	  Against	   the	   State:	  New	  Philosophical	   Readings	   (Boston:	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield,	  1996),	  19-­‐40	  226	  This	  is	  one	  way	  of	  interpreting	  Uwe	  Steinhoff’s	  claim	  that,	  “the	  deliberation	  process	  of	  a	  single	   individual	  may	   at	   times	   be	  much	  more	   balanced	   than	   a	   public	   political	   discourse	  infected	  with	  patriotism,	  or	  a	  decision	  process	  supported	  by	  a	  bureaucracy	  and	  advisory	  staff	  made	  up	  of	  yesmen	  and	  opportunists.”	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Terrorism,	  p.20	  n.34	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The	  objection	  can	  be	  stated	  in	  weaker	  or	  stronger	  forms,	  depending	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  one’s	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  serve	  their	  subjects.	   In	   the	   strongest	   possible	   terms,	   one	   might	   hold	   that	   states	  generally	  fail	   to	  serve	  their	  subjects	   in	  all	  domains.227	  A	  weaker	  view	  may	  accept	  that	  states	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects	   in	  certain	  domains,	  but	  deny	   that	   this	   is	   true	   of	   the	   harm-­‐apt	   domains,	   including	   the	   domain	   of	  warfare.	   This	   view	   accepts	   that	   real-­‐world	   authorities	   may	   successfully	  create	  decisive	  reasons	  to	  action	  on	  grounds	  of	  service,	  but	  denies	  that	  this	  ever	   in	   fact	   extends	   to	   acts	   of	   causing	   harm.	   The	  weakest	   version	   of	   the	  objection	  accepts	  that	  real-­‐world	  authorities	  may	  serve	  their	  subjects	   in	  a	  wide-­‐range	  of	  domains,	   including	  some	  that	  are	  harm-­‐apt,	  but	  denies	  that	  states	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects	  regarding	  the	  particular	  domain	  of	  warfare.	   This	   view	   grants	   that	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   harming	  are	  realistically	  possible,	  but	  denies	  that	  this	  is	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  war.	  	  The	   weakest	   version	   of	   the	   objection	   is	   the	   most	   powerful,	   for	   two	  reasons.	   Firstly,	   it	   makes	   the	   most	   modest	   empirical	   claim	   necessary	   to	  reach	   its	   conclusion.	   Secondly,	   there	   may	   plausibly	   be	   domain-­‐specific	  reasons	   for	   thinking	   that	   real-­‐world	   authorities	   fail	   to	   successfully	   serve	  their	  subjects	  regarding	  warfare.	  The	   objection	   can	  be	  pressed	   in	   two	  different	  ways,	   corresponding	   to	  two	   dimensions	   along	   which	   authorities	   may	   fail	   to	   serve	   their	   subjects	  regarding	  warfare.	  Firstly,	  authorities	  may	   fail	   to	   issue	   their	  directives	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  good-­‐faith	  assessment	  of	   the	  relevant	   reasons	   that	  apply	   to	  their	   subjects.	   Their	   claim	   to	   legitimacy	  over	   the	  domain	  of	  warfare	   then	  fails	   at	   the	   first	   hurdle.	   Term	   this	   the	   ‘maleficence	   objection’.	   Secondly,	  even	   if	  making	   the	   appropriate	   efforts,	   authorities	  may	   fail	   to	   serve	   their	  subjects	   by	   doing	   an	   insufficiently	   good	   job	   of	   assessing	   the	   relevant	  reasons	   and	   crafting	   directives	   designed	   to	   improve	   their	   subjects’	  conformity	  with	  them.	  They	  lack	  the	  competence	  required	  to	  pass	  the	  test	  of	  normal	  justification	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare,	  thus	  failing	  the	  test	  of	  normal	   justification.	  Term	   this	   the	   ‘incompetence	  objection’.	   In	   light	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  This	  strong	  claim	  does	  not	  entail	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  posteriori	  anarchism,	  since	  it	  may	  be	  combined	  with	  the	  view	  that	  states	  are	  legitimate	  on	  non-­‐service-­‐based	  grounds.	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this	  distinction,	  we	  can	  interpret	  McMahan’s	  complaint	  that	  states	  and	  their	  leaders	   are	   typically	   “transparently	   immoral,	   dishonest	   and	   intellectually	  bovine”228	  as	  combining	  both	  the	  maleficence	  and	  incompetence	  objections.	  As	   mentioned,	   there	   are	   reasons	   to	   think	   that	   these	   objections	   are	  particularly	   applicable	   to	   the	   domain	   of	   war.	   One	   important	   way	   of	  motivating	   the	   maleficence	   objection	   is	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   war,	   unlike	  other	  harm-­‐apt	  domains,	  primarily	  involves	  inflicting	  harms	  on	  individuals	  who	   are	   not	   members	   of	   one’s	   political	   community.229	  Given	   this,	   it	   may	  plausibly	  be	  argued	  that	  since	  states	  and	  their	  leaders	  are	  accountable	  only	  to	   their	   own	   citizens,	   they	   are	   heavily	   disincentivised	   from	   giving	   the	  appropriate	   weight	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   outsiders	   who	   will	   be	   harmed	   by	  resorting	   to	   war.	   230 	  Furthermore,	   since	   states	   are	   highly	   militarised,	  investing	  huge	  sums	  of	  money	  on	  acquiring	  the	  means	  of	  fighting	  wars,	  one	  may	   argue	   that	   states	   are	   incentivised	   to	   make	   use	   of	   these	   means,	  independently	   of	   the	  merits	   of	   their	   use.231	  Relatedly,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	  that	   the	  war-­‐making	  apparatus	  of	  states	  are	  disproportionately	  under	   the	  influence	   by	   private	   interests	   that	   profit	   from	   going	   to	  war,	   thus	   further	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  states	  will	  resort	  to	  war	  unjustly.232	  All	  these	  factors,	   and	   many	   more,	   fuel	   the	   objection	   that	   states	   typically	   lack	  authority	  over	  warfare	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  failure	  to	  assess	  and	  act	  upon	  the	  right	  reasons.233	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  p.3.	  229 	  Civil	   wars	   being	   a	   possible	   exception.	   Though	   in	   such	   cases,	   where	   a	   political	  community	   has	   fissioned	   to	   the	   point	   of	   civil	   war,	   it	   seems	   doubtful	   that	   belligerents	  consider	  each	  other	  co-­‐members	  with	  equal	  standing.	  230	  Michael	  Huemer	  makes	  the	  point	   that	   in	  general	   individuals	  have	  a	   lesser	  aversion	  to	  causing	  the	  deaths	  of	  those	  who	  they	  perceive	  as	  different	  or	  alien,	  and	  that	  this	  fact	  makes	  states	  more	  prone	  go	  to	  war	  unjustly.	  Huemer,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Authority,	  p.237.	  	  231	  Huemer,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Authority,	  p.306.	  This	  echoes	  Kant’s	  worry	  that	  states	  having	  standing	  armies	  creates	  a	  grave	  risk	  of	  abuse.	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  ‘Perpetual	  Peace:	  A	  Philosophical	   Sketch’,	   in	   H.S	   Reiss	   (ed)	  Kant:	  Political	  Writings,	  2nd	   Edition,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  93-­‐139.	  232 	  See,	   for	   example,	   Andrew	   Fiala,	   Against	   Religion,	   Wars,	   and	   States:	   The	   Case	   for	  
Enlightened	   Atheism,	   Just	   War	   Pacifism,	   and	   Liberal	   Democratic	   Anarchism	   (Plymouth:	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield,	  2013),	  Ch.7.	  233	  Interestingly,	  many	  who	  have	  pressed	  versions	  of	   the	  maleficence	  objection	   take	   it	   to	  support	   a	   non-­‐absolutist	   form	   of	   pacifism.	   For	   example,	   Rawls	   writes	   that	   large	   and	  powerful	   states	   “are	   in	   some	   circumstances	   so	   likely	   to	   be	   unjust	   that	   one	   is	   forced	   to	  conclude	  that	  one	  must	  abjure	  military	  service	  altogether.”	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1971),	   p.381.	   See	   also,	   Andrew	   Fiala,	   Practical	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The	   incompetence	  objection	  may	  also	  apply	   to	  a	  greater	  degree	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  war.	  Again,	  the	  fact	  that	  war	  involves	  interacting	  with	  outsiders	  provides	  support	  for	  this,	  since	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  states	  are	  much	  less	  well	   placed	   with	   regard	   to	   assessing	   the	   behaviour	   of	   outsiders	   than	   of	  members.	  Their	  domestic	  competence	  at	  assessing	  right	  reason	  thus	  does	  not	  entail	  competence	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  govern	  interactions	  with	  members	   of	   other	   states.	   In	   addition,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   certain	  structural	   features	   of	   states	   impair	   their	   ability	   to	   make	   good	   decisions	  regarding	  war.	  For	  example,	  Michael	  Huemer	  argues	  that	  since	  states	  have	  a	   monopoly	   on	   war-­‐making	   within	   their	   territory,	   the	   normal	   market	  mechanisms	   that	   lead	   to	   improved	   performance	   do	   not	   apply.	   Unlike	  service	   providers	   in	   other	   areas,	   states	   lose	   no	  market	   share	   by	  making	  poor	   decisions	   about	   war.234	  But	   perhaps	   the	  most	   powerful	   form	   of	   the	  incompetence	   objection	   is	   simply	   to	   point	   to	   the	   numerous	   examples	   in	  which	  states	  have	  made	  morally	  calamitous	  decisions	  regarding	  war.	  	  	  
5.8	  Response	  	  
5.8.1	  Three	  Concessive	  Remarks	  	  In	   responding	   to	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objection,	   I	   begin	   with	   three	   broadly	  concessive	  remarks.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  in	  arguing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  participating	  in	  unjust	  wars,	  I	  am	  not	  attempting	  to	  provide	  a	  defence	  of	   the	  orthodox	  Equality	  Thesis,	  which	   holds	   that	   participation	   in	   unjust	   wars	   is	   generally	   permissible.235	  This	  conclusion	  would	  only	   follow	   from	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	   if	   two	  empirical	  assumptions	  hold.	  Firstly,	  that	  all	  war-­‐making	  entities	  –	  or,	  more	  modestly,	   all	   recognised	  states	  –	  possess	   legitimacy	  over	   their	   subjects	   in	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare.	  Secondly,	  that	  every	  command	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pacifism	   (New	   York:	   Algora	   Publishing,	   2004);	   Saba	   Bazargan,	   ‘Varieties	   of	   Contingent	  Pacifism’	  in	  Frowe	  and	  Lang	  (eds),	  How	  We	  Fight,	  1-­‐17.	  234	  Huemer,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Authority,	  p.237.	  235	  Though	  my	  view	  may	  provide	  a	  maximally	  charitable	  account	  of	  why	  many	  people	  find	  the	  equality	  thesis	  plausible	  –	   it	  reflects	  the	  common	  (though	  often	  mistaken)	  conviction	  that	  their	  states	  have	  legitimate	  authority	  over	  them	  regarding	  warfare.	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unjust	  war	  issued	  by	  such	  authorities	  is	  not	  invalidated	  as	  clearly	  mistaken.	  These	  assumptions	  are	  incredibly	  demanding	  and	  certainly	  false.	  So,	  if	  the	  Authority	  View	  were	  intended	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  general	  permissibility	  of	  participation	   in	   unjust	  wars,	   the	  a	  posteriori	   objection	  would	   be	  decisive.	  Under	  the	  Authority	  View,	  an	  authority’s	  possession	  of	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  require	   participation	   in	   unjust	  wars	   is	   dependent	   on	   some	   fairly	   specific	  background	  conditions	  obtaining,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  established	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis.	   The	   a	   posteriori	   objection	   is	   correct	   to	   conclude	   that	   such	  authority	   will	   be	   lacking	   in	   many	   cases,	   but	   this	   should	   be	   no	   more	  surprising	  than	  the	   fact	   that	  various	  other	  conditions	  of	   just	  war	  theory	  –	  just	  cause	  most	  obviously	  –	  are	  often	  not	  satisfied.	  	  Secondly,	   it	   is	  worth	  emphasising	  that	  shifting	  from	  an	  a	  priori	   to	  an	  a	  
posteriori	   argument	   against	   the	   Authority	   View	   of	   War	   remains	   a	   major	  concession	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   reductivist,	   since	   it	   involves	   giving	   up	   a	  commitment	   to	   the	   Content	   Thesis	   and	   admitting	   the	   possibility	   of	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   causing	   harm.	   Given	   this,	   even	   if	   the	   a	  
posteriori	   objection	   is	   successful	   in	   showing	   that	   there	   are	   no	   actual	  legitimate	   war-­‐making	   authorities,	   the	   Authority	   View	   still	   succeeds	   in	  showing	   that	   considerations	   of	   authority	   cannot	   be	   eliminated	   from	   just	  war	  theorising	  in	  the	  way	  that	  reductivism	  claims.	  It	  remains	  the	  case	  that,	  in	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   an	   agent	   acts	   permissibly	   in	   war,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   establish	   whether	   or	   not	   that	   agent	   acts	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	  legitimate	   war-­‐making	   authority.	   The	   authority	   criterion	   remains	   an	  ineliminable	   part	   of	   just	   war	   theory,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   paired	   with	   a	   deep	  scepticism	  as	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  authorities.	  	  Thirdly,	   and	   relatedly,	   even	   if	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objection	   is	   correct	   to	  hold	   that	   existing	   political	   entities	   lack	   the	   requisite	   authority,	   it	   is	   less	  plausible	   to	  maintain	   that	   such	   authorities	   could	   never	   exist.	   It	   does	   not	  seem	   completely	   utopian	   to	   think	   that	   future	   intuitional	   reform	   could	  produce	  authorities	  that	  are	  able	  to	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare.	  	  The	  topic	  of	  institutional	  reform	  has	  been	  relatively	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unexplored	   by	   just	   war	   theorists.236	  One	   way	   of	   understanding	   the	   view	  presented	   here	   is	   as	   providing	   a	   sketch	   of	   the	   ideal	   to	   which	   our	   war-­‐making	  institutions	  should	  aspire.	  So,	  while	  reductivists	  could	  be	  correct	  in	  holding	  that	  no	  current	  war-­‐making	  entities	  possess	   the	  kind	  of	  authority	  capable	  of	  generating	  moral	   justifications	   for	  participating	   in	  unjust	  wars,	  they	  should	  still	  endorse	   taking	  steps	   towards	  creating	   institutions	  which	  would	   possess	   such	   authority.	   Hence,	   the	   success	   of	   the	   a	   posteriori	  objection	  would	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  not	  have	  practical	  relevance.	  	  
5.8.2	  Fine-­‐Grained	  Domains	  	  –	  Jus	  ad	  Bellum	  	  The	   foregoing	   remarks	   sought	   to	   show	   that	   considerations	   of	   authority	  remain	  relevant	  for	  just	  war	  theorising	  even	  if	  the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  is	  successful.	  There	  is	  a	  world	  of	  difference	  between	  legitimate	  authority	  over	  warfare	   being	   impossible	   and	   its	  merely	   being	   highly	   unlikely	   in	   present	  circumstances.	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   possibility	   of	   legitimate	  war-­‐making	   authority,	   and	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   causing	  harm	   in	  war,	   are	  not	  as	  unlikely	  as	   the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  alleges.	   I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  resist	   the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  on	  empirical	  grounds.	  This	  can	  only	  be	  done	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Instead,	  I	  offer	  some	  refinements	  of	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  principled	  grounds	  for	  resisting	  the	  objection.	  The	   force	   of	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objection	   comes	   from	   the	   natural	  assumption	   that	   in	   order	   to	   acquire	   the	   relevant	   legitimacy	   over	   the	  domain	  of	  war,	  an	  authority	  must	  successfully	  serve	  its	  subjects	  regarding	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  reasons	  that	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  war.	  Most	  obviously,	  including	  the	  reasons	  that	  determine	  whether	  wars	  possess	   a	   just	   cause	   or	   not.	   This	   assumption	   sets	   a	   fairly	   high	   bar	   for	  acquiring	   legitimate	  war-­‐making	   authority.	   The	   higher	   the	   bar,	   the	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  236	  Exceptions	   include	   Jeff	  McMahan,	   ‘The	  Prevention	   of	  Unjust	  Wars’	   in	   Yitzhak	  Benbaji	  and	   Naomi	   Sussmen	   (eds),	   Reading	  Walzer	   (Abingdon:	   Routledge,	   2013),	   233-­‐255	   and	  Allen	   Buchanan	   ‘Institutionalizing	   the	   Just	   War’,	   Philosophy	   and	   Public	   Affairs	   34,	   No.1	  (2006),	  2-­‐38.	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powerful	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objection	   is.	   I	   aim	   to	   resist	   the	   a	   posteriori	  objection	   by	   denying	   that	   the	   assumption	   is	   true.	   Authorities	   need	   not	  satisfy	  such	  a	  demanding	  standard	  of	  service	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  create	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  causing	  harm	  in	  war.	  	  The	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  rests	  on	  a	  holistic	  conception	  of	  the	  task	  that	  an	  authority	  must	  perform	  in	  order	  to	  possess	  this	  moral	  power.	  However,	  this	   conception	   is	  mistaken.	   	   Recall,	   on	   a	   service-­‐based	   view,	   authority	   is	  piecemeal	   with	   respect	   to	   domains	   of	   reasons.	   An	   authority’s	   legitimacy	  must	   always	   be	   demonstrated	   anew	   with	   respect	   to	   each	   domain	   over	  which	  it	  is	  claimed.	  Importantly,	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  domains	  is	  not	  fixed	  at	  a	  certain	   level	   of	   description.	   Complex	   activities	   are	   usually	   governed	   by	  distinct	   sub-­‐domains	   of	   reasons,	   corresponding	   to	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	  considerations	  that	  go	  in	  to	  determining	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  done,	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	   For	   example,	   the	   practical	   matter	   of	   which	   trade	   policy	   to	  adopt	   with	   a	   specific	   country	   is	   determined	   by	   a	   range	   of	   distinct	  considerations,	   such	  as	   the	  economic	  benefits,	   the	  political	   consequences,	  the	  social	  impact,	  etc.	  	  In	  order	  to	  acquire	  legitimacy	  regarding	  a	  certain	  activity,	  an	  authority	  need	   not	   serve	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   each	   and	   every	   one	   of	   the	   sub-­‐domains	  of	  reasons	  that	  govern	  a	  particular	  activity.	  Just	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  authority	  does	  not	  serve	  me	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  X-­‐related	  reasons	  does	  not	  entail	  anything	  about	  whether	  it	  serves	  me	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	   the	   Y-­‐related	   reasons,	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   authority	   does	   not	   serve	   me	  regarding	   the	   Xm-­‐related	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   the	   X-­‐related	   reasons	   does	   not	  entail	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  serve	  me	  regarding	  the	  Xn-­‐related	  sub-­‐domain	  of	  the	  X-­‐related	   reasons.	   When	   an	   authority	   serves	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   a	   sub-­‐domain	  of	  reasons,	  its	  legitimacy	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  class	  of	  reasons	  contained	  within	  that	  sub-­‐domain.	  But	  its	  commands	  are	  still	  relevant	  to	  the	  question	  of	   what	   ought	   to	   be	   done	   regarding	   the	  wider	  macro-­‐domain	   of	   reasons	  and	  may,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  decisively	  settle	  that	  question.	  This	   fine-­‐grained	   approach	   to	   individuating	   domains	   of	   authority	  applies	   equally	   to	   the	   complex	   activity	   of	   warfare	   and	   provides	   the	  resources	   for	   a	   principled	   response	   to	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objection.	   As	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mentioned	  earlier,	   the	  key	  target	  of	  the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  is	  the	  claim,	  which	  I	  have	  defended,	  that	  an	  agent	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  participating	  in	  an	  unjust	   war	   in	   virtue	   of	   a	   command	   to	   do	   so.	   Given	   this,	   I	   will	   begin	   by	  explaining	  how	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  approach	  allows	  this	  claim	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  fairly	  modest	  assumptions	  about	  states	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  serve	  their	  subjects.	   The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   an	   authority	   may	   successfully	   serve	   its	  subjects	   regarding	   a	   particular	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   the	   jus	   ad	   bellum	   reasons,	  while	   failing	   to	  serve	   them	  regarding	  a	  distinct	   sub-­‐domain.	  For	  example,	  an	   authority	   may	   fail	   to	   serve	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   the	   reasons	   that	  determine	  whether	  wars	  have	  a	  just	  cause,	  but	  successfully	  serve	  them	  on	  the	   matter	   of	   whether	   wars	   have	   a	   reasonable	   chance	   of	   success.	   This	  limited	   war-­‐making	   authority	   is	   sufficient	   to	   generate	   authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  participating	  in	  an	  unjust	  war.	  When	  an	  authority	   is	   legitimate	  regarding	  only	  a	  sub-­‐domain	  of	   jus	  ad	  
bellum,	   its	   commands	   provide	   pre-­‐emptive	   reasons	   for	   action,	   but	   only	  exclude	  those	  reasons	  that	  fall	  within	  that	  sub-­‐domain.	  When	  it	  commands	  a	   subject	   to	   participate	   in	   a	   war,	   the	   subject	   is	   rationally	   free	   –	   indeed,	  morally	   required	   –	   to	   weigh	   the	   command	   against	   the	   reasons	   for	   and	  against	  participation	  arising	  from	  ad	  bellum	  considerations	  over	  which	  the	  authority	  is	  not	  legitimate.	  If	  the	  war	  is	  unjustified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons	  that	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  authority’s	  legitimacy,	  these	  reasons	  not	  to	  participate	   will	   override	   the	   subject’s	   obligation	   to	   participate.	   They	   all-­‐things-­‐considered	  ought	  not	  to	  participate.	  However,	  if	  the	  war	  is	  ad	  bellum	  unjustified	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  considerations	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  sub-­‐domain	  of	   reasons	   over	   which	   the	   authority	   is	   legitimate,	   the	   subject	   will	   have	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  participate	  in	  that	  unjust	  war	  if	  commanded	  to	  do	  so.	  To	  return	  to	  the	  above	  example:	  If	  an	  authority	  possesses	  legitimacy	  over	  a	  subject	   regarding	   the	   success-­‐related	   ad	   bellum	   reasons,	   and	   issues	   a	  mistaken	  (but	  not	  clearly	  so)	  command	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  war	  that	  is	  unjust	  in	  virtue	  of	  lacking	  a	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  success,	  then	  that	  subject	  has	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	  for	  participating.	  	  Once	  we	  recognise	   that	  authorities	  may	  serve	   their	  subjects	  regarding	  specific	  components	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  not	  others,	  and	  that	  wars	  can	  be	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unjustified	   for	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	   reasons,	  we	   can	   generate	   the	   conclusion	  that	  there	  may	  be	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	  participating	  in	  unjust	  wars	  from	  much	  more	  modest	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  real-­‐world	  states	  to	  successfully	  serve	  their	  subjects.	  In	   fact,	   the	  required	  assumptions	  may	  be	  even	  more	  modest,	  since	  the	  relevant	   sub-­‐domains	   may	   be	   more	   fine-­‐grained	   than	   that	   of	   each	  requirement	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  Each	  of	  these	  sub-­‐domains	  may	  itself	  be	  made	  up	   of	   distinct	   sub-­‐domains	   of	   reasons,	   each	   of	   which	   is	   capable	   of	  determining	  whether	  that	  ad	  bellum	  requirement	  is	  satisfied.	  For	  example,	  whether	  a	  war	  has	  a	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  success	  may	  be	  determined	  by	  a	  range	  of	  different	  considerations	  –	  the	  fighting	  ability	  of	  one’s	  troops,	  the	  level	   of	   enemy	   resistance,	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   economy	   to	   support	   the	  war,	  weather	   conditions,	   etc.	   –	   each	   of	   which	   is	   potentially	   determinative	   of	  whether	  a	  particular	  war	  satisfies	  the	  success	  condition.	  	  Given	   this,	   an	   authority	   need	   only	   be	   legitimate	   over	   one	   of	   these	  narrower	   sub-­‐domains	   in	   order	   to	   possess	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   impose	  undefeated	   obligations	   to	   participate	   in	   an	   unjust	  war.	  More	   formally,	   in	  order	   to	   acquire	   this	   moral	   power,	   an	   authority	   only	   needs	   to	   possess	  legitimacy	   over	   a	   sufficiently	   important	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   the	   ad	   bellum	  reasons	   that	  determine	   the	   justification	  of	   resorting	   to	  war.	  An	  ad	  bellum	  sub-­‐domain	   is	   sufficiently	   important,	   in	   the	   relevant	   sense,	   if	   the	   reasons	  contained	  within	  that	  sub-­‐domain	  are	  potentially	  determinative	  of	  whether	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  is	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  justified	  or	  unjustified.	  Before	  moving	   on,	   it	   is	  worth	   considering	   a	   possible	   objection,	  which	  holds	   that	   these	   refinements	   of	   the	   Authority	   View	   involve	   a	   sleight-­‐of-­‐hand,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  far	  graver	  moral	  wrong	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  war	  that	  lacks	  a	  just	  cause	  than	  one	  whose	  injustice	  rests	  on	  other	  grounds,	  such	  as	  lacking	  a	   reasonable	   chance	   of	   success	   or	   failing	   to	   be	   the	   last	   resort.	   This	   is	  because	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  but	  not	  the	  second,	  one	  will	  be	  intentionally	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable.	   	  Given	  this,	   the	  objection	  holds,	   I	  haven’t	  really	  made	  good	  on	  my	  promise	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  generate	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  for	   causing	   seriously	   morally	   wrongful	   harm	   in	   war	   from	   fairly	   modest	  assumptions	  about	  states	  and	  their	  virtues.	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There	   are	   three	   responses	   to	   this.	   Firstly,	   on	   certain	   accounts	   of	  liability,	   such	   as	  McMahan’s,	   one	   can	   only	   be	   liable	   to	   harm	   that	   is	   both	  necessary	   and	   effective	   in	   averting	   a	   threat	   of	   unjust	   harm.	   Hence,	   one	  would	  be	  intentionally	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable	  in	  either	  type	  of	  unjust	  war.237	  Secondly,	  even	   if	   this	  difference	   in	   liability	  holds,	  killing	   large	  numbers	  of	  liable	  persons	  when	  doing	  so	   is	  either	  unnecessary	  or	   ineffective	  remains	  something	   that	   we	   have	   strong	   moral	   reasons	   to	   avoid	   doing.	   This	   is	  especially	  so	  when	  those	  who	  are	  liable	  possess	  excuses	  for	  their	  role	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  unjust	  threats.	  Thirdly,	  independently	  of	  whether	  participation	  in	   the	   second	   type	   of	   case	   involves	   intentionally	   killing	   non-­‐liable	  combatants,	  such	  action	  also	  involves	  causing	  substantial	  collateral	  harm	  to	  innocents.	   Hence,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   participation	   in	   the	   first	   type	   of	  unjust	   war	   involves	   a	   graver	   degree	   of	   moral	   wrongdoing	   than	   in	   the	  second,	   both	   involve	   the	   commission	   of	   acts	   of	   very	   seriously	   wrongful	  harming.	  	  	  
5.8.3	  Fine-­‐Grained	  Domains	  –	  Jus	  in	  Bello	   	  	  While	   the	  permissibility	  of	  participation	   in	  an	  unjust	  war	   is	   an	   important	  and	  high	  profile	  implication	  of	  the	  Authority	  View	  –	  one	  that	  proponents	  of	  the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  understandably	   focus	   on	   –	   these	   cases	   far	   from	  exhaust	   its	   practical	   applications.	   Taking	   a	   fine-­‐grained	   approach	   to	  individuating	  domains	  of	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  also	  reveals	  that	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   causing	   harm	   in	   war	   are	   possible,	   even	   if	   the	  authority	  in	  question	  lacks	  legitimacy	  over	  any	  aspect	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  	  This	   is	   because	   the	  moral	   status	   of	   actions	   performed	   in	  war	   are	   not	  fully	  determined	  by	  considerations	  that	  fall	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  though	  their	  status	  may	  of	  course	  be	  dependent	  on	  this	  domain	  of	  reasons.	  Whether	  specific	  actions	  in	  war	  are	  morally	  permissible	  is	  also	  determined	  by	   additional,	   less	   macro-­‐level	   considerations.	   For	   example,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  pp.8-­‐10.	  Some	  have	   found	  this	   implausible,	  see	   Joanna	  Mary	  Firth	   and	   Jonathan	   Quong,	   ‘Necessity,	   Moral	   Liability	   and	   Defensive	   Harm’,	   Law	   and	  Philosophy	  31,	  No.	  6	  (2012),	  673-­‐701.	  For	  further	  discussion,	  see	  Frowe,	  Defensive	  Killing,	  Ch.4	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permissibility	  of	  certain	  courses	  of	  action	  within	  an	  ad	  bellum	  justified	  war	  may	   depend	   upon:	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   particular	   targets	   are	   militarily	  valuable,	   whether	   specific	  mission	   or	   battles	   are	   necessary	   for	   achieving	  the	   war’s	   aims,	   whether	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   war	   have	   been	   sufficiently	  advanced	  to	  cease	  fighting,	  etc.	  The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   an	   authority	   may	   be	   sufficiently	   well	   placed	   to	  serve	   its	   subjects	   regarding	  distinctively	   in	  bello	   sub-­‐domains	  of	   the	  war-­‐related	   reasons,	   even	   if	   it	   fails	   to	   serve	   them	   regarding	   the	   ad	   bellum	  reasons.238	  Furthermore,	  these	  sub-­‐domains	  also	  have	  the	  feature	  of	  being	  
sufficiently	  important,	  in	  that	  the	  reasons	  contained	  within	  that	  sub-­‐domain	  are	  potentially	  determinative	  of	  whether	   acts	  of	   causing	  harm	   in	  war	  are	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   justified	   or	   unjustified.	   Given	   this,	   if	   an	   authority	  successfully	   serves	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   one	   of	   these	   sub-­‐domains,	   it	  acquires	   the	  moral	  power	   to	  place	   its	   subjects	  under	  undefeated	  content-­‐independent	   obligations	   to	   cause	   harm	   in	  war.	   Its	   subjects	   are	   bound	   to	  obey	   its	   commands	   within	   that	   sub-­‐domain,	   including	   those	   that	   fail	   to	  reflect	   right	   reasons	   (though	   not	   clearly	   so).	   This	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	  authority	   lacking	   the	  moral	   power	   to	   require	   participation	   in	   unjustified	  wars.	  	  Once	   it	   is	   recognised	   that	   authority	   over	   warfare	   can	   be	   piecemeal	  rather	   than	   holistic,	   the	   possibility	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justification	   for	  causing	   harm	   in	   war	   can	   be	   generated	   from	   much	   more	   modest	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  real-­‐world	  states	  to	  serve	  their	  subjects.	  	  
5.8.4	  Authority	  and	  Coordination	  	  This	  conclusion	  can	  also	  be	  supported	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  authorities	  can	  serve	   their	   subjects	   in	   different	   ways.	   The	   thrust	   of	   the	   a	   posteriori	  objection	   focuses	   on	   showing	   that	   states	   fail	   to	   serve	   their	   subjects	  regarding	  war	   in	  virtue	  of	   their	   lack	  of	  expertise	  on	  relevant	  matters.	  But	  expertise	  is	  not	  the	  only	  ground,	  or	  indeed	  the	  main	  ground,	  for	  justifying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  David	   Estlund	   also	   notes	   that	   considerations	   of	   war-­‐waging	   authority	   need	   not	   be	  restricted	   to	   the	   ad	   bellum	   domain.	   Estlund,	   ‘On	   Following	   Orders	   in	   an	   Unjust	   War’,	  pp.229-­‐231	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authority	  on	  a	  service-­‐based	  view.	  In	  addition,	  authorities	  may	  serve	  their	  subjects	  on	  grounds	  of	  coordination.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  acting	  rightly	  depends	  upon	   coordinating	   one’s	   actions	   with	   others,	   subjects	   may	   best	   comply	  with	  reason	  by	  obeying	  a	  common	  authority,	  rather	  than	  by	  each	  trying	  to	  act	   on	   the	   balance	   of	   reasons	   directly.	   This	   can	   be	   true	   even	   when	   an	  authority	  is	  fallible,	  and	  issues	  commands	  that	  fail	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason.	  Though	  it	  is	  surprisingly	  rarely	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  war	  ethics,	  an	  obvious	   morally	   relevant	   feature	   of	   warfare	   is	   that	   it	   requires	   huge	  amounts	   of	   coordination.239	  Given	   this,	   an	   important	   ground	   of	   authority	  over	   warfare	   on	   service	   grounds	   will	   be	   that	   of	   achieving	   coordination.	  Many	  in	  bello	  sub-­‐domains	  of	  the	  sort	  highlighted	  above	  will	  be	  authority-­‐apt	   for	   precisely	   this	   reason.	   Importantly,	   grounding	   authority	   over	  warfare	   on	   coordination-­‐based	   service	   further	   supports	   the	   possibility	   of	  authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	  harming	   in	  war.	  For,	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	  the	  rational	  benefits	  of	  having	  a	  coordinative	  authority	  over	  war,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	  subjects	  to	  obey	  its	  commands	  across	  a	  generalised	  range	  of	  cases.	   This	   may	   include	   cases	   where	   the	   authority	   issues	   mistaken	  commands	  that	  require	  causing	  harm	  that	  is	  not	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  content-­‐dependent	  reasons.	  	  So,	   while	   one	   might	   argue	   that	   states	   typically	   lack	   the	   required	  expertise	   over	   warfare	   required	   for	   authority,	   it	   seems	   less	   plausible	   to	  hold	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  successfully	  coordinate	  the	  actions	  of	   their	   subjects	   in	  war.	   	  Again,	   the	  practical	   significance	  of	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	   can	  be	  derived	   from	   fairly	  modest	  assumptions	  about	   states	  and	  their	  abilities.	  To	  sum	  up,	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  blunt	  the	  force	  of	  the	  a	  posteriori	  objection	  by	  showing	  that	  conditions	  under	  which	  authorities	  may	  acquire	  the	  moral	  power	   to	   give	   subjects	   undefeated	   reasons	   to	   cause	   content-­‐dependently	  unjustified	   harm	   in	   war	   are	   less	   demanding	   that	   one	   might	   assume.	  Correspondingly,	   the	   a	   posteriori	   objector	   will	   need	   to	   adopt	   a	   more	  extensive	  –	  and	   therefore	   less	  plausible	  –	  sceptical	  position	  regarding	   the	  capabilities	  of	   real-­‐world	  states	   to	   serve	   their	   subjects	   in	  order	   to	  defend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  An	  exception	  being	  Lazar,	  ‘Necessity	  in	  Self-­‐Defence	  and	  War’.	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the	   view	   that	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   causing	   harm	   in	   war	   are	  extremely	  unlikely	  to	  arise.	  
5.9	  	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War:	  A	  Second	  Cut	  
	  The	   preceding	   discussion	   reveals	   that	   my	   initial	   characterisation	   of	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  requires	  revising,	  since	  it	  assumes	  a	  rough-­‐grained	  view	   of	   the	   domain	   of	   reasons	   over	   which	   authorities	   must	   serve	   their	  subjects	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  legitimacy	  over	  war.	  	  Instead,	  as	  argued	  above,	  we	   should	   endorse	   a	   fine-­‐grained	   approach.	   The	   notion	   of	   ‘a	   domain	   of	  warfare’	   should	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   heuristic	   for	   the	   collection	   of	   sub-­‐domains	   of	   reasons	   that	   together	   govern	   right	   action	   regarding	   war.	   To	  reflect	  this,	  the	  Authority	  View	  requires	  the	  following	  reformulation:	  
	  
The	  Revised	  Authority	  View	  of	  War:	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  regarding	  the	  domain	  of	  warfare,	  or	  a	  sufficiently	  important	  sub-­‐domain	  of	  warfare,	  if,	  by	  obeying	   A’s	   commands,	   B	   achieves	   greater	   overall	   conformity	   with	   the	  reasons	  that	  govern	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  by	  means	  of	  war	  than	  by	  not	  obeying.	  
	  
5.10	  An	  Asymmetry	  	  A	   fine-­‐grained	   approach	   to	   specifying	   domains	   of	   authority	   over	  warfare	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  impose	  authority-­‐based	  constraints	  on	  participation	  in	  just	  wars	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  lower	  justificatory	  burden	  than	  the	  moral	   power	   to	   create	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   participation	   in	  unjust	  wars.	  This	  is	  because,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  to	  provide	  a	  decisive	   reason	   for	   refraining	   from	   participating	   in	   a	   war,	   that	   authority	  need	  only	  possess	  legitimacy	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  particular	  sub-­‐domain	  of	  jus	  
ad	  bellum	  considerations.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  war’s	  satisfaction	  of	  each	  aspect	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	   requirement	   is	  necessary	   for	  participation	   to	  be	   justified.	  Hence,	   an	   authoritative	   command	   to	   refrain	   from	   fighting	   is	   sufficient	   to	  give	  its	  subject	  a	  decisive	  reason	  not	  to	  participate.	  By	  contrast,	  a	  command	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to	  fight	  in	  an	  unjust	  war	  issued	  by	  an	  authority	  that	  is	  legitimate	  regarding	  a	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   give	   subjects	   a	   decisive	  reason	  to	  participate.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  reason	  for	  participation	  provided	  by	  the	  command	  may	  still	  be	  defeated	  by	  reasons	  not	  to	  participate	  arising	  from	  the	  war’s	  failure	  to	  satisfy	  additional	  ad	  bellum	  considerations	  that	  fall	  outside	   the	  authority’s	   sphere	  of	   legitimacy.	   In	  order	   for	   the	  command	   to	  justify	   participation	   in	   an	   unjust	   war,	   that	   war	   must	   also	   satisfy	   these	  additional	  ad	  bellum	  requirements.	  
	  
5.11	  The	  War	  Crimes	  Objection	  Revisited	  	  In	  this	  section	  and	  the	  next	  I	  consider	  a	  different	  objection	  to	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War,	  which	  holds	  that	  it	  falls	  foul	  of	  the	  same	  war	  crimes	  objection	  that	   I	   pressed	   against	   non-­‐reductive	   approaches	   to	   the	   ethics	   of	   war	   in	  Chapter	  3.	  The	  objection	  held	  that	  non-­‐reductive	  views	  cannot	  support	  the	  highly	   intuitive	   and	   stringent	   constraint	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   in	   war.	   Since	   I	   argued	   that	   this	   objection	   warrants	   rejecting	  those	  approaches,	  its	  applicability	  to	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  would	  pose	  a	  serious	  problem.	  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  source	  of	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection	  lies	  in	  the	  agent-­‐centeredness	  of	  non-­‐reductivist	  defences	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	   in	   war.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   if	   the	   relevant	   agent-­‐centred	  considerations	  –	  such	  as	  one’s	  associative	  duties	  to	  protect	  –	  are	  sufficient	  to	   justify	   the	   intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	   combatants,	   then	   those	  very	  same	   considerations	   are	   also	   sufficient	   to	   justify	   the	   intentional	   killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  	  In	   Chapter	   4,	   I	   argued	   that	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   causing	  harm	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   species	   of	   agent-­‐relative	   justification.	  Furthermore,	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   agued	   that,	   under	   certain	  circumstances,	   individuals	   may	   possess	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	  participating	   in	   unjust	   wars,	   and	   thus	   for	   killing	   non-­‐liable	   combatants.	  Hence,	  given	  that	  both	  the	  Authority	  View	  and	  non-­‐reductivist	  views	  offer	  agent-­‐relative	   justifications	   for	   killing	   non-­‐liable	   combatants,	   one	   may	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reasonably	   object	   that	   the	   war	   crimes	   objection	   applies	   equally	   to	   each.	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  inherits	  the	  very	  same	  problem	  that	  afflicts	  the	  non-­‐reductivist.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  objection	  is	  that	  if,	  as	  I	  have	  claimed,	  the	   command	   of	   an	   authority	  may	   be	   sufficient	   to	   justify	   the	   intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants,	   then	  that	  authority’s	  commands	  to	  target	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  will	  also	  justify	  doing	  so.	  Since	  we	  want	  to	  avoid	  this	  implication,	  it	  is	  argued,	  we	  must	  reject	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War.	  	  	  	  
5.12	  Response	  	  My	   response	   to	   this	   objection	   has	   two	   parts.	   Firstly,	   I	   argue	   that	   despite	  their	   structural	   similarity,	   there	   is	   a	   relevant	   difference	   between	   the	  Authority	  View	  and	  non-­‐reductivist	  views,	  which	  show	  that	   the	  Authority	  View	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  to	  nearly	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  non-­‐reductive	  views.	  Secondly,	  I	  concede	  that	  there	  may	  be	  possible	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   command	  of	   an	  authority	  does	  provide	  an	  agent	  with	  justification	  for	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants,	  but	  argue	  that,	  within	  this	  narrow	  range	  of	  cases,	  this	  conclusion	  is	  defensible.	  	  
5.12.1	  Distinct	  Forms	  of	  Agent-­‐Relativity	  	  The	  objection	  is	  correct	  to	  highlight	  that	  both	  the	  Authority	  View	  and	  non-­‐reductivist	  views	  offer	  justifications	  for	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  in	  war	  that	  invoke	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  crucial	  	  distinction	  to	  made	  between	  the	  two	  views,	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  the	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  that	  provide	  the	  justification	  are	  intrinsic	  reasons	  or	  instrumental	  reasons.	  On	  a	  non-­‐reductivist	  view,	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable	   is	   justified	   in	  terms	  of	  intrinsic	  or	  non-­‐instrumental	  reasons.	  For	  example,	  on	  the	  associative-­‐duty	  variant	  of	  non-­‐reductivism,	  the	  constraint	  on	  killing	  a	  non-­‐liable	  combatant	  is	  defeated	  by	  being	  overridden	  by	  a	  weightier	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  –	  the	  duty	  to	  protect	  one’s	  associates	  from	  serious	  harm.	  This	  reason	  is	  grounded	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in	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  the	  relationship,	  and	  not	  in	  any	  further	  value	  this	  is	  realised	  by	  protecting	  one’s	  associates.	  By	  contrast,	  on	  the	  Authority	  View,	  valid	  commands	  create	  instrumental	  reasons	  for	  action.	  The	  subject’s	  reason	  to	  obey	  the	  command	  arises	  from	  the	   fact	   that	   a	   policy	   of	   obedience	   is	   an	   optimal	   means	   for	   achieving	  conformity	  with	   the	  ultimate,	  non-­‐instrumental	  reasons	   that	  apply	   to	  her.	  There	   need	   be	   no	   intrinsic	   value	   in	   obedience	   itself.	   This	   is	   true	   of	   valid	  commands	  that	  require	  the	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants.	  	  This	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  agent-­‐relative	   justification	  is	  important,	  since	  it	  provides	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  with	  resources	  for	  avoiding	   the	   war	   crimes	   objection	   that	   are	   not	   available	   to	   non-­‐reductivists.	   The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   the	   instrumental	   structure	   of	   the	  Authority	   View	   allows	   for	   commands	   to	   be	   invalidated	   by	   their	   content,	  even	   when	   issued	   by	   a	   legitimate	   authority.	   These	   are	   commands	   that	  constitute	  what	  I	  earlier	  called	  ‘clear	  mistakes’.	  To	  recapitulate,	  commands	  are	   clearly	   mistaken	   if	   the	   subject	   can	   form	   the	   judgement	   that	   the	  command	   fails	   to	   reflect	   right	   reason	   without	   having	   to	   go	   through	   the	  same	  process	  of	  reasoning	  that	  the	  authority	  went	  through	  in	  producing	  its	  directive.	   Under	   these	   conditions	   the	   subject	   can	   disobey	   the	   command	  without	  forsaking	  the	  rational	  benefits	  that	  the	  authority	  is	  able	  to	  provide.	  There	  is	  no	  instrumental	  value	  in	  obeying	  such	  commands.	  The	  application	  of	  war	  crimes	  objection	  to	  the	  Authority	  View	  rests	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  authority’s	  having	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  obligate	  its	  subjects	  to	   intentional	   kill	   of	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   –	   such	   as	   by	   requiring	  participation	   in	   an	   unjust	   war	   –	   entails	   its	   having	   the	   moral	   power	   to	  obligate	   its	   subjects	   to	   intentionally	   kill	   non-­‐combatants.	   The	   distinction	  between	  clearly	  and	  non-­‐clearly	  mistaken	  commands	  shows	  that	  this	  claim	  is	  false.	  	  As	   explained	   above,	   in	   order	   to	   possess	   the	   former	   moral	   power,	   an	  authority	   must	   successfully	   serve	   its	   subjects	   regarding	   a	   sufficiently	  important	  sub-­‐domain	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  When	  this	  condition	  is	  met,	  subjects	  can	   be	   required	   to	   obey	   commands	   that	   are	   mistaken	   and	   require	  participation	  in	  unjust	  wars.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  when	  the	  subject	  cannot	  form	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the	   judgement	   that	   the	   war	   is	   unjust	   without	   going	   through	   the	   same	  process	   of	   ad	   bellum	   reasoning	   that	   the	   authority	   went	   through	   in	  producing	   its	   command	   to	   fight.	   However,	   if	   the	   same	   authority	   issues	   a	  command	  to	  target	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war,	  its	  subjects	  are	  able	  to	  form	  the	  judgement	  that	  the	  command	  fails	  to	  reflect	  right	  reason	  without	  having	  to	  engage	   in	   any	   ad	   bellum	   reasoning.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   permissibility	   of	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  ad	  bellum	  considerations	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  targeting	  combatants	  is.	  It	  is	  generally	  impermissible	  to	  target	   non-­‐combatants	   regardless	   of	   whether	   one’s	   war	   is	   justified	   or	  unjustified.	  Given	  this	  difference,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  be	  able	  to	  form	   the	   judgement	   that	   a	   command	   requires	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐combatants	  for	  that	  command	  to	  be	  invalidated	  as	  clearly	  mistaken.240	  	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  conditions	  of	  legitimacy	  sufficient	  for	  justifying	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  authority	  is	  legitimate	  over	  matters	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	   does	  not	  entail	   that	   its	   commands	   to	   target	  non-­‐combatants	   create	   any	   reasons	   for	   action,	   let	   alone	   undefeated	   reasons.	  This	   is	  because	  an	  authority	  that	   is	   legitimate	  regarding	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  only	  has	  the	  moral	  power	  to	  require	  act-­‐types	  that	  would	  be	  permissible	  in	  a	   justified	   war. 241 	  The	   war	   crimes	   objection	   can	   thus	   be	   rebutted.	  Commands	   to	   target	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  will	   invariably	  be	   invalid,	  even	   when	   issued	   by	   an	   authority	   that	   possesses	   the	   moral	   power	   to	  require	  participation	  in	  unjust	  wars.	  It	   is	  worth	   stressing	   that	   this	   response	   to	   the	  war	   crimes	  objection	   is	  not	   available	   to	   non-­‐reductivists,	   since	   they	   justify	   the	   permission	   to	   kill	  non-­‐liable	   combatants	   non-­‐instrumentally.	   There	   is	   no	   analogous	  mechanism	  for	  vitiating	  the	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  for	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable	  when	   the	   crosshairs	   are	   shifted	   from	   combatants	   to	  non-­‐combatants.	   For	  example,	   on	   the	   associative-­‐duty	   view,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   combatant	   can	  directly	   form	  the	   judgement	   that	   the	   individual	   they	  would	  have	  to	  kill	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  240	  This	   point	   provides	   one	   explanation	   of	   why	   the	   convention	   of	   combatants	   wearing	  uniforms	  may	  have	  moral	  significance.	  241	  This	   point	   is	   also	   made	   by	   David	   Estlund.	   ‘On	   Following	   Orders	   in	   an	   Unjust	   War’,	  pp.215-­‐216.	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order	  to	  protect	  their	  associate	  is	  a	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatant,	  rather	  than	  a	  non-­‐liable	  combatant,	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  duty	  to	  protect	  is	  weightier	   than	   their	   duty	   not	   to	   kill	   the	   non-­‐liable.	   An	   omniscient	   and	  infallible	  agent	  would	  remain	  justified	  in	  killing	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants,	  if	  necessary	  to	  discharge	  their	  duty	  to	  protect.	  So,	  despite	  defending	  agent-­‐relative	   justifications	   for	  killing	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war,	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  not	  permit	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   to	   nearly	   the	   same	   degree	   as	   non-­‐reductivist	  views.	  	  
5.12.2	  Accepting	  the	  Implication	  	  I	   have	   argued	   that	   in	   cases	   in	  which	   the	  Authority	  View	   justifies	   obeying	  commands	  to	  target	  non-­‐liable	  combatants,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  the	  view	  will	   justify	   obeying	   commands	   to	   target	   non-­‐combatants.	  However,	  while	  this	  suffices	  to	  rebut	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War	  will	  never	  have	   the	   implication	   that	   commands	   to	  target	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  are	  valid	  and	  give	  the	  subject	  undefeated	  reasons	  for	  action.	  	  This	   follows	  from	  the	  general	  point,	  made	   in	  Section	  4.10.2,	   that	   there	  are	   very	   few	   ‘intrinsically’	   clearly	   mistaken	   commands,	   which	   are	  necessarily	   invalid	  across	  all	  possible	  domains	   in	  which	  an	  authority	  may	  serve	   its	   subjects.	   Instead,	  determining	  whether	  a	  command	  constitutes	  a	  clear	   mistake	   or	   not	   involves	   a	   comparison	   between	   the	   content	   of	   the	  command	  and	  the	  specific	  domain	  in	  which	  it	  is	  issued.	  	  This	  point	  applies	  to	  my	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection,	  in	  which	  I	   argued	   that	   commands	   to	   target	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   will	   be	  invalidated	   as	   clear	   mistakes.	   Given	   the	   comparative	   nature	   of	   clear	  mistakes,	   this	   will	   only	   be	   true	   when	   the	   command	   is	   issued	   by	   an	  authority	  that	  is	  legitimate	  regarding	  a	  particular	  class	  of	  domains	  –	  such	  as	  domains	   of	   jus	  ad	  bellum	  considerations.	  When	   authorities	   are	   legitimate	  only	   regarding	   matters	   of	   jus	   ad	   bellum,	   its	   commands	   to	   target	   non-­‐
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combatants	   constitute	   clear	   mistakes	   because	   such	   commands	   couldn’t	  reflect	  right	  reason	  within	  that	  domain.	  	  However,	   as	   explained	   in	   Section	   5.8,	   domains	   of	   authority	   regarding	  war	   are	   not	   restricted	   to	   ad	   bellum	   domains.	   Authorities	   may	   also	  potentially	  serve	  their	  subjects	  regarding	  matters	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  This	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  are	  domains	  of	  authority	  over	  warfare	  in	  which	  commands	   to	   target	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants	   will	   not	   constitute	   clear	  mistakes.	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  the	  following	  scenario:	  	  
Sneaky	   Combatants:	   Nation	   A	   is	   fighting	   a	   just	  war	   against	   Nation	   B.	   In	  order	   to	   gain	   a	   military	   advantage,	   Nation	   B’s	   combatants	   disguise	  themselves	   as	   civilians,	   mix	   themselves	   with	   the	   civilian	   population,	   and	  launch	  attacks	  from	  within	  that	  population.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   imagine	   that	   Nation	   A’s	   military	   commanders	   are	   better	  placed	  with	  regard	  to	  distinguishing	  Nation	  B’s	  combatants	  from	  Nation	  B’s	  non-­‐combatants	   than	   Nation	   A’s	   combatants	   are.	   Nation	   A’s	   combatants	  will	   better	   distribute	   harms	   in	   accordance	   with	   right	   reason	   by	   obeying	  their	   military	   leaders	   than	   by	   acting	   on	   their	   own	   assessment	   of	   right	  reason.	  Given	   these	   facts,	   under	   the	  Authority	  View	  of	  War,	   it	   is	   possible	  that	   Nation	   A’s	   commanders	   acquire	   legitimacy	   over	   the	   in	   bello	   sub-­‐domain	   of	   distinguishing	   between	   actual	   and	   merely	   apparent	   non-­‐combatants.	  When	   an	   authority	   is	   legitimate	   over	   this	   particular	   domain,	  commands	  that	  are	  mistaken,	  and	  require	  the	  targeting	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	   in	   fact	   genuine	   non-­‐combatants	   will	   not	   necessarily	   constitute	   clear	  mistakes.	   They	   may	   remain	   valid	   and	   provide	   decisive	   reasons	   for	  action.242	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  Estlund	  also	  suggests,	  though	  very	  tentatively,	  that	  commands	  which	  require	  violating	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  could	  be	  binding,	  “depending,	  of	  course,	  on	  many	  more	  details	  of	  the	   particular	   case.”	   ‘On	   Following	   Orders	   in	   an	   Unjust	   War’,	   p.231.	   I	   hope	   to	   have	  provided	   an	   account	   of	  what	   these	  particular	  details	  might	   consist	   in.	  However,	   Estlund	  does	   seem	   ambivalent	   on	   this	   issue,	   since	   he	   later	   concludes	   that	   his	   view	   “leaves	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  authoritative	  command	  that	  violates	  the	  rules	  of	  war,	  but	  only	  modestly.”	  (p.233).	   The	   ‘only	  modestly’	   caveat	  would	   seem	   to	   exclude	   cases	   of	   intentionally	   killing	  non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants,	   which	   are	   an	   extreme	   violation	   of	   jus	   in	   bello.	   My	   view	   is	  therefore	   stronger	   than	   Estlund’s	   on	   this	   point.	   Furthermore,	   as	   examples	   of	   modest	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This	  is	  because,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  that	  such	  a	  command	  is	  mistaken,	  the	   subject	   would	   have	   to	   go	   through	   the	   same	   process	   of	   reasoning	  regarding	   distinguishing	   actual	   and	   apparent	   non-­‐combatants	   that	   the	  authority	   went	   through	   in	   issuing	   its	   command.	   Avoiding	   acting	   against	  reason	   in	   these	   particular	   cases	  would	   require	   the	   subject	   to	   forsake	   the	  service	  that	  the	  authority	  is	  able	  to	  provide.	  The	  subject	  therefore	  has	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   reason	   not	   to	   try	   to	   do	   so	   and	   instead	   to	   obey	   the	  authority,	   even	   in	   cases	  where	  doing	   so	   involve	   targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  It	   must	   then	   be	   conceded	   that,	   under	   certain	   highly	   specific	  circumstances,	   subjects	   will	   have	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	  targeting	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants.	   However,	   I	   contend,	   in	   these	   cases	  this	  conclusion	  should	  be	  accepted.	  When	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  yield	  the	  conclusion	   that	   an	   authority	   has	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   give	   its	   subjects	  decisive	   reason	   to	   target	  non-­‐combatants,	   it	  does	   so	  only	  because,	   and	   to	  the	   extent	   that,	   the	   authority’s	   having	   this	   power	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	  better	   overall	   avoid	   targeting	   non-­‐liable	   individuals.	   This	   point	   helps	  further	   distinguish	   the	   Authority	   View	   from	   non-­‐reductive	   views	   on	   the	  question	  of	   targeting	  non-­‐combatants.	   Its	   instrumental	   structure	  not	  only	  means	   that	   it	   will	   permit	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐combatants	   to	   a	   far	   less	  extent	  than	  non-­‐reductive	  views,	  it	  also	  means	  that,	  when	  it	  does	  so,	  it	  does	  so	  for	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  reasons.	  	  	  
5.13	  Conclusion	  
	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  applying	  the	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm	  developed	  in	   the	  previous	  chapter	   to	   the	  specific	  case	  of	  war	  provides	   the	  resources	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  violations	   of	   jus	   in	   bello	   which	  may	   be	   justified	   in	   virtue	   of	   an	   authoritative	   command,	  Estlund	  uses	  the	  case	  of	  giving	  prisoners	  of	  war	  two	  meals	  a	  day	  rather	  than	  three	  in	  order	  to	   conserve	   supplies,	   and	   the	   case	   of	   keeping	   prisoners	   awake	   for	   twenty-­‐four	   hours	   in	  order	   to	  gain	   information	   that	   could	   save	   lives	   (p.232).	  As	  Estlund	  describes	   them,	  both	  these	  cases	   seem	   intuitively	   justified	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  authority-­‐independent	   reasons,	   and	  hence	  do	  not	  provide	  examples	  of	  cases	   in	  which	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  serves	  to	  justify	   a	   genuine	  moral	   violation	  of	   jus	   in	  bello,	   even	   if	   they	  are	  violations	  of	   the	   laws	  of	  war.	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for	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   In	   particular,	   I	   have	  offered	  a	  defence	  of	   the	  claim	  that	   individuals	  who	  participate	   in	  wars	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  legitimate	  war-­‐waging	  authority	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  more	  extensive	  range	   of	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   in	   war	   than	   those	   who	   fight	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   authority.	   	   One	   important	   implication	   of	  my	   argument	   is	   that,	  under	   certain	   conditions,	   individuals	   may	   be	   justified	   in	   obeying	  commands	  to	  participate	  in	  wars	  that	  are	  in	  fact	  unjust.	  However,	   while	   I	   have	   aimed	   to	   rehabilitate	   an	   idea	   that	   runs	  throughout	  the	  just	  war	  tradition,	  my	  view	  remains	  revisionary	  in	  several	  respects.	  Firstly,	  to	  reiterate,	  the	  Authority	  View	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  those	  who	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  legitimate	  authority	  are	  subject	  to	  sui	  generis	  moral	  principles.	   Rather,	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   show	   that	   additional	   permissions	   to	  cause	  harm	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  same	  principles	  that	  govern	  all	   other	   forms	   of	   interpersonal	   harming.	   It	   thus	   fits	   into	   an	   attractively	  unified	  view	  of	  morality.	  Secondly,	   my	   account	   of	   legitimate	   war-­‐making	   authority	   avoids	   the	  statist	  bias	  that	  afflicts	  standard	  interpretations	  of	  the	  authority	  condition.	  The	  conditions	  of	  legitimacy	  required	  under	  the	  Authority	  View	  are	  purely	  normative,	   making	   no	   reference	   to	   formal	   or	   legal	   properties	   such	   as	  statehood.	   Given	   this,	   there	   is	   no	   principled	   reason	   why	   non-­‐state	  organisations	  could	  not	  qualify	  as	  legitimate	  authorities	  (though	  it	  may	  be	  easier	   for	   an	   organisation	   to	   satisfy	   the	   normative	   conditions	   if	   it	   also	  possesses	  the	  formal	  properties).	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  the	  Authority	  View,	   it	   is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	   justified	  war	  that	   it	  be	  waged	  by	  a	  legitimate	   authority.	   Hence,	   even	   non-­‐state	   groups	   that	   fail	   to	   possess	  legitimate	  authority	  are	  not	  barred	  from	  waging	  just	  wars.	  All	  that	  follows	  from	   this	   failure	   is	   that	   their	   members	   cannot	   be	   justified	   in	   fighting	   in	  
virtue	  of	  possessing	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification,	  not	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  fighting	  tout	  court.	  	  Thirdly,	   and	   conversely,	   my	   account	   of	   war	   and	   authority	   does	   not	  claim	   that	   all	   states,	   or	   even	   all	   morally	   decent	   states,	   have	   legitimate	  authority	   regarding	   all	   aspects	   of	   warfare.	   	   Whether	   or	   not	   a	   state	  possesses	  the	  relevant	  authority	  is	  determined	  by	  whether	  it	  passes	  a	  fairly	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   Leslie	   Green,	   The	   Authority	   of	   the	   State	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	  1988);	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  John	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  and	  Authority’	  in	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  Simon	  (ed)	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  Blackwell	  Guide	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   and	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  University	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Conclusion	  	  I	  conclude	  by	  providing	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	   the	  key	   ideas	  defended	  in	  the	  thesis.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  authority	  criterion	  plays	  a	  much	  more	   expansive	   role	   within	   mainstream	   just	   war	   theory	   than	   is	   usually	  acknowledged.	  As	  standardly	  understood,	  the	  authority	  criterion	  functions	  solely	  as	  a	  condition	  of	   jus	  ad	  bellum,	  providing	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	  justifying	  the	  resort	  to	  war.	  On	  this	  view,	  in	  order	  for	  a	  war	  to	  be	  justified,	  it	  must	   be	   initiated	   and	  waged	   by	   an	   entity	   that	   possesses	   a	   certain	   set	   of	  relevant	  properties.	  By	  contrast,	  on	  the	  revised	  interpretation	  that	  I	  argue	  for,	   the	   criterion	   also	   plays	   a	   crucial	   in	   bello	   role,	   capturing	   the	   idea	   –	  running	   throughout	   the	   just	  war	   tradition	  –	   that	   individuals	  who	   fight	  on	  behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entities	   enjoy	   additional	   permissions	   to	   cause	  harm	  in	  war	  that	  are	  unavailable	  to	  private	  actors.	  	  With	  this	  interpretation	  in	  place,	  I	  then	  demonstrated	  how	  it	  provides	  a	  more	   accurate	   understanding	   of	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   irregular	  belligerency	  to	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory.	  For	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  entity	  give	  rise	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  kill	  and	   injure,	   then	   just	   war	   theorists	   must	   provide	   an	   account	   of	   precisely	  which	  violence-­‐using	   entities	   can	  and	   cannot	   generate	   these	  permissions,	  which	   both	   tracks	   our	   intuitions	   about	   particular	   cases	   and,	   more	  importantly,	   explains	   why	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   entities	   has	   this	  impressive	   normative	   effect.	   Hence,	   far	   from	   being	   an	   interesting	   but	  peripheral	  issue,	  the	  challenge	  of	  irregular	  belligerency	  strikes	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   the	   most	   central	   theoretical	   commitments	   of	   mainstream	   just	   war	  theory.	  In	   the	   second	   chapter	   I	   began	   the	   task	   of	   assessing	   whether	   the	  authority	  criterion	  can	  be	  given	  a	  principled	  moral	  defence,	  by	  considering	  powerful	  objections	  to	  the	  criterion	  raised	  by	  a	  reductivist	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war.	  	  As	  I	  explained,	  the	  central	  commitment	  of	  a	  reductivist	  view	  is	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   moral	   permissions	   to	   cause	   harm	   that	   apply	   to	  individuals	  qua	   private	   agents	  –	  more	   specifically,	   liability	   and	   lesser-­‐evil	  justifications	  –	  	  are	  both	  sufficient	  and	  necessary	  for	  justifying	  the	  resort	  to	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war	   and	   the	   constituent	   acts	   of	   killing	   and	   injuring	   necessary	   for	   its	  prosecution.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   status	   of	   a	   belligerent	   entity	   has	   no	  independent	  moral	  significance.	  The	  sufficiency	  claim	  entails	  rejecting	  the	  standard,	   restrictive	   role	   of	   the	   authority	   criterion.	   The	   necessity	   claim	  entails	   rejecting	   the	   non-­‐standard,	   permissive	   role	   that	   I	   identified	   in	  Chapter	  1.	  	  While	  mainly	  expository	  in	  nature,	  this	  chapter	  aimed	  to	  illuminate	  this	  important	   and	   increasingly	   influential	   view	   by	   showing	   that,	   of	   all	   the	  revisionary	   aspects	   of	   a	   reductivist	   view,	   its	   rejection	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion	  may	  plausibly	  be	  considered	   its	  most	  radical	  break	  with	  the	   just	  war	  tradition.	  	  	  While	   I	   accepted	   the	   reductivist	   critique	   of	   the	   standard,	   restrictive	  authority	  criterion,	   the	   following	   three	  chapters	  of	   the	   thesis	   investigated	  the	   prospects	   for	   rehabilitating	   the	   authority	   criterion,	   in	   its	   permissive	  role.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  in	  Chapter	  3	  I	  considered	  a	  rival	  ‘non-­‐reductivist’	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  war.	  Proponents	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  morally	  analyse	  war	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  aggregated	  liability	  and	  lesser-­‐evil	  justifications,	   since	   war	   differs	   from	   private	   violence	   in	   some	   morally	  relevant	  respect.	  Non-­‐reductivists	  typically	  locate	  this	  difference	  in	  the	  fact	  that	   war	   involves	   the	   use	   of	   force	   by	   groups	   of	   individuals	   engaged	   in	  morally	  significant	  relationships	  with	  one	  another.	  A	  central	  claim	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	   is	   that	   these	   relationships	   are	   independently	   capable	   of	  generating	   permissions	   for	   killing	   and	   injuring	   in	   war,	   thus	   denying	  reductivism	  and,	   potentially,	   providing	   the	   resources	   for	   a	   defence	  of	   the	  idea	   that	   individuals	  who	   fight	   on	   behalf	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   entities	   gain	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war.	  However,	  I	  argued	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  must	  be	  rejected,	  since	  it	  faces	  an	  unpalatable	  dilemma:	  If	  successful	  in	  showing	  that	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  entity	  gives	  rise	  to	  additional	  permissions	  to	  cause	  harm	  in	  war,	   non-­‐reductivists	   must	   also	   jettison	   the	  most	   intuitive	   restrictions	   on	  conduct	   in	   war	   –	   most	   saliently,	   the	   prohibition	   on	   intentionally	   killing	  morally	   innocent	   non-­‐combatants.	   As	   I	   explained,	   this	   problem	   arises	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because	   non-­‐reductivists	   endorse	   an	   agent-­‐centred,	   rather	   than	   target-­‐centre,	  justification	  for	  killing	  non-­‐liable	  persons	  in	  war.	  Since,	  on	  this	  view,	  it	  is	  facts	  about	  those	  causing	  harm,	  rather	  than	  suffering	   it,	  which	  justifies	  killing	  the	  non-­‐liable,	  the	  view	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	   permissibility	   of	   killing	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants.	  	  In	  defending	  this	  conclusion	  I	  assessed	  various	  alternative	  strategies	  for	  grounding	  the	  principle	  of	  discrimination	  in	  war	  that	  non-­‐reductivists	  might	  invoke	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   dilemma	   and	   argued	   that	   they	   all	   fail.	   The	  factors	  identified	  are	  either	  morally	  irrelevant,	  insufficiently	  moral	  weighty,	  or	   fail	   to	   track	   the	   required	   distinction	   between	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants.	  	  My	   arguments	   in	   favour	   of	   rejecting	   non-­‐reductivism	   thus	   provided	  strong	  indirect	  support	  for	  reductivism	  –	  by	  eliminating	  its	  main	  rival	  –	  and,	  by	   extension,	   cast	   further	   doubt	   on	   the	   defensibility	   of	   the	   authority	  criterion.	  	  In	   the	   fourth	   chapter	   I	   provided	   the	   groundwork	   for	   an	   alternative	  defence	  of	  the	  permissive	  authority	  criterion,	  by	  exploring	  the	  connections	  between	  two	  central	  topics	   in	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy:	  the	  morality	  of	   interpersonal	   harming	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   moral	   legitimacy	   of	  authority	   on	   the	   other.	  Whereas	   those	  working	   on	   the	   ethics	   of	   harm	   are	  concerned	   with	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   individuals	   are	   justified	   in	  causing	   harm	   to	   others,	   the	   theorist	   of	   authority	   is	   interested	   in	   the	  conditions	   under	   which	   individuals	   are	   morally	   required	   to	   obey	   the	  commands	  of	  another.	  I	   considered	   two	   important	   questions	   that	   arise	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	  these	  two	  topics.	  The	  first	  concerned	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  may	  be	  morally	  justified	  in	  obeying	  commands	  that	  require	  causing	  serious	  physical	  harm	   to	   others.	   The	   second	   concerned	   the	   permissibility	   of	   imposing	  defensive	   harm	   on	   those	   who	   threaten	   unjust	   harm,	   but	   who	   do	   so	   in	  conformity	  with	  a	  legitimate	  command	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  first	  question,	  I	  argued	  that,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  can	  provide	  agents	  with	  an	  independent	  moral	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justification	   for	   causing	   serious	  physical	  harm	   to	  others.	  Controversially,	   I	  argued	   that	   this	   may	   be	   true	   even	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   harm	   would	   be	  straightforwardly	  unjustified	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  command.	  My	  argument	  for	  this	  position	  	  drew	  on	  a	  service-­‐based	  account	  of	  authority,	  according	  to	  which	   authorities	   possess	   the	   moral	   power	   to	   place	   their	   subjects	   under	  obligations	   to	   obey	   when,	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that,	   the	   subjects	   better	  conforms	   with	   reasons	   that	   apply	   to	   them	   by	   obeying	   the	   authority,	  compared	   to	   not	   obeying.	   This	   view	   thus	   offers	   a	   broadly	   instrumental	  justification	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  obey.	  	  I	  argued	   that	   the	  very	  same	  reasoning	  holds	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  reasons	  that	   govern	   the	   distribution	   of	   harm.	   If	   individuals	   will	   overall	   better	  distribute	  harms	   in	  accordance	  with	  right	  reason	  by	  obeying	  an	  authority,	  compared	  to	  not	  obeying,	  then	  obedience	  is	  morally	  required	  (and	  therefore	  justified).	   Importantly,	   this	   includes	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   authority	   issues	  commands	   that	   are	   mistaken	   and	   require	   distributing	   harm	   in	   ways	   not	  supported	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  authority-­‐independent	  reasons.	  In	  such	  cases,	  I	  argue,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  command	  may	  still	  have	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  –	  an	  instrumental	  reason	  –	  to	  obey	  the	  command.	  	  I	   termed	   this	   argument	   the	   ‘Authority	   View	   of	   Harm.’	   If	   successful,	   it	  yields	   two	   important	   results.	   Firstly,	   it	   shows	   that	   the	   range	   of	   possible	  justifications	   for	   harming	   is	   broader	   than	   standardly	   assumed	  within	   the	  literature	  on	  the	  morality	  of	  harm.	  In	  addition	  to	  standard	  justifications	  for	  harming	  –	   in	  which	   the	  right	  not	   to	  be	  harmed	  either	   fails	   to	  obtain	  or	   is	  overridden	   –	   the	   Authority	   View	   posits	   the	   existence	   of	   what	   I	   termed	  
authority-­‐based	   justifications	   for	   harm.	   Secondly,	   it	   reveals	   that	   certain	  common	  and	  intuitive	  views	  about	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  obey	  are	  mistaken.	  While	  is	  it	  true	  that	  commands	  are	  limited	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  validity	   and	   weight,	   it	   is	   not	   true	   that	   commands	   which	   require	   causing	  serious	  unjust	  harm	  to	  others	  necessarily	  exceed	  those	  limits.	  I	   then	   turned	   to	   the	   second	  question,	   concerning	   the	  permissibility	   of	  imposing	   defensive	   harm	   on	   agents	   who	   possess	   an	   authority-­‐based	  justification	   for	   causing	   unjust	   harm.	   In	   response,	   I	   argued	   that,	   in	   such	  cases,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   threatener	   possesses	   a	   justification	   does	   not,	   in	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itself,	   increase	   the	   justificatory	   burden	   for	   imposing	   defensive	   harm	   on	  them.	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  I	  contended,	  is	  that	  authority-­‐based	  justifications	  are	   fully	   agent-­‐relative,	   grounded	   in	   reasons	   for	   action	   that	   apply	  only	   to	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  command.	  Again,	  this	  conclusion	  yields	  two	  important	  results.	  Firstly,	  an	  on-­‐going	  debate	   within	   the	   morality	   of	   harming	   literature	   concerns	   the	   existence	  and	  scope	  of	  agent-­‐relative	  justifications.	  Typically,	  these	  justifications	  are	  defended	   by	   appeal	   to	   considerations	   of	   permissible	   partiality	   or	   self-­‐preference.	  If	  my	  arguments	  are	  correct,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  additional	  species	  of	   agent-­‐relative	   justification	   for	   harming	   that	   is	   not	   grounded	   in	  considerations	   of	   partiality	   and,	   as	   such,	  may	   not	   be	   susceptible	   to	   same	  objections	   that	   are	   typically	   levelled	   against	   the	   notion	   of	   agent-­‐relative	  justifications.	   Secondly,	   and	   relatedly,	   the	   authority-­‐based	   argument	   for	  agent-­‐relative	   justifications	   enables	   a	   novel	   defence	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	  ‘conflicts	   of	   permissibility’,	   in	   which	   two	   agents	  may	   each	   be	   justified	   in	  bringing	  about	  opposing	  and	  incompatible	  distributions	  of	  harm.	  	  Finally,	  while	  I	  denied	  that	  an	  agent’s	  possession	  of	  an	  authority-­‐based	  justification	   itself	   counts	   against	   imposing	   defensive	   harm	   on	   them,	   this	  does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   commands	   of	   authorities	   cannot	   raise	   the	  justificatory	  burden	   for	   acts	   of	   defensive	  harm.	   In	   the	   final	   section	  of	   the	  chapter	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   same	   argument	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   also	   supports	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   authority-­‐based	  
constraint,	  where	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  places	  the	  subject	  under	  an	  undefeated	  obligation	   to	   refrain	   from	  causing	  harm	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  justified.	  	  The	  Authority	  View	  of	  Harm	  provides	   a	   fairly	   general	   account	   of	   how	  judgements	   about	   the	   morality	   of	   causing	   harm	   are	   sensitive	   to	  considerations	   of	   authority.	   In	   the	   fifth	   chapter	   I	   applied	   the	   Authority	  View	   to	   the	   specific	   case	   of	  warfare	   and	   assessed	   its	   implications	   for	   the	  ethics	  of	  war.	  I	   argued	   that	   the	   twin	   notions	   of	   authority-­‐based	   justifications	   and	  constraints	   provide	   the	   resources	   for	   a	   qualified	   defence	   of	   both	   the	  permissive	  authority	  criterion	  and	  a	  reformulated	  version	  of	  the	  restrictive	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